JUDGMENT J.K. Tandon, J. - The petitioners were in occupation of house bearing municipal no. 1 situate at Shahjahanpur Road in the town of Bareilly. They were using it both for purposes of residence and for keeping their vehicles which they ply on hire. These vehicles are, according to them, stationed on the land, part of the premises in front of the main building. The second respondent, who is Adarsh Handloom Weaver's Co-operative Society Ltd., have purchased the above building from its previous owner in October 1957. After the purchases the President of the Society, it is alleged, moved the District Magistrate apparently under the provisions of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act to enable them ultimately to occupy the building for the purposes of their factory. This is evidenced by notice dated 1st March 1958, Annexure 'B' to the petitioner's main affidavit, which purported to require the petitioners to permit inspection of the building under Sec. 7-G of the above Act. It does not appear that any action thereafter was taken by the District Magistrate under the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act but on 15th March 1958 the District Magistrate of Bareilly purporting to act under Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 requisitioned the said accommodation by the following order : "Where as an accommodation is required for setting up a hand loom factory on co-operative lines by the Adarsh Hand-loom Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd., which in my opinion is a public purpose. The Kothi No. 1 at Shahjahanpur Road, situated in Mohalla Seefitola would suit this purpose and the Society has purchased the property rights of the premises. 1, G. M. Nigam, I. A. S. District Magistrate, Bareilly, under the powers conferred on me under Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Accommodation requisition Act, 1947 requisition the aforesaid building for the aforesaid purpose and order that the possession of the building shall be handed over to the President of the Adarsh Handloora Co-operative Society Ltd., within 15 days of the receipt of this order, by the persons occupying it." 2. The order has also mentioned that the petitioners are being provided with the alternative accommodation. The order has also mentioned that the petitioners are being provided with the alternative accommodation. This was considered necessary under the second proviso to Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Accommodation Requisition Act) as the petitioners were in occupation of the building. 3. The petitioners have challenged the validity of the above requisition on various grounds. They are that the Accommodation Requisition Act does not contemplate requisitions for the benefit of Co-operative Societies which is factually a very limited body formed for the profit of the individuals constituting that society, so that the purpose of the society cannot be said to be a public purpose; again that Sec. 3 of the Accommodation Requisition Act can be utilised for requisitioning an accommodation for a public purpose only where such requisitioning is necessary under the circumstances, and that the above two conditions, so necessary for a requisition under Sec. 3, did not exist in this case. According to him, therefore, the requisition had been made for the purposes of the owner as, however, was outside the purview of Sec. 3. It is also said that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind in deciding the needs of requisitioning, on the other hand, simply signed the order prepared by the Rent Controller who had no jurisdiction to determine these facts on the existence of which alone action under Sec. 3 was possible. 4. In order to appreciate the controversy it will be necessary to refer to the following provisions of the Accommodation Requisition Act. Sec. 3 confers power on the District Magistrate, where in his opinion it is necessary to requisition any accommodation for a public purpose, to do so by an order in writing. The section further requires him to state in the order that the possession of the accommodation shall be delivered to him within a period which he shall specify in the order. Sec. 4 provides that the order of requisition shall be served on the owner as well as the occupier of the premises and Sec. 5 requires the District Magistrate to pay compensation to the owner of the accommodation requisitioned by him. Sec. 4 provides that the order of requisition shall be served on the owner as well as the occupier of the premises and Sec. 5 requires the District Magistrate to pay compensation to the owner of the accommodation requisitioned by him. Under Sec. 8 where any accommodation requisitioned under the Act has to be released, the District Magistrate has to release it in favour of the person from whom it was requisitioned, that is, if the accommodation requisitioned was at the time of requisition in the possession of a tenant it shall be handed over to such tenant. 5. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the scheme of the Act does not warrant a requisition for the purpose of the owner's own occupation of the accommodation. The Accommodation Requisition Act authorises an accommodation to be requisitioned for a public purpose where it is necessary also in the opinion of the District Magistrate, but not otherwise. The mere existence of a public purpose will not justify a requisition unless the District Magistrate is further of the opinion that it is necessary to do so for that purpose. According to the petitioners both these conditions are wanting in the present case and in any event the second since the District Magistrate never held the opinion that requisition was necessary. 6. From the facts as they have been stated above it undoubtedly appeared that the District Magistrate was, in making the requisition order, guided by the fact that the accommodation was required by the Adarsh Handloom Weaver's Cooperative Society Ltd. for its own occupation. Indeed the fact of the notice sent under Sec. 7-G of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947, and the reference in the requisition order itself to the fact that the Society had purchased the property rights in the premises, went to show that the District Magistrate was in effecting the requisition dominated with the idea and the intention to put the Society, the owner of the premises, in possession of it. The provisions of Sec. 3 of the Accommodation Requisition Act are not intended for putting the owner of an accommodation back into possession of his property. Its object clearly is to enable the State, where it is so considered necessary, to requisition an accommodation for a public purpose. The provisions of Sec. 3 of the Accommodation Requisition Act are not intended for putting the owner of an accommodation back into possession of his property. Its object clearly is to enable the State, where it is so considered necessary, to requisition an accommodation for a public purpose. It is the public purpose and its necessity which enables, rather confers jurisdiction, to exercise the power of requisition under Sec. 3. 7. The learned counsel for the Society does not dispute that in this case the District Magistrate requisitioned the building for the use of the owner but his further contention is that the purpose for which the owner required the accommodation was a public purpose, as such the District Magistrate was well within his powers in effecting the requisition. Sec. 3 of the Act requires two conditions to exist to justify an order of requisition, firstly, the existence of a public purpose, and, secondly, the necessity of a requisition. On both these points, the District Magistrate has to form an opinion before ordering requisition. Neither the fact alone that public purpose existed, nor the existence alone of a necessity for requisition will justify a requisition, which can be made upon both these conditions being fulfilled. In the present case while it may be urged with some force that the District Magistrate was of the opinion that a public purpose existed, it is not possible to read in his order the fulfilment of the other condition, namely, the necessity for a requisition. In the relevant portion of his order, which has been quoted above, he has simply said that the purpose in his opinion was a public purpose, but he nowhere stated that he was further of the opinion that requisition was necessary. On the other hand, he has merely fortified his order by reference to the fact that the Society had purchased the property rights in the premises. But as was stated earlier, the powers conferred on the District Magistrate under Sec. 3 of the Act are not intended for the advantage of the owner of any property, therefore, in judging whether requisitioning of any particular accommodation is necessary or not for the relevant public purpose, he has to judge that fact independently of who is owner of the property. It does not bear out from the order of the District Magistrate that this part of the requirement of Sec. 3 was fulfilled in this case. 8. Again, the direction in the requisition order for handing over the possession of the building to the Society indicated that the requisition had been made primarily to put back the owner into possession. Under Sec. 3 possession has to be handed over by the person in occupation of the accommodation to the District Magistrate, but by the impugned order the District Magistrate, instead of asking the possession to be delivered to him, directed the same to be made over to the Society. This is explainable only in this manner that the requisition had been effected to restore possession of the building to the Society by evicting in this manner the tenants occupying it. This fully pointed out that the necessity of requisition was never considered by him in the contest of the purposes but he was impelled by the desire to restore the possession of the building to the society because it had acquired ownership of the building. 9. If followed from the foregoing discussion that the impugned order failed to satisfy the essential prerequisite namely the necessity of a requisition and in its absence it must be held to be an order in excess of the authority conferred by Sec. 3. 10. In view of this finding it is unnecessary to discuss other grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners. 11. In the result the petition is allowed and the order of requisition dated 15th March 1958 is quashed. The petitioners will get their costs from respondent No. 2.