Akhara Panchayati Kalan Udasian v. Musammat Bimla Wati
1958-12-05
D.N.ROY, R.N.GURTU
body1958
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R.N. Gurtu, J. - This is an appeal of Akhara Panchaiti Kalan Udasian, who were defendant in the suit. The suit was filed under the following circumstances, as will appear from the plaint: One Lala Har Prasad was the owner of property. Before he died, he executed a mortgage deed for Rs. 6,0001- with interest at the rate of -|10|-per cent. per month in favour of the defendant Akhara on the 21st of January, 1928. After the death of Lala Har Prasad, his two widows Smt. Chandrawati and Smt. Mokhani became his heirs to the estate and acquired a life interest therein and entered into possession of the property. The two widows aforesaid in the month of May, 1935, made an application under the Encumbered Estates Act in the court of the Second Special Judge, Saharanpur, to secure liquidation of their thus band's debt. Thereafter Smt. Mokhani died in the month of September, 1935, and the name of defendant no. 3, namely, Smt. Bishan Devi, a daughter of Lala Har Prasad was entered in place of Smt. Mokhani in the suit under the Encumbered Estates Act. In the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings the mortgage of 1928 was shown and the property in village Bhawapur, pargana Jwalapur, mentioned in Schedule A of the present plaint was shown as hypothecated under the aforesaid mortgage deed. Besides the said property, Lala Har Prasad had left other properties, movable and immovable, and they are entered in Schedule B of the present plaint and they form part of his estate and were also shown in the Encumbered Estates proceedings. 2. We may here mention that by mistake-an item of property was entered in the present Schedule B which should have been shown in Schedule A, because it was part of the property mortgaged under the mortgage deed referred to above. 3. In the Encumbered Estate, Act proceedings a simple money decree was passed in respect of the mortgage debt in favour of the Akhara and thereafter the decree was transmitted to the Collector for liquidation along with a list of the properties liable for attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of the debt. This was done under Sec. 19 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act and non-mortgaged property of Lala Har Prasad was also included in the list. 4.
This was done under Sec. 19 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act and non-mortgaged property of Lala Har Prasad was also included in the list. 4. Then the present suit was filed by Smt. Bimlawati Devi, a daughter of Har Prasad, as a reversioner. She alleges in the plaint that Smt. Chandrawati and Smt. Mokhani were illiterate woman and therefore they wrongly showed the entire property movable and immovable, and not only the mortgaged property of Har Prasad as being property which would be available for attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of his debts. The plaintiff's case was that she was not a party to the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings and she was a minor when the proceedings were instituted, and that since she had attained majority now and had come to know of the proceedings therefore in order to protect her interest she was filing the suit. She claimed the following relief:- "A. By means of a decree it may be declared that the property mentioned in Schedule B of the plaint is not liable for payment of any debt of defendant no. 1, in connection with the proceedings in suit No. 183|51 of 1935 under the Encumbered Estates Act of the court of the Second Special Judge, Saharanpur, (Smt. Chandrawati and others applicants) , which is pending decision in the court of the Iqbal Officer, Roorkee, for liquidation, nor is the said property liable to transfer, nor is such a transfer binding upon the plaintiff after the death of Smt. Chandrawati defendant no. 2." 5. In this way by her plaint she sought a declaration in respect of all other properties, except the mortgaged property. 6. The Akhara entered defence and raised various pleas and one of the pleas was that the entire property of Har Prasad had rightly been shown in the list of properties as available for attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of the debt, as it was Har Prasad's debt which was to be satisfied out of the said properties. It was pleaded that the suit was barred under Sec. 47 of the Encumbered Estates Act. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff was not the daughter of Har Prasad and that she was not entitled to file the suit.
It was pleaded that the suit was barred under Sec. 47 of the Encumbered Estates Act. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff was not the daughter of Har Prasad and that she was not entitled to file the suit. The court below considered the case of the parties and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was the daughter of Lala Har Prasad. It also came to the conclusion that the present plaintiff could not have intervened in the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings as she was a mere reversioner and had no right in present then or now. It also held that the present suit was not barred by Sec. 47 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act as the present plaintiff was not a party in those proceedings. It then came to the conclusion that save and except the property which was expressly mortgaged under the mortgage deed of Har Prasad, no other property of Har Prasad could be made available for attachment, sale or satisfaction of the mortgage debt of Har Prasad. In the result a declaration was granted to the following effect:- "The plaintiff's suit for declaration that any transfer of the properties specified in Schedule B of the plaint (except Item No. 1) made in liquidation proceedings of the Encumbered Estates Act Case No. 184|51 of 1935 (Special Judge II Grade Saharanpur) will not be binding on the plaintiff after the death of Musammat Chandrawati, is decreed but her claim for declaration regarding 3 bighas, 13 biswas pukhta land of Khewat at No. 1|2 of Mohal Jadid Mastahkam, village Bhuapura, pargana Jwalapur (Item No. 1 of Schedule B of the plaint) is dismissed." 7. We have already indicated that this Item No. 1 ought really to have been in Schedule A of the plaint as it was a part of the mortgaged property. 8. The Akhara has come up in appeal and on its behalf two contentions have been raised. Firstly, that the property mentioned in Schedule B, i.e. the non-mortgaged property of Har Prasad was available for satisfaction of Har Prasad's debts and that liquidation could be had against all such property also in connection with the simple money decree which had been passed in favour of the Akhara and not only in respect of property expressly mortgaged under the mortgage deed.
The second contention is that in view of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the present plaintiff, who claims as a reversioner and who admits that the surviving widow Smt. Chandrawati is still in possession of the entire estate of her husband, cannot maintain the suit. So far as the first point is concerned, it is to be decided upon an interpretation of Sec. 49, sub-Sec. (1) of the Encumbered Estates Act. That section runs as follows:- "If the debts of a landlord are the debts due from his deceased ancestor which are legally recoverable only from certain property in the possession of the landlord, only such property and no other property belonging to the landlord shall be dealt with under the provisions of this Act; and all references to the property of the landlord in the various sections of this Act shall be deemed to be references only to such property and to no other." 9. The contention is that the words "which are legally recoverable only from certain property" in Sec. 49 (1) do not mean that only property which is specifically mortgaged in a mortgage deed can alone be sold and not other property. It is contended by the appellant's counsel that what the section means is this that where the applicants landlords are the successors of a person who has incurred the debt, then the debt can only be realised by sale of the property which such deceased debtor possessed and it cannot be realised by the sale or mortgage of non-inherited property which may belong to the landlord applicant (who has made the application) in his own right and which does not come to him from the deceased ancestor whose debt is being sought to be satisfied. Now in this case the position is that the mortgage debt was created by Har Prasad and when Smt. Chandrawati and Smt. Mokhani made the application under the Encumbered Estates Act it was with a view to having the debts which Har Prasad had incurred, liquidated under the said Act. The mortgage debt of 1928 was his debt. It is not clear whether there were other debts also. The mortgage debt was converted into a simple money decree under the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings.
The mortgage debt of 1928 was his debt. It is not clear whether there were other debts also. The mortgage debt was converted into a simple money decree under the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings. Therefore for the satisfaction of that decree all the property which had come to the widows from Har Prasad was being offered as required by the Act so that satisfaction might be obtained against it and the widows had shown all such property in the Schedules of property in connection with the application in the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act. 10. Upon a consideration of the language of Sec. 49 (1) we are clear that the section does not mean that only the hypothecated property was available for satisfaction of the deceased ancestor's mortgage debt. The section means that the deceased ancestor's property alone would be available for the satisfaction of the deceased ancestor's debts. The deceased ancestor's property in the possession of the landlord applicants could be made available for the deceased ancestor's debts and not any personal property which the landlord applicants, his successors, may have of their own in contradistinction to such property which comes to them from the deceased ancestor. We are therefore of the view that even the property not covered by the mortgage deed which was shown in Schedule B of the present plaint and was previously also shown in the landlord-applicant's application as the property of Har Prasad was and is liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in relation to the debts of Har Prasad. 11. By now everyone is familiar with the fact that the Special Judge converts mortgage decree into, simple money decrees and only simple money decrees are passed under the Encumbered Estates Act and those simple money decrees are satisfied in the way laid down in the Encumbered Estates Act by the decrees being forwarded to the Collector in a priority list along with a schedule of the landlord's property which was liable to satisfy the said debts by attachment, sale or mortgage. 12. Therefore in our view the court below clearly gave a wrong interpretation to Sec. 49 (1) of the Encumbered Estates Act and a wrong declaration in consequence in respect of the property entered in the plaint Schedule B". 13.
12. Therefore in our view the court below clearly gave a wrong interpretation to Sec. 49 (1) of the Encumbered Estates Act and a wrong declaration in consequence in respect of the property entered in the plaint Schedule B". 13. In regard to the next contention that the present plaintiffs had no locus stand to file the suit in view of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, we are in agreement with learned counsel for the appellant. We may point out that in paragraph 4 of the present plaint it was admitted that the widows, who had a life interest, had entered into possession of the property of Har Prasad. There is no statement that any part of the property of Har Prasad ever went out of the possession of the widows. It appears that when the present suit was filed the liquidation proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act in the Sub-Divisional Officer's court were sought to be stayed. At first an interim stay order was granted on the 28th of October 1946, by this Court, and then the stay was confirmed on the 7th of December, 1946, and the Sub-Divisional Officer was prohibited from dealing with properties other than the property mortgaged. It has not been contended before us that the effect of proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act is to divest the landlord applicant even before the mortgage deeds or sale-deeds contemplated under the Act are actually executed by the Collector in liquidation of the decrees. It is also admitted that possession of the landlord applicants is not disturbed by virtue of the pendency of the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings. It is evident, therefore, that the widows have never been dispossessed of the property of Har Prasad in respect of which the declaration was sought. Consequently the position is that today the estate is still legally in possession of the surviving widow, namely, Smt. Chandrawati and the life interest undoubtedly stands extended and has become an absolute estate. It is not now open to Smt. Bimlawati Devi on the assertion that she is a reversioner to challenge the action of Smt. Chandrawati. The suit therefore is liable also to be dismissed.
It is not now open to Smt. Bimlawati Devi on the assertion that she is a reversioner to challenge the action of Smt. Chandrawati. The suit therefore is liable also to be dismissed. on this ground for even if the property in question could not have been proceeded against under the Encumbered Estates proceedings it would have been at the absolute disposal of Smt. Chandrawati and the present plaintiff would have no reversionary rights with respect to it. 14. We might add that it was agreed that the Zamindari Abolition Act did not affect the question whether the plaintiff had or had not a right as reversioner to prosecute the suit after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, because the rights of the widow in the Estate would become attached to the compensation and rehabilitation bonds. But we have already held that the property in question was available to the creditors in the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings and now the compensation and rehabilitation bonds will take the place of the property. 15. In view of what we have said this appeal must be and is allowed, the judgment and decree of the court below must be and are set aside and the plaintiff's suit must stand dismissed with costs of the trial court and of this Court.