Judgment :- 1. The second revision is by the petitioner, landlord, whose petition for eviction from his residential house, of a tenant, under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, has been dismissed concurrently by all the courts below. 2. The petitioner was, at date of the petition and for some time previously, residing in his tarwad house along with his brothers and sisters and their children. According to the petitioner, he found it very inconvenient to continue like that and so he required his own building, for his residential purposes. And petitioner also moved into rented quarters by the time the petition came on for trial. The respondent tenant in his objections, questioned the bona fides of the petitioner's claim and asserted that the building in question was too small and did not befit the petitioner's status. During the trial, petitioner admitted that the building he sought surrender of, was unfit for his occupation as it stood and had to be reconstructed if it was to answer his residential needs. Based on this admission practically it was, that the three courts below right up to the District Judge, in first revision came to the conclusion that petitioner had not made out a bona fide claim for eviction and so rejected his petition. The first two courts, viz., the Rent Controller, Kozhikode and the Subordinate Judge of South Malabar, relied also on their finding that the hardship caused to the tenant would far outweigh the advantages that might accrue to the landlord on the eviction for arriving at their conclusion. 3. Learned counsel for the landlord petitioner, urges before me that the courts below had misled themselves in thinking, that a landlord cannot seek surrender of his own building for purpose of reconstruction and subsequent residence. He complains also that subordinate authorities had wrongly introduced the question of comparative hardship to the tenant and their order was to that extent clearly bad. 4. He complains also that subordinate authorities had wrongly introduced the question of comparative hardship to the tenant and their order was to that extent clearly bad. 4. Now sub-section (a) (i) to S.7 (3) of the Act which governs the case says: "(a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building (i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation and if he is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned". Clause (d) is unimportant for our purpose and so it is not extracted. Then S.7 (3) (e) says: "The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that, in the case of an application under clause (c) the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord". There is a second proviso which does not concern us. Learned counsel is therefore right in saying that no question of hardship to the tenant arises for consideration in this case under S.7 (3) (a) (i). It is only under sub-section (c) of S.7 (3) that that matter will come in. But the question still is, whether the petitioner's claim for eviction was not lacking in bona fides otherwise and was on that ground properly dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent contends in this connection that the statute contemplates the satisfaction of the landlord's residential needs, by the very building in question and therefore, its preservation as contrasted with its destruction and replacement. And he refers to the specific provision in the corresponding enactment in Travancore-Cochin authorising eviction, also in cases "where the building is proposed to be reconstructed". The contention is ingenious but cannot be accepted. And he refers to the specific provision in the corresponding enactment in Travancore-Cochin authorising eviction, also in cases "where the building is proposed to be reconstructed". The contention is ingenious but cannot be accepted. For, in my judgment the Act, designed as it is to place fetters upon the inherent right of the owner, must receive strict construction so as at least not to penalise him. The landlord should, if possible be encouraged rather than hampered in adding to the number of good city dwellings. The object of the rule it appears to me, is not to avoid the tenants of humble dwellings from being thrown out in any event but to dispense substantial justice between landlords and tenants. Indeed it has been held in England that a dwelling house may be reasonably required by the landlord for occupation by himself notwithstanding that he intends to make extensive alterations to the house before residing in it. See Megarry on Rent Laws, 5th Edn. Assuming then, that a landlord may be held to require a building for his own occupation within the meaning of the Act, even though the building concerned may be in need of reconstruction, still the court is entitled to look to every relevant circumstance affecting the landlord and his position, before it comes to the conclusion that his requirements is bona fide. The nature and character of the landlord's accommodation at the time the petitions for eviction and the size, scope and character of his requirements are matters relevant to the enquiry. The state of the landlord's mind and the genuineness of his demand, even if they are there, may not suffice; it is the over all view of the statutory authority as to the landlord's requirement that prevails. And a decision taken by the Authority that the claim is in particular case, bona fide or otherwise, is a finding of fact with which appellate or revisional courts will not ordinarily be astute to interfere. 6. In this case the non-mention of the unfitness of the present building for the petitioner's occupation in the notice of demand or the petition or even in the evidence before court until stage of cross-examination, have led the courts below to suspect whether the idea of reconstruction or repair was at all honestly entertained by the petitioner. 6. In this case the non-mention of the unfitness of the present building for the petitioner's occupation in the notice of demand or the petition or even in the evidence before court until stage of cross-examination, have led the courts below to suspect whether the idea of reconstruction or repair was at all honestly entertained by the petitioner. The learned District Judge in disposing of the revision before him, has indeed characterised this reconstruction proposal as a shift in the petitioner's case and resorted to as a pretext for evicting the tenant for securing a higher rent. And taking into consideration the petitioner's previous proceedings against the tenants in 1948, abortive though it was, one cannot say that the inferences drawn by the courts below were not justified. It may be that the Rent Controller and the Subordinate Judge in appeal touched on one or other aspect which was not quite proper. But on the whole their orders are not in any way wanting in legality or propriety except it may be on the question of costs. For as observed by Pauchapakes Ayyar, J. in the recent case in Natesan v. Surya Bagadhur Shah, (1957) 2 M.L.J. 586, it will be to impose an unnecessary burden on a disappointed landlord to call upon him to pay the costs of the other side besides bearing his own. 7. Learned counsel finally wanted me to say that the respondent to this revision being only the nephew of the original tenant, could not claim a tenant's rights under the Act. But this respondent had been added as a legal representative of the original tenant, during the course of the proceedings before the Rent Controller and had been allowed to figure as respondent in the appeal and the revision which had been later taken. I therefore decline to interfere on this aspect. The petitioner will however have liberty to seek such relief as he may be entitled to, in proceedings properly taken. 8. I therefore dismiss the revision petition but with the direction that the parties will bear their respective costs throughout. Dismissed.