Judgment :- 1. The short point that arises for decision in both these C.M.S. As., relates to the interpretation of S.8 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act as amended making it applicable to usufructuary mortgages. 2. Main arguments were advanced in C. M. S. A. 44/1954 by Mr. K. P. Ramakrishna Ayyer, learned counsel for the appellant therein and his contentions were supported by Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar appearing for the appellants in C. M. S. A. 104/1954. 3. In C. M. S. A. 44/1954, Mr. K. P. Ramakrishna Ayyer accepted the position that if the principle adopted by the lower courts was correct, then the amount fixed is correct. But his contention is that the principle applied by both the lower courts is not correct. In O. P. 41/1947 the debt was scaled down on 12-9-1947 as per the provisions of the Act then in force. The debtor applied to amend the decree by scaling down the debt further When the matter came up at one stage before the appellate court, it held that the debt in this case has to be scaled down by applying sub-section 9 (a) (1) of S.9-A and in accordance with the said decision, the learned District Munsiff, following the decision of the Madras High Court reported in Sevugam Chettiar v. Ranganatha Mudaliar (1940-II-M.L.J. 870) scaled down the debt as on 1-10-1937. But the contention of the appellant is that the material date should be taken, not as 1-10-1937, but 12-9-1947 namely, the date of the order in O. P. 41/1947. 4. According to Mr. Ramakrishna Ayyer, the decision of Mr. Justice Wadsworth and Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri in Sevugam Chettiar v. Ranganatha Mudaliar (1940-11-M. L J. 870) relied upon by both the lower courts is not applicable because of the various subsequent amendments made in the Act. 5. Though he accepts the position that S.8 (3) of the Act will apply, according to him, the date mentioned in clause (1) namely 1-10-1937 cannot be incorporated in clause (3). 6. This contention is controverted by the learned counsel, Mr. Krishnaswami, appearing for the respondents. 5. Though he accepts the position that S.8 (3) of the Act will apply, according to him, the date mentioned in clause (1) namely 1-10-1937 cannot be incorporated in clause (3). 6. This contention is controverted by the learned counsel, Mr. Krishnaswami, appearing for the respondents. According to him, whatever provisions may have been made in respect of usufructuary mortgages, the principle regarding the scaling down falls either under S.8 or S.9 according as the debt is one incurred before the first October 1932 or after 1st October 1932 and the decision of the Madras High Court concludes the position. 7. In my opinion the Division Bench of the Madras High Court reported in Sevugam Chettiar v. Ranganatha Mudaliar (1940-11-M. L. J. 870) really concludes the matter notwithstanding the fact that there have been subsequent amendments to the Act. As already stated, the appellate court had stated that the debt must be scaled down under S.9-A (9) (a) (1). S.9-A definitely says that the section applies to all mortgages executed before the 30th September 1947 and sub-clause (9) (a) (1) of S.9-A also finally states that the provisions of S.8 or S.9 read with S.12 or S.13 as the case may be, shall apply to the entire debt. S.12 only provides that in respect of debts scaled down under the Act, it shall carry interest at the rate previously applicable under law, custom, contract or otherwise, but not exceeding 61/4%. S.9-A (9) (a) (1) itself contemplates the application of S.8 or 9 as the case may be. As admittedly the debt comes under S.8 and as Mr. Ramakrishna Ayyar accepts the position that Clause.3 of S.8 will apply, the only question is whether the date referred to in clause (1) of S.8 applies to clause (3) also. 8. Mr. Justice Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., in the decision reported in Sevugam Chettiar v. Ramanatha Mudaliar (1940 -11-M. L. J. 870) held, that though sub-section 3 of S.8 does not mention the date up to which debts have to be scaled down, still considering the whole scheme of the sub-clause, the date mentioned in sub-section (1) will apply to sub-clause (3) also. The learned judges have considered the matter and have come to the conclusion that sub-sections 2, 3 and 4 of S.8 are in the nature of provisos to sub-section (1) whose operation is limited and qualified by those provisions. The learned judges have considered the matter and have come to the conclusion that sub-sections 2, 3 and 4 of S.8 are in the nature of provisos to sub-section (1) whose operation is limited and qualified by those provisions. The learned judges have held that reading S.8 as a whole, the date mentioned in sub-section (1) is the date up to which all debts falling under that section have to be sealed down As there is no dispute that clause (3) of S.8 applies in this case, it follows that according to the decision of the Madras High Court referred to above, the decision of the lower courts is correct and the Second Appeal is dismissed as also the memorandum of objections. Parties to bear their own costs in both in this court. 9. In C. M. S. A. 104/54, the learned District Judge reversed the order of the District Munsiff and applying S.8 held that the debt has to be scaled down as on 22-3-1938, the date of commencement of the Act. This may be erroneous because the relevant date under S.8 is 1-10-1937. 10. In this matter, the mortgagor filed an application under S.19-A of the Act and claimed that more than double the principal amount had been paid and as such, the debt is completely discharged. The mortgagee contended that the crucial date for finding out the double payments is 1-10-1937 as mentioned in S.8 of the Act. But the learned District Munsiff held that the crucial date is the date of the filing of the application for scaling down and accordingly, he held that to make up double the principal amount a sum of Rs. 157-2-0 more has to be paid. 11. The mortgagee filed an appeal before the learned District Judge reiterating the contentions that he took before the learned District Munsiff. The learned District Judge rejected the contentions of the mortgagee that the transaction will come under S.10 (2) (1) of the Act. Regarding the date to which the debt is to be scaled down, the learned District Judge differed from the trial court and fixed 22-3 -1938, the date on which the Act came into force. He did not accept the mortgagor's contention that it is the date of application nor the contention of the mortgagee that it is 1-10-1937. Regarding the date to which the debt is to be scaled down, the learned District Judge differed from the trial court and fixed 22-3 -1938, the date on which the Act came into force. He did not accept the mortgagor's contention that it is the date of application nor the contention of the mortgagee that it is 1-10-1937. On this basis, he reversed the judgment of the trial court and passed a fresh decree by showing the amount of Rs. 500/- for principal and 17-11-8 for interest on 29-7-1951 and directed the payment of 51/2% interest on the principal amount. 12. The mortgagor has filed this appeal and wants the date of scaling down to be fixed as the date of the application. As per the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court referred to above, the date will be 1-10-1937 and not 22-3-1938 as held by the learned District Judge. But the grievance of the appellant is that the date of his application for scaling down is the crucial date which certainly is not well-founded. Therefore, there is no substance in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. Leave in both the Second Appeals refused.