Somasundaram, J.- These are revisions by the two accused who were tried and convicted by the Sub-divisional First Class Magistrate, Sankari, under sections 16 (1) and 7 read with section 2 (1) (b ) and (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and rule 29 framed under the said Act. The convictions and sentences were upheld by the Sessions Judge of Salem. The facts relating to the case are these: There was a society called the Government Servants’ Co-operative Society, Mettur township. The first accused was the manager of the society while the second accused was the sales clerk in the grocery section. P.W. 1 is the Food Inspector of Mettur township. On 18th June, 1957, P.W. 1 purchased 1½ pounds of Bengal gram powder from the second accused, the sales clerk. The first accused was not present at that time. The usual formalities which the Food Inspector observes when he purchases for the purpose of testing was observed and there is no dispute about it. The Bengal gram powder was sent to the public analyst. The public analyst in his report, Exhibit P-2 has stated that the sample sent was found to contain an artificial water soluble yellow colouring matter derived from, coal tar and he gave it as his opinion that the sample is adulterated. This opinion of the public analyst is not disputed and the presence, therefore, of artificial water soluble yellow colouring matter derived from coal tar is beyond question. This does not fall under any of the exemptions of coal tar dyeing as provided under the rules. A faint attempt was made in the lower Court to urge that it was soap powder so as to bring it within the exemption but that was rightly rejected by the Courts below and was not argued before me. This society was formed under the Co-operative Societies Act. There was a Board of Directors of which the Divisional Engineer is the Chairman. The Board consists of nine members and the stores are managed by this Board of Directors. There is a purchasing committee appointed by this Board and i is they who recommend or purchase on behalf of the society and the article is sold in the society. It was considered to be the best in quality. The Board consists of nine members and the stores are managed by this Board of Directors. There is a purchasing committee appointed by this Board and i is they who recommend or purchase on behalf of the society and the article is sold in the society. It was considered to be the best in quality. Either while purchasing or afterwards no warranty was taken by the Society from its vendors for the purity of the powder sold. That the powder sold is adulterated within the meaning of that expression under the rules is not disputed. That the society is a company within the meaning of section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is not also disputed. Section 17 of the Act is as follows: “ Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence, etc., etc.” In the Explanation, ‘Company’ is defined as “ Any body corporate, and includes a firm or other association of individuals.” As already stated, the first accused who was the manager of the society was on leave at the time of the same. There is an Honorary Secretary also for the Society. Though the first accused is called the manager of the company there is no proof that he is the manager within the meaning of that expression in section 2 (9) of the Indian Companies Act, nor is there any evidence that he was in charge, or was responsible for the company or for the conduct of its business. The offence with which the accused are charged is one under section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act which is punishable under section 16 (1) (a) of the said Act. The offence with which the accused are charged is one under section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act which is punishable under section 16 (1) (a) of the said Act. Under section 7 of the Act: “ No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute- (i) any adulterated food.” Section 16 (i) says: “ If any person- (a) whether by himself or by any person on his behalf............sells or distributes, any article of food in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule made thereunder, etc., etc., shall be punishable....” The first accused was on leave on the day of the sale. He does not come within the definition of Manager under the Indian Companies Act and there being no proof that he was in charge or was responsible to the company in the conduct of the business of the company, he cannot be brought within the scope of sections 7 and 16 of the Act. So, as far as he is concerned, in my opinion, the conviction and sentence cannot stand and they must be set aside and this accused acquitted. The fine, if paid, will be refunded. The real trouble arises with regard to the second accused. He was only a sales clerk. He has to do the duties assigned to him, namely, to give the articles asked for by the purchasers and take the price in return, and account for the prices. It is not suggested that he knew that this Bengal gram powder was adulterated. In those circumstances, the question arises as to how far the second accused is liable. That knowledge or mens rea is not necessary in such cases is clear from the wording of the section itself. The section does not say ‘no person, knowingly, or having reason to believe that the food is adulterated, shall sell’, etc. The whole Act and the sections contained therein are based on the English statutes like the Food and Drugs Act of England. It has been held in a series of decisions that mens rea or knowledge is not necessary in such cases. The whole Act and the sections contained therein are based on the English statutes like the Food and Drugs Act of England. It has been held in a series of decisions that mens rea or knowledge is not necessary in such cases. In Betts v. Armstead,1 the Court had to consider whether knowledge is necessary when the section merely states as follows: “ No person shall sell to the prejudice of the purchaser any article of food or any drug which is not of the nature etc., etc.” There what was sold was a loaf of bread which contained a quantity of alum. The defence of the accused was that he did not know that the bread contained alum. The trial Court dismissed the complaint. But in the Queen’s Bench Division, Cave, J., after referring to the wording of the section says: “ Those terms are not in any way qualified, but it was suggested that the justices ought to read into the section the word 'knowingly', and they adopted that suggestion. That word is not to be found in the section, and it is clear from the words of other sections of the Act that the word ‘knowingly’ was intentionally omitted from section 6.” He, therefore, found that the decision of the justices was wrong. In this opinion, A.L. Smith, J., also concurred and the case was remitted to the lower Court. In Dyke v. Gower2, the facts were these: the respondent, a retail milk seller, poured into a pail eight barn gallons of unskimmed milk, which she sold therefrom in small quantities to her customers, dipping it out of the pail from time to time with a measure. The sale of the contents of the pail extended over a space of between four and five hours, during the whole of which time, owing to the neglect of the respondent to keep the milk stirred, the cream was continually rising to the surface. When, not more than two quarts of milk remained in the pail, the appellant purchased of the respondent a pint of milk, which was served to him from the pail, and which, upon analysis, showed a deficiency of 33 per cent. of fatty matter. The respondent did not disclose the deficiency to the appellant. The deficiency was entirely due to the manner in which the earlier customers had been served. of fatty matter. The respondent did not disclose the deficiency to the appellant. The deficiency was entirely due to the manner in which the earlier customers had been served. Lord Coleridge, C.J., dealing with the case observes as follows: “ The milk seller sold the milk in that condition, and she did so in one sense fairly enough ; for in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I will assume that she did not gain by it-that is to say that she sold the upper portion of the milk which contained an excess of fat at the same price as that at which she afterwards sold the lower portion, which was deficient in fat. But this Act was passed with the object, not of punishing the seller, but of protecting the buyer, and of insuring, so far as it is possible to insure, such a result, that a person who buys an article of a particular description should get a genuine article, and one which contains the proper quantity of the different elements that an article of that description ought to contain........Then the section goes on,” And no person shall sell an article so altered “- that is, altered physically, altered by the abstration of a part of it so as to injuriously affect its quality- ‘without making disclosure of the alteration. ‘Here the respondent has admittedly sold milk so altered without making any disclosure. Has she not then been guilty of an offence against the section ?” The argument was that the alteration had not been made with the prohibited intent; and dealing with that argument Lord Coleridge, C.J., says: “ It is not necessary in the interests of the public to prohibit the mere alteration of an article of food, unless the alteration is coupled with the intent of selling it in its altered state without notice, for the mere alteration without such intent may be perfectly innocent. Where, however, the alteration is followed by actual sale, the intent with which the article was altered must become perfectly immaterial, the injury to the purchaser being just the same whether there was a wrongful intent or not.” Then referring to Pain v. Boughtwood1, Lord Coleridge, C.J., observes:- “ it was held that mens tea was not a necessary ingredient in the offence of selling an altered article under section 9” . In this opinion Wright, J., concurred and held that the defendant’s knowledge of the adulteration was perfectly immaterial. These decisions in Dyke v. Gower2, and Pain v. Boughtwood1, were followed in Morris v. Corbett3, and in this decision Williams, J., says: “ This act is what is called benevolent legislation, and we must apparently put a benevolent construction on it.” To the same effect is the decision of Lord Goddard, C.J., in Lamb v. Sunderland and District Creamery, Ltd.4, where he observes: “ In this case it was not necessary to prove mens tea. All that needed to be proved was that there was a sale to the prejudice of the purchaser of something which was not of the nature, substance, or quality demanded by him......” So, the above decisions are clear authority for the position that mens rea or knowledge is not necessary and the sections also do not impose such a condition to prove the offence or guilt against the person concerned. It is contended by Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam that the wording of the section is such that it excludes a servant. The section, as already stated, says: “ No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf, etc.” In section 16 also “ If any person- (a) whether by himself or by any person on his behalf................”. According to the contention, this clearly suggests that the servant is not liable but the master or the principal alone is liable. I must say at the outset that this contention has considerable force. The wording of the section is not like the wording in the English Act ‘No person shall sell.. ‘It is contended by the Public Prosecutor that this belongs to the category of offences where there is an absolute prohibition of sale and that “any person either by himself or any person on his behalf” includes the servant as well. He relies on the decision in Hotchin v. Hindmarsh6. were Lord Coleridge, C.J., observes as follows:- “ In my opinion, a person who takes the article in his hand, and performs the physical act of transferring the adulterated thing to the purchaser, is a person who sells within this section.” Mathew, J., also concurred with that opinion and observes as follows: “ Section 6 enacts that 'no person shall sell to the prejudice of the purchaser,' etc. It is contended that we should read this as 'no person unless he be a servant.' Why should those words be introduced ? It is clear from the series of sections following section 6 that the Legislature meant to deal with the person who does the physical act........It would be an extraordinary interpretation of the Act to hold that even where it was shown that the person who did the act was guilty, his employer alone should be liable to be convicted. .... The result might be that while the guilty person would escape, his innocent employer might be convicted.” I have myself held in another case (Crl. Appeal No. 138 of 1957) an appeal by the State against the acquittal of the second accused in that case who was a servant of the first accused that the second accused is liable. I have held that the trial Court’s interpretation of section 7 that both of them are not liable was wrong and found the servant also guilty of the offence. At that time the respondent was not represented by any counsel and this aspect of the case was not presented to me. Now that it is brought to my notice, I find that there is considerable force in the argument. Decisions which hold that mens rea is not altogether ruled out in all cases are relied on. The decision in Williamson v. Norris1, is also relied on to show that the servant is not liable. I have already pointed out that with regard to these classes of cases mens rea is not necessary and that there is an absolute prohibition. In fact, in the decision in Brown v. Foot2, it is pointed out that both the master and the servant will be liable. The decision in Pyarimohan Saha v. Harendranath Ray3, is also relied on by the Public Prosecutor to show that the agent also is liable. The section there viz., section 11 speaks of 'the seller or agent selling the article' , therefore the agent or servant is within the prohibition of the words ‘no person shall sell’. I must confess to some difficulty in interpreting section 7 and section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The section there viz., section 11 speaks of 'the seller or agent selling the article' , therefore the agent or servant is within the prohibition of the words ‘no person shall sell’. I must confess to some difficulty in interpreting section 7 and section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The expression ‘No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf seems to suggest liability of the master or the principal or owner whether he sells the article himself or by a servant. This question is one of importance and is of constant occurrence and it is likely that two views may be taken of the section, particularly in view of the policy and the principle of the Act being to prohibit all sales by whomsoever it may be. It is better that an authoritative decision is given by a Bench of this Court. The papers will, therefore, be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for orders as to posting this case before a Bench. These petitions then came on for hearing before a Bench (Panchapakesa Ayyar and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ.). S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, for 1st Accused. M. Srinivasagopalan, for 2nd Accused. The Public Prosecutor (P. S. Kailasam) on behalf of the State in both the cases. The Order of the Court was made by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.- These two cases have been directed to be posted before this Bench by the Hon’ble Chief Justice on a reference by Somasundaram, J., as to whether a servant selling goods on behalf of his master will fall primarily and directly within the scope of the penal provisions of sections 7 and 16 of the Act XXXVII of 1954, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, as Somasundaram, J., who had been prima facie of the view that the servant will also be absolutely liable primarily and directly for the sale of adulterated food on behalf of the master in two cases decided by him, sitting singly, (Criminal Appeal Nos. 84 and 138 of 1957), both ex parte felt some doubt about the correctness of his view regarding the law, and wanted it to be clarified and settled by a Bench. The facts in these two cases are briefly these:- There is a Society called the Government Servants’ Co-operative Society, Mettur township, Salem District. 84 and 138 of 1957), both ex parte felt some doubt about the correctness of his view regarding the law, and wanted it to be clarified and settled by a Bench. The facts in these two cases are briefly these:- There is a Society called the Government Servants’ Co-operative Society, Mettur township, Salem District. The first Accused, Moses, was the manager of the Co-operative Society, while the second accused Rangaswamy, was the sales clerk in charge of the grocery section. P. W. 1 was a member of the society, and was also the Food Inspector of Mettur township. He got information that the Bengal gram powder sold by the Society, though considered by the public to be the best Bengal gram powder available in the market, was adulterated with a brand of coal tar dye, not permitted under the Act. So, on 18th June, 1957, P.W. 1 purchased 1½ pounds of Bengal gram powder from the second accused, the sales clerk in charge of the grocery section for 29 nP. He observed the usual formalities prescribed when purchasing a food stuff for the purpose of testing. The Bengal gram powder was sent to the public analyst. The public analyst found that the Bengal gram powder contained an artificial water soluble yellow colouring matter derived from coal tar and gave it as his opinion that the sample was adulterated. There was no contention before the Court (S.D.M. Sankari, who tried the case) that the Bengal gram powder in question was not adulterated. The only defence, on the facts was that the adulteration was not prejudicial to health and would not injure anybody, but only added colour to the substance and made it attractive to the buyer. That, of course was an untenable plea. It is well-settled that, under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the adulterated substance need not be poisonous or injurious. Indeed, it may even be conducive to health. The object of the Act is to see that the substance sold is not mixed with any other thing not permitted by law. Thus, if ghee is adulterated with lard of pig or with beef suet, it may be that from the purely physical health point of view the mixture may be more nutritious. But the offence is complete, because a substance not recognised by law has been used for mixing. Thus, if ghee is adulterated with lard of pig or with beef suet, it may be that from the purely physical health point of view the mixture may be more nutritious. But the offence is complete, because a substance not recognised by law has been used for mixing. So the plea will fail like a plea that the adulterer is a healthier man than the husband, in a charge of adultery. Both the accused raised the plea in law that they were not liable for the primary offence under section 7 of the Act. The first accused contended that he was on casual leave on the day when the Bengal gram powder was sold by the 2nd accused to P. W. 1, and that at no time was he in charge of the sales, or responsible to the company for the sale, and that he was not therefore a seller at all. The second accused contended that he never sold the Bengal gram powder himself, that is, for his own benefit, but only on behalf of the Co-operative Society, and so will not be liable directly under section 7. Both the accused were convicted by the Sub-Divisional First Class Magistrate, Sankari, Salem, under sections 7 and 16(1) read with section 2(1) (b) (j) and rule 29, and were sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50 each. They appealed to the Sessions Judge, Salem, who confirmed the convictions and sentences. Then they filed Crl. Rev. Cases Nos. 191 and 192 of 1958 in this Court. Somasundaram, J., acquitted the first accused, Moses, on the ground that he was not as a matter of fact in charge of the sales of the Co-operative Society, and was not a seller, and had not sold the Bengal gram powder himself, or got it sold by the 2nd accused. He therefore, set aside the sentence of fine and directed the fine if paid, to be refunded to the 1st accused. Therefore, Crl. Rev. Case No. 191 of 1958 relating to the first accused, is unnecessary, as the question of law referred to us is not necessary to be decided for disposing of the case as against the first accused. The question of fact decided in his favour, namely, that he was not the seller of the Bengal gram powder, and had not got it sold on his behalf by the second accused, is conclusive. The question of fact decided in his favour, namely, that he was not the seller of the Bengal gram powder, and had not got it sold on his behalf by the second accused, is conclusive. We are, therefore, not called upon to deal any more with Crl. Rev. Case No. 191 of 1958, as rightly contended by Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam appearing for the first accused, and conceded by the learned Public Prosecutor. That petition has been disposed of by Somasundaram, J., himself and accused 1 has been acquitted. Now we come to Crl. Rev. Case No. 192 of 1958, relating to the second accused. The question here is whether the 2nd accused is right in his plea that he will not come directly within the purview of section 7 and the absolute liability thereunder, as he did not sell the Bengal gram powder himself or cause any person to sell it on his behalf. Mr. Srinivasa Gopalan, the learned counsel for the 2nd accused, urges vigorously that absolute liability is a terrible thing, as it does away with mens rea, or guilty knowledge, required under the law for most offences, and that it should not be imposed on any one unless the wording of the charging section clearly applies. According to him, the Legislature intended only the primary seller, selling the goods himself or by any person on his behalf, to have absolute liability, fastened on him, regardless of guilty knowledge express or implied, and that the servant selling the goods not for himself but for the master would only be liable, under the ordinary law, for aiding and a betting the offence of selling the adulterated food, and that, for abetment, where the general law would apply, guilty knowledge, express or implied, should be proved by the prosecution. He did not deny that if the servant adulterated the food himself, or if the servant knew that the food he was selling was adulterated or had reason to believe, by exercise of due diligence, that the food he was selling was adulterated, he would be liable for abetment of the offence. Thus if a servant waters the milk himself, or knows that the milk he sells is watered milk, or has reason to believe that it is watered, he will be guilty of abetment. Mr. Srinivasa Gopalan does not dispute that. Thus if a servant waters the milk himself, or knows that the milk he sells is watered milk, or has reason to believe that it is watered, he will be guilty of abetment. Mr. Srinivasa Gopalan does not dispute that. What he disputes is the absolute liability of the servant who is perfectly innocent and has no guilty knowledge, express or implied, and merely sells the adulterated food on behalf of the master, and not for his own benefit. According to him, the phrase in section 7, ‘any person either by himself or any person on his behalf ‘, means that the sale should be by a person for himself or through another for his benefit. The learned Public Prosecutor joined issue on this point and quoted several English decisions for the position that absolute liability will fasten itself on the servant as well as on the Master selling the goods. The leading English case he relied on is the House of Lords ruling in Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply Association1, where it was held, at page 865, as follows:- “The act of selling, the act of compounding, and every other definite and particular act mentioned in the 1st section (of the Food and Drugs Act of England), and in the sections by which penalties are imposed, are struck at, whether the person who does them is a principal to whom the business belongs, or any one whom he employs to carry on the business.” It was expressly held that the seller, whether the master or servant, will be liable under the penal provisions of the English Act. Coleridge, C.J.‘s observations in Hotchin’s case2: “ A person who takes the article in his hand and performs the physical act of transferring the adulterated thing to the purchaser is a person who sells within the section” , and similar observations in several other English rulings to the same effect were relied on by the learned Public Prosecutor. Mr. Srinivasa Gopalan relied on the ruling in Williamson v. Norris3, where Lord Russel held that, under the Licensing Act, a servant selling liquor in unlicensed premises without guilty knowledge, express or implied, would not be guilty under the Act. and that some kind of aid or abetment should be proved. But that was not under the Food and Drugs Act of England which is more draconian in its scope. and that some kind of aid or abetment should be proved. But that was not under the Food and Drugs Act of England which is more draconian in its scope. We may take it that under the English Food and Drugs Act, absolute liability will fasten not only on the primary seller, the master, but also on the secondary seller, the servant who actually sells on behalf of the master and delivers the goods. It is not disputed by Mr. Srinivasa Gopalan, and cannot be disputed, that the servant who sells and delivers goods to a customer will also be a seller within the meaning of the definition in the English Act as well as in the Indian Act. A Full Bench ruling of this Court, in Radhakrishna Rao v. Province of Madras4, has held categorically that a servant can also be a seller in spite of the sale being in the presence of the master, the primary seller. That ruling was under the Sales Tax Act. But it may apply here too. The servant will be a seller within the definition under the Prevention of the Food Adulteration Act also. But Mr. Srinivasa Gopalan, while conceding this, and also conceding that it is enough if the servant, thought not the owner, sells the goods for his own benefit, urges that a servant who does not sell the goods for himself that is for his own benefit, will not be caught by the provisions of section 7, as he sells them on behalf of the Master. We agree. The terms of the English Food and Drugs Act are far wider and will certainly include the liability of the servant, the secondary seller, even when he sells only on behalf of the master, and, indeed, even the persons who are merely in possession of the adulterated foodstuffs, whereas under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act a mere possession of adulterated food for the purpose of sale is not made an offence except in the case of manufacturer of the food-stuffs under section 16(1) (b) of the Act. In other words, neither the master the primary seller, nor the servant the secondary seller, can be convicted and punished under the Preventive Food Adulteration Act for mere possession of adulterated food or materials employed for adulteration unless he is the manufacturer of the food. In other words, neither the master the primary seller, nor the servant the secondary seller, can be convicted and punished under the Preventive Food Adulteration Act for mere possession of adulterated food or materials employed for adulteration unless he is the manufacturer of the food. Thus, if he manufactures baby food he will be liable for possession, but not for mere possession under the Act, when he is only the seller whether as master or servant. The learned Public Prosecutor has to concede this. That shows that the English Act is far wider in its scope in fixing absolute liability than the Indian Act. This is possibly because England is a highly educated country, where there is 100 per cent literacy and the population is accustomed to enlighened public health rules for more than two centuries, whereas India is a very backward country, with 15 per cent. literacy and 85 per cent. illiteracy, and people plunged in dark ignorance regarding scientific matters and public health rules and even elementary things like the consequences of food adulteration. When it is a bit complex, as in this case of a coloured coal tar dye being used, no ordinary servant who sells can be expected to be aware of the adulteration unless he is aiding and abetting the offence. It is obvious that laws of a country are enacted by an enlightened legislature to suit the conditions of that country. Therefore, in our opinion, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act of 1954 has deliberately refrained from enacting the wide provisions of the Food and Drugs Act of England, and has restricted the fixation of absolute liability to persons like master, the primary sellers,, who are expected to be more educated than the servants or secondary sellers and to know the consequences of the sale of adulterated food-stuffs better. This is also seen to be so because, under section 16 of the Act, minimum punishment of a draconian character have been prescribed for the sale of adulterated food for the second or third time. It is well-known that in all enlightened systems of jurisprudence a minimum punishment is never prescribed except where it will be justified by public interests and where the subject also warrants it. It is also to be noticed that these draconian minimum punishments are prescribed not merely for the second and third convictions but for the second and third offences. It is well-known that in all enlightened systems of jurisprudence a minimum punishment is never prescribed except where it will be justified by public interests and where the subject also warrants it. It is also to be noticed that these draconian minimum punishments are prescribed not merely for the second and third convictions but for the second and third offences. A servant may be selling adulterated food 100 times per day, and, even before he is convicted for one offence, he will render himself liable for the minimum punishments. prescribed for the second and third and subsequent offences. The English law prescribed for less drastic punishments right through. Our Legislature was, in our opinion, well aware of these dire consequences, and has therefore satisfied itself with restricting the absolute liability to the educated master, the primary seller. If the master is caught hold of and punished drastically, there is no need to catch hold of the servant also and fasten the absolute liability on him even without any guilty knowledge, express or implied. It is something like the ancient Hindu adage that it is enough to catch a cobra by its head, and then the belly and tail will be controlled or like the Nyaya saying that when the trunk is cut the branches will fall by themselves. So, the ground to extend the absolute liability to the servant selling on behalf of the master urged by the learned Public Prosecutor, does not commend to us. It is enough if the servant selling goods for his own benefit (though not the owner) is saddled with absolute liability and if the servant having guilty knowledge, express or implied, and selling on behalf of the master, is punished for abetment of the offence under section 7. No absolute liability need to be fastened on him in public interests when he sells only on behalf of the master. The learned Public Prosecutor concedes that measurers, weighers, packers, etc., of the adulterated food stuffs sold will not come within the purview of section 7.. But he says that the servants who sell the goods, deliver them and receive the money will be liable under section 7. The distinction he makes cannot stand. Often, in a big shop a clerk sells the goods, the clerk at the counter receives the money and the porter at the gate delivers the goods. But he says that the servants who sell the goods, deliver them and receive the money will be liable under section 7. The distinction he makes cannot stand. Often, in a big shop a clerk sells the goods, the clerk at the counter receives the money and the porter at the gate delivers the goods. Which of the three is to be booked under section 7 ? The learned Public Prosecutor may say, " all the three ‘. Then the jails will be unnecessarily filled with a large number of innocent people, as urged by Mr. Srinivasa Gopalan. As already observed, if there is guilty knowledge, express or implied, servants can be booked for aiding or abetting the offence. They can also be booked directly under section 7 if they sell the goods themselves, that is, for their own benefit. The learned Public Prosecutor says that, whatever may be the reason, the Legislature has enacted section 7 in terms which make the servant also absolutely liable unless this Court declares section 7 ultra vires of the Constitution. We cannot agree. The effect of the section is not what the learned Public Prosecutor considers it to be. Section 7, in our opinion, does not fasten any absolute liability on the servant or the secondary seller, unless he sells the goods for his own benefit. The phrase used in section 7 means, in our opinion, that the sale should be by a person for himself or by any person on his behalf. It is significant that section 7 does not say that a person selling on behalf of another will also be liable. The word ‘himself’ must be given its natural meaning in the context, and the natural meaning, in the context in our opinion, is what we have stated above. So the sections and rulings under the English Act have no application to India, as the English Act does not have the words, ‘himself or any person on his behalf’. It has simply the word “sells” . The learned Public Prosecutor then relied on a ruling of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Pyarimohan Saha v. Harendranath Ray1, where the Bench held that absolute liability would fasten on the servant, or the secondary seller also, even when selling goods on behalf of the master, when construing the provisions of the Bengal Food Adulteration Act. The learned Public Prosecutor then relied on a ruling of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Pyarimohan Saha v. Harendranath Ray1, where the Bench held that absolute liability would fasten on the servant, or the secondary seller also, even when selling goods on behalf of the master, when construing the provisions of the Bengal Food Adulteration Act. Though the wording in that was much the same as in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, we are unable to agree with the interpretation put by the Bench which went largely on the English rulings referred to above without considering the fact that the English rulings related to the English Food and Drugs Act which is far wider in its scope in fixing absolute liability than the Indian Act, and much more lenient in the punishment for the first and subsequent offences. With respect, we are unable to follow the interpretation put by the Bench of the Calcutta High Court with regard to a similar wording like the one used in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. In the end, therefore, we hold that sections 7 and 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, will not primarily apply to the servant, the secondary seller of adulterated food unless he sold it for his own benefit, and that the servant selling the food on behalf of his master can only be made liable for aid or abetment of the offence on proof of guilty knowledge, express, or implied. As no such guilty knowledge, express or implied, has been brought home to the second accused Rangaswamy, it follows that his conviction and sentence must be set aside, and be acqutited. We do so accordingly, and direct that the fine, if paid, be refunded to him. Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J.- I agree, with my learned brother in the conclusions: he has arrived at. I only wish to add a few words to the judgment just now pronounced by my learned brother. The question that has been raised in this Criminal Revision Case (C. R. C. No. 192 of 1958) is as to whether the servant of a master who sells adulterated food-stuffs such as the one in the present case is also liable under section 7 and section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (XXXVII of 1954). The question that has been raised in this Criminal Revision Case (C. R. C. No. 192 of 1958) is as to whether the servant of a master who sells adulterated food-stuffs such as the one in the present case is also liable under section 7 and section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (XXXVII of 1954). It is beyond question that under section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (XXXVII of 1954), the master is liable for selling goods either by himself or through his servant or any agent, for the matter of that. The language of that section warrants this interpretation. It is also beyond question that when the servant sells the goods on behalf of his master or any company, limited or otherwise, he does sell the goods. The act of selling is done by him. He delivers the goods and receives the price. But it has to be seen whether the fact that the servant sells goods on behalf of the master would make him liable for any offence, in case the foodstuffs sold happen to be adulterated on analysis and examination. The question is whether the language of section 7 warrants such an interpretation. The learned Public Prosecutor has relied on a series of English decisions commencing from 1880 onwards for his proposition that there is an unqualified liability on the part of the servant also for the sale of adulterated stuff, even as the master or the company under whom the servant serves is liable for such a sale. In Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply Association1, the term 'person' is declared to include a servant as well. There can be no exception to this for the term 'person' will include master, servant and agent, etc. It is also laid down there that he who sells, whether master or servant, commits an offence. In Hotchin v. Hindmarsh2, it has been held that the servant is responsible, for the sale of adulterated food. The man who takes the price and gives the goods is described to be the seller. In Derbyshire v. Houliston3, also liability of the master as well as his servant has been declared, if the master or the servant sells adulterated stuff. The man who takes the price and gives the goods is described to be the seller. In Derbyshire v. Houliston3, also liability of the master as well as his servant has been declared, if the master or the servant sells adulterated stuff. It is immaterial whether the master is alone the owner of the goods entitled to the proceeds of the sale and the servant is not such an owner but only a paid man. The mere act of selling either by the master or by the servant has been held to be an offence, if the foodstuffs sold happen to be adulterated. In Brown v. Foot4, also it was held that the servant was the seller, though for civil purposes the servant must be established to be cognizant of the adulteration. The decision held that for a criminal conviction a master and the servant stand on the same footing. The relevant English statute, according to all these decisions, imposes an absolute liability both on the master as well as on the servant in regard to the offence of sale of adulterated foodstuffs under the Food and Drugs Act. The servant who delivers the goods for the price to be paid is certainly the seller, according to these decisions, and whether it be on his own behalf or on behalf of the master it does not matter, and the servant will nevertheless be a seller, and such a seller under the English Food and Drugs Act is liable to the penalty imposed by the law. The learned Public Prosecutor explained that under the English Act, as even under the Indian Act with which we are now concerned, it is the interest of the purchaser that is kept paramount and that is why, whether the seller be the master or whether he be the servant, no sale should take place to the prejudice of the purchaser and such an object could be ensured only by making both the master and the servant, whoever may be the seller, absolutely liable for the offence of selling adulterated foodstuffs under the said Act. The question then is whether the English and the Indian statutes stand on the same footing without there being distinction in the scope and application of the relevant sections of the two statutes. The question then is whether the English and the Indian statutes stand on the same footing without there being distinction in the scope and application of the relevant sections of the two statutes. So far as the English cases relied on by the learned Public Prosecutor and elaborately discussed by our learned brother Somasundaram, J., in the reference are concerned, the propositions laid down in those decisions seem to be unexceptionable, if the terms of the charging and penal sections of the English Food and Drugs Act are to be kept in view. Under the English Food and Drugs Act, the underlying scheme, no doubt, seems to be that there should be an absolute liability cast upon the master as well as the servant for the sale of adulterated stuff and no person should be allowed to escape by pleading that he had no knowledge of the adulteration of the foodstuffs or that he was merely a servant under the master who had employed him for the purpose of selling. It is true, that the words 'knowingly' or 'with knowledge' have not been used in the English Food and Drugs Act, nor do they occur in the Indian Statute. In the Indian Prevention of Food Adulteration Act nowhere are the words 'knowingly' or 'with knowledge' to be found in the relevant sections. But it will be seen, on a careful analysis of the language and the terms used in the English Act as compared with those used in the Indian Act, the scheme underlying the sections in the Indian Act seems to be rather different. While the English Act is too wide in its scope and application to offences under the Food and Drugs Act, the same does not appear to be the case with the the Indian Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. A reading of section 1 (2) of the English Food and Drugs Act of 1938 and a comparison of the language used in that Act with the language used in section 7 of the Indian Act brings out the difference in more than one respect. A reading of section 1 (2) of the English Food and Drugs Act of 1938 and a comparison of the language used in that Act with the language used in section 7 of the Indian Act brings out the difference in more than one respect. In section 1 (2) of the English Act, the language is: " No person shall sell or have in his possession for the purpose of sale any food or drug to which any substance has been so added." But section 7 of the Indian Prevention of Food Adulteration Act would say: " No person" shall himself, or by any person on his behalf, manufacture for sale, or store, sell or -distribute any adulterated food, any misbranded food, any article of food for the sale of which a licence is prescribed...." The language of section 7 in its scope and application seems to restrict itself in the first instance to that person who shall himself sell and in the second instance to that person who causes it to be sold by any other person on his behalf. But it does not seem to extend to or comprehend within its scope the person who sells on behalf of another. If that were the intention, the Legislature should have inserted the words " or on behalf of any other person " after the words " No person shall himself sell or by any person on his behalf". Even otherwise, if the intention of the Legislature was that there should be an absolute liability imposed upon a servant or an agent for the sale of adulterated foodstuffs, the Legislature would have adopted the same language as has been used in section 1 (2) of the English Act. This Act must be presumed to have been before the Legislature at the time the law was enacted. Neither of these things having been done, it is difficult to hold that the decision of the English Courts, which interpreted the English Act, the language 1 of which happens to be quite different from the language employed in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, would be of any assistance to the learned Public Prosecutor. That the scheme of the English Act seems to be different from the scheme of the Indian Act also appears to be clear from a comparison of the penal sections in the two Acts. That the scheme of the English Act seems to be different from the scheme of the Indian Act also appears to be clear from a comparison of the penal sections in the two Acts. If you take section 16 of the Prevention of the Food Adulteration Act, the first offence, the offender is to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or a fine which may extend to Rs. 2,000, and for the second offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine. But this does not happen to be the case in the English Act. In the English Act, the first offence is to be punished only with a fine and it is only for the second offence that the punishment is made a little more severe, subject to certain conditions, and obviously imprisonment is imposed only for the second offence. Further, if the defences available under the English Act are to be compared with the defences that are made available under the Indian Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, there also the scheme seems to be quite different. In the English Act, for instance, the offender can put up the defence that the adulteration has not been injurious to health, but such a defence is not available to the offender under the Indian Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. There is difference also in the other defences available under the two Acts. So that when the scheme of the English Act differs in so many respects from that of the Indian Act, it will not be proper to rely upon the English decisions for the interpretation of the sections of the Indian Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The interpretation of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is to be on the actual terms and the language used by the statute and the intention with which the Legislature would have employed the language and the terms used in the sections of this Act. It is plain that under the Indian statute, the servant or the agent has been left out and the principal alone is made liable absolutely for the offence. Section 7, as it stands, does not warrant the inference that the servant or agent is also liable along with the master or irrespective of or independently of the master or employer. It is plain that under the Indian statute, the servant or the agent has been left out and the principal alone is made liable absolutely for the offence. Section 7, as it stands, does not warrant the inference that the servant or agent is also liable along with the master or irrespective of or independently of the master or employer. The learned Public Prosecutor also relied upon two Indian decisions. The first one was Pyarimohan Saha v. Harendranath Ray1 , wherein a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that there was absolute liability imposed upon the servant also if he sells goods on behalf of his master. But a reading of that decision clearly shows that the learned Judges followed only the English decisions as the basis of that judgment and the Bengal Act is not exactly the same as the Indian Statute. Brown v. Foot1, and Hotchin v. Hindmarsh2, have been referred to in that decision. The other decision relied upon by the learned Public Prosecutor is Radhakrishna Rao v. Province of Madras3 . But this decision was cited more by way of analogy in support of the proposition that the learned Public Prosecutor was sponsoring, viz., that the word " sale" as defined in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was of much wider scope than the word “ sale ” as defined in the Sales-tax Act. There can be no controversy with regard to this. It is also quite true that a servant can be seller without being the owner of the goods himself. But the question here in the instant case is whether he will come under the penal sections of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act if he does not sell the goods himself but sells them only for and on behalf of his master. Curiously enough, it will be noticed that in the English Act the word “ sell ” is not defined anywhere, but in the Indian Act, the word “ sell ” is defined very elaborately. Curiously enough, it will be noticed that in the English Act the word “ sell ” is not defined anywhere, but in the Indian Act, the word “ sell ” is defined very elaborately. If it were the intention that sales by all persons, whether with knowledge or without knowledge, were to be brought within the scope of the penal sections of the Indian Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, then certainly, nothing could have prevented the Legislature from adopting the very language and the terms of the various sections that were already found in existence in the English Act, viz., the Food and Drugs Act. But the Indian Legislature seems to have departed very considerably from the scheme of that Act in using the language both in the charging as well as the penal sections of the Act. There must be good reason for this departure and it must be presumed to be deliberate. No doubt, a person, who knowingly or with knowledge of adulteration sells foodstuffs, should not be allowed to escape. But the real question here is whether the language used in section 7 warrants the inclusion of the person who sells without knowledge of the adulteration. I am of opinion that obviously such a person cannot be so included, because the intention and the meaning of the language does not lend scope to the inclusion of a person who seeks to sell or offers to sell or exposes for sale adulterated goods on behalf of his master or employer. The clear language of section 7 is to the effect that a person should himself sell or sell through any other person on his behalf, in order to be brought within the mischief of that section, and the provision cannot be extended to include what has not been actually intended by the Legislature, viz., that a person who sells on behalf of another should also be made liable to the penalties prescribed. Some meaning or significance has to be attached to the word ' himself ' and to the words "by any other person on his behalf "occurring in the Indian Statute. They cannot by any means be ignored when the true intention of the Legislature is to be found out. In this view, neither the English decisions cited before us nor the Calcutta decision would be of any avail to the learned Public Prosecutor. They cannot by any means be ignored when the true intention of the Legislature is to be found out. In this view, neither the English decisions cited before us nor the Calcutta decision would be of any avail to the learned Public Prosecutor. On the other hand, as my learned brother has pointed out, if the servant has knowledge of the adulteration and he still sells the foodstuffs, he will certainly come within the mischief of the ordinary penal law and could be charged for abetting or aiding the offence under the Food Adulteration Act committed by his master. But, in so far as the scope of the sections, which we are called upon to interpret, is concerned, it is difficult to hold that the servant could also be held liable in an absolute manner, without attributing to him and proving any knowledge on his part, for the mere act of selling adulterated stuffs on behalf of his master. If such were the case, then the consequences would be indeed very serious, as has been pointed out by my learned brother. I do not wish to expatiate on that aspect. A servant might be transacting a hundred sales of the same adulterated foodstuff in a day and if the interpretation which is sought to be put upon the language of section 7 by the learned Public Prosecutor is to be accepted, he will be committing a hundred offences and will be liable for a hundred prosecutions. One could even go to the extent of saying that he has been continuously committing the offence all the time he has been selling the adul- treated stuff and it may be a continuous chain of offences, all for the benefit of his master. It is really unthinkable that the Legislature could have intended such a consequence when it deliberately omitted to include in express or implied language any servant who is authorised to sell goods on behalf of his master, whether it be an individual or a company. I am, therefore, inclined to state that the answer to this reference should be no other than that the servant, who is selling adulterated foodstuff, without knowledge of the same, or without having any part or lot in the adulteration, would not be liable under section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (XXXVII of 1954). I am, therefore, inclined to state that the answer to this reference should be no other than that the servant, who is selling adulterated foodstuff, without knowledge of the same, or without having any part or lot in the adulteration, would not be liable under section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (XXXVII of 1954). The answer is in the negative to the reference and in consequence, Criminal Revision No. 192 of 1957 will be allowed, and the fine, if any, which has been imposed, will have to be refunded. R.M. ------------- Reference answered accordingly and Petition allowed.