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1958 DIGILAW 40 (ORI)

GOVINDA PRASAD AGARWALA v. ABHIRAM BALA

1958-03-31

RAO

body1958
JUDGMENT : Rao, J. - This appeal is directed against the order of the Subordinate Judge, Mayurbhanj passed on an execution application by which the movable properties belonging to the Appellant were ordered to be attached for realisation of the monies due under the decree. The Appellant is not a party to the suit. He is a surety. The first Respondent filed a suit against the second Respondent Madhusudan Parida for realization of about Rs. 9000/- and during the pendency of the suit applied for attachment before judgment of the movable properties of the Defendant. In that proceeding the Appellant offered himself as a surety for the due performance of the decree to be passed against the Defendant. A decree was passed on 21-11-1952 for Rs. 9750-10-9 with costs of about Rs. 1375.11.9 against the second Respondent who was Defendant in the suit. On 9-2-1953, the first Respondent-decree-holder filed an application for execution to realise the amount due under the decree. To this execution application, both the original Defendant-judgment-debtor No. 1 and the Appellant-surety were made parties. The prayer in the execution application Was to the effect that the amount would be realized from judgment-debtor No. 1 -the Defendant, failing that from judgment-debtor No. 2, the Appellant-surety and failing realisation of the amount by attachment of movable properties there is also a prayer in the execution application for attachment of immovable properties and sale of the same to realise the amount due under the decree. On this execution application, notices were issued to both the original Defendant-judgment-debtor No. 1 and the surety-judgment-debtor No. 2. The notice simply asked the Appellant to show cause why execution should not be proceeded against him. It is in similar terms as that issued against judgment-debtor No. 1. Judgment-debtor No. 1 filed an application, on receipt of the notice on 30-3-1958, for being allowed to pay the amount due from him in instalments. This application was objected to by the decree-holder on 18-4. 1953 and after about 1 t years this application Was disposed of on 9-11-1954 by rejecting the same. Judgment-debtor No. 1 filed an application, on receipt of the notice on 30-3-1958, for being allowed to pay the amount due from him in instalments. This application was objected to by the decree-holder on 18-4. 1953 and after about 1 t years this application Was disposed of on 9-11-1954 by rejecting the same. After the application for payment of the money by instalments filed by the judgment-debtor No. 1 was disposed of, the decree-holder in the same execution application applied for proceeding against the surety for realization of the amount without asking for attachment of either the movable properties of judgment-debtor No. 1 or for sale of his immovable properties. On 6-1-1955, that is, the next day attachment of movable properties of the Appellant surety was ordered and a warrant for attachment of the same was issued. On 7-1-1955, the surety appeared and objected to the issue of the warrant and prayed that it should be recalled. On the same day, the learned Subordinate Judge recalled the warrant stating in his order that it was issued by mistake- against the surety and that the warrant should be issued against the Defendant-judgment-debtor No. 1. That warrant for attachment of movable properties of the Defendant-judgment-debtor No. 1 was returned with the endorsement that sufficient movable properties of the judgment-debtor were not .found. I fail to appreciate this endorsement and I am surprised how the court accepted the same. The process server is directed by the court to attach the movable properties of the judgment-debtor. It is his duty to attach as many properties as are found in the possession of the judgment-debtor. The word 'sufficient' indicates that the process server arrogated to himself the power to value the properties and It might be that he simply made a return though he found some properties. The learned Subordinate Judge ought to have asked for an explanation from this process-server as to the return made by him with regard to the attachment of the Defendant-judgment-debtor No. 1. On this warrant being returned with the endorsement as stated above the executing court ordered attachment of the movable properties of the surety. It is against this order that the Appellant has come up in appeal. 2. Mr. Sinha, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant contends that the order of the lower court directing attachment of his movable properties is ultravires and is without jurisdiction. It is against this order that the Appellant has come up in appeal. 2. Mr. Sinha, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant contends that the order of the lower court directing attachment of his movable properties is ultravires and is without jurisdiction. He contends that unless notice as contemplated u/s 145 of the CPC is issued in Form No. 13 of Appendix H to the surety asking him to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him, the court cannot get jurisdiction to direct attachment of his properties. Section 145 is to this effect, Where any person has become liable as surety (a) for the performance of any decree or any part thereof, or (b) for the restitution of any property taken in execution of a decree, or (c) for the payment of any money, or for the fulfillment of any condition imposed on any person, under an order of the Court in any suit or in any proceeding consequent thereon, the decree or order may be executed against him, to the extent to which he has rendered himself personally liable, in the manner herein provided for the execution of decrees, and such person shall, for the purposes of appeal, be deemed a party within the meaning of Section 47: Provided that such notice as the Court ;n each case thinks sufficient has been given to the surety. Form No. 13 of Appendix H is entitled "Notice to surety of his liability under a decree (Section 145)" and is as foIlows: To Where as you_________ did on____become liable as surety for the performance of any decree which might be passed against the said_____ Defendant in the above suit; and whereas a decree was passed on the _____day of______ 19 _______, against the said Defendant for the payment of_______ and whereas application has been made for execution of the said decree against you: Take notice that yon are hereby required on or before the___day of_____ 19_, to show cause why the saId decree should not be executed against you, and if no sufficient cause shall be, within the time specified, shown to the satisfaction of the Court, an order for its execution will be forthwith issued in the terms of the said application. It is thus clear from Section 145, CPC as well as the form given in the CPC that to enforce the liability against the surety in execution, the law requires that a particular notice to show cause why the decree should not be executed against the surety is to be given to him. From the statement of the facts above it is dear that no such notice as contemplated u/s 145 CPC and form No. 13 of Appendix H was given to the surety. Mr. S. Patnaik for Respondent No. 1 referred me to the order sheet which shows that on the filing of the execution application on 9.2.1953 against both the original Defendant and the surety a notice was issued to the surety and that he appeared. But I do not think that this general notice on the execution application issued to him along with judgment-debtor No. 1 is the notice contemplated u/s 145, Code of Civil Procedure 3. In Support of his contention, Mr. Sinha relied upon a decision in the case of K.A. Muhammad Sultan Sahib v. Nagoji Rao AIR 1931 Mad 828 where A stood surety for B who was arrested before judgment, and after a decree had been passed against B a notice was served on A to produce B; A was unable to comply with the order but himself appeared and asked for time which was refused and the Court directed the arrest of A u/s 145. 00 these facts it was held by Mr. Justice Curgenven that the order directing execution to issue against A was ultravires and the Court in refusing to review the order committed an error. In the case of Tan Kin Shan and Ors. v. U. Che Si and Ors. AIR 1925 Ran 135 a Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court held: Attachment on the property of a judgment-debtor's surety without previous notice to the surety calling upon him to show cause is ultra vires. These two decisions show that in order to get jurisdiction to execute the decree against the surety, the surety must be served with a notice as contemplated u/s 145 CPC Mr. These two decisions show that in order to get jurisdiction to execute the decree against the surety, the surety must be served with a notice as contemplated u/s 145 CPC Mr. Patnaik tried to distinguish these two decisions by submitting that the decisions of those two cases apply only in cases where there is absolutely no notice given to the surety and that it is enough that such notice as the Court thinks fit may be issued and then the requisites of the law are complied with. I cannot accept this contention .In the Madras case the surety did have notice of the execution application in as much as he was served with a notice to produce the Defendant against whom the decree was passed. He appeared before the Court and prayed for time. Time was refused and he was arrested. That order was set aside by Justice Curgenven on the ground that a notice as contemplated u/s 145 CPC was not served on him. In my opinion, therefore, the order of the learned Subordinate Judge that in as much as the Appellant appeared before him through an advocate is enough notice to him cannot give him jurisdiction to execute the decree. It is necessary that the surety must be given notice as to why the decree should not be executed against him in as much he may, if he receives such a notice, contend before the Court as to why execution should not be levied against him relying upon the terms of the bond or potting forth any other contentions. 4. I am, therefore, of opinion that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is not correct. I would therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the lower court. The Appellant will have the costs of this appeal as well as costs of the proceedings before the lower court. The amount deposited by the Appellant under the orders of this Court shall be returned to him. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed