JUDGMENT 1. The appellant in these two appeals was a tenant in respect of four rooms in 93/1/h, Baithakkhana Road, Calcutta, three of then being on the ground floor and one on the third floor under the respondents. The respondents' case is that these four rooms were covered by two separate tenanciesone at a monthly rent of Rs. 24-8 for the three rooms on the ground floor and another tenancy at the rate of Rs. 9-13 per month for the room on the third floor. Accordingly they brought two ejectment suits in respect of the two tenancies on the allegations that each of these tenancies has been determined by a notice to quit and further that the defendant was not entitled to the special protection against ejectment in view of his defaults in payment of rent since the month of December, 1949. In the plaint as originally drafted, there was also an averment that the defendant's tenancies had been ipso facto determined by operation of law. Later the plaintiffs prayed for the deletion of paragraph 4 of the plaint which contained this averment and the prayer was allowed. The averment in paragraph 2 of the plaint that the defendant was in arrears of rent legally payable by him to the plaintiffs since the month of December, 1949, however, remained unaltered. The defendant's contention in both these suits was firstly that the four rooms were covered by one single tenancy at a rental of Rs. 15-5-3, an additional sum of Rs 3 being paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs for electric charges and that accordingly the notice to quit was invalid and ineffective in law. In paragraph 11 of the written statement it was further pleaded that there was actually no default, as thee defendant had been depositing rents at the contractual rates. An additional plea taken in paragraph 11 of the written statement was that even if it be held that the deposits made by the defendant were short and insufficient, then action should be taken under section 14 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1950 and defendant should be given an opportunity of paying up the arrears as provided therein and the suit should be dismissed upon such payment being made. 2. 2. The trial court rejected the defendant's contention and found that the plaintiffs' case that there were two tenancies had been proved; it found also that the notices were duly served and that even if pre-1950 Act defaults be ignored, he was not entitled to any protection against eviction under the provisions of section 14 of the 1950 Act in view of the proviso to subsection (3) thereof, its finding on fact being that on three occasions each of two months the defendant had defaulted in payment of rents. Accordingly it decreed both the suits. On appeal the learned judges of the Small Causes Court also found that there were two separate tenancies in respect of the four rooms as found by the learned trial judge. They further held that the defendant was a defaulter for six consecutive months from March. 1950 to August, 1950 and thus made defaults on three occasions of two months each within a period of 18 months prior to the institution of the suit and that he was, therefore, not entitled to any protection against eviction in view of the proviso to subsection (3) of section 14 of the Rent Act of 1950. Accordingly they dismissed the appeals. 3. Two points have been raised on behalf of the appellant in both these appeals. The first is that the finding of the appellate court that there were two separate tenancies was vitiated by an error of law inasmuch as the judges had misread the previous judgment in a Small Causes Court Suit, Ex. A, and had further not taken into consideration a hatchita on which the defendant relied. As regards the document, Ex. A, the judges, who heard the appeal, observed: "but in this judgment the learned court did not hold that there was one tenancy at the consolidated rent of Rs. 15-5-3. " Mr. Mukherjee tried to convince us that in fact in this judgment, Ex. A, the Small Causes Court Judge did hold that there was one tenancy and not two tenancies. We have been taken through the entire judgment, Ex. A, and I am unable to agree with Mr. Mukherjee that there was any decision by the court that there was one tenancy. A, the Small Causes Court Judge did hold that there was one tenancy and not two tenancies. We have been taken through the entire judgment, Ex. A, and I am unable to agree with Mr. Mukherjee that there was any decision by the court that there was one tenancy. The mere fact that the Small Causes Court suit was dismissed does not justify the conclusion that in fact the judge of Small Causes Court did hold that there was one tenancy. As I am unable to discover any clear finding in Ex. A that there was one tenancy at the consolidated rent of Rs. 15-5-3 for all the four rooms, I am of opinion that the judges, who heard the appeal, cannot be said to have been wrong when they say "in this judgment the learned court did not hold that there was one tenancy at the consolidated rent of Rs. 15-5-3. " Nor am I able to agree that the mere fact, that there is no reference in the judgment of the appellate court to the hatchita, which is said to support the defendant's case, is any reason to think that this was not taken into consideration by them. In my opinion, there is nothing that would justify our interfering in second appeal with the decision of the appellate court that there were two separate tenancies in respect of the disputed rooms. The first point urged by Mr. Mukherjee has, therefore, no substance. 4. The other point urged by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the appellant, is that the court of appeal below erred in law in taking into consideration for the purpose of the application of the provisions of section 14 of the 1950 Act the defaults for the months of March, 1950 to August, 1950 and that if these be left out of account, the defendant will not be hit by the proviso to subsection (3) of section 14 and will be entitled to the protection of section 14 (1) and (3). It is argued that it being clear from the evidence that there had been defaults for three consecutive months, namely for December, 1949. January, 1950 and February, 1950, when the Rent Act of 1948 was in operation, there was ipso facto determination of the tenancy and so until the Amendment Act (Act LXII of 1950) became law on the 30th November, 1950. January, 1950 and February, 1950, when the Rent Act of 1948 was in operation, there was ipso facto determination of the tenancy and so until the Amendment Act (Act LXII of 1950) became law on the 30th November, 1950. it was impossible for the defendant to make any payment of rent. Mr. Mitter, who appeared before us on behalf of the respondents, drew our attention to the fact, which I have already mentioned above, that the averment in the plaint, that there was ipso facto determination of the tenancy, had been withdrawn by the deletion of the paragraph containing this averment. If the other averment in paragraph 2 of the plaint that the defendant had defaulted in payment of rent from December, 1949, had also been withdrawn, there would have been no scope for adducing any evidence as regards the defaults or otherwise for these months of December, 1949, January, 1950 and February, 1950. In fact, however, the plaintiffs did not withdraw the assertion in paragraph 2 of the plaint that the defendant was habitually a defaulter and "was in arrear of rent legally payable by him to the plaintiffs since the month of December, 1949. "The correctness of this assertion was challenged by the defendant and it appears from the record that evidence was actually adduced by the plaintiffs to the effect that the rents legally payable by the defendant to the plaintiffs for the months of December, 1949, January, 1950 and February, 1950 had not been paid. The trial court has actually considered this matter and recorded a conclusion that the defendant had failed to prove that he paid the rent for December, 1949 and January, 1950 and that he paid the rent of February, 1950 by money order on the 21st March, 1950 and that he paid only Rs. 18 per month for that month. This finding of the trial court has not been reversed by the court of appeal. Indeed, it cannot be disputed for a moment that the evidence on the record clearly justifies the conclusion which the trial court reached that the rents for these tenancies for December, 1949, January, 1950 and February, 1950 were not paid by the defendant within due time. I cannot see, therefore, how the operation of the law that in consequence of these three consecutive defaults the tenancies stood determined can be escaped. I cannot see, therefore, how the operation of the law that in consequence of these three consecutive defaults the tenancies stood determined can be escaped. Once it is found, as we are bound to find, that there was ipso facto determination of these two tenancies, the conclusion that necessarily follows is that up to the date of the Amending Act LXII of 1950 the defendant was not, in law, able or competent to pay the rents for these tenancies as he had ceased to be a tenant. It would be absurd to treat him as a defaulter within the meaning of law for the omission to pay rent at a time when the law itself prevented him from paying it. It may be mentioned that this view, that defaults in the payment of rents in respect of tenancies which had ipso facto been determined under the operation of section 12 (3) of the 1948 Act, for the period up to the enactment of the Amending Act (Act LXII of 1950) cannot be taken into account for deciding whether there has been any default within the meaning of the proviso to section 14 (3) of 1950 Act, was taken by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Roy v. Surendra Nath Ghose (1) (57 C. W. N. 627). It is true that in that case the question arose in connection with the construction and application of section 18 (5) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950. It is quite clear, however, from the judgment delivered m that case that this decision on the question of law that defaults prior to the Amending Act could not be taken into consideration in respect of tenancies which had ipso facto been determined, was not intended to be limited to cases coming under section 18 (5) only. It is quite clear, however, from the judgment delivered m that case that this decision on the question of law that defaults prior to the Amending Act could not be taken into consideration in respect of tenancies which had ipso facto been determined, was not intended to be limited to cases coming under section 18 (5) only. Even apart from the decision of the Full Bench mentioned above, I would have had no hesitation in holding that such defaults could not be taken into account in respect of tenancies which had ipso facto been determined, I consider, however, that the Full Bench having expressly decided that question, we would, in any case, be bound to follow that decision, whenever a question arose whether a default in respect of a tenancy which had ipso facto been determined, for the months up to October, 1950, could be taken into account. My conclusion, therefore, is that the appellant's contention, that the defaults in respect of the months of March, 1950 to August, 1950 could not be taken into account, and that the court of appeal below was wrong in holding that in view of the defaults in payment of rents for these months the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 14 came into operation. 5. According to Mr. Mukherjee, once it is found that these alleged defaults for the months of March, 1950 to August, 1950 could not be taken into account we are bound to hold, on the facts of these two cases, both of which were instituted on the 27th September, 1950, that the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 14 cannot come into operation. He points out that it was held in the case of Amal Krishna Basu v. Chandi Charan Banerjee (2) (56 C. W. N. 528), that only defaults made prior to the institution of the suit can be considered for the purpose of this proviso. In that case, this court had to consider a suit filed on the 10th October, 1950 on the allegation that prior to that date there had been defaults in the payment of arrears of rent from May, 1950. An application for action under section 14 (1) was made by the defendant on the 5th December, 1950 and an order was passed on it on the 17th March, 1951. An application for action under section 14 (1) was made by the defendant on the 5th December, 1950 and an order was passed on it on the 17th March, 1951. It was contended before this court that at the date of the order the tenant had been in default in payment of rent from May, 1950 to December, 1950, Obviously if the period of 18 months mentioned in the proviso was to be calculated with reference to the date of the order and defaults made within a period of 18 months prior to the date of the order could be taken into consideration, the defendant in that case was hit by the proviso. The question had been considered in several cases by judges sitting singly till it came up before a Division Bench of which I was a member in the case of Amal Krishna Basu v. Chandi Charan Banerjee (2) (56 C. W. N. 528). Following the view taken by Roxburgh, J. in the case of Krishna Gopal Kedia v. Banerjee Mukherjee and Co. (Civil Revision Case No. 769 of 1951) and Lahiri, J. in the case of Krishna Chandra v. Bipin Behari Saha (S. A. 1031 of 1951), this court held in Amal Krishna Basu's case that the contention of the landlord could not be accepted and that the period of 18 months which had to be considered for the purpose of proviso to section 14 (3) of the Act must be a period preceding the date of the institution of the suit. 6. If this be the correct position of the lawas we would be bound to hold till this view has been overruled by a Full Bench the clear consequence is that the suit having been instituted on the 27th September, 1950, there had not been three defaults within the meaning of section 12 (1) (i) of the Act prior to the date of the institution of, the suit, and consequently the proviso to section 14 (3) will not come into operation. Mr. Mitter has, however, submitted that the law as laid down in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2) and in the earlier cases is no longer good law in view of the pronouncement of the Full Bench in Ajit Kumar Roy's case (1) (57 C.W.N. 627). Mr. Mitter has, however, submitted that the law as laid down in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2) and in the earlier cases is no longer good law in view of the pronouncement of the Full Bench in Ajit Kumar Roy's case (1) (57 C.W.N. 627). He has drawn our attention to the concluding portion of the judgment given by Chakravartti, C. J., where the question referred to the Full Bench was answered. Sub-paragraph (iii) of the answer is in these words: "(iii) The proviso will have effect in the case of such suits pending at the date of the amending Act, but only with respect to defaults committed after the date of the said Act. " It is clear that in respect of suits pending at the date of the amending Act defaults committed after the date of the amending Act were necessarily after the date of the institution of the suit. Mr. Mitter contends that by giving this answer to the question referred to the Full Benchan answer with which Das, J. and P. B. Mukharji, J. concurredthe learned Chief Justice was laying down the general proposition that whenever the question arises whether the proviso to section 14 (3) applies defaults after the institution of the suit should be taken into consideration and that the 18 months' period will be any period of 18 months prior to the date when the question is considered. The appellant's contention is that in this part of the judgment there was no intention to construe the proviso for all purposes, but only to construe it for the purpose of section 18 (5) of the Act. The question is not free from difficulty. While it is true that there is no express decision by the majority of the Full Bench that in all cases when the proviso to section 14 (3) falls to be considered, defaults after the institution of the suit can be taken into consideration, one has to remember that even if there be no express decision, but there is a decision to this effect by necessary implication, it will be proper for us to hold that that decision, by necessary implication, is binding on us and has had the effect of overruling the previous decisions on the question, including the decision in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2) (56 C. W. N. 528). 7. 7. The question that still remains to be answered is whether there is any such decision by necessary implication. At one stage, I was inclined to the view that there was such a necessary implication and though no reason had been given for overruling the view of law taken in Amal Krishna Basu's ease (2) and the other cases, mentioned above, the majority of the Full Bench has, by necessary implication, laid down the law that in all cases when the proviso to section 14 (3) falls to be considered, the defaults after the institution of the suit will also be taken into consideration. After further consideration. I have reached the conclusion that that is not the correct position in law and that the view of law taken in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2) (56 C W. N. 528) and other cases has not been overruled and still remains good law. One has only to read the judgments delivered by Chakravartti, C. J. and P. B. Mukharji, J. to see that there is no reference whatsoever to the decision in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2) and the other cases and no consideration of the question whether the period of 18 months mentioned in the proviso is only a period prior to the date of the institution of the suit. In my opinion, it will be improper and indeed not quite fair to the judges, who formed the majority, to attribute to them a decision of this nature overruling the previous decisions of this court, without considering them at all. It is worth noticing in this connection that in Amal Krishna Basics case, (2) this court had to deal with a suit which was instituted after the 1950 Act had come into operation. It seems to me more reasonable to think that the Full Bench had no intention to touch the proposition of law as laid down in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2) as regards suits instituted when the 1950 Act was in force and intended only to lay down that in respect of suits instituted when the 1948 Act was in operation and which were still pending when the 1950 Act came into operation, the court in giving relief under the provisions of that section, should take into consideration even defaults after institution of the suit. I tried to point out in my dissenting judgment in Ajit Kumar Roy's case (1) (57 C. W. N. 627), it will be impossible to give any practical application to the proviso in cases coming under section 18 (5) if the proposition of law laid down in Amal Krishna Basu's case that the 18 months for the purpose of the proviso must be 18 months prior to the date of the institution of the suit was adhered to. The majority of the Full Bench came to the conclusion, on a consideration of the language used in section 18 (5) that in giving relief under section 14 in accordance with the provisions thereof, the court was bound to take into consideration also the limitations in section 14. Once having come to that conclusion, the majority, it seems to me to be reasonable to think held that it necessarily followed that the proposition of law laid down in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2) should not be applied to cases coming under section 18 (5). This, however, does not justify the further contention that the majority of the Full Bench intended to say that the proposition of the law as laid down in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2) could not be applied even in suits brought when the 1950 Act was in force. As I have mentioned above, this court in Amal Krishna Basu's case, (2) had to deal with a suit instituted when the 1950 Act was in force. Nothing was said in that case as regards suits instituted under the 1948 Act. The majority of the Full Bench was, therefore, not pressed by the decision in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2). 8. It is, in my opinion, reasonable to think that if the majority of the Full Bench decided to overrule the law as laid in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2) in respect of suits brought when the 1950 Act was in force, they would have done so in clear and unmistakable words and would have given reasons for the same. When they did not do so, it is not proper to read into the answer given by them which were, in terms limited to cases under section 18 (5), a decision overruling the law laid down in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2). I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the argument of Mr. When they did not do so, it is not proper to read into the answer given by them which were, in terms limited to cases under section 18 (5), a decision overruling the law laid down in Amal Krishna Basu's case (2). I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the argument of Mr. Mitter, that the Full Bench in Ajit Kumar Roy's case (1) has, by necessary implication, decided that in all cases when the proviso to section 14 (3) of the 1950 Act has to be considered, defaults after the institution of the suit should be taken into consideration, is not correct. 9. The correct position in law, in my opinion, is that in applying the proviso to suits instituted when the 1950 Act was in force, the court is to see whether during any period of 18 months between dates of the Act and institution of the suit, there has been three defaults of the nature indicated. Where as in the present case, there has been ipso facto determination under the previous Act, the period to be considered is the period between the 30th November, 1950 and the date of the institution of the suit. In the present case both the suits wore filed even before the 30th November, 1950 and consequently, the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 14 has no operation. It was, therefore, the duty of the trial court to take action under section 14 (1) and (3). As he has not done it and the court of appeal has also not made the correct order, we have to send these cases back to the trial court for passing a proper order under the provision of section 14 (1) and then thereafter to dismiss the suits if within the date fixed by it in the order, the tenant defendant deposits in the court the sums specified in that under and to dispose of the suits in accordance with law in default of such payment. I would, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below and order that the cases be sent back to the trial court for decision in accordance with law in the light of the directions given above. Costs will abide the result.