Judgment :- RAMACHANDRA IYER J. This is an application pupating to be under section 45B of the Banking Companies Act for a decree for partition of the properties set out in the schedule to the application free from the objection of the respondents and separate possession of a 7/8th share thereof Applicants Nos. 1 to 3 to the sons of K. R. Shenoy, the first respondent. The fourth applicant is the mother of the latter. It is claimed that the applicants, along with the first respondent, formed members of a joint Hindu Family. On 21st August, 1941, K. R. Shenoy created a usufructuary mortgage over the two items of properties set out in the application, along with another item of favour of his uncle, Subbaraya Shenoy, for a sum of Rs. 18, 000 borrowed by him. A period of 20 years was fixed for redemption. On 5th July, 1943. Subbaraya gained his mortgage right to the third respondent the Agricultural and Industrial Bank Ltd., Coondapur, which shall hereafter be referred to as "the bank", and which is now under liquidation under orders of this court in O.P. No. 73 of 1953. On 3rd May, 1946, the mortgage, K. R. Shenoy, sold the equity of redemption in the two items mentioned in the application to his cousin, one Vithaldas. The bank assigned his rights under the mortgage to the second respondent, Security and Investment Corporation (India) Ltd., for a sum of Rs. 4, 000. The second respondent thereafter purchased the equity of redemption in the two items of properties from Vithaldas on 10th December, 1948. The result is that the second responded became the full owner of the properties. On 23rd December, 1948, the second respondent created mortgage by deposit of title deeds over the priorities in favour of the bank for securing a sum of Rs. 75, 000. The bank was ordered to be wound up on 6th April, 1953. At the instance of the official liquidator a preliminary and a final decree on the mortgage have been passed in application No. 2221 of 1956Thereupon the application filed the present application for partition claiming that they were entitled to a 7/8th shares in the two items of properties. The bank was ordered to be wound up on 6th April, 1953. At the instance of the official liquidator a preliminary and a final decree on the mortgage have been passed in application No. 2221 of 1956Thereupon the application filed the present application for partition claiming that they were entitled to a 7/8th shares in the two items of properties. In the affidavit in support of their claim the applicants stated that the properties were joint family properties in the hands of their grandfather and on his death his widow, the fourth applicant, became entitled to a half share therein, the other half vesting in the three applicants and the first respondent in equal shares. It was then stated that all the aforesaid transactions were not supported by consideration, necessity, etc., and could not therefore operate to create any valid security in the property or any interest in it in favour of the bank for more than 1/8th share of the first respondent. Certain other objections to the validity of the assignment created by the third respondent were also taken. It is clear from the affidavit that there are other items of properties in the family but the applicants purporting to apply under section 45B of the Banking Companies Act have applied to this court for a partition which in effect could only be a partial partition of the joint family priorities. They also raised the question as to the binding nature of the alienation made by the first respondent in favour of Subbaraya Shenoy and Vithaldas This application is contested on behalf of the bank. For the present purpose it is unnecessary to refer to the objections raised by the official liquidator other than the one regarding the maintainability of the application Mr. M. L. Nayak, learned counsel for the official liquidator, has contended that an application under section 45B for partition of the family properties under circumstances stated above could not be entertained and the remedy of the applicants, if any, was to file a suit in the appropriate court. It may be noticed that neither the applicants nor their father, the first respondent, are shown to be either a debtor, creditor or contributory of the bank. It may be noticed that neither the applicants nor their father, the first respondent, are shown to be either a debtor, creditor or contributory of the bank. The claim that is alleged in the application is substantially one for partition of the joint family properties against the first respondent and for possession against the second respondent in respect of the properties if directed to be so dividedThe contention on behalf of the applicants is that section 45B is wide enough to include a claim like the present one, as the applicants are also challenging the extent of security held by the bank. Mr. Vasantha Pai, leaned advocate for the applicants, contends that although the first respondent has purported to sell the entire interest in the two items of property to strangers such sale could not validly convey the interest of the applicants in the property and as the bank has got a security over the property created by the second respondent, who derived title under the impugned sale of the first respondent, the question of the extent of security held by the bank would arise. That, he contended, being relevant for the purpose of liquidation of the suit property. That, he contended, being relevant for the purpose of liquidation of the suit property. Before considering the contention of the learned advocate for the applicants, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of section 45A and section 45B of the Banking Companies Act, as amended in 1953 Section 45A States "The provisions of this Part and the rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Indian Companies Act, 1913, (VII of 1913), or the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), or the Code criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), or any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law, but the provisions of any such law or instrument in so far as the same are not varied by, or inconsistent with, the provisions of this Part or rules made thereunder shall apply to all proceedings under this Part." * Section 45B States "The High Court shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in section 45C, have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide any claim made by or against a banking companies which is being wound up (including claims by or against any of its branches in India) or any application made under section 391 of the Companies Act, 1956, by or in respect of banking company or any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law of fact, which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a banking company, whether such claim or question has arisen or arises or such application has been made or is made before or after the date of the order for the winding up of the banking company or before or after the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953." * By the Amending Act of 1950, Part IIIA containing sections 45A to 45H was first inserted in the Banking Companies Act, 1949. That part was recast and the present provisions, sections 45A to 45X, were introduced by the Amending Act of 1953. That part was recast and the present provisions, sections 45A to 45X, were introduced by the Amending Act of 1953. Under the amending Act of 1950, section 45A stated that no court, other than the High Court exercising jurisdiction in the place whether the registered office of the banking company, which was being wound up, was situate, shall have jurisdiction to entertain any matter relating to or arising out of the winding up of banking company. Section 45B under the Amending Act of 1950 gave power to the High Court to decide all claimed made by or against the banking company and all questions of priorities and all other questions whatsoever whether of low or of fact, which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of the banking company coming within the cognizance of the court. The new section 45B inserted by the amending Act of 1953 takes the place of sections 45A and 45B of the Amending Act of 1950. On a reference to the provisions of sections 45A and 45B of the 1950 Act, it is clear that the jurisdiction conferred under section 45B on the High Court was in respect of those matters in which jurisdiction was excluded from the other courts by virtue of section 45A; that is to say, that the mattes should relate to or arise in the course of winding up of a banking company In Associated Banking Corporation of India v. Nazaralli Kassambhai it is stated that section 45A of the Banking Companies Act ousts the jurisdiction of courts other than the High Court, and section 45B confers a special jurisdiction upon the High Court. Therefore the jurisdiction that was conferred on the High Court should relate to or arise out of the winding up of the company. Section 45B as enacted in 1953 is of a slightly wider import. From the section as I have set out above, it is clear that exclusive jurisdiction is given to the High Court to entertain and decide any claim made by the banking company, made against the banking company, and any question of priorities arising in the course of the winding up, and any question of whatsoever of law or fact which may relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a banking company. In order that the High Court may have jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 45B, there should either be a claim or against the banking company or a question should arise which should relate to or arise in the course of the winding upThe connotation of the word "claim" has been considered by RAMASWAMI J. in Thangayya v. Hanuman Bank. The learned Judge has held that it is a word of very extensive signification embracing the several species of legal demand, and that the word also signifies a demand made of a right or a supposed right. But the claim contemplated under the section being one by or against the banking company in liquidation, it should have a relation to the liquidation. Winding up or liquidation is a process by means of which the dissolution of the company is brought about by the collection and realisation of its assets and applying them in payment of its debts, and if there is surplus to return to the shareholders the sums which they have contributed to the company. On the former aspect the essence of liquidation is realisation of the assets of the company from its contributories, as well as from outside debtors. The claim by the company could, therefore, be only against the debtors and contributories. So far as the claim against the company is concerned they may be by the creditors of or even by persons having claims regarding their property against the company. It is the duty of the liquidator to put all unsecured creditors on an equal footing and pay them pari pasu. In order to effectuate that purpose power is given under section 45B to decide question of priorities. It is the duty of the liquidator to put all unsecured creditors on an equal footing and pay them pari pasu. In order to effectuate that purpose power is given under section 45B to decide question of priorities. It is, therefore, clear that only those matters that will facilitate the winding up of the banking company, namely, realisation of its assets and distribution of the same amongst the various people entitled to them that could properly be the subject-matter of enquiry under section 45B In Palmer's Company law, 19th Edition, pages 388, the duties of an official liquidator are set forth as follows "They are to take possession of and protect the assets, to make out the requisite lists of contributories and of creditors, to have disputed cases adjudicated upon, to realize the assets subject to the control of the committee of inspection (if any), in certain matters, and to apply the proceeds in payment of the company's debts and liabilities in due course of administration, and, having done that, to divide the surplus amongst the contributories and to adjust their rights." * These are the relevant questions that can come in winding up proceedings, and which have to be adjudicated upon under section 45B. It cannot be said that the claim of the applicants in the presents cases for partition can come under any one of these categories. The second respondent is the debtor to the bank. There is no dispute between the second respondent and the bank in regard to the validity of the mortgage. Such title as the second respondent has should be held to have been secured to the bank. The fact that the second respondent's title may be defective, if the first respondent had exceeded his powers as a Hindu father cannot make that question as one relating to or arising out of the winding up of the banking company Mr. Vasantha Pai in an able argument referred me to the various decisions as supporting his connection. Dhirendra Chandra v. Associated Bank of Tripura, was relied on to show that section 45B comprehends all sorts of claims which relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a banking company. Vasantha Pai in an able argument referred me to the various decisions as supporting his connection. Dhirendra Chandra v. Associated Bank of Tripura, was relied on to show that section 45B comprehends all sorts of claims which relate to or arise in the course of the winding up of a banking company. Relying upon that decision the learned counsel contended that "in the course of the winding up of a company" should be held mean "during the course of the winding up of a company". That is to say if any dispute arises while the winding up proceeding of a banking company was pending that question if it affected in any way the banking company should be investigated by the concerned High Court In this connection he relied upon the decision in Jadunath Rai v. Bank of Calcutta Ltd., where the learned Judges held that the expression "in the course of winding up" meant "during winding up". The decision in Dhirendra Chandra v. Associated Bank of Tripura, related to a dispute between a person who was a tenant of the bank and the official liquidator and the Supreme Court held that the dispute which section 45B. It is clear that the question arose at the instance of a tenant of bank in regard to property held by the bank. That would, therefore, be a claim against the bankShri Ram Narain v. Simla Banking and Industrial Co., was next realised on. In that case there was an order against the bank in favour of a displaced person under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Debts Adjustment Act of 1951. The banking company against whom the order was passed went into liquidation. In execution of the order certain properties of the bank were attached by the Bombay High Court. The Punjab High Court, in whose jurisdiction the banking company was situate set aside the order of the executing court on the ground that the former court alone had jurisdiction under section 45B of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings to execute the decree, and claims and matters which necessarily arose in the course of execution fell within the scope of section 45B and that the execution proceedings could be within the exclusive jurisdiction of Punjab High Court. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings to execute the decree, and claims and matters which necessarily arose in the course of execution fell within the scope of section 45B and that the execution proceedings could be within the exclusive jurisdiction of Punjab High Court. It may be noticed that in both the cases which went before the Supreme Court the claim was either by the bank in respect of its property, or against the bank in respect of its liability I have already referred to the decision in Jadunath Rai v. Bank of Calcutta. That was a case for partition of the properties as against the bank which evidently had a share therein. Pending the suit for partition the winding up of the bank ensued. It was held that the proceedings for final decree for partition should be transferred to the High Court under section 45B. There again the question related to the property held by the bank in which a co-sharer wanted to have a partition. In Associated Banking Corporation v. Nazaralli Kassambhai the suit had to be filed by the official liquidator against a debtor of the bank in the City Civil court at Bombay. A question arose as to whether the suit had be filed in the High Court under section 45B of the Act or whether it is only cognizable by the City Civil Court as the value of the subject-matter was within its competence. It was held that the phrase "relating to winding up" is of wider and of more extensive import than the expression "arising our of the winding up", and that a suit filed for recovery of a debt due by the debtor to the bank helping to wind up the affairs of the company and assisting in the ultimate distribution of the assets of the companyIn Discount Bank of Indian Ltd. v. Trilok Nath, there was a claim by the bank against its constituent by way of the suit against the constituent. That was sought to be transferred to the High Court under section II of the Banking Companies Act. That was sought to be transferred to the High Court under section II of the Banking Companies Act. It was held that the realisation of a debt due to the bank is a matter relating to the winding up In Gurbinder v. Munshi Ram, a question arose as to whether a suit by an assignee of a mortgage from a bank on the mortgage against a third party would come under the provisions of section 45B of the Act. The bank was subsequently impleaded as a party to the suit and the learned Judges held that there were certain pleas which would affect the bank, and would amount to a claim against the bank, and the suit was therefore exclusively trouble by the High Court In Thangayya v. Hanuman Bank, RAMASWAMI J. held that an application for patta under the Madras Estates Land Act, though made under a special Act, could be entertained only be the court in charge of the liquidation of the bank. The learned Judge considered all the relevant authorities on the subject. In that case the claim was in regard to a property held by the bank, so that is was really a claim against the bank There are two decisions of the Orissa High Court to which reference should be made now. In Official Liquidator, Puri Bank Ltd. v. Jitendra Nath Das, it was decided that the question as to whether a debtor of the a banking company under liquidation should be adjudged an insolvent, and should get the protection of the Insolvency Act is a matter relating to the winding up of the banking company, and consequently the High Court alone had exclusive jurisdiction to decide that question and all other question arising out of the same, and that the District Court which had jurisdiction under the Provincial Insolvency Act, was not competent to entertain the petition of the judgment debtor. The leaned Judge held that the solvency of the debtor of a banking company, and the question as to whether he should be given protection under the Insolvency law were matters so intimately connected with the realisation of the assets of the banking company, that it should be fairly inferred that they relate to the winding up of the company. I have great doubts, in my mind, as to the correctness of that decision. I have great doubts, in my mind, as to the correctness of that decision. The adjudication of an insolvent involves a question of status and it is only the courts which have got a jurisdiction in that regard that can adjudicated a person as an insolvent. Though the adjudication of a debtor ultimately leads to realisation by the creditor of his dues, it cannot be said that adjudication an insolvent is a method of collecting the debt. It may be difficult to say that an adjudication of a debtor as an insolvent, which depends upon acts of insolvency being committed and other statutory requirements being satisfied, is a matter so intimately connected with the realisation of the bank's assets. Although an arguments of conveniences in not always a safe guide for the interpretation of an enactment, I must point out that if adjudication of debtors to the bank is transferred to the High Court under section 45B of the Banking Companies Act, it will lead to complication; for in the process of administering the affairs of the bank, a court will have to administer the estate of all its insolvent debtors which will bring in its train various problems and difficultiesIn official Liquidator, Puri Bank Ltd. v. Kanhu Charan Das, an estate which was subject to a mortgage in favour of a bank under liquidation was taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (Act 1 of 1952). That Act provided for a compensation being given to the owners in instalments. The question arose as to whether the amount due to the banking company could be realised in one lump sum or in installments. It was held that such a question would come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned Judge held that the provisions of section 37(3) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act should give way before section 45B of the Act, and that the official liquidator should apply to the court and not before the claims officer for the determination of the amount payable to the company out of the total compensation payable for the acquisition of the estate of the debtor. I am of the view that this decision may require reconsideration. I am of the view that this decision may require reconsideration. Section 45B is only a rule of procedure, and it creates no substantive right in the bank over the security higher than what its own mortgagor had. If the right of the debtor was only to obtain compensation in the manner prescribed by the statute, section 45B cannot be read so as to confer a higher right on him and invest power in a civil court to decide what it was prohibited to do It is clear from the decisions referred to above except the two decisions of the Orissa High Court that section 45B would apply only to cases, where there is a claim by or against the banking company, i.e., questions which related to or affected the realisation or disposal of the assets held by the bank. Such claims would necessarily have a connection with the sending up of company. The present case is one for partition as against the father the first respondent. The banking company itself is not the owner of the property; so that it cannot be said that it is a claim against the bank. It is no doubt true that the banking company has got a security over the property, and perhaps is interested in the full security being preserved to it intact to enable the realisation of its dues. That interest is nothing more than a commercial interest. The mere fact that the bank is interested in the security cannot mean that the application have a direct claim against the bank. It may be that the share of the first respondent alone may be sufficient to cover the dues to the bank, or it may be that the bank may decide to bring to sale the right, title and interest of its debtor, leaving it to the purchaser to get the quantum of rights in the property agitated in a proper court; or the bank may sell the outstanding itself to a third person. In none of these cases will the bank be interested in the claim of the applicants. In an ordinary partition suit by a member of a joint Hindu family, the creditor or mortgagee is not a necessary party. In certain cases the creditors are impleaded as proper parties, so that their claims can be adjudicated and provisions made for the payment of the debt. In an ordinary partition suit by a member of a joint Hindu family, the creditor or mortgagee is not a necessary party. In certain cases the creditors are impleaded as proper parties, so that their claims can be adjudicated and provisions made for the payment of the debt. But no decree can be passed in favour of the creditor in the partition suit. The mortgagee not being a necessary party, it cannot be held that the partition suit the claim is against the bank, who is the mortgageeIn Krishnamoorthi Pillai v. Sundaramurthi Pillai RAMESAM J. observed that the function of the insolvency court was to distribution the assets between the creditors and not decide court was to distribute the questions between the insolvent and the rest of the world. I am of opinion that that principle would apply to the present case as well. To hold otherwise would be to make the court in charge of liquidation proceeding take upon itself the administration of the properties of the constituents of a bank in liquidation. A partition suit generally comprises several claims, of the sharers, of maintenances holders, of creditors of the family etc. It is but proper that such suits are disposed of in the usual course rather than in the summary procedure envisaged by section 45B of the Act. If section 45B is so construed as to result in bringing into court in charge in liquidation proceedings the family partition of the bank's debtors, it would not merely encumber the work of the court, but entangle the liquidation proceeding in endless litigation, and far from achieving the speeds disposal of the liquidation of the company, the liquidator would be faced with almost perpetual litigation. Besides these it will involve great hardship upon the various members and debtors of the family who have to come from far off places to agitate the partition claim in the High Court I am, therefore, of opinion that the claim in the present case is not cognizable by this court under section 45B of the Banking Companies Act, and I dismiss the application. No Costs. The official liquidator can take the costs out of the funds in his hands Application dismissed.