ORDER R.S. Shukla This order will govern Appeal Nos. 5 and 6/XII-1/57, the Respondent being common in both the cases. Both the Appellants applied under Section 41, C.P. Tenancy Act for conferral of occupancy rights on an area of 4.15 acres of K. No. 3779 in village Eatanpur, tahsil Bilaspur. Their applications were rejected by the Sub-Divisional Officer, on the main ground that the lease in question having been made prior to 1939 the Appellant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 41 (1) of the C.P. Tenancy Act. He also held that out of two Respondents, one was woman and the other a minor and, therefore, in accordance with the proviso to Section 41 no presumption of sub-letting could be raised against them. An appeal by the present Appellants before the Deputy Commissioner also failed on the ground: (i) that the appeal was time-barred; (ii) that the Appellants held the disputed land from before the year 1939 and that they were not in possession of the suit-land on the date of their application under Section 41. The order of the Deputy Commissioner is now- challenged in second appeal on a number of grounds, the most important of which are discussed below. The first point relates to the tenability of the appeal before the Deputy Commissioner on grounds of limitation. It is an admitted position that the appeals should have been filed before him on 9-9-53 but were actually preferred on 14-9-1953 (12th and 13th September being holidays). Thus the Appellants were called upon to explain the lost days, i. e. 9th, 10th or 11th September. They advanced the plea that the delay was due to the mistaken advice of their pleader's clerk that the last day for filing the appeals was 12th September. On the question as to how far a mistake by a pleader's clerk can be a sufficient cause for condoning delay, a large number of rulings were cited by the parties. Particular reference may, however, be made to AIR 1955 Cal 553 which was chiefly relied upon by the Learned Counsel of the Appellants. On the question as to how far a mistake by a pleader's clerk can be a sufficient cause for condoning delay, a large number of rulings were cited by the parties. Particular reference may, however, be made to AIR 1955 Cal 553 which was chiefly relied upon by the Learned Counsel of the Appellants. The relevant portions of the above judgment may be reproduced below: The learned Judge (trial Court) thought that the principle applicable was that one had to inquire whether the mistake or ignorance of law displayed by the lawyer was itself a bona fide or excusable mistake and that if it is not bona fide or excusable it would be the client who would be affected. It appears on the authorities that the view taken by the learned Judge is not correct. What a client has to prove in such cases is that in approaching a particular lawyer whom he had approached, he had acted bona fide and with reasonable care. If he proves so much, the onus lying upon him is discharged. If the lawyer, on being so approached, gives misleading advice and acting upon that advice the client allows the period of limitation to expire, he is entitled to rely upon such wrong advice as sufficient cause for the delay provided always that his initial approach to the particular lawyer had been bona fide and the choice of the lawyer had not been careless or unreasonable. (underlined by me) In AI R 1955 Mys 54 it was held, on the assumption that there was bona fide default on the part of the pleader's clerk, that the Petitioner should not suffer on this account. The Mysore High Court, in its turn, relied on some earlier decisions of various High Courts in which the delay was condoned on the view that the parties should not suffer on account of negligence of Counsel or counsel's clerk. It is true that a bona fide mistake on the part of a counsel or his clerk may be sufficient cause to condone the delay but at the same time the rule laid down in AIR 1955 Cal. 553 cannot be lost sight of. What is important to examine is whether there was any negligence or carelessness on the part of the Appellants themselves. 553 cannot be lost sight of. What is important to examine is whether there was any negligence or carelessness on the part of the Appellants themselves. It would be seen that in the Calcutta case the learned Judges went so far as to say that the Appellants are expected to make a careful and reasonable choice of their lawyers also quite apart from their duty to be diligent in prosecuting the appeal. The factual position in the present case has been fully stated by the learned Deputy Commissioner in para 12 of his order. The facts enunciated therein have not been challenged by the Appellants and it is apparent that the Appellants exhibited gross negligence in not approaching their counsel at the appropriate stage and in relying on his clerk's advice instead. It may be stated that the clerk made a bona fide mistake but then there is no justification for the Appellants to have kept back the matter from their counsel and to have approached the counsel only on the last date of filing the appeals. There can, therefore, be little doubt that the delay in filing the appeals resulted directly from the negligent conduct of the Appellants themselves and the learned Deputy Commissioner was correct in declining to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. As the parties were also heard on merit both before me and the lower Court, I may say few words in this connection also. There is a concurrent finding by both the lower Courts that the disputed land was held by the two Appellants from before the year 1939. This being a finding of fact, it would not be competent for this Court to re-open the matter at this stage. More so, when the record of the lower Court shows that the above finding of the lower Courts is based on relevant evidence and is not perverse. The powers of the Board, in second appeal, are limited under Section 41 (3) (c) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code to the following grounds and no others: (i) That the order is contrary to law or usage having the force of law; (ii) That the order has failed to determine the material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (iii) That there has been a substantial error or defect in the procedure, etc. etc. etc. In view of the above provision, the Board has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of facts. (See 1954 N.L. J. 320.) On this ground alone the Appellants are not entitled to the declaration under Section 41 (1) ibid and the appeals must accordingly fail. The learned Deputy Commissioner, while holding that the lease was prior to 1939, has, however, discussed in his order the alternative plea advanced by the Appellants for the first time before him viz., that they were holding the disputed land under a year-to-year lease. This plea appears to have been raised before him only during the course of arguments as no foundation for the same was laid in the memo, of appeal. However, as the evidence stands, I am in agreement with the learned Deputy Commissioner that the Appellants have failed to establish that they were in lawful possession of the disputed land on the date of their application under Section 41, or that the lease was from year to year. All the arguments that were advanced before the Deputy Commissioner were only repeated before me and I need not dwell on them as the learned Deputy Commissioner has fully dealt with them and I agree with his reasoning. In view of what has been said above I see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Deputy Commissioner and dismiss the appeals. Copy of this order be placed on the record of each case. Appeal dismissed.