Rajamannar, C.J.- These two appeals arise out of two suits filed originally in this Court on its Original Side (C.S. Nos. 103 and 183 of 1954) and subsequently transferred to the City Civil Court at Madras where they were numbered as O.S. Nos. 1456 and 1463 of 1955 respectively. Both the suits were tried together by the learned Additional Judge of the City Civil Court and decreed as prayed for. The first defendant in the two suits is the appellant in the two appeals before us. O.S. No. 1456 of 1955 is a suit to recover a sum of Rs. 26,798-4-7 alleged to be due for balance of principal and interest in respect of a promissory note executed on 1st March, 1951, by the first defendant, Ms. Wazir Sultan & Sons, a firm of merchants carrying on business at Hyderabad, in favour of the second defendant, Shyamala Industrial Corporation, Ltd., a private limited company, for Rs. 32,691-5-2 O.S. (that is, Hyderabad currency) and assigned by the second defendant to the plaintiff, Karlapaty Syamlamba, on 15th January, 1954. The following are the material allegations in the plaint. On 1st March, 1951, the defendants settled their accounts in respect of a partnership business carried on by them at Secunderabad and the second defendant retired from the partnership and released its rights therein in consideration of a sum of Rs. 32,691-5-2 agreed to be paid by the first defendant to the second defendant. For this sum the first defendant executed a promissory note agreeing to pay the sum with interest at 4 per cent. per annum. Towards the promissory note a sum of Rs. 2,691-5-2 (O.S.) was paid and there is a sum of Rs. 30,000 (O.S.) now due for principal, equivalent to Rs. 25,714-4-7 in Indian Currency and interest from 1st March, 1951, which comes to Rs. 1,084. On 19th February, 1954, the first defendant paid a sum of Rs. 2,000 by a cheque towards the promissory note. After giving credit for the said sum, an amount of Rs. 26,798-4-7 is due for principal and interest. The first defendant by partner Abdul Hameed Sultan filed a written statement in which the execution of the promissory note was admitted. The only plea was that in addition to the payments admitted by the plaintiff to have been received, the defendant made further payments of Rs. 5,000 (O.S.), Rs. 5,000 (O.S.) and Rs. The first defendant by partner Abdul Hameed Sultan filed a written statement in which the execution of the promissory note was admitted. The only plea was that in addition to the payments admitted by the plaintiff to have been received, the defendant made further payments of Rs. 5,000 (O.S.), Rs. 5,000 (O.S.) and Rs. 2,000 (Indian Currency) on 12th June, 1951, 21 st July, 1951 and 17th, October, 1951, respectively and therefore the first defendant is liable to pay only the amount that may be found due after giving credit to these payments. These payments were alleged to have been made to Mr. K. Appa Rao, Managing Director of the second defendant company. The first defendant complained that the said Appa Rao had for his own reasons unlawfully treated the said payments to other accounts on which no amount was due to him and had also filed another suit. The plaintiff was no other than the mother of the said Appa Rao and the plaintiff in the other suit is no other than his nephew. An error in the calculation of the amount due in the plaint was also pointed out. The other suit, O.S. 1463 of 1955, is a suit on another promissory note executed on 2nd January, 1950, by the first defendant, M/s. Wazir Sultan & Sons, represented by its managing partner Hameed Sultan, in favour of the second defendant, K. Appa Rao, for a sum of Rs. 45,000 and transferred by him to the plaintiff on 25th August, 1951. The following are the material allegations in this plaint. On 2nd January, 1950 the first defendant by its managing partner Hameed Sultan executed a promissory note in favour of the second defendant for a sum of Rs. 45,000 (O.S.) repayable with interest at 12 per cent per annum. In respect of the said promissory note the first defendant paid to the second defendant two sums of Rs. 5,000 each on 12th June 1951 and 21st July, 1951 respectively. The balance due in respect of the principal and interest is Rs. 52,985 (O.S.) equivalent to Rs. 45,414 in Indian Currency. The first defendant practically admitted the execution of the promissory note but denied all liability under it. 5,000 each on 12th June 1951 and 21st July, 1951 respectively. The balance due in respect of the principal and interest is Rs. 52,985 (O.S.) equivalent to Rs. 45,414 in Indian Currency. The first defendant practically admitted the execution of the promissory note but denied all liability under it. His case was as follows; By deed of partnership dated 12th June, 1949, the first defendant and Shymala Industries Corporation, Ltd., a private limited company of which K. Appa Rao was the Managing Director, became partners and conducted business at Hyderabad. Under the said deed of partnership the Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., was to invest in the partnership firm capital to the extent of Rs. 70,000 and the second defendant, its Managing Director, was to be in sole charge of the business. The partnership commenced its business, on 12th June, 1949 and was dissolved by mutual consent on 28th February, 1951. Advances were made by the Shyamala Industries from time to time and as per the balance sheet of the partnership as on 31st December, 1949, the total sum thus advanced was Rs. 42,959-14-0. In respect of this amount the second defendant K. Appa Rao, Managing Director of the Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., desired that the first defendant should execute a promissory note for a sum of Rs. 45,000 in his favour, and in pursuance of such a request he executed the promissory note. It was specifically agreed at the time that the suit promissory note was enforceable only to the extent of the amount that might be ultimately due by the partnership. The promissory note was an Additional security for the sums advanced As per the balance sheet of the partnership firm drawn on 28th February, 1951, the date of its dissolution, the first defendant had to pay to the other partner a sum of Rs. 16,490-8-10 towards the balance due on the loan account and half the losses of the partnership which amounted to Rs. 34,741-0-8. After certain adjustments it was settled that the first defendant was liable to pay the sum of Rs. 32,691-5-2 and for this sum a promissory note was executed by the first defendant in favour of the Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., (the promissory note which is the subject-matter of O.S. No. 1456 of 1955). This sum included the balance due in respect of the advances made by second defendant to the firm. 32,691-5-2 and for this sum a promissory note was executed by the first defendant in favour of the Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., (the promissory note which is the subject-matter of O.S. No. 1456 of 1955). This sum included the balance due in respect of the advances made by second defendant to the firm. Hence the suit promissory note for Rs. 45,000 automatically got extinguished and is therefore not enforceable. The assignment in favour of the plaintiff who is a near relation of the second defendant is fraudulent and intended to make the first defendant liable twice over for the same debt. Though the first defendant demanded a return of the promissory note the second defendant promised to do so but did not. The first defendant also raised a plea of limitation as the suit had been filed more than three years after the execution of the promissory note. Both the suits were tried together and the evidence adduced by the parties was treated as evidence in the two suits. The learned trial Judge held that the promissory note for Rs. 45,000 was not executed for the purpose and in the circumstances set out by the first defendant, that the said promissory note was not extinguished by the execution of the other promissory note for Rs. 32,691-5-2 as alleged by the first defendant, that the two sums of Rs. 5,000 each were sent by the first defendant in part payment of the promissory note for Rs. 45,000 and not for the other promissory note and that the suit was not barred by limitation. Following the result of these findings, the learned Judge also held that the first defendant should not be given credit to the said two sums as payments towards the promissory note of Rs. 32,691-5-2. There was one other payment of Rs. 2,000’ made by the first defendant on 17th October, 1951, which K. Appa Rao credited towards his alleged dues in respect of a mica transaction. The learned Judge expressed a doubt whether Appa Rao could lawfully appropriate this sum towards the mica account when such appropriation was disputed by the first defendant. But he held that the said sum could not be taken as paid towards the promissory note for Rs. 32,691-5-2 and refrained from recording a definite finding as to what relief the first defendant should get for this admitted payment. But he held that the said sum could not be taken as paid towards the promissory note for Rs. 32,691-5-2 and refrained from recording a definite finding as to what relief the first defendant should get for this admitted payment. In the result both the suits were decreed as prayed for. The main contest in these two appeals has centred round the promissory note for Rs. 45,000 executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant Appa Rao on 2nd January, 1950 (Exhibit B-4). It runs thus: “ On demand we promise to pay Mr. K. Appa Rao or his order a sum of Rs. O.S. Rs. 45,000(Rupees Forty-five thousand only) with interest at 12 per cent. per annum for value received in cash. The first defendant’s case in short is that there was no payment in cash of any sum and that the promissory note was executed as an additional security for the sums advanced by K. Appa Rao as the Managing Director of the Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., as per the terms of the partnership agreement. The partnership deed executed on 12th June, 1949 by and between the first defendant firm and the Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., (Exhibit B-1) provided inter alia that the Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., should invest in the business an amount to the extent of Rs. 70,000 only free of interest and that any amount advanced over and above this sum shall carry interest at a rate not exceeding 4½ per cent. per annum.The Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., shall be in sole charge of the staff and establishment of the business, and have the power to lend moneys and to operate upon the funds and bank accounts of the company and shall also be in sole charge and control of the running of the business. The balance sheet as on 31st December,1949, diclosed that the Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., had invested a sum of Rs. 42,959-14-0 as on that date. According to the first defendant, the promissory note was executed as a security for this sum rounded off to Rs. 45,000. Abdul Hameed Sultan, the managing partner of the first defendant firm, in his evidence deposed as follows: " Appa Rao did not pay me cash Rs. 42,959-14-0 as on that date. According to the first defendant, the promissory note was executed as a security for this sum rounded off to Rs. 45,000. Abdul Hameed Sultan, the managing partner of the first defendant firm, in his evidence deposed as follows: " Appa Rao did not pay me cash Rs. 45,000 either on that day or any day before or afterwards.I executed pronote because K. Appa Rao said that he has advanced to the partnership business and there is no security and he asked me to give the pronote as security for the amounts advanced " He asked Appa Rao why a promissory note was necessary and Appa Rao gave as a reason that his partners were compelling him to obtain a promissory note. There are several circumstances which, in our opinion, lead us to the conclusion that this cas cannot be true. In the affidavit filed by one Ramamoorthy, the Head Clerk, of the first defendant’s firm, in support of the application filed by the first defendant in this Court for leave to appear and defend the suit, it was stated that this promissory note for Rs. 45,000 was security for any possible losses which the first defendant would have to bear ultimately. This case is quite inconsistent with the case subsequently develop, ed by the first defendant that the promissory note was intended to serve as an additional security for the sums advanced by the Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd. We are unable to comprehend how the promissory note would be an additional security. Under the terms of the partnership deed the advance up to Rs. 70,000 bore no interest ; but the promissory note provided for interest at 12 per cent per annum. It is most unlikely that the first defendant would promise to pay interest, and at that high rate, for amounts advanced by the Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., which they were bound to advance. In our opinion, the conduct of the first defendant subsequently, at the time of the execution of the second promissory note, is conclusive on the point and demonstrates the falsity of the plea. It is common ground that the later promissory note for Rs. 32,691-5-2 comprised the amount due in respect of the advance made by Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., as per the terms of the agreement. It is common ground that the later promissory note for Rs. 32,691-5-2 comprised the amount due in respect of the advance made by Shyamala Industries Corporation, Ltd., as per the terms of the agreement. If the version of the first defendant is true, one would have ordinarily expected a cancellation of the promissory note for Rs. 45,000 on the execution of the other promissory note. Indeed that it must be deemed to have been cancelled is the case of the first defendant. But admittedly no such thing was done and the promissory note was allowed to continue with Appa Rao. The first defendant says that he asked Appa Rao for the return of the promissory note but Appa Rao said that it was in Madras and that it would be returned as soon as he goes there. He again asked Appa Rao when he came to Hyderabad and he was told that he, Appa Rao, had forgotten to bring the promissory note. In spite of this no written demand was ever made by the first defendant for the return of the promissory note. Admittedly two drafts drawn on the Central Bank of India for Rs. 5,000 (O.S.) each were sent by Hameed Sultan the managing partner of the first defendant firm, to K. Appa Rao. In the accompanying letter there is no mention regarding the purpose for which these two amounts were sent, whether they were towards either of the promissory notes or on any other account. But it is not without significance that the two amounts are sent to K.Appa Rao by name and not to the Shyamala Industries Corporation. The first defendant does not say that there was any liability to pay any amounts to K. Appa Rao individually. Hameed Sultan in his evidence no doubt would say that though in law Appa Rao may be distinct from Shyamala Industries Corporation, in substance they were the same and he was dealing only with Appa Rao in all his transactions. It is idle to expect any Court to accept this explanation when to his knowledge there were two promissory notes executed, one in favour of K. Appa Rao and the other in favour of the Shyamala Industries Corporation. The cheque for Rs. 2,000 sent on 20th February, 1954, was drawn in favour of the Shyamala Industries Corporation. The assignee of the promissory note for Rs. The cheque for Rs. 2,000 sent on 20th February, 1954, was drawn in favour of the Shyamala Industries Corporation. The assignee of the promissory note for Rs. 45,000 who is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 1463 of 1955, issued a notice through his advocate calling upon the first defendant to pay the balance of principal and interest due in respect of the said promissory note after giving credit to the two sums of Rs. 5,000 (O.S.) each sent by means of two drafts. The reply to this demand is curious. It (Exhibit B-15) runs thus: “ Reference to your notice on behalf of your client Mr. P. Satchithananda Rao of Audiappa Naick Street, Madras, I have to inform you that as already informed Mr. K. Appa Rao the supposed transferor of the alleged promissory note that it is not at all valid and it has been considered invalid. Also that the transferor or any action taken thereon does not bind me or my firm. Further I deny that payments were made in respect of the said promissory note. Any action that may be taken by your client on such wrong promissory note shall be at his own risk.” There is not a whisper in this important letter of the defence eventually set up at the trial, namely, that the promissory note had been executed only as additional security for the advances made to the partnership by the Shyamala Industries Corporation, and that it became unenforceable on the execution of the promissory note for Rs. 32,691-5-2 (O.S.) by the first defendant in favour of Shyamala Industries Corporation. There was a similar notice of demand from the assignee of this later promissory note through his advocate on 3rd February, 1954 (Exhibit B-17). In this notice credit was not given to the two sums of Rs. 5,000 (O.S.) each which had been sent by the first defendant to Anna Rao. The reply to this notice is as follows (Exhibit B-18): “ As per our conversation, we are herewith sending you a cheque No. H. A. 23497, dated 10th February 1954 for Rs. 2,000 and the balance will be paid to you in due course. Mr. T. R. S. Iyengar had sent a notice on 3rd instant and We find that the balance shown in it does not tally with our books. 2,000 and the balance will be paid to you in due course. Mr. T. R. S. Iyengar had sent a notice on 3rd instant and We find that the balance shown in it does not tally with our books. Please verify the same and send us the amended accounts.” It is not a little surprising that there is no mention of the plea now raised that the aforesaid two sums had been paid towards this promissory note. It is most extraordinary that the first defendant did not produce any books of account. The curious reason given for this conduct is that they were not bound to produce them unless they were called upon to do so by the plaintiff. The explanation has only to be stated to be rejected. It cannot be expected of the plaintiff to summon for the production of the defendant’s account books. If the first defendant wanted to establish their case that there was no consideration for the promissory note for Rs. 45,000, and that amount was not paid in cash to them, it was their duty to produce the books for the relevant period to show that no such amount was received by them. During the hearing of the appeal an application was made on behalf of the first defendant, C.M.P. No. 5927 of 1958, to admit the day book and ledger purported to have been maintained by their firm during the relevant period. In the affidavit filed by a partner of the firm, not Hameed Sultan, the managing partner, the reason given for not producing the account books earlier is that their advocate did not advise them to produce them as there was no notice served on them by the other side to produce them. The application was opposed and we have no hesitation in dismissing it. The application is very belated and, if granted, there will have to be a remand and practically a retrial of the case. As the execution of the promissory note in question (Exhibit B-4) was admitted, the onus lay on the first defendant as the executant to prove that there was no consideration for it and that it was executed in the circumstances and for the purpose mentioned in its written statement. We are of opinion that the first defendant has not discharged that onus. We are of opinion that the first defendant has not discharged that onus. It was not even suggested that Appa Rao was not financially in a position to advance the sum of Rs. 45,000. There is also evidence that the first defendant firm was in need of finance. Hameed Sultan the managing partner admitted that at or about the material time he floated three companies,, the authorised capital of which was respectively Rs. 6,25,000, Rs. 5,00,000 and 10,00,000. By the end 1949 all these companies had gone into liquidation. About Rs. 90,000 (O.S.) was due to the Industrial Trust Funds, Ltd., and they were discharging the debt in instalments. As we have said before, the first defendant has not produced the account books of the firm to show that the amount was not received in cash. No-adequate explanation has been forthcoming as to why the promissory note was executed if no money had been paid. We are not in the least impressed with the explanation attempted by the first defendant that it was as security for the sums advanced to the partnership by Appa Rao or Shyamala Industries Corporation. We have mentioned the circumstances which conclusively prove that the first defendant’s explanation cannot be true. We hold, agreeing with the learned trial Judge, that the promissory note in question has not been shown to be devoid of consideration. We have deliberately refrained from referring so far to certain copies of letters and credit slips, the originals of which are alleged to have been posted by Appa Rao to the first defendant. These are Exhibits A-1 and A-2 which relate to the first demand draft for Rs. 5,000 sent on 12th June, 1951 and Exhibits A-3 and A-4 which relate to the second sum of Rs. 5,000 sent on 21st July, 1951. In the letter dated 19th June, 1951 (Exhibit A-1), we find it stated that the amount sent had been, credited towards the promissory note account of the first defendant. The enclosed credit slip is in the following terms: " Received from Hyderabad Vazir Sultan Garu, Credit towards pronote for Rs. 5,000 sent on 21st July, 1951. In the letter dated 19th June, 1951 (Exhibit A-1), we find it stated that the amount sent had been, credited towards the promissory note account of the first defendant. The enclosed credit slip is in the following terms: " Received from Hyderabad Vazir Sultan Garu, Credit towards pronote for Rs. 45,000, dated and January, 1950, executed in favour of K. Appa Rao by cheque sent on Hyderabad Central Bank bearing No. B. 404831 for rupees four thousand two hundred and eighty five and annas eleven only." Exhibits A-3 and A-4 are the corresponding letter and credit slip for the second sum of Rs. 5,000. We must say that we are not completely satisfied with the genuineness of these copies. It is not clear if they were sent by registered post. If they were, the acknowledgment should have been filed but they are not. The copies which are now produced can be brought into, existence at any time. Exhibit A-7 was put forward by the plaintiff as the receipt given by the post office for the envelope containing Exhibits A-3 and A-4 sent by Appa Rao to Abdul Hameed Sultan We are not convinced that this is so. In Exhibit A-3 the addressee’s name is given as Mr. Hameed Sultan whereas the receipt contains the name Abdul Hameed Sultan. One cannot help remarking that if this postal receipt was so well preserved, why was not the acknowledgment which would contain the signature of some one on behalf of the first defendant preserved and produced. We do not therefore wish to rest our decision on these documents. A copy of a notice alleged to have been issued to the first defendant by the advocate for Appa Rao calling upon the first defendant to pay the principal and interest due upon the promissory note, dated 2nd January, 1950, was relied on (Exhibit A-6, dated 1st June, 1951). Appa Rao admitted in evidence that this was a copy of a copy of the notice prepared a few days before it was filed into Court. This document was rightly rejected by the learned Trial Judge. The promissory note (Exhibit B-4) recites receipt of Rs. 45,000 in cash while the case of the first defendant was that no cash was paid. The case of Appa Rao was that he did pay cash. This document was rightly rejected by the learned Trial Judge. The promissory note (Exhibit B-4) recites receipt of Rs. 45,000 in cash while the case of the first defendant was that no cash was paid. The case of Appa Rao was that he did pay cash. To probabilise his version, Appa Rao put forward the case that he collected about Rs. 39,000 by sale of lands belonging to his mother at Jaggayyapet through his manager, one Narasimha Ayyar (P.W. 2) and that it was this money that was paid to the first defendant as consideration for the promissory note In support of his case he relied upon the day book and ledger of the United Commercial Syndicate which stands for all practical purposes for its proprietor Appa Rao Registration copies of sale deeds executed to several persons were filed in further support of this case. These sale deeds however bear dates subsequent to the date of the promissory note in question, ranging as they do from February, 1050 Mr. Rajah Ayyar commented on many infirmities in the case sought to be built up on the entries in the account books. There is some force in at least some of the comments, but we do not think it necessary for the disposal of this appeal to discuss in detail the several entries and the oral evidence relating to them and to give a finding, on the question whether Appa Rao advanced the amount of Rs 45,000 (O.S.) from and out of moneys obtained by him by sale of lands belonging to his mother. As the learned Judge has said, there was no necessity to plead that Appa Rao got the money advanced for the promissory note Exhibit B-4 from any particular source. It is sufficient to state that it was for the first defendant to prove by satisfactory evidence that ho consideration passed for the promissory note and that it was executed in the circumstances alleged by him and that it was not enforceable as such. On 17th October, 1951, the first defendant sent another draft on the Central Bank of India, Ltd., for Rs. 2,000 (I.C.) to Appa Rao. On 17th October, 1951, the first defendant sent another draft on the Central Bank of India, Ltd., for Rs. 2,000 (I.C.) to Appa Rao. Appa Rao acknowledged this by his letter, dated 22nd October, 1951, (Exhibit B-11) but added that his advocate has already notified to the first defendant that he had assigned the promissory note in favour of Sri P. Satchithananda Rao and he was therefore crediting the amount to the mica account. He called upon the first defendant to remit the balance of Rs. 12,000 due on that account and take possession of the mine. On 1st November, 1951, the first defendant in reply to this definitely informed Appa Rao that they did not agree to or accept his mica accounts and therefore to his crediting the said Rs. 2,000 to the mica account and that the sum should be "credited to the amount due on Auction Account only". The learned Judge has in more than one place expressed a doubt as to whether Appa Rao was entitled to credit this amount of Rs. 2,000 to the mica account about which there was dispute between the parties. Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Ayyar appearing for the. plaintiff in O.S. No. 1456 of 1955 did not contend that the amount should be credited to the mica account. He agreed that it may be credited to the promissory note of Rs. 45,000 (Exhibit B-4)., There remains only the question of limitation. The promissory note for Rs. 45,000 (Exhibit B-4) was executed on 2nd January, 1950. The suit was brought on 3rd February, 1954, that is, beyond three years. To save the suit from the bar of limitation the plaintiff relies on two payments by drafts drawn on the Central Bank of India and sent along with the covering letters, Exhibits B-8 and B-9 on 12th June, 1951 and 21st July, 1951, respectively, and the provisions of section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. To save the suit from the bar of limitation the plaintiff relies on two payments by drafts drawn on the Central Bank of India and sent along with the covering letters, Exhibits B-8 and B-9 on 12th June, 1951 and 21st July, 1951, respectively, and the provisions of section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. The material provisions of that section as it stands now, and as it stood on the date of the suit are as follows:- “Section 20 (1).- Where payment on account of a debtor of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period, by the persons liable to pay the debt or legacy, or by his duly authorised agent, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made: Originally the sub-section ran as follows: Where interest on a debt or legacy is, before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid as such by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy, or his agent duly authorised in this behalf, or where part of the principal of a debt is, before the expiration of the prescribed period paid by the debtor or by his agent authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made.” By the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1927, in place of the old proviso the following proviso was substituted: “ Provided that, save in the case of a payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appear in the hand-writing of, or in a Writing signed by the person making the payment.” As the sub-section now stands, the distinction between the payment of interest as such and the payment of part of the principal of a debt no longer exist. The words are general so far as a debt is concerned. The payment must be “on account of a debt” . The words are general so far as a debt is concerned. The payment must be “on account of a debt” . According to the sub-section as it now stands, the creditor to get the benefit of an extension of limitation, has to prove two facts: (1) that there has been a payment on account of a debt before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or by his duly authorised agent and (2) that there is an acknowledgment of the payment in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment. It is important to keep these two requirements separate. Payment is an act. It consists in the passing of money or the equivalent of money from one person to another. The acknowledgment is a record in writing. Section 20 (1) does not admit of an oral acknowledgment. When a payment, say of money, is made by one person to another, it may be made for different reasons. The payment may be in person, in which case the person paying may mention to the person receiving the money the purpose for which the payment is made. Apart from any authority, it appears to us to be common sense to hold in such a case evidence can be given as regards the purpose for which the payment was made. Now obviously a payment alone, even if it is established that it was on account of a debt, would not be sufficient to start a fresh period of limitation. There should be an acknowledgment of the payment in a document either in the handwriting of, or in writing a signed by the person making the payment. This acknowledgment is only evidentiary in character. It is the payment. that starts the fresh period of limitation and not the acknowledgment of the payment. Vide Vtsvanath Raghunath v. Mahndeo Rajaram1, per Beaumont, C.J. Hence it has been held that the fresh period of limitation would start from the date of the payment and not from the date of the acknowledgment, Ram Prasad Mohan Lal, In re2. In Visvanath Raghunath v. Mahadeo Rajaram1, cited above, Beaumount, C.J., observes thus: “It is true that the payment has to be made within the prescribed period; but the Act does not provide that the acknowledgment is to be made within that period. In Visvanath Raghunath v. Mahadeo Rajaram1, cited above, Beaumount, C.J., observes thus: “It is true that the payment has to be made within the prescribed period; but the Act does not provide that the acknowledgment is to be made within that period. It is the payment and not the acknowledgment which extends the period of limitation. The acknowledgment is merely a matter of evidence and provided it is signed before the suit is commenced that appears to me to be sufficient.” While the words “ on account of a debt” occur in the main sub-section they do not occur in the proviso. Under the proviso, all that is required is an acknowledgment of the payment in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment. Mr. Rajah Ayyar, learned counsel for the first defendant-appellant contended that the acknowledgment of the payment should on the face of it show that it is a payment on account of a debt. But the language of the proviso does not compel us to agree with this contention. In support of his argument he relied on an early ruling of this Court in Mackenzie v. Tiruvengadathan1, which was followed without discussion in Ram Chander v. Chandi Prasad and others2, and the decision of a single learned Judge of the Patna High Court in Gobind Ram v. Firm Chuni Ram3. In Mackenzie v. Tiruvengadthan1, to compute a fresh period of limitation, a cheque drawn in favour of the debtor and endorsed by him to the creditor was relied on. That was the only writing which they produced in evidence of a part payment made on account of the principal. No evidence was produced to show that the endorsement had been made and signed by the debtor. It was held by Parker, J., who first tried the suit that this would not avail the plaintiff as there was no evidence even as to who made the endorsement. On appeal, the learned Judges confirmed this decision but made the following observations obiter: “Assuming that respondent No. 2 (the debtor) endorsed the cheque B, it does not satisfy the requirements of section so of the Act of Limitation. The proviso to that section requires that the fact of the part-payment should appear in the handwriting of the debtor or his agent. The proviso to that section requires that the fact of the part-payment should appear in the handwriting of the debtor or his agent. The cheque is only an order for payment, and it does not evidence any payment at all. Nor does it show for What purpose the payment was made. There is no doubt, some parole evidence as to the payment, but the Act requires that the fact of the payment, and that such payment was a part-payment, should appear in writing signed by the debtor or his agent authorized to make the payment”. It is necessary to remember that the proviso under the Limitation Act of 1877, which was the Act applicable, ran thus: “ Provided that in the case of part-payment of the principal of a debt, the fact of the payment appears in the handwriting of the person making the same.” The observations must be understood in the context that what was relied on was a cheque. There has been considerable change of opinion as regards the conception of payment by cheque and it is now well established that a cheque may be treated as payment. A full discussion of the topic is to be found in Subramanyam v. Venkatarathnam4, and Prafulla Chandra Nag v. Jatindra Nath Kar5. There is also the difference in language between the section as it stood then and as it now stands. We cannot treat the decision in Mackenzie v. Tiruvengadathan1, as an authority on section 20, sub-section (1) as it now stands. In Gobind Ram v. Firm Chuni Ram3 a certain amount was sent by the debtor by money order; but there was nothing in the money order coupon to show on what account the remittance was made. Rowland, J., held that the requirement of section 20 was not satisfied. The reasoning of the learned Judge can be stated in his own words: “ I think the acknowledgment must appear on its face to be on account of the debtor, at least on account of a debt whereas in the money order coupon there is nothing at all to show on what account the remittance was made.” The learned Judge was apparently of the view that it is necessary that the connection between the payment and the debt should appear on the face of the writing required by the proviso to section 20 (1) of the Limitation Act. With respect to the learned Judge we do not agree with him as his view is not supported either by the language of section 20 or by the decisions of Courts. An early decision of the English Courts in Tippets v. Heine6, was relied on but it does not directly bear on a construction of the present sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Ayyar for the plaintiff-respondent relied on certain observations and decisions as supporting his contention that the conditions required by section 20 must be deemed to have been complied with in this case. His argument was that it can be proved by evidence that a payment was on account of a debt and that it is not necessary that the acknowledgment of the payment should specify expressly the debt towards which the payment had been made. It may be by evidence of surrounding circumstances or of direct parole evidence of what happened at the time of payment. It may consist in an appropriation by the creditor of an open payment. All that section 20 (1) requires is proof of payment on account of a debt and an acknowledgment of payment in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment and proof of the payment can be in any manner recognised in law. So the argument ran. Great reliance was placed on the observations made by the Judicial Committee in Rama Shah v. Lal Chand1. No doubt that was a case decided before the amendment of 1942 and related to the true construction and effect of section 20 of the Limitation Act as amended by the Amending Act of 1927. The decision on the facts in that case has no direct application to the present case. There the suit was brought on a promissory note, dated 4th February, 1930. The suit was instituted on 24th January, 1936. To save the suit from the bar of limitation, an endorsement on the promissory note in the writing of the defendant, dated 24th January, 1933, was relied on. The endorsement ran thus: “ Paid Rs. 100 to-day in this pronote” . The High Court of Lahore held in appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge who gave a decree to the plaintiff that the sum of Rs. The endorsement ran thus: “ Paid Rs. 100 to-day in this pronote” . The High Court of Lahore held in appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge who gave a decree to the plaintiff that the sum of Rs. 100 was never appropriated by the debtor or by the creditor either to interest or part-payment of principal until the date of suit, that is, until long after three years had elapsed from the date of the promissory note and, therefore, the suit was time-barred. The reasoning of the High Court was that a payment made generally on account of an interest bearing debt becomes a payment towards the principal only by appropriation thereto and must, in order to have the effect of preventing limitation, be appropriated before the period of limitation had expired. The Judicial Committee held, reversing the decision of the High Court, that as there was evidence that the payment had been appropriated to principal by the defendant within the prescribed period, the suit was not barred. There is considerable discussion on the import of the words “as such” in relation to the payment of interest but that discussion is now academic having regard to the amendment in 1942. Dealing with the right of appropriation, by a creditor, their Lordships said: “ The subject of appropriation of payments ‘is dealt with in the Indian Contract Act by sections, 59 to 61, inclusive. Section 60 provides that, when the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there: are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor” . Their Lordships laid down that the creditor’s act of appropriation of payment to the principal debt should be before the lapse of the prescribed time. On the facts they held that there had been such an appropriation within the prescribed time. Their Lordships laid down that the creditor’s act of appropriation of payment to the principal debt should be before the lapse of the prescribed time. On the facts they held that there had been such an appropriation within the prescribed time. There is one passage in the opinion of their Lordships which does help the plaintiff-respondent and that is this: “ stress was laid on the change in the proviso from 'the fact of the payment appears' to 'an acknowledgment of the payment appears', but neither expression affords in their Lordships’ opinion any ground for holding that the character of the payment, as intended to go towards interest or towards principal, must appear by the writing, still less that it must be ascertainable or ascertained at the date of the payment”. The ruling in Kcndaswami Mudaliar v. Thevammal2, though given long before the above Privy Council decision, proceeds on the same assumption. It was held that according to the plain language of the proviso to section 20 of the Limitation Act, what is required is acknowledgment of payment. Whether the said payment is payment towards interest as such or principal can be proved by other evidence. Though this decision was also before the amendment of 1942, it is valuable because: of its construction of the proviso which remained unaltered by the amendment in 1942. In that case a promissory note was executed by the debtor in favour of his creditor and it was alleged by the creditor that it was towards a portion of the interest on the debt due under the previous note in his favour. The lower Courts accepted this case of the creditor. It was held that the promissory note saved the suit brought on the original debt from the bar of limitation. The learned Judge, Venkataramana Rao, J., held that evidence could always be given that the payment was made towards a particular debt. After a discussion of several decisions of this Court and other Courts, the learned Judge held that so far as part of principal was concerned, a writing need not show that payment was towards principal. He pointed out: " If the scheme of the Act is taken into consideration, it does not appear to be the intention of the legislature that the writing evidencing the payment should also indicate that the payment is towards interest or principal. He pointed out: " If the scheme of the Act is taken into consideration, it does not appear to be the intention of the legislature that the writing evidencing the payment should also indicate that the payment is towards interest or principal. Section 19 deals with an acknowledgment of liability as such in respect of any property or right or debt. Section 20 is intended to provide by way of statutory declaration that from the fact of payment of interest or part-payment of principal of a debt you can imply acknowledgment of liability in respect of the debt. If it was intended that the Writing also should specify that the payment was towards interest or principal of a debt, section 20 is superfluous as the writing will operate as an acknowledgment under section 19 of the Limitation Act. I am therefore of opinion that the writing need not specify that the payment was made towards interest or principal. That any payment Was made towards a particular debt evidence can always be given". It may be mentioned in passing that the decision in Mackenzie v. Thiruvengadathan1, was referred to by the learned Judge and its scope limited. In Prafulla Chandra Nag v. Jatindra Nath Kar2, it was held that when part-payment of a debt is made and accepted by cheque written in the handwriting of the person liable to pay the debt, it was evidence both of the fact of payment and of acknowledgment within the meaning of section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. At page 325, S.K. Ghose, J., said: "The Indian statute only requires that the acknowledgment must be of the payment. It is not necessary that it must also be stated that the payment is towards a particular debt." There is no direct authority of this Court or of any other Court on the construction of sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Limitation Act as amended in 1942. But the principles which have been, in our opinion, clearly laid down in dealing with section 20 (1) before 1942 will apply to cases arising after the amendment of 1942. We hold that the fact that the payment of money was on account of a debt can be proved by evidence and it need not appear on the face of the acknowledgment of payment in writing. We hold that the fact that the payment of money was on account of a debt can be proved by evidence and it need not appear on the face of the acknowledgment of payment in writing. It can always be proved that a payment was towards a particular debt. The Court may be called upon to infer from circumstances and probabilities that a payment was towards a particular debt. In the case before us, as we have already mentioned, it was never suggested on behalf of the first defendant that several debts were due and owing to the plaintiff by them and that therefore it could not be taken that the payment of Rs. 5,000 each by drafts was towards a debt other than the debt due under the promissory note for Rs. 45,000. Of course there was the other debt due under the promissory note, dated 1st March, 1951 (Exhibit B-7); but that promissory note was not in favour of K. A. Appa Rao. It was in favour of the Shyamala Industries Corporation which is different in law from Appa Rao. It appears to be reasonably clear to us that these two drafts must have been sent to the plaintiff in part-payment of the debt due under the promissory note Exhibit B-4. The drafts were sent in June and July, 1951. Even leaving out of account Exhibits A-2, A-3 and A-4, there is the notice given by the plaintiff on 7th November, 1951 (Exhibit B-14) in which it was expressly stated that the sums sent by the two drafts were credited to the promissory note of Rs. 45,000. This notice was within three years from the date of the promissory note. The suit was filed in February, 1954, within three years from the date of the notice. There was clearly appropriation by the creditor towards the impugned promissory note within the prescribed time and that fulfils the condition that the payment should be on account of the debt. As the suit was instituted within three years from the date of these payments, the suit was not barred by time. It also follows that in calculating the amount due under the promissory note Exhibit B-4, the first defendant should be given credit to the two sums of Rs. 5,000 each, as well as to the sum of Rs. 2,000 sent by a demand draft subsequently. It also follows that in calculating the amount due under the promissory note Exhibit B-4, the first defendant should be given credit to the two sums of Rs. 5,000 each, as well as to the sum of Rs. 2,000 sent by a demand draft subsequently. C.C.C. Appeal No. 15 of 1957 which relates to this promissory note is allowed only to the extent of Rs. 2,000 but is substantially dismissed. The appellant and the plaintiff-respondent will pay and receive proportionate costs. In the other suit which has given rise to C.C.C. Appeal No. 16 of 1957, there was practically no defence except the plea of partial discharge on the ground that the three payments of Rs. 5,000 5,000 and 2,000 were made towards the promissory note on which this suit was based. As we have held that these payments must go towards the promissory note of Rs. 45,000 (Exhibit B-4), they cannot obviously be taken as payments made towards Exhibit B-7. The plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for the sum claimed by him. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. C.C.C. A. No. 15 of 1957 having been set down for being mentioned this day, the Court made the following order:- The decree of the lower Court shall be amended by substituting the value of the Indian currency for Rs. 45,000 Hyderabad currency for the principal amount namely Rs. 37,800. Interest will be calculated on this sum. It is represented that since the date of this decree of the Court below further payments have been made towards the amount due under the decree. Such payments, if any, will be given credit. V.S. ------------- Appeals dismissed.