Judgment Raj Kishore Prasad, J. 1. These two civil revisions have been heard together, because both of them arise out of the same suit, and, in both of them, the question of valuation of the suit arises, and, the petitioner, who is defendant No. 4, is also the same. 2. Civil Revision No. 161 of 1955 is directed against an order dated 17-11-1954 of Mr. Raghoji Prasad, Munsif, Third Court, Patna. Civil Revision No. 170 of 1955 is directed against an order dated 11-2-1955 of Mr. H. Singh, Second Court, Patna. 3. These two orders of the two different Munsifs were passed on two different occasions, but in the same suit. The circumstances under which the above two orders were passed, may briefly be stated as below: 4. The suit land is an orchard, having an area of 9.93 acres of land, recorded under khata No. 19, situated in Mauza Sikhandpur, mahalla Nasriganj, police station Dinapur, in the district of Patna. 5. The original tenants of the suit land were Ilahi Bux and others. The landlord of the holding in suit obtained a decree for arrears of rent on 30-10-1934 against Ilahi Bux and other tenants. In execution of this decree, the landlord purchased the suit land at a court sale on 19-8-1936 for Rs. 800/-; and, subsequently, on 16-2-1938 obtained delivery of possession over the same through Court. 6. The landlord, thereafter sold the land to defendant No. 1 for Rs. 1450.00 under a registered sale deed on 21-9-1938, Defendant No. 1, in his turn, sold the same land, on 28-4-1951, by a registered sale deed to defendant No. 4, the present petitioner, for Rs. 53,000/-. 7. Before the purchase of defendant No. 4 in 1951, and, after the sale by the landlord to defendant No. 1 in 1938, the plaintiffs-opposite party purchased the entire disputed land, under four registered sale deeds in February, 1948, from the heirs of Ilahi Bux and others, the original tenants of the land in suit, for Rs. 1450/-. 8. In July, 1948, there was a dispute about the possession of these lands between the plaintiffs on one side and defendants 1 to 3, defendants 2 and 3 being lessees from the defendant No. 1, on the other, which ultimately led to a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which the suit land was attached on 24-11-1948. The Sec.145 proceeding was ultimately decided on 29-6-1950 against the plaintiffs, and, in favour of defendants 1 to 3, holding these defendants to be in possession of the suit land. 9. The plaintitffs thereafter, brought the present suit on 12-6-1953 for declaration of title and recovery of possession. 10. The suit was instituted in the second Court of the Munsif at Patna, and, the plaintiffs valued the suit at Rs. 1,450/-, the value of the orchard in suit, for the purpose of payment of court-fee and jurisdiction both. 11. Defendants 1 and 4 appeared and filed their written statements in April, 1954, in which both of them disputed the valuation given by the plaintiffs, and, also challenged the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit the value of which according to them could not be less than Rs. 53,000.00 representing the market value of the suit land. 12. Issues were settled on 21-6-1954, which included issues Nos. 5 and 7 regarding valuation of the suit and the jurisdiction of the Court, On 17-7-1954, the defendant, presumably defendant No. 4, filed a petition praying that issues Nos. 5 and 7 be decided first before hearing the whole suit and, this prayer was allowed by the court on the same day. 13. But before this Question of valuation and jurisdiction could be decided, the suit was transferred on 29-7-1954 to the third court of the Munsif at Patna. The presiding officer of the court was Mr. Raghoji Prasad. Before him, defendant No. 1 also filed a petition praying that the valuation matter be decided first. The learned Munsif, accordingly, fixed 3-11-1954 for hearing the valuation matter. He, by his order dated 17-11-54 decided the question of valuation, and, found on the materials on the record, that the value of the disputed property was Rs. 2,175/-, and, therefore, the suit was beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction, which was only upto Rs. 2,000/-. The suit, accordingly, was retransferred from his court to the second court of the Munsif at Patna from where the suit had been transferred and where the suit had been originally instituted. 14. When the suit was retransferred to the second court of the Munsif, Patna, the presiding officer of the court was Mr. H. Singh. He took up the determination of the issues regarding valuation and jurisdiction first, with the consent and for the convenience of the parties. 14. When the suit was retransferred to the second court of the Munsif, Patna, the presiding officer of the court was Mr. H. Singh. He took up the determination of the issues regarding valuation and jurisdiction first, with the consent and for the convenience of the parties. On a consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, he held that the value of the disputed orchard was Rs. 4,000/-, which was the limit of his pecuniary jurisdiction, and, therefore, he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He, however, directed the plaintiffs to amend the plaint accordingly and to pay the deficit court-fee thereon. 15. Against the above mentioned two orders, the present two applications in revision have been filed, as mentioned before, by defendant No. 4. 16. In anticipation of the objection, which might be taken by Mr. P. R. Das, on behalf of the plaintiffs-opposite party, regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the orders under revision, it was contended, on behalf of the petitioner, by Mr. Baldeo Sahay that the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere with an order, like the present one, in appropriate cases, under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where, on the determination of the question of the valuation of the suit land, depends the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court, wherein the suit is instituted. 17. In support of his contention, Mr. Sahay relied on a Pull Bench decision of this court in Mt. Rupia V/s. Bhatu Mahton, AIR 1944 Pat 17 : ILR 22 Pat 783 (FB) (A); a Bench decision of this Court in Ramcharitar Panday V/s. Basgit Rai, ILR 11 Pat 161: (AIR 1932 Pat 9) (B), and, decision of the Privy Council in Joy Chand Lal V/s. Kamalaksha Chaudhury, AIR 1949 PC 239: 76 Ind App 131 (C). 18. Mr. P. R. Das, in reply, relied on Sec.11 (1) of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (Act VII of 1887), and, on the well-known and celebrated observation of Lord Esher in The Queen V/s. Commissioners For Special Purposes of Income-tax, (1888) 21 QBD 313 at p. 319 (D), which was quoted with approval by our Supreme Court in Rai Brij Raj Krishana V/s. S.K. Shaw and Bros., AIR 1951 SC 115 ; 1951 SCR 145 (E). 19. The first argument presented by Mr. 19. The first argument presented by Mr. Das was that as under Sec.11(1) of the Suits Valuation Act, the question of valuation can be raised even at the appellate stage, on an appeal from the ultimate decision in the suit itself, because the conditions mentioned in Clause (a) of Sec.11 (1); of the Act are present here, it is obvious that the petitioner has a remedy, and therefore, this Court should not interfere in revision at this stage. The second contention of Mr. Das was that as the Munsif had statutory obligation and jurisdiction to decide the issue regarding valuation and jurisdiction of the court, and as in exercise of his jurisdiction, he has decided it, whether the decision be right or wrong in fact or in law, his decision cannot be interfered with in revision. He further submitted that it cannot be denied that the Munsif had jurisdiction to decide jurisdictional facts in order to determine whether he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and therefore, this Court, in such circumstances, has no power to interfere with this decision. 20. The principle laid down in the above mentioned cases, relied upon at the Bar, cannot possibly be disputed, and, has not been so disputed by either party. It has been affirmed even by our Supreme Court in Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. V/s. D.C. Patel, AIR 1953 SC 16 (F). 21. It is well settled that a Civil Court has inherent power to decide the question of its own jurisdiction, although, as a result of its enquiry, it may turn out that it has no Jurisdiction over the suit. 22. The question as to what is the scope of Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is also now firmly established by a decision of the Supreme Court in Keshardeo V/s. Badha Kissen, AIR 1953 SC 23 (G), in which the two decisions of the Privy Council in N. Venkatagiri Ayyangar V/s. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, AIR 1949 PC 156: 76 Ind App 67 (H), and AIR 1949 PC 239: 76 Ind App 131 (C), the latter of which was relied upon by Mr. Sahay, have been quoted with approval. Sahay, have been quoted with approval. In the just mentioned Supreme Court decision, what the words "illegally" and "material irregularity", in Sec.115 of the Code mean, have been considered, and, their Lordships of the Supreme Court approved the observation of Bose J., in his order of reference in Narayan Sonaji V/s. Sheshrao Vithoba, AIR 1948 Nag 258 (I), wherein it was said that the words "illegally and "material irregularity" do not cover either errors of fact or law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at, but to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated relate to material defects of procedure, and not to errors of either law or fact after the formalities which the law prescribes have been complied with. By the above decisions of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council, it has, therefore, been further well established that if the erroneous decision by a subordinate court results in the subordinate court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or failing to exercise jurisdiction so vested, a case for revision arises under Sub-section (a) or Sub-section (b), and, in such a case, Sub-section (c) can be ignored. 23. On the above principles, therefore, it is manifest that if the valuation fixed by the court below is found to be arbitrary, purely speculative, and, based on no evidence, it will obviously be the duty of this Court to interfere with the order under revision in spite of Sec.11 (1) of the Suits Valuation Act. In such a case, the court below must be deemed to have acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in deciding the case, and then, the present application, of the petitioner will attract Sec.115 of the Code and would justify this Court in interfering with impugned orders of the court below. This view is supported by ILR 11 Pat 161: (AIR 1932 Patna 9) (B), which was affirmed by the Pull Bench in AIR 1944 Pat 17: ILR 22 pat 783 (A). 24. Keeping the above principles and the test laid down in the above mentioned cases in view, I will now proceed to examine the order under revision, to find out, if it comes within the mischief of the ratio decidendi of the above cases. 25. Mr. H. Singh as appears from his order dated 11-2-1955. 24. Keeping the above principles and the test laid down in the above mentioned cases in view, I will now proceed to examine the order under revision, to find out, if it comes within the mischief of the ratio decidendi of the above cases. 25. Mr. H. Singh as appears from his order dated 11-2-1955. In Civil Revision No. 170 of 1955, has accepted the pleader commissioners report, and, also partially the evidence of D. W. 5, regarding the situation of the disputed orchard, and, what it contains. In this connection, he has recorded his finding to the following effect: ".................. .According to the report of a pleader commissioner this orchard contains 260 mango trees, 268 palm trees, 42 other trees, 3 wells and 2 out-houses besides boundary walls to the extent of 250 feet to 1050 feet on all sides on it. But it is also evident from this report that the said mango trees are all very old and include big, small, thin and leafless trees of which as many as 20 are single branched and a large number of them have become affected with Dimak (that is, white ants) due to old age. As regards the palm trees the said report shows that nearly one third out of them are unproductive and they appear to have grown voluntarily. Similarly according to it all the said 5 wells are quite old and dilapidated with the result that excepting one, the others are out of use since long. We further find from it that all the above boundary walls have also become dilapidated due to their old age: that their bricks have been affected by noni (salt peter) and that the out-houses contain only 3 dilapidated-rooms with tiled roof. It is also evident from it that the said orchard is full of wild grasses which make it quite difficult for anybody to go through it; that level of it is uneven and that it contains low and deep lands of hard soil with brick bats at several places .......... It is further evident from the statement of D. W. 5 that this orchard is by the side of the Patna Dinapur road and that a girls school and a municipal office are near it. It is further evident from the statement of D. W. 5 that this orchard is by the side of the Patna Dinapur road and that a girls school and a municipal office are near it. The commissioners report referred to above also shows that about 19 kathas of land of the said orchard is culturable in which he found some potatoes, arahar, sarso and wheat grown in December 1954 when he visited the spot." 26. After making the above observations, and, considering the evidence in the case, he recorded his concluded opinion in the following terms: "......... ....According to the very admission of these defendants the disputed orchard was only worth Rs. 1450.00 in the year 1938. Of course, there had been rise to the extent of about 4 times in the prices of all things including lands in the year 1953 in which the present suit was filed in comparison to their prices prevailing in the year 1938 as has been stated by D. W. 5. But while fixing the value of the above orchard, one cannot lose sight of the present dilapidated condition of the trees, wells and structures contained in it. So regard being had to all these facts and circumstances discussed above I hold that the value of this orchard is only Rs. 4000.00 and this court which has got jurisdiction to try suite upto this value is quite competent to take cognizance of the same." 27. After having said, which he had jurisdiction to say, that the value of lands as compared with the value of lands in 1938 had increased about four times in 1953 when the suit was filed, I do not understand how he suddenly jumps to the conclusion that in view of the deterioration the value should be only Rs. 4,000/-, and not even one rupee more, which would have made the suit beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction. If the price has gone up four times, then the price of the disputed land, which was Rs. 1,4507-in 1938, would be about Rs. 5,800/-. 4,000/-, and not even one rupee more, which would have made the suit beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction. If the price has gone up four times, then the price of the disputed land, which was Rs. 1,4507-in 1938, would be about Rs. 5,800/-. In view of the present dilapidated condition of the trees, wells and structures contained in the disputed orchard, to what extent the value should be decreased and what would be that extent of deterioration and on what basis such deterioration or decrease in the value should be fixed, & had been fixed here, is not clear from the order of the court below. In my opinion the value fixed by the court below at Rs. 4,000.00 is far too arbitrary and is based on factors which are purely speculative and about which there is no evidence, and, none has of course been indicated in the order itself. It is obvious that because the learned Munsif had pecuniary jurisdiction up to Rs. 4,000/-, he fixed the value at that amount. Under the circumstances mentioned by him and in the absence of any evidence to show the extent and basis of decrease in the value, I do not understand why the value should not be either less than Rs. 4,000.00 or more than Rs. 4,000.00 or more than Rs. 4,000.00 or even Rs. 4001/-, or more, and why it should be only Rs. 4,000/-. The obvious answer is that the court below fixed the value at Rs. 4,000.00 in order to make the suit within its pecuniary jurisdiction, and, cognisable by it. In my opinion, therefore, the order of Mr. Singh dated 11-2-1955, being arbitrary and purely speculative, and not based on any positive evidence, but on speculation it is plain that he has acted with material irregularity in the manner in which he has reached the above decision, and, accordingly, Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is attracted to the present case, and to such a case even Sub-section (c) of Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure will also apply. 28. For the reasons given above, I would set aside the order of Mr. Raghoji Prasad dated 17-11-1954, as also of Mr. 28. For the reasons given above, I would set aside the order of Mr. Raghoji Prasad dated 17-11-1954, as also of Mr. H. Singh dated 11-2-1955, and remand the case to the Second Court of the Munsif for a reconsideration of the issues relating to the valuation of the suit and jurisdiction of the Court on the materials already on the record. 29. I may here mention that if the suit would have been in the court of the Subordinate Judge, I would not have interfered with the order of the court below, because whether the valuation was above" Rs. 4,000/-, and, if so to what extent, it would not have in the least affected the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge to entertain the suit, and, the question of valuation could have been agitated at the appellate stage, when an appeal would have been ultimately filed from the final decision in the suit itself, as provided by Sec.11 (1) (a) of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887; but, in the present case, if at the appellate stage on an appeal subsequently filed by any of the parties from the ultimate decision in the suit itself, the appellate court finds that the valuation fixed by the court below is wrong, and, it should be more than Rs. 4,000/-, then in such a case it would be plain that the plaint may have to be returned for representation before a Subordinate Judge which would mean unnecessary harassment to the parties. In this view of the matter, I am interfering with order of the court below at this very stage so that the two questions of valuation of the suit and the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court below may both be decided one way or the other now, and if the court finds that the valuation is more than Rs. 4,000.00 then obviously the plaint will have to be returned for representation before the proper court. 30. In the result, the rules are made absolute. Both the applications are allowed, and, the orders complained of are set aside, and, the matter is remitted to the court of the second Munsif at Patna for disposal of the two issues regarding valuation of the suit and the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court in accordance with law. The petitioner will be entitled to his cost of this Court. Rules made absolute.