JUDGMENT Mootham, C.J. - This is an appeal from an order of Mr. Justice Chaturvedi dated 2-9-1955, dismissing a petition u/Art. 226 of the Constitution. The circumstances in which that petition was filed are these: The first appellant is the owner of a house in the city of Mirzapur, which in the year 1926 was leased to a tenant for use as a flour mill. The house continued to be used as a flour mill by successive tenants until about the year 1948 when the then tenant, one Munni Lal, vacated the premises taking with him the mill machinery which he had installed therein. Whether the house was then used for residential purposes or remained unoccupied is not clear; but in 1951 it was leased by the first appellant to the second appellant for the purpose of running a flour mill. At that date the house was devoid of any mill machinery, and in accordance with what appears to be the usual practice the second appellant installed his own machinery for the purpose of utilising the premises as a mill. 2. Under the bye-laws of the Municipal Board of Mirzapur which is the first respondent, no person may establish or maintain a flour mill unless he has been granted a licence for that purpose. The second appellant accordingly applied to the Municipal Board for a licence, but this was refused on 29-11-1951. The second appellant appealed to the District Magistrate who by an order dated 29-3-1952, allowed the appeal and directed the Municipal Board to grant a licence to this appellant, and a licence was granted accordingly for the year 1952-53. The Municipal Board then made an application under section 321 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, to the District Magistrate that he should review his order of 29-3-1952. The District Magistrate acceded to this prayer and on 21-8-1952, set aside his earlier order. This order of 21-8-1952, was however in its turn quashed by an order of this Court made on 13-10-1954, in Writ Petition No. 540 of 1952. The second appellant then made a further application to the Municipal Board for a licence but the Medical Officer of Health, who under the Rules was the licensing officer, rejected the application on 13-4-1955. This order of 21-8-1952, was however in its turn quashed by an order of this Court made on 13-10-1954, in Writ Petition No. 540 of 1952. The second appellant then made a further application to the Municipal Board for a licence but the Medical Officer of Health, who under the Rules was the licensing officer, rejected the application on 13-4-1955. The appellants then filed a second petition in this Court in which they challenged the validity of the order of the Medical officer of Health refusing to grant a licence and prayed that the order be quashed by a writ of certiorari. That petition was dismissed by the order which is the subject of the present appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants has advanced two arguments in this Court. His first contention is that the order made by the District Magistrate on 29-3-1952, was a final order which was binding on the Medical Officer of Health who accordingly could not refuse the second appellant's application for a licence on a ground which had been rejected by the District Magistrate. His second submission is that the Municipal Board is now estopped from raising any question as to the validity of the District Magistrate's order as it has throughout acquiesced in it. 4. It is necessary at this stage to refer to the respondent Board's bye-laws for the regulation and control of flour mills in the Mirzapur Municipality. Bye-law No. 2 provides that no person shall establish or maintain a flour mill within such limits unless he has been granted a licence, and bye-law No. 7 provides that all licences granted under the bye laws shall be subject to a number of conditions which are then enumerated. Bye-law No. 2 provides that no person shall establish or maintain a flour mill within such limits unless he has been granted a licence, and bye-law No. 7 provides that all licences granted under the bye laws shall be subject to a number of conditions which are then enumerated. It is the first of these conditions which is of importance in this case and it reads thus:-- (a) The premises in which the mill is situated shall be pucca in construction and strong enough to stand the forces of vibration of the mechanical power used to work the machinery for milling gram, and shall not adjoin any premises used for residential purposes at the time the mill is first established except in cases where the owner of the mill himself resides in the adjoining premises or a written permission of both the owner and occupier of the said premises has been previously obtained and filed in the Municipality, or the premises in which the mill is established is intercepted by a public lane or street at least 8 ft. wide from the neighbouring buildings. 5. Now the Municipal Board initially rejected the second appellant's application for a licence on the ground that the owners of the adjoining premises objected to the house being used as a flour mill. The District Magistrate on appeal held that the objection could not be entertained as it was made for the first time in 1951 whereas the mill had been first established in the year 1926. It is that decision of the District Magistrate which the appellants contend is final and conclusive, and that it was therefore not open to the Medical Officer of Health to reject the second appellant's application for a licence for the year 1955-56 on the ground that the appellant's mill must be treated as a mill established for the first time in 1951. Mr. Justice Chaturvedi held that under the Municipalities Act no appeal lay to the District Magistrate from the rejection in 1951 of the application then made by the second appellant to the Municipal Board for a licence, and that accordingly the order of the District Magistrate of 29-3-1952, upon which the second appellant placed so great a reliance was itself invalid. 6. 6. Now we think it is unnecessary to express a final opinion upon either of the contentions which have been advanced on behalf of the appellants, for we are of the opinion that this appeal must fail on another ground. The view taken by the District Magistrate in 1952, and the cornerstone of the appellants' case is that the phrase "at the time the mill is first established" appearing in bye-law 7(a) means "at the time the premises were first used as a flour mill". We have with the assistance of learned counsel examined the bye-laws and we do not think that this is the true interpretation of this phrase. The ordinary meaning of the word "mill" is a building fitted with machinery for grinding corn, and although the word "mill" is used in more than one sense in the bye-law it is, in our opinion, with that meaning that it is used in the phrase we are now considering. Now the premises in question were used as a mill for the first time in the year 1926, and had the machinery which was at that time erected in the premises remained therein it would have been possible to argue that the mill was first established in that year. It is not however in dispute in this case that each successive tenant who occupied the premises for the purpose of running a mill brought with him, and when his tenancy expired took away, the entire machinery which was utilised for the purpose of the milling operations. In our opinion this is not a case in which there is one mill established in 1926, but is one in which each successive tenant has established his own mill. Prior to the occupation of the premises in 1951 by the second appellant the last tenant who had used the premises as a mill was Munni Lal who had left the premises in 1948. It is not in our opinion correct to describe the premises during those years which intervened between 1948 and 1951 as a mill. They were premises which could be convened into a mill by the installation therein of the requisite machinery, and we think that the true position is that the mill which the second appellant proposed to run was first established within the meaning of bye-law 7(a) in the year 1951. They were premises which could be convened into a mill by the installation therein of the requisite machinery, and we think that the true position is that the mill which the second appellant proposed to run was first established within the meaning of bye-law 7(a) in the year 1951. We think therefore that the condition laid down in that bye-law applied, and that it was necessary for the second appellant to obtain the permission in writing of the adjoining owners. We are not therefore in agreement with the view which was taken by the District Magistrate in the year 1952. The order is not however now before us, and we are not called upon to set it aside. The appellants, however are asking this Court to set aside the order of the learned Judge dismissing their petition and therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, to quash the order of the Medical Officer of Health dated 13-4-1955. It appears to us however that the view taken by the Medical Officer of Health as to the interpretation to be placed upon bye-law No. 7(a) is preferable to that which found favour with the District Magistrate, and in such circumstances it will not in our opinion be proper for this Court, assuming that it were to decide the other points which arise in the appeal in the appellants' favour, to grant the relief which they seek in the petition out of which the appeal arises. We are accordingly of opinion that this appeal must fail. It is therefore dismissed, but in the circumstances we make no order as to costs.