Judgment.- These are two Civil Revision Petitions sought to be filed against the Decrees and Judgments of the learned District Judge of South Arcot in C.M.A. Nos. 11 and 12 of 1958, confirming the Orders and Decrees of the learned District Munsif of Tirukoilur in O.S. Nos. 309 and 310 of 1956. The facts are: The suit properties originally belonged to one Ramalingam Pillai, the father of the revision petitioner-plaintiff, Gnanambal Ammal. According to the plaintiff, Ramalingam Pillai died intestate and she became entitled to the suit properties after the lifetime of her mother Periyanayaki, who died in September, 1944. Kannappa Pillai (sole respondent in C.R.P. No. 1709 of 1958 and the second respondent in C.R.P. No. 1723 of 1958) is the brother of Periyanayaki. On 14th May, 1943, Periyanayaki Ammal executed a registered settlement deed which recites that she got the properties under the registered will of her husband dated 10th October, 1930 and had settled one half of the properties upon Kannappa Pillai and the other half on the children of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has subsequently executed sale deeds, mortgages, dated 30th October, 1945 2rd April, 1953 and 6th September, 1953 (Exhibits B-2 to B-5 in O.S. No. 309 of 1956) and another sale deed, dated 10th October, 1945. The plaintiff has now filed these two suits for a declaration of her title to the suit properties and for recovery of possession, which is admittedly with the alienee. The contention of the defendant in O.S. No. 309 of 1956 was that when the plaintiff seeks to establish her title, this cannot be done without getting rid of the settlement deed dated 14th May, 1943 and the sale deed executed by her, which came into existence in pursuance of the settlement deed. The defendants in O. S. No. 310 of 1956 contended that the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit without a prayer for the cancellation of the usufructuary mortgage deed and the sale deed executed by her father on 10th October, 1930 (Exhibit B-1 and B-2) as also the sale deed executed by her on 10th October, 1945. It must be remembered that the contention of the plaintiff in this suit was that Ramalingam Pillai created those alienations in order to defeat the claim of Periyanayaki for maintenance. It must be remembered that the contention of the plaintiff in this suit was that Ramalingam Pillai created those alienations in order to defeat the claim of Periyanayaki for maintenance. Therefore, the defence in the two suits was that the plaintiff must value her reliefs in accordance with section 40 of the new Court-fees Act and that under section 53 of the said Act the value of the suits for Court fee should determine the value for jurisdiction. It may be pointed here that the plaintiff has filed a memo. in each of the suits that the value of the properties concerned in each of the suits is more than Rs. 5.000. Both the Courts below accepted the contention of the defendants and directed the return of the plaints for presentation to proper Court having pecuniary jurisdiction. Hence these revisions by the defeated plaintiff. That the Revision Petitioner is bound in O.S. No. 309 of 1956 to sue for the cancellation of the settlement deed executed by her mother and the sale deeds mortgages executed by her, and in O.S. No. 310 of 1956 for the cancellation of the mortgage deed and the sale deed executed by her father and the sale deed executed by her before she can get any relief, can admit of no doubt whatsoever. It is quite true that when the plaintiff’s case is that a document is sham and nominal, it need not be set aside and the suit for relief on that footing is not one for cancellation: Adinarayana v. Rattamma1, Krishnaswami v. Kuppu Ammal2, Ramanujam Pillai v. Ramaswami Pillai3, Hameed Rowther v. Mohideen Pichai4. But even in such cases, if the plaintiff sues for cancellation, he would have to pay Court-fee for the relief, whether it was necessary to have the deed cancelled or not; see the remarks in Adinarayana v. Rattamma1. The words “purports to create etc.” in section 40 of the new Court-fees Act make this clear beyond doubt. As however cancellation need not be asked for, the position summed up above is good law even under the new Act. The words “purports to create etc.” in section 40 of the new Court-fees Act make this clear beyond doubt. As however cancellation need not be asked for, the position summed up above is good law even under the new Act. But a prayer for a mere declaration about plaintiff’s title after attacking the document as sham and nominal in the body of the plaint, does not attract the application of the provision: Krishnaswami v. Kuppu Ammal1, A prayer for declaration that the sale was sham and nominal is the same thing as asking for a declaration about the plaintiff’s title being unaffected by the sale and does not bring the suit under this provision; Hameed Rowther v. Mohideen Pichai2, which prevails over the single Judge decisions in Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar3, and Thirumayandi Thevar v. Uthanda Thevar4. It is also quite true that in order to determine the class under which a suit falls for the purpose of Court-fee, the substance of the relief as disclosed in the plaint taken as a whole should be looked into and not the form of the prayer in which the relief is cast; vide remarks in Ramaswami v. Rangachariar5. A plaintiff cannot be allowed to evade payment of proper fee by omitting to ask for a relief when the success of his suit depends on the relief being granted to him. The Court cannot however go beyond the plaint allegations, because it is the allegations in the plaint that determine the Court-fee and the class under which the suit falls for the purpose of Court-fee: Asa Ram v. Jagan Nath6; Thakurji v. K.R.S. Sahi7. The basis for determination of Court-fee is the suit as laid in the plaint and not the contentions in defendant’s written statement; Ganesh Gopal v. Moreshwar Narain8. But when in the course of the trial, it appears that it is the intention of the plaintiff to interpret his plaint in one way for purposes of Court-fee and in another way during the trial, the Court is justified in returning the plaint for amendment, so that the plaintiff should be tied down to one specific case both for purpose of Court-fee and for trial; see the unreported decision in C. R. P. No. 137 of 1947, dated 13th February, 1948. Thus it is for the Court to construe a plaint and determine what it really seeks taking into consideration the substance and not merely the form of the relief prayed for; Kayathan Roche v. Chinnayya9 Athimoola v. Fathimathul10, Alagar Ayyangar v. Srinivasa Iyer11, Pathumma v. Mohideen,12 Vaman Vinayak v. Narayan Hari13(for a full case-noted discussion see A.I.R. Commentaries. The Court-fees Act, 1870 and Suits Valuation Act, 1887, 2nd edn. section 7, n. 3, pages 62 and foll.) Section 12 (2) of the New Court-Fees Act confers a statutory right on the defendant, by his written statement filed before the first hearing of the suit or before evidence is recorded on the merits of the claim, to plead that the subject-matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is not sufficient. The said section also provides that all questions arising on such pleas shall be heard and decided before evidence is recorded affecting such defendant, on the merits of the claim. The following extract from Krishnamurthi and Muthrubutham’s Guide to the Law of Court-fees (Fourth edition) at page 10 is apposite: “Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 12 give a new statutory right to defendant to raise objections to the adequacy of Court-fee paid by the plaintiff. Though there is a wider spread practice especially in moffusil Courts of defendants raising such objections and being heard on such objections, there is no legal sanction for it under the old law as laid down in Madras decision. A recent Andhra case decided by Mr. Justice Umamaheswaram contains views Which are in conformity with these subsections,14. Defendants are not interested in collection of proper fee and are interested only in obstructing the prosecution of the suit by such objections if possible. The question of Court-fee is a matter primarily between the Government and the party liable to pay the Court-fee,15 Defendants may however, justifiably be interested in some cases Where he is not sure of success in contending that the plaintiff has overvalued his suit and paid excess Court-fee and that in any event he should not be liable for such excess by way of costs. But the reason behind the sub-sections seems to be that a decision on the question of valuation may not only affect Court-fee but also jurisdiction of Court in which defendant is obviously interested” . But the reason behind the sub-sections seems to be that a decision on the question of valuation may not only affect Court-fee but also jurisdiction of Court in which defendant is obviously interested” . In the A.I.R. Commentaries on the Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, Second edition, the vast amount of Law which has gathered round this subject has been analysed and the subject has been dealt with in a cogent and logical manner. Bearing these principles set out therein in mind, if we examine the facts of these two Revision Petitions, we find that notwithstanding the glib assertions about the sham and nominal character of the various documents referred to in the plaints, there are allegations in the plaint which clearly show that they have been made only for the purpose of avoiding payment of proper Court-fee. In O.S. No. 309 of 1956 the plaintiff has admittedly executed Exhibits B-2 to B-5 on the basis that the settlement deed executed by her mother was a true and valid document. Even in the plaint the plaintiff has stated that she sold a half share in a site to the defendant. In one of her plaints the plaintiff has stated that the settlement deed is sham. She has also stated that it is a nominal document. It is true that if the plaintiff did not ratify the settlement deed by executing Exhibits B-2 to B-5 in favour of third parties, the position might be different. It is clear from the plaint averments that the defendant is in possession of the suit properties and that he got them in pursuance of the settlement deed executed by the plaintiff’s mother and the sale deed executed by the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot establish her title to the suit lands in O.S. No 309 of 1956 without getting the settlement deed Exhibit B-1 and the alienations made by her set aside. In O.S. No. 309 of 1956, the suit is in substance one for cancellation of the settlement deed executed by her mother and also the sale deed and usufructuary mortgage deeds executed by her. Having regard to the subsequent transactions Exhibits B-2 to B-5, it could not be said that the plaintiff did not claim title through her mother. In O.S. No. 310 of 1956 the plaintiff claims title to the suit properties as heir to her father Ramalingam Pillai. Having regard to the subsequent transactions Exhibits B-2 to B-5, it could not be said that the plaintiff did not claim title through her mother. In O.S. No. 310 of 1956 the plaintiff claims title to the suit properties as heir to her father Ramalingam Pillai. Hence the sale deed executed by her father is an obstacle to the plaintiff claiming items 1 to 9 and the sale deed executed by the plaintiff is an obstacle to her claiming title to items 10 and 11 therein, Admittedly possession of the said items has passed to the alienees by reason of the sale deeds executed by the plaintiff and her father. So, the plaintiff cannot recover possession of the suit properties without getting the sale deeds executed by her and her predecessor-in-title duly cancelled. Therefore, by merely profusely using the words “sham and nominal” the substance and essence of the suits cannot be burked. It is not the form but the substance of the suit must be taken into account: Pachayakkal v.Shanmughavelayudasami.1It is the duty of the Court to see that the provisions of the Court-fees Act are not so construed as to furnish a chance of escape and a means of evasion: Raj Rajeswari v. Gati Krishna 2. Courts cannot sanction that the effect of which would be to perpetuate a fraud on the Government revenue and to deprive the State of what is legitimately its due. Sri Ram v. Kwajahu3, Dil Afza Began, v. Dy. Commissioner, Bahraich4: of course a party is entitled if he can in a legal manner to circumvent the incidence of a taxing Act; Har Lal v. Sri Ram5, Pathumma v. Mohideen6, Pachayakkal v. Shanmugavelayuda-swami1. The decisions of both the Courts below are irreproachable. These Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. P.R.N. ----- Petitions dismissed,