JUDGMENT : Das, J. - This is an appeal by the 2nd Defendant against a judgment of reversal by the learned Subordinate Judge, Berhampur, dated November 6th, 1951, decreeing the Plaintiff's suit preliminarily for accounts from 1940 till October 24, 1946. 2. The Plaintiff commenced a suit for accounts of a partnership firm, Pravash Chandra Kanti Chandra which was dissolved on October 24, 1946. Although Plaintiff-2 Kanti Chandra Jain was a partner of the firm, Pravash Chandra Kanti Chandra with Defendant-2 Pravash Chandra, the suit was filed on behalf of six Plaintiffs; the other five Plaintiffs being his father, Plaintiff-I, and his three minor brothers Plaintiffs 3 to 6 represented by their next friend, the Plaintiff-1. Defendant-l is the father of Defendant-2 who is his adopted son. The whole case of the Plaintiff is that a partnership was formed between Plaintiff-2 and Defendant-2 in about 1940. It is an admitted fact that the parties to this litigation are Marwaris and both the families are trading families. According to the Plaintiff, Defendant. 1 who is a capitalist carrying on business in various places all over India wanted to open a shop at Berhampur in the name of his adopted son, Pravash Chandra, Defendant-2, and the son of the 1st Plaintiff (Plaintiff-2), and with that end in view a shop was opened in 1940 on partnership basis under the name and style of Pravash Chandra Kanti Chandra, This partnership firm was registered under the Indian Partnership Act and Plaintiff-2 was the working partner thereof. According to the plaint averments this partnership was one at will. There was an agreement that the profit should be divided between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants in the ratio of t : i. Doe to certain misunderstanding the partnership stood dissolved on October 24, 1946, and Defendant-2 remained in charge of the stock-in trade and the account books of the firm. Defendant-2 did not pay the share of the profits of this business to the Plaintiffs and accordingly, the Plaintiffs filed the suit on October 17, 1947, for a formal declaration for dissolution of the partnership, and for rendition of accounts. They also prayed for a preliminary decree for accounts and for ascertainment of the profits by a commissioner. 3. Defendant-1 filed his written statement admitting the case of the Plaintiffs and remained exparte. Defendant-2 however contested the suit. They also prayed for a preliminary decree for accounts and for ascertainment of the profits by a commissioner. 3. Defendant-1 filed his written statement admitting the case of the Plaintiffs and remained exparte. Defendant-2 however contested the suit. He denied the partnership as also the fact of the Plaintiff having any interest in the suit-business. His whole contention was that the suit-business belongs exclusively to the Defendants. The learned Munsif who heard the suit at the first instance, dismissed it holding that Mangal Chand who signed the application for registration of the partnership had never any authority nor did the second Defendant ever consent to be a partner of this firm. He further found that Defendant-1 was available for all sorts of manoeuvres of the 1st Plaintiff and there was in fact no legal partnership between the Plaintiff-2 and Defendant-2. Accordingly, he held that Plaintiff-2 or the members of his family are not entitled to any profit in this business, On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge held that there was a valid partnership entered into between the Plaintiff-2 and Defendant-2 and that Mangal Chand Agarwalla had the power to sign the document on behalf of both the partners, and accordingly, the Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary decree for accounts, and for their 1/4th share in the profits. Thus, he directed the appointment of a commissioner to examine the accounts. It is against this decision of the learned Subordinate Judge that the Defendant-2 has preferred this appeal. 4. The sale contention of Mr. H. Mohapatra, learned Counsel for the Appellant, there was no partnership in law between the second (Plaintiff said the Defendant No. 2) Or the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any share in the profits of this business. 5. Before dealing with this legal question, I would like to state the facts in a little more detail. The Plaintiff-1 was the power of attorney-holder of Defendant-1 who has business an over India. It is the Defendant-1 who wanted to open a shop at Berhampur in the name of his adopted son and the eldest son of Plaintiff-1. From the plaint averments it is clear that it was an unilateral action on the part of the 1st Defendant and it militates against the theory of an oral agreement between the alleged partners. It is the Defendant-1 who wanted to open a shop at Berhampur in the name of his adopted son and the eldest son of Plaintiff-1. From the plaint averments it is clear that it was an unilateral action on the part of the 1st Defendant and it militates against the theory of an oral agreement between the alleged partners. The second Plaintiff had attempted to set up a theory of oral agreement that was entered into between him and the second Defendant at Delhi. The learned Munsif after considering the evidence of P.W. 1 (Plaintiff-2) and other evidence on record came to the finding that the oral agreement pleaded by the Plaintiff has no real foundation. It may be remembered that though in paragraph 7 of the plaint, Plaintiff-2 was described as a working partner, in fact, he did not come to Berhampur till the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945, when he came to check the accounts relating to the years 1940-43. An attempt has been made to prove that a sum of Re. 5000/. was invested by the second Plaintiff towards his share of the capital in this business, but from his cross-examination it is apparent that no such sum in fact was ever invested by him. The application for registration (Ext. A) of the firm of Pravash Chandra Kanti Chandra dated October 30, 1940, which was signed by Mangal Chand alone on March 21, 1945, is the only document that has been filed. According to the case of the Plaintiffs, there was no Instrument of partnership. The partnership was started on an oral agreement. No certificate of registration was produced in this case. From Ext. A it appears that the names of two partners only are given therein without any specification of shares and the application for registration was signed by Mangal Chand on behalf of both the Plaintiff-2 and Defendant-2. u/s 58 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (Act IX of 1932), the statement in the application for registration shall be signed by all the partners or by their agents specially authorised in this behalf. There is no proof in this case that any special authority was given to Mangal Chand either by Plaintiff-2 or by Defendant-2. Plaintiff-2 in his evidence stated that both the partners sent a letter from Delhi authorising Mangal Chand to sign the application. There is no proof in this case that any special authority was given to Mangal Chand either by Plaintiff-2 or by Defendant-2. Plaintiff-2 in his evidence stated that both the partners sent a letter from Delhi authorising Mangal Chand to sign the application. Defendant-2 in his evidence stoutly denied it, and no such letter has been filed before the Court either. Further, in the absence of any specification of shares it Is to be presumed that the ratio was 50 : 50. The plaint allegation, however, are directly against this. u/s 68 no doubt any statement recorded in the register of firms shall, as against any person by whom or on whose behalf such statement, was signed be conclusive proof of any fact therein stated. A legal presumption can only be drawn when there is a valid application for registration and there has been a proper registration made by the Registrar of Firms. Provision has also been made in the Indian Partnership Act regarding the mode of determining the existence of a partnership. u/s 6 it is provided that in determining whether a group of persons is or is not a firm, or whether a person is or is not a partner in a firm, regard shall be had to the real relation between the patties as shown by all relevant facts taken together. In the present case taking the entire evidence and the circumstances into consideration, it cannot be said that the real intention of the parties that is, Plaintiff-2 and Defendant No. 2, was to form any such partnership. 6. Mr. Mohapatra in support of his argument relied upon Section 234(3) of Mulla's Hindu Law, 11th Edition. White dealing with partnership with outsiders, the learned author says as follows: It is competent to the manager of a joint family business, acting on behalf of the family, to enter into a partnership with a stranger. But not all members of the joint family but only such of its members as have In fact, entered into partnership with the stranger, become partners. The manager, no doubt, is accountable to the family, but the partnership is exclusively one between the contracting members including the manager and the stranger. But not all members of the joint family but only such of its members as have In fact, entered into partnership with the stranger, become partners. The manager, no doubt, is accountable to the family, but the partnership is exclusively one between the contracting members including the manager and the stranger. Such a partnership would be governed by the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, with the result that if the manager died, the partnership would be dissolved on his death The surviving members of the family cannot claim to continue as partners with the stranger nor Can they institute a suit for a dissolution of the partnership, their position being no higher than that of sub-partners. Nor can the stranger partner sue the serviving members as partners for the manager estate, if any. On a partition between the members of a joint family of which the manager is a partner with a stranger, the manager is bound to realize his share of the partnership assets for the benefit of the family, and for distribution among the members thereof. But this, it is conceived, he cannot do until the term of the partnership has expired. 7. Doubtless, there can be a valid partnership between the Karta of a joint Hindu family as representing a Hindu undivided family on one hand and a member of the family in his individual capacity on the other. In such a Case the individual member retains his interest in the family property and at the same time enjoys the fruits of his investment and the benefits of his separate, property and for this purpose, it is not necessary for him to separate from the family. It is stated In paragraph 5 of the plaint that the 1st. Defendant wanted to open a shop at Berhampur in the name of the second Defendant who is his adopted son and the second Plaintiff. It was orally agreed to start the business at Berhampur. Therefore, the question that falls to be considered is whether Defendant-l can enter iota a partnership business on behalf of Defendant-2. In other words, whether the manager of a trading Hindu family can enter Into a partnership with a stranger on behalf of a coparcener or a member of the joint family. Therefore, the question that falls to be considered is whether Defendant-l can enter iota a partnership business on behalf of Defendant-2. In other words, whether the manager of a trading Hindu family can enter Into a partnership with a stranger on behalf of a coparcener or a member of the joint family. It is now well-settled that there can be a partition in a joint Hindu family for purposes of entering into a partnership business with a stranger Vide Sri Sundar Singh Majhutia v. Commissioner of income tax 69 I.A. 119. Similarly, not only the Karta of a trading family can enter into a partnership with a stranger, but he can also enter into a valid partnership with a member of the family and if that member invests his separate property in the partnership, he will be deemed in that case to be a stranger and it is not necessary in that case to separate himself from his family Vide Lala Laxman Das v. Commissioner of Income. Tax Lahore 74 I.A. 277. In this connection, I may refer to Section 308 A of the Mayne's Hindu Law 11th Edition P. 388, where the learned author states as follows: Section 308 A. The managing member of a trading family has wider powers than those of the manager of a non-trading family. There is no deviation from the fundamental principle that what is done must be for the benefit or necessities of the family but acts such as the incurring of debts and drawing of negotiable instruments are necessities to a trading family while they would not be so to a non-trading family. (The italics are mine). Defendant-1 has not been examined in this case, nor is there any evidence on record that it was for the benefit of the family consisting of the Defendants 1 and 2. 8. Mr. Ranjit Mohanty, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents argued that the principle of 'holding out' should be applied in this case. (The italics are mine). Defendant-1 has not been examined in this case, nor is there any evidence on record that it was for the benefit of the family consisting of the Defendants 1 and 2. 8. Mr. Ranjit Mohanty, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents argued that the principle of 'holding out' should be applied in this case. This principle has been embodied in Section 28 of the Indian Partnership Act which provides that anyone who by words spoken or written or by conduct represents himself or knowingly permits himself to be represented, to be a partner in a firm, is liable as a partner in that firm to anyone who has on the faith of any such representation given credit to the firm, whether the person representing himself or represented to be a partner does not know that the representation has reached the person so giving credit. In this connection, he also drew my attention to Lindley on Partnership 11th Edition, P. 111. This contention cannot be accepted, because there does not appear to be any evidence on record that Defendant-2 either by words or by conduct represented himself to Plaintiff-2 to be a partner in the firm. Plaintiff-2 came to Berhampur only at the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945 and Defendant-2 came in the year 1946. Defendant-2 had denied the fact of the existence of any partnership or his authorising Mangal Chand to file the application for registration and the Plaintiffs not only have failed to prove the oral agreement, but also the representation or consent of Defendant-2 to be a member of the disputed partnership. Mr. Mohanty relied upon a decision of the Lahore High Court reported in AIR 1926 340 (Lahore) . What was held in that case was that where there was no written agreement of partnership, it is necessary for the Plaintiff to show the conduct of the parties towards one another, the mode in which they have dealt with one another, and the mode in which each has with the knowledge of the other dealt with other people, raises a necessary presumption that a partnership was entered into. As a rule, in the absence of direct evidence of partnership the relationship is shown by books of accounts, by correspondence, by the evidence of employees by admission and so forth. As a rule, in the absence of direct evidence of partnership the relationship is shown by books of accounts, by correspondence, by the evidence of employees by admission and so forth. From the evidence on record it appears that it is Defendant-1 who wanted to start a business at Berhampur and the partners to the said business were not in the locality until either 1945 or 1946 and accordingly the Plaintiff has failed to prove any such relationship between him and Defendant-2. There is nothing 'on record to show anything regarding the conduct of the parties or the mode in which they have dealt with one another or the mode in which each has with the knowledge of the other dealt with outsiders. No books of account, or correspondence relating to this business have been produced or any employee of the firm has been examined. Hence, this decision does not apply to the facts of the present case. 9. Thus, the sole contention raised by Mr. H. Mohapatra is bound to succeed. In my opinion, there was no valid and legal partnership between the second Plaintiff or the Plaintiff and Defendant-2 and as such neither the Plaintiff-2 nor the Plaintiffs are entitled to any share in the profits of the partnership business. 10. Mr. Mohanty lastly contended that a decree should have been passed against Defendant-1 in view of his own admission. Defendant-1 was not a party to the alleged partnership. All that he admits in his written statement is that there was a partnership business between the Plaintiff-2 and Defendent-2. He has not examined himself at the trial. Therefore, in view of my above findings the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any decree against the 1st Defendant. In the result, I would set aside the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge dated the November 6,1951, restore the judgment of the learned Munsif dated July 18, 1949, and allow this appeal with costs. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed