Judgment.- This second Appeal is sought to be preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge of South Arcot in A.S. No. 168 of 1956, confirming the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsif of Cuddalore in O.S. No. 194 of 1953. The point of law raised is that the lower appellate Court should have allowed the amendment asked in I.A. No. 449 of 1957 and that the trial Court instead of dismissing the suit should have directed the return of the plaint. The facts are: The appellant-plaintiff filed the suit for rendition of accounts in respect of the profits of the consolidated partnership of Mask &38; Co., and K.S. Co., and to decree his share of the profits after ascertainment. The plaintiff and his brothers Murad and Sultan were partners of K.S. Co., which had its place of business both at Porto novo and Singapore. Defendants 1 to 8 were partners of Mask &38; Co., at Panruti. K.S. Co., at Porto novo and Mask &38; Co., at Panruti entered into a partnership. Plaintiff’s brother Sultan Maracair died on 14th August, 1928. But the suit partnership between K.S. Co., and Mask &38; Co., continued. After the death of Sultan Maracair, insolvency proceedings were initiated in Singapore Supreme Court against the firm K.S. Co., which had its independent business at Singapore unconnected with the suit partnership. During the insolvency proceedings the plaintiff and his brother Murad for themselves and on behalf of the heirs of deceased Sultan Maracair executed a release deed in favour of Mask &38; Co., and agreed to Mask &38; Co., paying Rs. 5,164-14-11 as representing the interest of K.S. Co., in the joint partnership with Mask &38; Co., to the Official Receiver, Singapore. But subsequently the heirs of Sultan Maricair filed O.S. No. 35 of 1942 and got a decree for dissolution of partnership and for taking of accounts. The Commissioner appointed for the said purpose found that a sum of Rs. 54,784-0-9 was due to the share of Sultan and later there was a compromise decree for Rs. 52,500. The plaintiff came to know of the fraud practised on him and his brother Murad only during the course of the enquiry by the Commissioner. The plaintiff’s case is that he became aware of the fraud practised on him and his brother Murad only on the date of the compromise decree. 52,500. The plaintiff came to know of the fraud practised on him and his brother Murad only during the course of the enquiry by the Commissioner. The plaintiff’s case is that he became aware of the fraud practised on him and his brother Murad only on the date of the compromise decree. He filed the present suit ignoring the release deed on the ground that it was void. The respondents-defendants contended that the settlement of the partnership accounts was made after full and complete scrutiny of the accounts of the plaintiff and his brother Murad, that the plaintiff was not entitled to re-open the settlement, that the contention of the plaintiff in O.S. No. 35 of 1942 was that the present plaintiff and his brother Murad were not entitled to represent them and the said contention was accepted by this Court in second appeal, that the release deed was not void but at best only voidable and that the plaintiff should sue to set aside the same and that the plaintiff has no locus standi to maintain the suit as he was adjudged an insolvent. The learned District Munsif framed several issues on the pleadings but dismissed the suit giving findings on few of the issues which were argued before him. He found that the release deed executed by the plaintiff was voidable and not void, that the suit was therefore not maintainable without setting aside the settlement of accounts and the release deed, that having regard to the value of the release deed the suit was beyond the jurisdiction of the trial Court and that the plaintiff has no locus standi to maintain the suit. Therefore, he dismissed the suit with costs. Before the lower appellate Court the learned advocate for the appellant did not dispute the finding of the trial Court that the release deed was at best voidable and not void and he conceded that the plaintiff should set aside the release deed. Then the learned advocate for the appellant took time and filed I.A. No. 499 of 1957 to amend the plaint by adding a prayer for setting aside the release deed. The learned District Judge refused to allow the amendment of the plaint on two grounds. Then the learned advocate for the appellant took time and filed I.A. No. 499 of 1957 to amend the plaint by adding a prayer for setting aside the release deed. The learned District Judge refused to allow the amendment of the plaint on two grounds. First of all, he found that by allowing the amendment of the plaint for the first time asked in the lower appellate Court, he would be depriving the defendants of a valuable plea of limitation. In this case the contesting defendants took the plea in the trial Court itself that the suit was not maintainable without setting aside the settlement of accounts and the release deed dated 1st June, 1932. The trial Court framed issue 4 on the said plea but the appellant did not care to amend the plaint at any stage of the suit in the trial Court. There is no dispute that on the date when the amendment petition was filed, the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation. It is well-settled that an amendment which introduced a new cause of action cannot be allowed, if the cause of action has become barred by limitation. Parannath v. Madhu1, Vithu v. Dhondi2, Ambabai v. Baku3, Gulzar v. Kalayan4, Mcleod & Co. v. Ivan Jones5, Ram Karan v. Baldeo 6 , Vaithilingam v. Kandaswami 7. Secondly, the suit was not in time even on the date of its first presentation. The plaint was filed on 4th March, 1953, with the allegation that the plaintiff became aware of the fraud during the course of the enquiry before the Commissioner and that the extent of the fraud was known only on the date of the compromise decree on 25th March, 1950. It is significant that the plaintiff has not stated the date on which the Commissioner found that Rs. 54,784-0-9 was payable by the defendants in O.S. No. 35 of 1942 to the heirs of Sultan. The suit by the heirs of Sultan was filed in 1942, and even the second appeal in the High Court was filed in 1945. It is not necessary that the plaintiff should know the extent of fraud for filing the present suit, which is only for taking of accounts on the ground that the release deed was obtained by fraud. The suit by the heirs of Sultan was filed in 1942, and even the second appeal in the High Court was filed in 1945. It is not necessary that the plaintiff should know the extent of fraud for filing the present suit, which is only for taking of accounts on the ground that the release deed was obtained by fraud. The plaintiff has come forward with the present suit on the last month of the period of limitation with a plea that the plaintiff came to know of the extent of the fraud only within three years prior to suit. This has not been believed by both the Courts below. Therefore, it is obvious that the suit was not in time even on the date of suit. The amendment asked for was both belated and unjust and was not rightly granted by the lower appellate Court. The learned District Judge was also justified in refusing the amendment on another ground, viz., that the effect of allowing the amendment would be to oust the jurisdiction of the trial Court to try the suit. The learned District Judge as a Court of appeal would have only the powers which the trial Court could have exercised. The decision in Singara Mudaliar v. Govindasami Chetty8, is authority for the proposition that no Court will permit a plaint to be so amended as to oust its own jurisdiction to try the suit. Order 7, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribed that the plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted and that on returning the plaint the Judge shall endorse thereon the date of its presentation and return, the name of the party presenting it and brief statement of the reasons for returning it. The words “at any stage of the suit” have been added to give effect to the decisions in which it was laid that the plaint shall be returned at any stage of the suit even after the trial has begun and concluded, unless the Court finds that the plaint has to be rejected under Order 7, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure viz., where it does not disclose a cause of action ; where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so, where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written on paper insufficiently stamped and the plaintiff does not make good the deficiency within the time, if any, granted by the Court; and where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. In the present case the plaintiff naturally does not press that the plaint should have been rejected, because in such a case the rejection of the plaint takes away the very basis of the suit and it is as it were that no suit at all was filed. The dismissal of the suit while recognising the existence of the suit, indicates its termination. The next point for consideration is, whether the trial Court or the lower appellate Court should have directed the return of the plaint. I have just now indicated the scope of Order 7, rules 10 and 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial Court could not have directed the return of the plaint because it found not that the suit was beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction and it could proceed under Order 7, rule 10, but because by reason of the various findings the suit should be dismissed. The lower appellate Court could not direct the return of the plaint because on the date when the amendment was sought for in LA. No. 449 of 1957, the suit itself was hopelessly barred by limitation. The lower appellate Court could only direct the return of a viable plaint and not a dead plaint. Therefore, no point of law arises and the decisions of the Court below are irreproachable and this Second Appeal is dismissed. V.S. ------ Appeal dismissed.