JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against an order passed by the Subordinate Judge, First Court at Howrah, in exercise of his jurisdiction under section 141 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, as extended to the Howrah Municipality. By the aforesaid Order, certain objections by the respondent, Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. against re-assessment of valuation of certain premises were upheld. Certain provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, (Bengal Act III of 1923) have been made applicable, with modifications, to the Municipality of Howrah, by the Government, in exercise of its power under section 541 (2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. 1923. This appeal is governed by the provision of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, as extended to the Municipality of Howrah, hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as "the Act. " 2. Admittedly, the respondent, Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. is the owner of a plot of land, measuring 2 B-18k-12ch. together with separate structures thereon, which is numbered separately as premises No. 433 and 433/1, Grand Trunk Road (North ). At one time premises No 433 had been let out by the respondent company to a tenant, who continued in occupation till September, 1950. At the time of general re-valuation, effective from 3rd quarter 1918-49, the two premises had been separately assessed to municipal tax, in the manner hereinafter appearing. Premises No. 433 Grand Trunk Road (Let out to a tenant @ Rs. 500 per month) Premises No. 433 Grand Trunk Road (Let out to a tenant @ Rs. 500 per month) 500x12 =Rs. 6,000 Less 10 p. c. =Rs. 600 Annual value =Rs. 5,400 Tax @ 22 p. c. =Rs. 1,188 After the tenant in occupation of premises No. 433 Grand Trunk Road, left, the respondent Company claims to have gone in possession of premises No. 433 Grand Trunk Road itself and to have effected physical amalgamation of the two premises. At the time of the general re-valuation to be effective from the 3rd. quarter, 1953-54, two notices under section 136 of the Act, both dated the 26th. May, 1953, were served on the respondent Company, calling upon the respondent Company to furnish return of value of land and building in respect of the two premises No. 433 and 433/1, Grand Trunk Road. S. K. Sawday and Co. quarter, 1953-54, two notices under section 136 of the Act, both dated the 26th. May, 1953, were served on the respondent Company, calling upon the respondent Company to furnish return of value of land and building in respect of the two premises No. 433 and 433/1, Grand Trunk Road. S. K. Sawday and Co. acting as agent for the respondent Company, filed one consolidated return, in respect of both the premises No. 433 and 433/1, Grand Trunk Road. Along with the return S. K. Sawday and Co. addressed a letter (Ex. A), dated the 9th. July 1953, to the Assessor, Howrah Municipality of which the relevant portions are quoted below: "re: 433 and 433/1. G. T. Road, Howrah. Kindly amalgamate both the premises as these are being now occupied entirely by our clients Messrs. Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. Enclosures (1) Return. (2) Site plan showing holdings to be amalgamated. " 3. It appears from a copy of the notice under section 138 of the Act (Ex. 5), in respect of premises No. 433 Grand Trunk Road, and the valuation Report (Ext. G), in respect of premises No. 433/1, Grand Trunk Road, that the Howrah Municipality did not assess the two premises, on the basis of amalgamation, as prayed for. The two premises were separately assessed as before, and while the old annual value, in respect of premises No. 433/1, namely, Rs. 5651/- was maintained, the annual value of premises No. 433, was increased from Rs. 5400/- to Rs. 6494/- on the ground that there was an increase in the estimated value of the land and that previously there had been an under-valuation. 4. There was an objection made to the increase in valuation of premises No. 433, by S. K. Sawday and Co. on behalf of the respondent Company. The petition of objection is Ext. 1 and is dated the 1st. May, 1954. Amongst various objections taken, the last item of objection was as follows: "holdings No. 433 and 433/1, G. T. Road (North) have not been amalgamated as prayed for. " on the same date, another letter, [ex. 1 (b)] was written by S. K. Sawday and Co. on behalf of the respondent Company, of which the material portion is quoted below: "our formal letter of objection is enclosed herewith. We would refer you to our letter No. 510/ap. TD/2912 dated 9th. " on the same date, another letter, [ex. 1 (b)] was written by S. K. Sawday and Co. on behalf of the respondent Company, of which the material portion is quoted below: "our formal letter of objection is enclosed herewith. We would refer you to our letter No. 510/ap. TD/2912 dated 9th. July 1953 to the assessor in which we requested him to amalgamate holding Nos. 433 and 433/1 G. T. Road (North) which are contiguous and of which our clients are both owners and occupiers. We fail to see why these two holdings have not been amalgamated and would request you to consider this question again at the time of hearing. " The Administrator of the Municipality rejected the objection by the assessee by an Order, [ex. 1 (a)], dated the 6th. July 1954, and confirmed the annual value of premises No. 433 at Rs. 6494/ -. On the 7th. July 1954, the respondent company, through its agent S. K. Sawday and Co., applied for a copy of the Order dated the 6th. July 1954. The application is marked Ext. 1 (f). Thereafter on the 10th/14th. July 1954 S. K. Sawday and Co. on behalf of the respondent company, wrote a letter to the Administrator, Howrah Municipality, protesting against the order made by the Administrator on the 6th July 1954. Material portions from the said letter [ext. A (l)] are quoted below: "on the 6th. of July, last our Sri T. Das Gupta attended the hearing of Appeal No. 365 of Circle No. 11 in pursuance of a notice dated 21st. June 1954 under section 140 (blurred by ink) and (2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act as extended to Howrah. Sri Das Gupta was given to understand that no notice of hearing in respect of 433/1 G. T. Road was served on us as the valuation of the property had become final in absence of any objection. You were further pleased to observe that no notice under section 138 was served in this case as the valuation was not increased. We would request you to kindly let us have the date when notice under section 137 (2) was published in local newspapers and the names of the newspapers in which the notice was published. You were further pleased to observe that no notice under section 138 was served in this case as the valuation was not increased. We would request you to kindly let us have the date when notice under section 137 (2) was published in local newspapers and the names of the newspapers in which the notice was published. We pointed out that we had applied for amalgamation of the holdings 433 and 433/1 G. T. Road as early as 9th July, 1953 but your non-compliance with the provisions of section 134 has put us to a disadvantage and deprives us of the opportunity of filing an objection against the proposed valuation of 433/1 G. T. Road. Your reply to that was that neither could we expect you to put the Municipality to a disadvantage by effecting amalgamation and re-valuation at the same time that you had to act within the provisions of the Act and that you had entire discretion to revalue the holding first and then amalgamate at a later date depending on your convenience. We differ from this partisan view of the matter and hold that the provisions of Section 184 is clear and unambiguous and it is obligatory on you to effect amalgamation and revaluation at the same time without offering you any scope to use your discretion on the facts of this case. We hold that your action in this case is unjustifiable and without any sanction of the law. " 5. The appellant Municipality acknowledged the letter [ex. A (l)] by its letter, Exhibit 2 (a), dated the 14th. July 1954, and although it was stated in the letter that the said letter from S. K. Sawday and Co. was receiving attention for necessary action, nothing further appears to have been done in this matter. The application for copy of the assessment order Ext. 1 (f), had a cheque career and although made on the 7th July, 1954, the copy was not delivered to the respondent company till the 21st September, 1954. was receiving attention for necessary action, nothing further appears to have been done in this matter. The application for copy of the assessment order Ext. 1 (f), had a cheque career and although made on the 7th July, 1954, the copy was not delivered to the respondent company till the 21st September, 1954. The reasons for this delay in the supply of copy will be dealt with hereinafter, while considering the plea of limitation taken by the appellant on the 29th of October, 1954, an appeal, as provided for by section 141 of the Act, was filed by the respondent company against the order of the increased assessment, made in respect of premises No. 433 Grand Trunk Road. 6. Before the lower appellate court, the appeal was opposed by the Municipality, on various grounds, two of which need be noted here, namely, that the appeal was barred by limitation and secondly, that the amalgamation could not be granted because there had been no compliance with the rules for amalgamation of the two premises. In clarification of the second objection, it was contended at the time of the hearing of the appeal, before the lower appellate court, that the application for amalgamation could not be granted inasmuch as the two holdings had separate water connections. The lower appellate court rejected the contentions raised by the Municipality and allowed the appeal. The order of the Administrator of the Municipality assessing premises No. 433, Grand Trunk Road at an annual value of Rs. 6,494 was set aside and) the Municipality was given liberty to reassess the holding No. 433, Grand Trunk Road after dealing with the application for amalgamation according to law. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality appeals against the aforesaid order. Mr. Bhola Nath Roy, learned Advocate for the appellant, urged three points in support of the appeal: (1) the appeal before the lower appellate court by the respondent company, under section 141 of the Act, was barred by limitation; (2) under section 134 of the Act it was for the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation to effect amalgamation of the two premises. Instead of doing so the respondent company asked the Municipality to amalgamate. Instead of doing so the respondent company asked the Municipality to amalgamate. Since it was none of the business of the Municipality so to do, the assessment made in disregard of the request to amalgamate was a good assessment; (3) there was no appeal preferred against the valuation of premises No. 433/1, Grand Trunk Road; under section 142 of the Act that valuation is now final. If premises No. 433, Grand Trunk Road is now to be assessed on the basis of its amalgamation with premises No. 433/1, Grand Trunk Road that would mean reopening of the valuation of premises No. 433/1, Grand Trunk Road as well. Mr. Roy's argument was that a court of law should not indirectly do that which it is not directly allowed to do. 7. So far as the plea of limitation is concerned reference need be made to the provisions of section 141 (2) and (3) of the Act, which are to the following effect: section 141 (2) : Such appeal shall be presented to the Subordinate Judge of Howrah within thirty days from the date of the order passed under section 140, and shall be accompanied by an extract from the register of objections containing the order objected to. Section 141 (3): The provisions of Parts II and III of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, relating to appeals, shall apply to every appeal preferred under this section. 8. The argument of Mr. Roy on the point of limitation is that the application for copy was made by S. K. Sawday and Co. on behalf of the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. on the 7th July, 1954, but the application was not accompanied by fees, prescribed under the schedule of fees for copies of records from the Municipal Record Room (Ex. N). The respondent waited till the 30th August, 1954, when it sent its first reminder to the appellant [ex. 1 (d)]. The prescribed fee was not sent even along with the said reminder and what was said in the aforesaid reminder was that if any fee was necessary for taking out a copy of the order, the same would be paid as soon as the Municipality advised the applicant regarding the amount. Thereafter a second reminder was sent by the respondent company on the 7th September, 1954, but even at that time the prescribed fee was not deposited. Thereafter a second reminder was sent by the respondent company on the 7th September, 1954, but even at that time the prescribed fee was not deposited. Ultimately the fee was deposited on the 10th September, 1954, as is evidenced by a receipt granted by the Howrah Municipality (Ex. M) and the copy was made ready on the 13th September, 1954. The respondent company took delivery of the copy on the 21st September, 1954. According to Mr. Roy, the time from the 7th July, 1954, to the 21st September, 1954 was not the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order appealed against. The Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. was not entitled to exclusion of this period under section 12 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act. As such the appeal filed by the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. on the 29th October, 1954, when the Civil Courts reopened after the Puja holidays, was [barred by the special limitation prescribed under section 141 (2) of the Act. The expression "time requisite for obtaining a copy" as used in section 112 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act is a strong expression; it means some thing more than time required. It means time properly required and throws upon the applicant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period was due to his default. The delay caused by the carelessness or negligence in paying for the copy can not be excluded from the computation of the period of limitation. If application for copy made by the respondent company, required to be accompanied by any fees, legally prescribed, then the failure on the Part of the respondent Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. so to do would deprive it of the benefits under section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act. Therefore, if on the 10th September, 1954, when the fee was deposited, the period of limitation had already run out, the appeal before the Subordinate Judge of Howrah, filed on the 20th October, 1954, must be barred by limitation. 9. It was argued before us by Mr. S. R. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the respondent company, that no fees were legally payable for the copy and the schedule of fees prescribed under exhibit N had no force of law. 9. It was argued before us by Mr. S. R. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the respondent company, that no fees were legally payable for the copy and the schedule of fees prescribed under exhibit N had no force of law. His argument in substance was that by applying for the copy on the 7th July, 1954, his client had done all that was required of it to be done and the respondent company was entitled, thereafter, to wait until such time as the copy was made available to it. He further argued that the Howrah Municipality as a statutory body had no jurisdiction to levy copying fees or certification fees under a domestic resolution (Ex. P) unless authorised by law and there was no law which authorised the Howrah Municipality so to do. Therefore, even if any demand for fees had been made, the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. would be at liberty to refuse to pay such fees. What was more, no demand for copying fees had been actually made by the Municipality in this case until such time that the employees of S. K. Sawday and Co. called at the office and deposited fees, then demanded of them. Mr. Banerjee invited our attention to the fact that the Municipality could not make out its story that the demand for copying fees had been made to the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. by the Municipality by a letter, dated the 2nd August, 1954. 10. We have examined Ex. L, the Municipal office endorsements on the application for copy, dated the 7th July, 1954. We find that on 19th July, 1954. there was a note made on the application to the effect that necessary fees might be deposited with the Record Keeper. On the 30th July, 1954, another note was made on the application. "please write. " We agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the Municipality failed to prove that it had actually written to the respondent asking for deposit of fees. In our opinion, however, nothing turns on whether the Municipality did or did not make any demand for fees. If fees were legally payable, then it was the duty of the applicant the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. to apply on payment of fees or to pay the fees in due time, in any event, before the period of limitation ran out. If fees were legally payable, then it was the duty of the applicant the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. to apply on payment of fees or to pay the fees in due time, in any event, before the period of limitation ran out. The real question, therefore, is whether the Municipality had any [lawful right to levy fees for copying charges. Mr. Roy argued that under section 351a of the Bengal Municipal Act 1884, which applied to the Howrah Municipality at the material time, the Commissioners at a meeting could make Rules as to the business and affairs of the Municipality. Such Rules, if made, were subject to the sanction of the Local Government and if sanctioned had to be published in such manner as the Local Government might direct. Mr. Roy argued that Rules were actually framed under section 351a for giving of copies and the Rules as framed were sanctioned by the then Government of Bengal. Mr. Roy drew our attention to a letter from an Under Secretary to the then Government of Bengal, dated the 27th April/13th May, 1915 by which the sanction of the Local Government was accorded to the Rules. That letter is not an exhibit in this case but we looked into the letter with the consent of Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent company, who did not dispute the existence of such a Totter. We direct that a plain copy of the said letter be kept on the record as a piece of additional evidence used by us in appeal. Material portion from the aforesaid letter is quoted below: "I am directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your Memo. No. 164-M/xxvi-14, dated the 20th February, 1915, and to say that under sub-section (2) of section 351a of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, the Governor in Council is pleased to sanction, in super session of the existing rules on the subject, the rules framed by the Commissioners of the Howrah Municipality under sub-section (1) of that section for the conduct of business at meeting, etc. A copy of the rules as now sanctioned is enclosed and I am to request that the Commissioners may be asked to publish them by a copy in English and Vernacular being posted at the Municipal office and at the office of the Magistrate, Howrah. A copy of the rules as now sanctioned is enclosed and I am to request that the Commissioners may be asked to publish them by a copy in English and Vernacular being posted at the Municipal office and at the office of the Magistrate, Howrah. " Rule 107 of the Rules for conduct of business, framed under section 351a above referred to and printed in Part I of Howrah Municipality-municipal Manual, provides for supply of copies and authorises the Chairman from time to time to frame rules prescribing the procedure for issue of copies of Municipal records both certified and uncertified. 11. Although the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884 was repealed by the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, Mr. Roy argued the Rules continued to be effective by virtue of the provisions of section 25 of the Bengal General Clauses Act. In exercise of his power, under Rule 107, the schedule of fees evidenced by Ex. N was introduced by the Chairman at a meeting of the Municipality in the year 1949 (Ex. P ). On the above materials, Mr. Roy argued, that the levy of copying fees, as in the Schedule of fees (Ex. N) had statutory Validity behind it. 12. The elaborate argument of Mr. Roy can be disposed of on a short ground. Section 351a of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884 does not authorise the Commissioners of Municipalities to make rules for levy of fee or charges for supply of copies. Therefore, under the authority of that section, the schedule of fees, as in Ex. N, could not be framed. If the Howrah Municipality framed any domestic rules in the matter, as evidenced by the proceedings of the Budget Special Committee of the Municipality (Ex. I?), the same had no legal validity. Therefore, although such fees were all through being charged and although ultimately the respondent company also paid the fees so as to get the copy, we are not prepared to hold that the non-payment of such fees till the 10th September, 1954 was an instance of negligence and carelessness and disentitled the respondent company to the benefits of section 12 of the Limitation Act. We hold that the entire period from the 7th July, 1954 till the 13th September, 1954 (if not till the 21st September, 1954) should be excluded in computing the period of limitation. If the above period is excluded Mr. We hold that the entire period from the 7th July, 1954 till the 13th September, 1954 (if not till the 21st September, 1954) should be excluded in computing the period of limitation. If the above period is excluded Mr. Roy admits, that no further question of limitation arises. We therefore hold that the appeal before the lower appellate court was not barred by limitation. Turning now to the second objection of Mr. Roy, we are again unable to accept his contention. Section 134 of the Act provides that if any land or building, bearing two or mote municipal numbers, or portions thereof, be amalgamated into one or more new premises, the Chairman shall assess them, on amalgamation, after assigning to them one or more numbers, as the case may be. The Act no where defines amalgamation. Ordinarily the word amalgamation means merger butt the word has no precise legal meaning. Therefore amalgamation of land and building or premises has to be taken in its general sense, namely the makings or the conversion of plots of land or buildings into one, either by erection of one boundary wall or by removal of the marks of separation between them. 13. It appears from Ex. C, the site plan, that there are no separating wall or other separating marks between, the two premises. Previously the two premises were in different occupation, but at the material time the two premises were in one occupation by the respondent company. For effecting a physical amalgamation nothing further was required to be done by the respondent company. It is true that the two premises had two separate water connections. Assuming for the sake of argument that on amalgamation the amalgamated premises must have a single water connection, the size of the ferrule and the diameter of the communication pipe being determined by the annual value of the holding on, amalgamation, as provided for in schedule XIV of the Act, we are of opinion that the said change in water connection could not be effected by the respondent company by itself. There are rules for "construction of service pipes ferrules and works in schedule XIV of the Act, which contain sufficient indication that such works are to be done either in the presence of Municipal officers authorised in that behalf or through workmen of the Municipality. Therefore, if on receipt of the letter (Ex. There are rules for "construction of service pipes ferrules and works in schedule XIV of the Act, which contain sufficient indication that such works are to be done either in the presence of Municipal officers authorised in that behalf or through workmen of the Municipality. Therefore, if on receipt of the letter (Ex. A), dated the 9th July, 1958, the Municipality was of opinion that the amalgamation of the two premises could not be accepted so long as there remained separate water connections, the Municipality should have called upon the respondent to take steps in that direction. The Municipality, however, failed to pass any order on the application, dated the 9th July, 1953 and ignored it altogether in making the assessment. 14. We hold, in agreement with the learned Subordinate Judge, that under section 134 of the Act it is the option of the owner to amalgamate his holdings. On such amalgamation physically being made the Chairman of a Municipality must assess the holdings on amalgamation after assigning to them one or more numbers. Here the respondent company did all that it could do by itself in the matter of amalgamation. If without one water connection, the amalgamation was not complete, a proposition which we very much doubt, it was the duty of the Municipality to speak to that effect and call upon the respondent company to take steps for one water connection. The Municipality could not ignore the letter altogether and proceed in the matter of re-valuation, as if no amalgamation had been effected or sought to be effected. The argument of Mr. Roy that in this case the respondent company did not itself amalgamate the two premises but left the matter to be done by the Municipality does not appeal to us. In the context of events, to which reference has already been made, the language used in Ex. A, the letter, dated the 9th July, 1953 does not bear that interpretation. The language used in Ex. A should be taken as one of politeness informing the Assessor of the Municipality about the factor of amalgamation and asking the Assessor to proceed on the basis of amalgamation in the matter of assessment. We accordingly reject the second argument advanced by Mr. Roy. We hold that the Municipality Was wrong in this case in assessing premises Nos. 438 and 433/l otherwise than on the footing of amalgamation. We accordingly reject the second argument advanced by Mr. Roy. We hold that the Municipality Was wrong in this case in assessing premises Nos. 438 and 433/l otherwise than on the footing of amalgamation. But although we do so, we do not see how we can set aside the assessment of valuation of premises No. 433 Grand Trunk Road at this stage. 15. There was no appeal preferred against the valuation of premises No. 433/1, Grand Trunk Road. Mr. Banerjee argued that the valuation of premises No. 433/1 had not been increased and therefore the respondent Company need not have appealed. That is a wrong approach. Premises No. 433/1, had been separately assessed to annual value. The respondent Company should not have accepted the valuation because according to the respondent Company the valuation should have been on the basis of amalgamation. The respondent Company should have challenged the valuation. Having failed to do so, the respondent Company allowed the valuation to become final. 16. Mr. Banerjee next argued that Ms client could not appeal against the assessment of valuation in respect of premises No. 433/1, because the respondent Company had not been served with any notice under section 138 of the Act. Also there was no publication of the valuation under section 137 of the Act. He argued that the respondent had made that position clear in its letter to the Administrator darted the 10th. 14th. July, 1954. [ex. A (1)]. We do not, find any substance in this contention. The respondent Company certainly came to know of the valuation of premises No. 433/l on the 6th. July 1954. Even assuming that no public notification had been made and no notice under sec. 138 had been served on this respondent, the respondent Company should have preferred its objection on the 6th. July 1954 or immediately thereafter and if late at that time should have asked for extension of time under the proviso to section 139 (2) of the Act. If the proviso even was of no help, the respondent company should have asked for a notice under section 138 of the Act, in order to enable it to prefer its objection. In any event the respondent company should not have allowed its right of objection to go by default. If the proviso even was of no help, the respondent company should have asked for a notice under section 138 of the Act, in order to enable it to prefer its objection. In any event the respondent company should not have allowed its right of objection to go by default. Be that as it may, we are not satisfied that public notification under section 137 of the Act had not been made in the instant case. Lakshman Charan Ghosh, witness No. 2 examined by the Municipality speaks of service of notification under section 137 of the Act. Ex E (2) also evidences service of such notice. We do not find any reason why we should not hold that there was public notice of valuation given as required under section 137 of the Act. We are of opinion, regard being had to the evidence on record, that the learned Subordinate Judge was not justified in declining to enter into the question whether or not public notice under section 137 of the Act had been given. Since we hold that such public notice was given and since admittedly the respondent company did not prefer its objection to the valuation of premises No. 433/l even after that, the respondent company lost its right to challenge that valuation. If we now set aside the valuation of premises No. 433 and direct the valuation of the premises to be made on the basis of its amalgamation with premises No, 433/1, we would be really touching the valuation of premises No. 433/1, which has now become final, by operation of law. We should not do that because we have no jurisdiction now to touch the assessment of valuation of premises No. 433/1. The respondent company has by its own default lost its remedy, in the present proceedings. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the Court of appeal below and affirm the assessment of premises No. 433, Grand Trunk Road. In the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs.