JUDGMENT A.N. Mulla, J. - This is a reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kheri, commending that the proceedings against Chitra Kumari, Chhotey Lal, Pratap Shanker and Kripa Shanker be quashed as no case is made out against them. 2. The brief facts of the case are that some property belonging to Sheo Kumar was found in the house of Daya Shanker who is also being prosecuted in this case. The prosecution story is that Sheo Kumar had stayed for a while at the house of Daya Shanker. When he shifted to a separate house, Daya Shanker and Naththoo Lal went up to the house of Sheo Kumar, and after securing his absence from the house on some pretext they stole an iron safe belonging to him and brought it to the house of Daya Shanker. Sheo Kumar, when he discovered the theft, made a report and expressed his suspicion against Daya Shankar and Naththoo Lal. As a result the house of Daya Shankar was searched and this iron safe was found in his house. The investigating agency did not confine its attention to Daya Shankar and Naththoo Lal alone, but it prosecuted all other persons who were residing in the house of Daya Shankar. Chitra Kumari is the wife of Daya Shankar and the other three applicants are his younger brothers who reside in the same house. Presumably their prosecution was under Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code for the iron safe which was recovered was presumed to be in the joint possession of all these applicants. The applicants prayed for a discharge before the Magistrate, but when the Magistrate did not grant their prayer they went in revision before the Sessions Court and the learned Additional Sessions Judge has thereupon made this reference. 3. It is obvious that a charge can be framed only if there is some evidence which, if believed, can bring home the guilt to an accused person. In this case the only fact which is proved against the applicants is that they reside in the same house from which the stolen property was recovered. This fact by itself is not sufficient to prove that they were in joint possession of this stolen property. There is no indication that this iron safe was recovered from any room which was locked and the key to that room was provided by any of the applicants. This fact by itself is not sufficient to prove that they were in joint possession of this stolen property. There is no indication that this iron safe was recovered from any room which was locked and the key to that room was provided by any of the applicants. It is true that a big iron safe kept in the house would be seen by the other members of the house too, and therefore the knowledge of the presence of the stolen property in the house might be inferred against the applicants; but before knowledge can be considered as sufficient to prove possession there must be some indication that this knowledge was guilty knowledge and was equivalent to dominion over stolen property. There is no such evidence in this case. For the purpose of holding joint possession some conduct or act which shows dominion over stolen property should also be proved against the accused and the presence of stolen property alone in the house cannot be considered sufficient. In this case the recovery was made very soon after the property was brought to the house, for the name of Daya Shankar was mentioned in the first information report. It can, therefore, be inferred that the recovery of this stolen property was made very shortly after the property was brought to the house. There is no indication that the other residents of the house who admittedly did not bring it agreed at any stage to receive or retain the stolen property in the house. Daya Shankar was the head of the family and even if they suspected that some stolen property was being placed in the house they could not stop him. Three of the applicants are the younger brothers of Daya Shankar and Chitra Kumari is his wife. The law does not expect that the wife should leave the house of her husband if he brings stolen property to the house. It would be an extraordinary conception of law really if other dependant persons, in order to save themselves from criminal prosecution, will have to leave the house occupied by their near relations and go to the streets merely because they suspect that some stolen property has been brought in the house. It is against normal human behaviour that near relations should go and report the matter to the authorities against their own relations. It is against normal human behaviour that near relations should go and report the matter to the authorities against their own relations. The words used in Sec. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act are that a Court "may presume" and the word "may" in this section is not equivalent to "shall". A discretion is vested in the court whether in the proved circumstances of the case a presumption should be raised or not. The raising of such a presumption is optional with the Court. It is a presumption of fact and not a presumption of law. Presumptions of fact are based wholly upon the circumstances of a particular case in the back ground of normal human conduct and behaviour. I am therefore of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case the other residents of the house at best passively acquiesced and they were not in any way exercising any dominion over the stolen property from which a justifiable presumption may be drawn that they were in joint possession. I have already discussed this aspect of the law in Khuman v. State, I.L.R. 1955 All. 464 I am therefore in entire agreement with the conclusion reached by the Additional Sessions Judge and I think that the prosecution of these four applicants would be an abuse of the process of law. I therefore accept the reference and quash the prosecution so far as these four applicants are concerned. There is no evidence against them which justifies their prosecution. The case against Daya Shankar and Naththoo Lal will proceed for the prosecution alleges certain other circumstances against them also which greatly distinguishes their case from the case of the applicants.