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1958 DIGILAW 5 (GAU)

Homi Khullakpa v. Thongkhothang

1958-01-20

J.N.DATTA

body1958
ORDER This is a revision petition, and is directed against the order of the learned District Judge, Manipur, dated 31-5-1957 by which he refused to extend the period of limitation under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, for an appeal and dismissed the same as time-barred. 2. The facts are somewhat interesting and will bear statement at some length for the purpose of appreciating the real point involved. The dispute relates to Loutei village, within Ukhrul sub-division and as stated in his order by the S. D. O. and also in the list of villages to be found in the schedule, appended to the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947, this village consists of two different habitations, one of Tangkhuls with a separate headman, and another of Kukis with their own headman. The Tangkhuls and Kukis, first settled on toe hill which is to the east of river Thembal. Some years ago, the Tangkhuls removed to the west of the river aid settled at the foot of the hill there. The Kukis then through their Chief or headman applied to the S. D. O., Ukhrul (Misc. Case No. 230 of 1955-56) for being permitted to move also to the western side of the river, at a distance of about half a mile from the new settlement of Tangkhuls, on grounds of sanitation and facility of cultivation of their lands. The Tangkhuls opposed, and by his order dated 28-2-56, the S. D. O. ordered that a map be prepared showing the present site occupied by the two villages or sub-villages, and an enquiry be made from the Tangkhuls, as to which portion of the village they were prepared to allot to the Kukis, so that future conflict between the two tribes might be avoided. 3. Against this order the Tangkhuls (present petitioners) through their Khullakpa or headman preferred an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur. The Memo of appeal was filed on 14-3-56 and on 15-3-56 an order was passed by tile S. D. O. that, that court had no jurisdiction to hear the case, and the memo of appeal (described as petition) may be returned to the petitioner for being filed before the appropriate appellate court. The memo of appeal was accordingly returned to the petitioner, but there is no endorsement on it, or any record anywhere, as to when it was actually returned to the petitioner. The memo of appeal was accordingly returned to the petitioner, but there is no endorsement on it, or any record anywhere, as to when it was actually returned to the petitioner. It was presumed by the learned District Judge and it was admitted by the learned counsel before me that the memo of appeal was returned soon after 15-3-56, and the same was re-presented in the court of the District Judge on 4-8-56, along with an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. 4. It might be stated here that in the meantime the S. D. O. had taken further steps in the matter, and submitted his recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner on 18-6-1956 that the Kukis should be allowed to come down and settle at a suitable place, but on the eastern side of the river, and not on its western side, as they wanted. The D. C. approved of it by his order dated 9-7-1956, and also directed the S. D. O. that the two villages should be clearly demarcated. 5. It will be thus clear that the action taken was purely in the exercise of Executive or Revenue powers. It may be that the S. D. O. proceeded under S. 62 or S. 64 of the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947, the Circle Bench being then non-existent due to the administrative changes brought about after the merger. But the Deputy Commissioner was constituted the Hill Bench, by the order of the Chief Commissioner, dated 23-5-1951 (No. J/18/51/23). That was however pronounced ultra vires by this Court in a decision, see Konsam Amujao Singh v. Paejathang Haokip, AIR 1955 Manipur 30 . It appears and the allegations in the petition under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, also support that view, that the petitioner filed the said appeal before the Deputy Commissioner as the Hill Bench, and the Deputy Commissioner returned it, because he was not the lawfully constituted Hill Bench. Under S. 63 of the Hill Regulation also, appeals from orders of the S. D. O. under S. 62, lay to the Hill Bench. 6. All this difficulty and confusion appears to have been the result, that though the Manipur State Courts Act, 1947, was amended in 1950, by the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950, necessary amendments in the Manipur State Hill Peonies (Administration) Regulation, 1947, were not made. 7. 6. All this difficulty and confusion appears to have been the result, that though the Manipur State Courts Act, 1947, was amended in 1950, by the Manipur State Courts (Amendment) Order, 1950, necessary amendments in the Manipur State Hill Peonies (Administration) Regulation, 1947, were not made. 7. On the passing of the Manipur (Courts) Act, 1955, which came in force from 1-3-56, the position became more clear and the civil appellate jurisdiction came to vest in the District Judge, in respect of the Hill area also, but that does not mean that thereby he got appellate powers in Revenue or other matters also, which had vested in the Hill Bench in the past. The present appeal could not therefore be taken to him, as there was no decision of a civil nature, nor can it be said that the S. D. O. was acting as a Civil Court. 8. It might also be pointed out that what the S. D. O. had decided by the order dated 28-2-56, cannot be said, by any stretch of imagination, to have been a decision of any rights of parties, so as to form the basis of an appeal, and if the complaint is that the site given to the Kukis belongs to the Tangkhuls, then an action might lie in a cavil court having Jurisdiction, but no appeal will lie in a civil court of appellate jurisdiction against that order, which was purely an executive or administrative order. 9. In these premises, the question of extending time for preferring the appeal did not arise and the learned District Judge could not extend the time under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, even if he was so minded. The petitioners own allegations in the application before the District Judge show that the cause of delay was that lie did not know in which court the appeals which went to the Hill Bench before, would lie. But again he came to a court having no jurisdiction. 10. The result is that the revision petition fails and is rejected. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order for costs. Petition dismissed.