Rajamannar, C.J.- This is an application taken out by the respondentin O.S. Appeal No. 66 of 1958 pending in this Court. The appeal is against thedecree passed in a M.S. NO.9 of 1957 allowing the petition filed by thepetitioner herein for judicial separation from her husband, the respondent. Thepresent application is for the sanction of a reasonable amount to be paid to thepetitioner either in a lump sum or in instalments by the respondent to enableher to defend the appeal and ether interlocutory applications and for an orderthat the compliance of the same may be made a condition for therespondent-appellant prosecuting the appeal and connected proceedings. In theaffidavit filed in support of this application we find the following statementsof the legal position. In paragraph 2, the applicant says: “His Lordship Mr. Justice Balakrishna Ayyar has. laid down the jaw inApplication No.1457/57 that whatever the origin of the rule may have been it isnow well-established that a husband is bound to put the wife in funds thatshould enable her to fairly prosecute or fairly defend a materimonial action.This has been approved by a Bench of this Honourable Court.” The following further statements are also to be found in the affidavit : “Decisions in England which are attracted by section 7 of the Divorce Actlay down the rule that the law always requires the husband to provide his wifewith the 'sinews of war' to defend herself and 'it is a matter of' high policyand high propriety' that the husband should pay the wife the cost of defending aproceeding against her in the Divorce Court and that the wife is entitled to.defend herself at the expense of the husband irrespective of the result . . . .. ” “I am advised that it is a practice in England not to allow the husband toprosecute his case unless sufficient funds are paid to the wife and thispractice may be adopted in this case.” There is no provision as such in the Divorce Act or in any of the rulesframed under the Act conferring a right on the wife who is a party to theproceedings under the Act to obtain any advance funds to prosecute any suit orother proceeding. Section 7 provides: “ Subject to the provisions contained in this Act, the High Courts andDistrict Courts, shall in all suits and proceedings hereunder, act and giverelief on principles and rules which, in the opinion of the said Courts, are asnearly as may be conformable, to the principles and rules on which the Court forDivorce and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being acts and givesrelief. ” Mr. Rajagopalachariar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended thatit was the settled practice in England to grant relief such as has been prayedfor in this case to the wife, that is to say, that the wife should be grantedmoneys to defray the expenses of an appeal filed by the husband against thedecree for divorce or judicial separa1ion passed by the trial Court. In theaffidavit filed by the petitioner to which we have referred earlier on, ~n thisjudgment, it is stated that Mr. Justice Balakrishna Ayyar, had laid down the lawon the point in Application No. 1457. That was an application made in thematrimonial suit when it was pending in the trial Court, and the Division Benchof this Court which confirmed the order passed by Mr. Justice Balakrishna Ayyar,granting a sum of Rs. 1,000 to the petitioner for the costs of the suit, wasalso confined to the expenses of the suit. Learned counsel for the petitionerwas unable to cite any decision of the English Courts or of the Indian Courts orany passage from well-known text-books on Divorce in which it has been laid downthat a wife is entitled to be granted in advance moneys to defray the -expensesof conducting the appeal filed either by herself or by her husband. Mr. Govind Swaminathan, appearing for the respondent, drew our attention tothe decision of a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party in Mrs.Barbara. Georgina Debnam v. Mr. Frederic Cecil Burnie Debnam1.That was a case where an application was made by the wife for a direction to thehusband to pay her a sum of Rs. 350 as counsel's fee and the amount required forpaying for the printed papers to enable her to conduct the appeal which had been filed by the husband against a decree nisi for dissolution of the marriage. There was also an alternative prayer for security for the costs of the appeal. 350 as counsel's fee and the amount required forpaying for the printed papers to enable her to conduct the appeal which had been filed by the husband against a decree nisi for dissolution of the marriage. There was also an alternative prayer for security for the costs of the appeal. It was held that the wife was not entitled to an order directing the respondent to pay her moneys for the conduct of the appeal. An order for security for the costs was made, but, we are not concerned with that part of the judgment as, before us, there is no such application. It was observed in the course of the judgment that no authority had been brought to the notice of the Bench for an application of the rule relating to a suit to an appeal either by the wife or by the husband. The rationale of the rule for making the husband supply the wife with funds to conduct a suit for dissolution of the marriage was discussed and it was pointed out that the rule was based on two principles, namely, the doctrine of common law agency of necessity; and secondly, public policy in relation to the protection of the married status. Mr. Rajagopalachariar did not attempt to convince us that this decision of the Division Bench, which is binding on us, was wrong. He sought to distinguish it on the ground that it related to a decree nisi for dissolution of the marriage whereas in this case the decree is only for judicial separation. But it appears to us that there is no foundation for this distinction. It is well-established that even after the decree for judicial separation, the wife cannot pledge her husband’s credit in the same way as she cannot after a decree for divorce. (See Laity on Divorce, 14th Edn. page 304). Petitioner’s learned counsel referred us to the well-known dictum of CozensHardy, M.R. in Kemp-Welch v. Kemp-Welch and Crymes1, that if the Divorce Court treats a wife in some respects worse than a husband, it undoubtedly treats a husband in a very important matter worse than a wife, inasmuch as it always requires a husband to provide his wife with the sinews of war to defend herself. This observation was made in an application by the wife for payment of the costs of the trial Court. This observation was made in an application by the wife for payment of the costs of the trial Court. It may now be taken to be well-settled that there is a practice in England of ordering the husband to pay the wife’s costs for defending a divorce proceeding. This practice appears to have come down from the olden days of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and has continued after the foundation of the Divorce Court. But so far as we are aware, no such rule obtains in respect of an appeal. Mr. Rajagopalachariar cited a passage from Rayden on Divorce, 6th Edn., which runs thus: “Although, if a wife obtains a decree and her husband appeals, she is entitled to defend herself, it does not follow that he must pay her the costs of the appeal as a matter of course.” This statement of the law in the 6th Edn. is different from the statement contained in the earlier editions of the book. In the 4th Edn., the corresponding statement of the law was as follows: “If a wife obtains a decree and her husband appeals, she is entitled to defend herself and he must pay her costs of the appeal even if he succeeds.” In Kara v. Kara and Holman2, it was pointed out that this statement of the law is not accurate. But this passage, in any event, has no bearing on the question now before us. It relates to the costs of the appeal and not to costs payable in advance. There appears to have been an impression that even after the disposal of an appeal in which the wife is unsuccessful she should get the costs of the appeal. That impression has been corrected by the Court of Appeal, in the case above cited, Kara v. Kara and Holman2 . The passage which is more appropriate to the question now before us is found in Rayden on Divorce, 6th Edn., at page 514: “A wife who defends or prosecutes an appeal to the Court of Appeal, unlike a wife Who defends or prosecutes proceedings in Divorce Division cannot, merely because she is the wife, and, in the absence of special grounds, require her husband to give security for her costs.” It is, therefore, clear to us that the rule that obtains to a matrimonial suit does not apply to an appeal against the decree in such a suit. When a wife is not entitled as of right even to an order for security for costs of the appeal in the absence of special to enable her to conduct the appeal which had been filed by the husband against a decree nisi for dissolution of the marriage. There was also an alternative prayer for security for the costs of the appeal. It was held that the wife was not entitled to an order directing the respondent to pay her moneys for the conduct of the appeal. An order for security for the costs was made, but, we are not concerned with that part of the judgment as, before us, there is no such application. It was observed in the course of the judgment that no authority had been brought to the notice of the Bench for an application of the rule relating to a suit to an appeal either by the wife or by the husband. The rationale of the rule for making the husband supply the wife with funds to conduct a suit for dissolution of the marriage was discussed and it was pointed out that the rule was based on two principles, namely, the doctrine of common law agency of necessity; and secondly, public policy in relation to the protection of the married status. Mr. Rajagopalachariar did not attempt to convince us that this decision of the Division Bench, which is binding on us, was wrong. He sought to distinguish it on the ground that it related to a decree nisi for dissolution of the marriage whereas in this case the decree is only for judicial separation. But it appears to us that there is no foundation for this distinction. It is well-established that even after the decree for judicial separation, the wife cannot pledge her husband’s credit in the same way as she cannot after a decree for divorce. (See Laity on Divorce, 14th Edn. page 304). Petitioner’s learned counsel referred us to the well-known dictum of CozensHardy, M.R. in Kemp-Welch v. Kemp-Welch and Crymes1, that if the Divorce Court treats a wife in some respects worse than a husband, it undoubtedly treats a husband in a very important matter worse than a wife, inasmuch as it always requires a husband to provide his wife with the sinews of war to defend herself. This observation was made in an application by the wife for payment of the costs of the trial Court. It may now be taken to be well-settled that there is a practice in England of ordering the husband to pay the wife’s costs for defending a divorce proceeding. This practice appears to have come down from the olden days of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and has continued after the foundation of the Divorce Court. But so far as we are aware, no such rule obtains in respect of an appeal. Mr. Rajagopalachariar cited a passage from Rayden on Divorce, 6th Edn., which runs thus: “Although, if a wife obtains a decree and her husband appeals, she is entitled to defend herself, it does not follow that he must pay her the costs of the appeal as a matter of course.” This statement of the law in the 6th Edn. is different from the statement contained in the earlier editions of the book. In the 4th Edn., the corresponding statement of the law was as follows: “If a wife obtains a decree and her husband appeals, she is entitled to defend herself and he must pay her costs of the appeal even if he succeeds.” In Kara v. Kara and Holman2, it was pointed out that this statement of the law is not accurate. But this passage, in any event, has no bearing on the question now before us. It relates to the costs of the appeal and not to costs payable in advance. There appears to have been an impression that even after the disposal of an appeal in which the wife is unsuccessful she should get the costs of the appeal. That impression has been corrected by the Court of Appeal, in the case above cited, Kara v. Kara and Holman2 . The passage which is more appropriate to the question now before us is found in Rayden on Divorce, 6th Edn., at page 514: “A wife who defends or prosecutes an appeal to the Court of Appeal, unlike a wife Who defends or prosecutes proceedings in Divorce Division cannot, merely because she is the wife, and, in the absence of special grounds, require her husband to give security for her costs.” It is, therefore, clear to us that the rule that obtains to a matrimonial suit does not apply to an appeal against the decree in such a suit. When a wife is not entitled as of right even to an order for security for costs of the appeal in the absence of special grounds, it follows that she is certainly not entitled as of right to obtain an order for payment of moneys in advance to defray her expenses for the conduct of the appeal. As we said before, no authority has been cited to us by Mr. Rajagopalachariar to support the petitioner’s claim. Following the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Mrs. Barbara Georgina Debnam v. Mr. Fredric Cecil Burnie Debnam1, and as we do not find any special grounds in this case, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to the order prayed for. This application is dismissed. No order as to costs. R.M. ----- Application dismissed.