Order.- The first petitioner was the holder of the Uthumalai zamin, which was notified under the provisions of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 and taken over by the Government on 3rd January, 1951. One of the items of properties the first petitioner Had in his zamindari was the private market in Surandai Village. The first petitioner leased that market to the second petitioner. That lease was before the Estate was notified under Act XXVI of 1948. The petitioners’ claim was that the entire extent of 1 acre and 32 cents of land was enclosed by a compound wall, and that the whole of that property came within the scope of section 18 of Act XXVI of 1948 and that he was entitled to retain that property even after the estate itself vested in the Government under section 3. The Estate Manager, however, was of the view, that the land not occupied by sheds, measuring about one acre, did not fall within the scope of section 18, and the Estate Manager purported to dispossess the petitioners. Even earlier, in 1953, the Board cancelled the lease that had been granted by the first petitioner in favour of the second petitioner. Against the order of the Estate Manager, the petitioners applied to the Collector to get back the site. Eventually on 30th April, 1955, the Board held that the market at Surandai vested in the Government free of all encumbrances from 3rd January, 1951. This was communicated to the first petitioner by the Estates Manager on 23rd May, 1955. The petitioners thereupon approached the Government. But, by its order dated 31st May, 1956, the Government: declined to interfere with the order of the Board. The petitioners thereupon applied under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to set aside the order of the Board dated 30th April, 1955. It should be remembered that the substance of the order dated 30th April, 1955 was communicated to the first petitioner by the Manager by his letter dated 23rd May, 1955, and that alone has been produced before me. Nonetheless, what the petitioners seek to set aside is the order of the Board dated 30th April, 1955. It should be remembered that the substance of the order dated 30th April, 1955 was communicated to the first petitioner by the Manager by his letter dated 23rd May, 1955, and that alone has been produced before me. Nonetheless, what the petitioners seek to set aside is the order of the Board dated 30th April, 1955. The main basis on which the validity of the order of the Board dated 30th April, 1955 was assailed was that it had no jurisdiction to decide the question at issue, because the Act vested that jurisdiction only in the Government (see section 18 (6) of the Act). The defence of the Government was that under section 67 (2) (c) of the Act, there was a delegation of the powers conferred by the statute on the Government by section 18 (6), to the Board, and it was those powers that the Board exercised when it gave its decision on 30th April, 1955. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the delegation relied on by the Government was invalid, is, in my opinion, well founded. The scheme of the Act provides for the determination of various disputed questions by various designated officers including the Board and the Government. The Board has been invested with certain revisional powers, I am referring to this only to emphasise that, where the Act intended that certain powers should be exercised by the persons named therein, it took the trouble of saying so in express terms. What section 18(6) of the Act provides for is determination of disputed questions. The determination should really be at least quasi-judicial in its scope. It should be taken as well settled, that, in the absence of any express provision in the statute or at least any provision from which can be gathered the necessary intendment to provide for delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, such delegation would be invalid. Section 18 (6) specifically vests a quasi-judicial function in the Government. I have already pointed out that the scheme of the Act clearly shows the distinction the Act keeps between the various classes of officers entrusted with similar judicial or quasi-judicial functions. So when section 18 (6) entrusted the statutory duty of adjudicating upon a disputed question to the Government, in the absence of any words, it is obvious that the legislature intended only the Government to exercise that function. So when section 18 (6) entrusted the statutory duty of adjudicating upon a disputed question to the Government, in the absence of any words, it is obvious that the legislature intended only the Government to exercise that function. A delegation of that function purporting to be under section 67 (2) (c) is invalid. Section 67 (2) (c) can cover only powers that could be lawfully delegated, and the powers entrusted to the Government under section 18 (6) could not be lawfully delegated. This is not a case where the Government, though it purported to decline to interfere in revision with the orders of the Board, purported to exercise the powers under section 18(6) of the Act. In fact, the specific stand taken was that those powers had been delegated to the Board, and it was the Board that exercised those powers. If the delegation was bad in law, the decision the Board purported to give by its order dated 30th April, 1955, could not be viewed as one under section 18(6) and therefore it was a decision given by a statutory authority which had no jurisdiction to render that decision. It is on that short ground that the order of the Board dated 30th April, 1955, will have to be set aside. Even in their application to the Collector, the petitioners pointed out that this was a question that had to be referred to the Government under section 18(6) of the Act. But, as the Government was of the view that there had been a lawful delegation, the question was ultimately disposed of by the Board. By setting aside the order of the Board by issuing a writ of certiorari, the position is that the question at dispute still remains to be decided and remains to be decided by the statutory authority under section 18(6) of the Act. The rule nisi is made absolute to the extent indicated above. The order of the Board dated 30th April, 1955 will stand set aside by the issue of a writ of certiorari. The petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. R.M. ----- Petition allowed.