JUDGMENT Tandon, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on behalf of one Sardar Iqbal Singh. The petitioner claims to possess seven licences granted to him by the Gram Sabha of village Rup Pur Khadra for plying of rickshaws on hire. Out of these, licences, five bear numbers 22, 23, 25, 132 and 175. Village Rup Pur Khadra is admittedly situate on the borders of the Lucknow Municipality, very close to Islamia College Hostel, besides some other spots of the town of Lucknow. The said licences were, according to the petitioner granted to him by the Gram Sabha of the said village in accordance with Sec. 37 (d) (ii) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act read with Rules 222 and 223 of the rules framed under that Act. His complaint was that the Municipal Board, Lucknow, through its servants, impounded the aforementioned five rickshaw's on the 20th and 24th of August, 1957, while these were carrying passengers from Rup Pur Khadra to destinations within the Municipal limits of Lucknow. According to him the hiring of the rickshaws was done at Rup Pur Khadra. 2. The Lucknow Municipal Board has, in pursuance of Sec. 298 (2), List I-H (c) and (d), made several bye-laws for the regulation and control of rickshaws plying for hire or kept for private use within the Municipal limits of Lucknow. Bye-law 2 provides that no person shall ply for hire or use for private purposes a cycle or a hand-drawn rickshaw within the limits of the Lucknow Municipality except under a licence granted by the Executive Officer of the Board on payment of certain fees. Bye-law 4 provides that no person shall act as a driver or shall employ a driver unless he holds a valid licence granted by Executive Officer on Form No. 12 on payment of a licence fee of Rs. 3/- per annum. Thus under bye-law 2, the Board issues licences for rickshaws, while under bye-law 4, the driver of a rickshaw had also to obtain a licence before he could drive it within the Municipal limits. Reference may also be made here to bye-law 20 which authorises the Board's officials to require any rickshaw-driver committing a breach of the bye-laws to accompany him to the Municipal officer for action to be taken against him, including suspension of his licence. Reference may also be made here to bye-law 20 which authorises the Board's officials to require any rickshaw-driver committing a breach of the bye-laws to accompany him to the Municipal officer for action to be taken against him, including suspension of his licence. Bye-law 22 says that where a licence is suspended, the licencee shall deliver the rickshaw to the Executive Officer or any officer appointed by the Board and thereupon such officer shall keep the vehicle during the period of suspension at such place as may, from time to time, be fixed by the Executive Officer and for which a fee at the rate of Rs. 1/- per day shall be chargeable. 3. The petitioner has by this petition challenged the right of the Board to impound rickshaws, his further contention was that he had a right to bring his rickshaws within the Municipal limits in the course of carrying and dropping at their destination the passengers who had boarded his rickshaws at Rup Pur Khadra. He claims that he has a constitutional right to pass and repass with his rickshaws through the public streets within the Lucknow Municipality and he relied for this on subclauses (d) and (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution. He further alleged that no less than 450 rickshaws, under licences issued by the Cantonment Board, Lucknow, had been allowed by the Municipal Board to pass and repass through the streets within the Lucknow Municipality without any hindrance or being subjected to impounding, so that its action in allowing rickshaws licensed by the Cantonment Board and not allowing rickshaws licensed by the Gram Sabha was discriminatory and therefore, in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution. The relief asked for by the petitioner was this:- "A writ of mandamus and prohibition or such other writ or order may be issued against the Municipal Board, Lucknow, requiring it to forbear from impounding the rickshaws passing or repassing the Municipal limits of Lucknow for the convenience of the residents belonging to the Gram Sabha Rup Pur Khadra and to release those already impounded by it." 4. The petitioner further prayed for an ad-interim injunction against the Board restraining it from impounding the rickshaws belonging to the petitioner, but we are no longer concerned with this relief. 5. The Board does not deny that the rickshaw's in question were impounded. The petitioner further prayed for an ad-interim injunction against the Board restraining it from impounding the rickshaws belonging to the petitioner, but we are no longer concerned with this relief. 5. The Board does not deny that the rickshaw's in question were impounded. The contention of the Municipal Board, however, is that these and other rickshaws bearing licences granted by the Gram Sabha were found plying for hire within the Lucknow Municipal limits and it was on that account that they were impounded. 6. It appeared that in pursuance of a certain policy adopted by the Board, issue of fresh licences for new rickshaws had been stopped for some time by the Board. The Board fixed a maximum limit of 3250 licences which number had already been reached. The result was that new rickshaws could not be permitted to ply even, if one was prepared to obtain a licence from the Board. Consequently it was alleged that the petitioner and likewise some other persons, in order to get round the said decision of the Board, maliciously obtained licence in large numbers from Gram Sabha Rup Pur Khadra and have on their strength started plying for hire rickshaws within the Lucknow Municipality. It also was urged that Rup Pur Khadra had a population of about 500 persons only but licences for over 450 rickshaws has been granted by it, which fact showed that what otherwise appear to be an innocent act was actually a device to ply for hire rickshaws within the Lucknow Municipality without licences. For the above reasons the Board has contended that the Court should refuse to grant the writ prayed for. 7. The petition was filed against the Municipal Board alone. Subsequently, however, three persons, Man Singh, Gur Bachan Singh and Ram Narain Talwar, who are some of the Licence-holders from the Board for plying rickshaws on hire within the Lucknow Municipal Board, applied to be made parties claiming that they were interested in the result of the petition. Their request was granted by an order dated the 18th of September, 1957. They also have resisted the issue of any writ against the Board and put forward substantially the same pleas as did the Board. Their request was granted by an order dated the 18th of September, 1957. They also have resisted the issue of any writ against the Board and put forward substantially the same pleas as did the Board. They also challenged the petitioner's right to pass and repass with his rickshaws within the Lucknow Municipality even for the purposes of carrying passengers from Rup Pur Khadra to destinations within the Lucknow Municipality and taking them back. They further contended that the Gram Sabha of Rup Pur Khadra had no authority to issue licences, nor could any rickshaw licenced by them enter the Municipal limits without obtaining licences from the Municipal Board. These interveners claimed that since the presence of these rickshaws adversely affected their trade, for which they have to pay heavy fees to the Municipal Board, they claimed the right to object to their plying within the Municipal limits. 8. It may be worthwhile to refer here to an application moved on behalf of the Board on the 21st of November, 1957, after the conclusion of the hearing. In this application the Board disowned ever having interfered with the entry of any vehicles, including rickshaws, carrying passengers from beyond Municipal limits or their going back, whether with or without passengers, and it was pointed out that the Board did not challenge the right of a citizen of the Union to enter either on vehicles or otherwise, the Municipal limits and to go out of those limits or to pass through it. It, however, reiterated that the applicant's object in making this petition was that these vehicles, which he was actually keeping and plying for hire within the Municipal limits and for which he held no licences, might continue to do so under the pretext that they carried passengers from beyond the Municipal limits. 9. As the Board failed to take up the stand that has now been taken by it or to concede the right of the petitioner to bring his rickshaws within the Municipal limits, considerable time was spent in thrashing out this aspect of the case. It was not until the arguments had concluded that it conceded the petitioner's right in that behalf. It was not until the arguments had concluded that it conceded the petitioner's right in that behalf. And now that this right is no longer disputed the relief asked by the petitioner must be granted and an order should be issued against the Municipal Board, Lucknow directing it to forbear from impounding the rickshaws passing or repassing within the Municipal limits of Lucknow for the convenience of the residents belonging to the Gram Sabha Rup Pur Khadra and boarding such rickshaws outside the Municipal limits of the Lucknow Municipality. Since the interveners did not concede the legal position as did the Board the exact legal position has to be determined. But before we did so it might be worthwhile to refer to the affidavits filed on behalf of the parties. The petitioner has, in para 3 of his affidavit dated August 27, 1957, said that the five out of the seven rickshaws bearing Nos. 22, 23, 25, 173 and 175 had crossed into the Municipal limits of Lucknow on the 20th and the 24th August, 1957, as these had been hired by passengers belonging to Rup Pur Khadra. His complaint accordingly was that the rickshaws were stopped and impounded by the Municipal authorities while they were carrying passengers who had boarded at Rup Pur Khadra for destinations within the Lucknow Municipal limits. This is affirmed once again in para 4 of the same affidavit. The Board's allegation contained in its affidavit dated the 17th September, 1957, on the contrary, is that these rickshaws were found plying within the Municipal limits of Lucknow and it was for that reason that they were impounded under bye-laws 20 to 22 of the Bye-laws which had been framed for the regulation and control of rickshaws plying for hire or kept for private use within the limits of the Lucknow Municipality. In paragraph 8 of the affidavit the Board also alleged that these persons were actually plying their rickshaws for hire within the Lucknow Municipality under the pretext of carrying passengers from Rup Pur Khadra to Lucknow and back, and in paragraph 9, that rickshaws holding licences from Gram Sabha, Rup Pur Khadra, were not entitled to ply within the Municipal limits of Lucknow or enter those limits unless they were licensed by the Municipal Board. 10. 10. Two questions thus emerge for consideration, first, whether the five rickshaws in question were carrying passengers from Rup Pur Khadra to destinations within the Lucknow Municipality, and, secondly, whether they were, in the absence of a licence from the Lucknow Municipality, entitled to enter the Municipal limits. On the second question there has been a concession by the Board by its application of the 21st November 1957, wherein the right of the petitioner to enter the Municipal limits in the course of carrying passengers from Rup Pur Khadra to Lucknow was accepted. The only question which, therefore, remained, so far as the Board was concerned, was whether the vehicles were impounded because they had been plying for hire within the Municipal limits or, were they merely carrying passengers from Rup Pur Khadra to destinations within the Lucknow Municipality. 11. As a rule we do not enter into an investigation of disputed facts in these proceedings which are decided on the basis of affidavits. But it, nevertheless, is necessary for a decision of this case to find whether the rickshaws in question were plying for hire within the Municipal limits or not. In support of their contention the Board placed two further affidavits, one by Mujtaba Husain, the Inspector attached to the licensing office of the Board and the other by Sri Hari Shanker Sharma, the licensing officer. The latter, while stating in paras 20 and 21 of his affidavit dated the 21st November, 1957, that rickshaws Nos. 25 and 132 were detained at Lalbagh and Qaiserbagh on 20th August, 1957, and that rickshaws Nos. 23 and 175 were detained at Nakhas and Quaiserbagh on 28th August, 1957, along with his affidavit, also filed the statements said to have been obtained by the Inspector concerned from the passengers, who were then seated in those vehicles. According to them, these passengers had hired the vehicles within Municipal limits for destinations within Municipal limits. It was urged that these statements were inadmissible in evidence and the Board ought to have filed affidavits of those persons or should have put them in the witness-box. There is doubtless this difficulty in accepting these statements in the absence of the persons concerned not having been put forward. It is not possible to rely on them in proof of the truth of the facts stated in them. There is doubtless this difficulty in accepting these statements in the absence of the persons concerned not having been put forward. It is not possible to rely on them in proof of the truth of the facts stated in them. There are before us the affidavits made by Mohan, Baqar Mirza, Adharey and Dulare, who were driving those vehicles at that time. According to them the passengers had boarded the vehicles at Rup Pur Khadra for destinations within the Lucknow Municipality. In face of these affidavits it is not possible to hold that the vehicles in question were "plying for hire" within the Municipal limits at the time they were intercepted. There is on behalf of the Board, therefore, no satisfactory proof that the passengers had boarded the impounded rickshaws within the Municipal limits or had hired them inside those limits. In these circumstances it has, in our opinion, to be assumed for the purposes of the decision of this petition that the rickshaws in question were carrying passengers from Rup Pur Khadra, though this question loses its importance because the impounded vehicles have already been released. 12. Before we proceed to consider the main question urged in this case, we may briefly refer to the objection taken by the Board, namely, that the Gram Sabha, Rup Pur Khadra, had no legal authority to issue licences. In its opinion the law simply entitled the Gram Sabha to levy a tax on vehicles kept within its limits or plying for hire therein. It can issue no licences. A decision on this question in our opinion, is not necessary for the decision of the present case, though we are disposed to think that Sec. 37 (d) (ii) of the Panchayat Raj Act read with Rules 220 and 223 gave authority to the Gram Sabha to license in that manner the plying of rickshaws. 13. The contention put forward was whether the petitioner had or had not a licence, he certainly had the constitutional right to enter the territory of the Lucknow Municipality for the purpose of bringing passengers within that territory and even to take them back without the necessity of a licence from the Municipal Board of Lucknow. 13. The contention put forward was whether the petitioner had or had not a licence, he certainly had the constitutional right to enter the territory of the Lucknow Municipality for the purpose of bringing passengers within that territory and even to take them back without the necessity of a licence from the Municipal Board of Lucknow. The petitioner claims that right under Article 19(i) (d) and (g) which guarantee to an Indian citizen the freedom of movement and the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. His learned counsel urged that the petitioner had an unrestricted right of entry into the Municipality in the exercise of his right to carry on his trade and business as also in the exercise of the right of free movement throughout the territory of the Union. Article 304, which guarantees freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse, was not referred to though it was perhaps more relevant. However, it would not be necessary to go into that question as in either event the right of the Board to stop the vehicles entering the Municipal limits from places beyond those limits can only be supported on the bye-laws framed by it. We, therefore, at once revert to them. Bye-law 2 required that no person shall ply for hire a cycle or hand-driven rickshaw within the limits of the Lucknow Municipality except under a licence granted by the Board. Bye-law 4 likewise said that no person shall act as a driver of any such rickshaw unless he holds a valid licence granted by the Board. The prohibition in these bye-laws, therefore, is against plying for hire of rickshaws within the Municipal limits of Lucknow. The portion of these bye-laws which applied to rickshaws kept for private purposes is not relevant here, as the petitioner's case, uncontroverted, has been that the rickshaws in question were licensed by the Gram Sabha, Rup Pur Khadra, and were kept there but were detained in the course of their journeys from Rup Pur Khadra to destinations within the Lucknow Municipality. According to him, the hiring was done in each case at Rup Pur Khadra and they were used simply for carrying the passengers to their destinations in pursuance of the hiring done at Rup Pur Khadra. No hiring was done within the Municipal limits though a portion of the journey was performed within those limits. According to him, the hiring was done in each case at Rup Pur Khadra and they were used simply for carrying the passengers to their destinations in pursuance of the hiring done at Rup Pur Khadra. No hiring was done within the Municipal limits though a portion of the journey was performed within those limits. What is necessary, therefore, is to ascertain the correct meaning of the expression 'plying for hire,' particularly as the Board urged that the carrying of passengers irrespective of whether the hiring was done outside the Municipal limits or within those limits amounted to "plying for hire" within the Municipal limits if any part of the journey fell within those limits. 14. The above stand taken by the Board, in our view, cannot be sustained. "Plying for hire" means the act of waiting for and soliciting passengers. Therefore, no sooner a person has hired a vehicle the "plying for hire" of the vehicle is completed. As was observed by Lord Trevettin C. J. in Sales v. Lake, 1922(1) KB 553: "A carriage could not accurately be said to ply for hire unless two conditions were satisfied: (1) There must be a soliciting or waiting to secure passengers by the driver or other person in control without any previous contract with them, and (2) The owner or person in control who is engaged in or authorises the soliciting or waiting must be in the possession of a carriage for which he is soliciting or waiting to obtain passengers." 15. There must, therefore, be soliciting or waiting to secure passengers before a vehicle can be said to ply for hire. The above view was endorsed in Local Fund Overseer Mayavaram v. Pakkirisami, A.I.R. 1928 Madras 166 also. There must therefore be a general invitation by the person in charge of the vehicle to the members of the public to make contracts with him for carriage in the vehicle and it is only at the place where such invitation is extended that the vehicle can be said to ply for hire. Merely carrying passengers to destinations at some place within the Municipal limits and therefore covering in the course of the journey some part of the Municipal limits will not be plying for hire within the Municipal limits. Merely carrying passengers to destinations at some place within the Municipal limits and therefore covering in the course of the journey some part of the Municipal limits will not be plying for hire within the Municipal limits. We are unable to accept the contention that carrying a passenger on any part of the Municipal road irrespective of where the hiring was done is plying for hire within the Municipal limits. Where therefore hiring is done outside the Municipal limits even though a portion of the journey falls within Municipal limits, the vehicle cannot be said to be plying for hire within the Municipal limits. Such being the meaning of the expression "plying for hire", the bye-laws in question which regulate the plying of rickshaws for hire within the Municipal limits cannot hold good in the case of rickshaws which solicit or extend invitation to passengers beyond those limits. These bye-laws cannot affect or control the right of such other vehicles to enter the Municipal limits. The right of entry of such vehicles inside the Municipal limits belongs to the petitioner independently of these bye-laws and is not affected by them; and if this is so, as we have no doubt it is, the Board cannot on the strength of the said bye-laws intercept or impound vehicles. 16. The petitioner relied on Article 14 also of the Constitution to challenge the action of the Municipal Board, because according to him the Board allowed rickshaws licensed by the Cantonment Board to enter and carry passengers within the Municipal limits but did not do so in the case of rickshaws licensed by the Gram Sabha of Rup Pur Khadra. As the bye-laws stand, there is nothing in them to discriminate between rickshaws licensed by one or the other authority. There is therefore no substance in this plea. 17. Now that we find that the petitioner has a right to bring his rickshaws within the Municipal limits while carrying such passengers as hired them outside those limits, the question arises as to what relief may be granted to him. Now that the right to such entry is not disputed by the Board, ordinarily it should have been sufficient to affirm the right to such entry, even having regard to the allegations of the Board that there was an effect by such methods to introduce spurious vehicles for hiring purposes within the Municipal limits. Now that the right to such entry is not disputed by the Board, ordinarily it should have been sufficient to affirm the right to such entry, even having regard to the allegations of the Board that there was an effect by such methods to introduce spurious vehicles for hiring purposes within the Municipal limits. Rup Pur Khadra has a population of about 500 persons only; Nevertheless 450 rickshaws have been licensed by that Gram Sabha. Neither the fact of Rup Pur Khadra being adjacent to Lucknow, nor the combined requirements of Rup Pur Khadra and the adjoining localities could justify such a large number of vehicles. The suspicion of the Board cannot be said to be wholly unjustified. But we cannot overlook the fact that the Municipal Board persisted even up to the last stage of arguments to dispute the right of the petitioner to enter the Municipal limits with passengers on his rickshaws though they were hired outside those limits for destination within those limits. We have, therefore, thought it necessary to make an order directing the Municipal Board Lucknow, to forbear from impounding rickshaws entering the Municipal limits while carrying passengers from Rup Pur Khadra to destinations within those limits, or while they were taking such passengers on their return trip. This will, however, not affect the right of the Board to detain in accordance with the bye-laws any vehicle which may be found plying for hire within the Municipal limits. We order accordingly. 18. The petitioner will get his costs from the opposite-parties to be paid by them in equal proportion. Mulla, J. - Pronounced under Rule 1 (2) of Chapter VII of the Rules of Court.