JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge of North Malabar confirming the decree of the trial court in certain respects and reversing the trial court's decree in certain other respects. 2. This appeal is one of the several cases that has come up to the courts as between the members of the family of Soopi Haji or as between persons claiming title under one or other of the members of the family of Soopi Haji. 3. The circumstances which led up to the present litigation are as follow: One Soopi Haji acquired the suit properties, but in the name of his first wife Ummacha, and he had six children by her namely, the defendants 1 to 5 and one Mariyumma the mother of the plaintiff. Soopi Haji had executed a Karar, Ext. A2 on 13-7-1908 with Ummacha, making provisions for the enjoyment and management of the properties. As the legal effect of the said Karar is in dispute regarding some items, it will be considered in greater detail later in the judgment. At this stage, it may be stated that item 4 was not in the possession of the family on the date of this Karar. In or about 1920, Ummacha died and Soopi Haji married the 16th defendant as his second wife and had a daughter by her namely, the 17th defendant. Soopi Haji died on 12-9-1928. But prior to his death he executed a will on 6-9-1928, Ext. B29, in and by which he bequeathed the suit properties to his second wife and the daughter by her namely, the 16th defendant and 17th defendant. Litigation started between Soopi Haji's children by his first wife and his second wife and daughter. There was a decree in O. S. 1031/1919 under which the children of Soopi Haji by his first wife had been made liable to pay a sum of Rs. 5000/- to Soopi Haji with a charge over item 1. Soopi Haji had left the right to execute this decree to his second wife and daughter. The second wife and daughter executed this decree and the plaint items 1, 2, 5 and 7 were sold and purchased by the various defendants. 5000/- to Soopi Haji with a charge over item 1. Soopi Haji had left the right to execute this decree to his second wife and daughter. The second wife and daughter executed this decree and the plaint items 1, 2, 5 and 7 were sold and purchased by the various defendants. Defendants 1 to 5 along with the plaintiff's guardian had executed a Kanom in respect of items I to 7 and taken back the properties on lease. A suit O. S. 373/42 filed in the District Munsiff's Court, Tellicherry by the 7th defendant on the lease back, resulted in a decree in his favour and the 7th defendant purchasing items 2 to 7 in execution of that decree. The 14th defendant has subsequently purchased items 2 and 4 from the 7th defendant. 4. The plaintiff, who is the daughter of Mariyumma who in turn, was the daughter of Ummacha, filed the present suit for partition and separate possession as heir of her mother ignoring the sales in execution of the decrees in O. S. 1031 of 1919 and 373/42. 5. The contesting defendants pleaded that the decree in O. S. 373/42 and sale in execution of that decree were binding on the plaintiff and that she is not entitled to make any claim regarding the items comprised therein. It was also contended that item 1 had been validly sold in execution of the charge decree in O. S. 1031/1919 and those proceedings are also binding on the plaintiff. It was also specially contended by defendants 9, 25 and 26 that Ummacha's children have no right over plaint item No. 4 and that the Karar Ext. A2 has no legal force so far as this item is concerned. Soopi Haji was at liberty to deal with this item and in fact, he had disposed of the said item along with other items by his will, Ext. B29 to his second wife and daughter, defendants 16 and 17 from whom defendants 25 and 26 have ultimately acquired rights. 6. Item 8 appears to have been conceded by all parties as not existing. It was also contended that the claim of the plaintiff regarding item 9 was in any event barred by limitation. 7. B29 to his second wife and daughter, defendants 16 and 17 from whom defendants 25 and 26 have ultimately acquired rights. 6. Item 8 appears to have been conceded by all parties as not existing. It was also contended that the claim of the plaintiff regarding item 9 was in any event barred by limitation. 7. The learned District Munsiff held that items 1, 2 and 5 to 7 have been validly sold in execution of the decree in O. S. 1031/1919 and that the tavazhi of Soopi Haji has prescribed title to item 9 by adverse possession. In this view, the learned District Munsiff held that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any relief regarding these items. 8. Regarding items 3 and 4, the trial court held that the decree in O. S. 373/42 District Munsiff's Court, Tellicherry and the sales in pursuance of the decree were not binding on the plaintiff. The learned District Munsiff held that the plaintiff is not entitled to any right in item 4, but he held that the defendants 16 and 17 are precluded from disputing the title of the plaintiff to item 4. 9. In this view, the learned District Munsiff dismissed the suit of the plaintiff ragarding items 1, 2 and 5 to 7 but granted a decree for partition in favour of the plaintiff regarding items 3 and 4 only. So far as movables or outstandings are concerned, the trial court held that they were not existing. 10. Against the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsiff, three appeals were filed before the learned District Judge of North Malabar. The plaintiff herself filed A. S. 397/50 against the dismissal of her suit regarding items 1, 2, 5 to 7 and 9. Defendants 7 and 14 filed A. S. 323/50 regarding the decree for partition granted to the plaintiff over items 3 and 4. Defendants 9, 25 and 26 filed A. S. 394/50 contending that partition of item 4 should not have been decreed to the plaintiff. 11. The learned District Judge held that items 1, 2 and 5 to 7 were sold in pursuance of the compromise decree in O. S. 1031/1919 to which the plaintiff's mother's father Soopi Haji was a party. Item 1 was purchased by defendants 16 and 17 and the other items by certain other defendants all in court sales. 11. The learned District Judge held that items 1, 2 and 5 to 7 were sold in pursuance of the compromise decree in O. S. 1031/1919 to which the plaintiff's mother's father Soopi Haji was a party. Item 1 was purchased by defendants 16 and 17 and the other items by certain other defendants all in court sales. The plaintiff's mother Mariyumma was bound by the decree and in all the execution proceedings the plaintiff was represented by her father the 6th defendant as guardian and no objections were taken by the guardian to the sales. In this view, the learned Judge held that the plaintiff is bound by the decree in O. S. 1031/ 1919 and also by the court sales in execution of that decree regarding items 1, 2 and 5 to 7 and that therefore, she was not entitled to claim any rights in those items. 12. Regarding item No. 9, that was an item included in the Karar Ext. A2 and in the will Ext. B29. Under Ext. B29 the will, Soopi Haji had given it to his neice and children. Irrespective of the fact as to whether Soopi Haji was competent to dispose of this item by will contrary to the terms of the Karar Ext. A2, the learned Judge agreed with the conclusions arrived at by the trial court that after the death of Soopi Haji in 1928 the possession of the property had passed to the tavazhi of Soopi Haji and the said tavazhi had been dealing with that item in their own rights. The learned Judge has accepted the evidence afforded by Exts. B23 to B25 which are more than 12 years prior to suit as also the oral evidence in the case and held that neither Ummacha's children nor the second wife and daughter of Soopi Haji ever laid any claim to this item after his death. In this view, the learned Judge confirmed the finding of the trial court that Soopi Haji's tavazhi represented by defendants 19 to 21 have completed their title to item 9 by adverse possession. In this view, the learned Judge negatived the right of the plaintiff to this item also. 13. Thus the learned Judge confirmed the decree of the trial court as against the plaintiff regarding items 1, 2 and 5 to 7 and 9 and dismissed her appeal A. S. 397/50. 14. In this view, the learned Judge negatived the right of the plaintiff to this item also. 13. Thus the learned Judge confirmed the decree of the trial court as against the plaintiff regarding items 1, 2 and 5 to 7 and 9 and dismissed her appeal A. S. 397/50. 14. Regarding the other two appeals namely A. S. 323/50 and A. S. 394/ 50 filed by defendant 7 along with defendant 14 and by defendant 9 along with defendants 25 and 26 respectively regarding items 3 and 4, the learned Judge held that item 3 is included in the Karar Ext. A2. The learned Judge held that theseitems were not tavazhi properties and that defendants 1 and 2 were not competent to represent the plaintiff in the transactions which ultimately resulted in the decree O. S. 373/42 in execution of which these items have been sold. The learned Judge held that the plaintiff's suit regarding these items have been filed within the period of limitation and he also held that the plaintiff would be entitled to claim a partition in items 3 and 4 if she is entitled otherwise and would not be barred by the proceedings in O. S. 373/42. 15. But as item 3 was included in the Karar Ext. A2, the learned Judge held that the plaintiff will be entitled to a decree regarding item 3 and he therefore, confirmed the decree of the trial court in favour of the plaintiff regarding item 3. 16. Regarding item 4, the learned Judge held that it was a property acquired by Soopi Haji after the Karar Ext. A 2 and it has been bequeathed by Soopi Haji under his will B 29 to his second wife and her daughter. He held that Ummacha and her children did not acquire any right in this property by virtue of the Karar Ext, A 2. The learned Judge has also held that defendants 16 and 17 were not estopped from disputing the right of the plaintiff. In this view, the learned Judge negatived the right of the plaintiff regarding item 4 and as such, set aside the decree of the trial court so far as this item is concerned. 17. In this view, the learned Judge allowed A. S. 394/50 filed by defendants 9,25 and 26 regarding item 4. In this view, the learned Judge negatived the right of the plaintiff regarding item 4 and as such, set aside the decree of the trial court so far as this item is concerned. 17. In this view, the learned Judge allowed A. S. 394/50 filed by defendants 9,25 and 26 regarding item 4. Regarding A. S. 323/50 filed by defendants 7 and 14 regarding items 3 and 4, he allowed the said appeal regarding item 4 alone and dismissed the appeal regarding item 3. 18. The dispute regarding item 3 has been finally settled by the decision of both the lower courts. 19. The plaintiff alone has filed the present appeal regarding items 1, 2, 4, 5 to 7 and 9. Mr. Pocker, learned counsel for the appellant, very vehemently contended that the decision of the lower court confirming the decree regarding items 1, 2, 5 to 7 and 9 is not correct. In any event, Mr. Pocker contended that the reversal of the decree of the trial court by the learned District Judge regarding item 4 is contrary to law. 20. There is no appearance before me by the parties who are interested in items 1 and 9. The appeal of Mr. Pocker regarding items 2 and 5 to 7 are opposed by Mr. Achuthan Nambiar appearing for defendants 7 and 14. Both the lower courts have held concurrently against the appellant regarding these items. The courts have held that Soopi Haji was a party to the compromise decree in O. S. 1031/1919 and that the plaintiff was represented by her father as guardian in all the proceedings connected with the execution and that the plaintiff 1 is bound by those proceedings regarding items 1, 2 and 5 to 7. Regarding item No. 9 again, both the courts have held that after the death of Soopi Haji, the property has been taken possession by the thavazhi of Soopi Haji and that they have been holding this item adversely to the rights of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff's title is barred by adverse possession. Mr. Pocker has not been able to satisfy me that the findings of the two courts regarding these items are not in any way justified by the evidence in the case. The questions involved regarding these items are pure questions of fact on which there is a decision of the two courts against the appellant. Mr. Pocker has not been able to satisfy me that the findings of the two courts regarding these items are not in any way justified by the evidence in the case. The questions involved regarding these items are pure questions of fact on which there is a decision of the two courts against the appellant. I see no reason to interfere with the findings regarding these items and as such, the Second Appeal is dismissed regarding items 1, 2, 5 to 7 and 9 and the appellant will pay half the costs to defendants 7 and 14. 21. Item No. 4 stands on a different footing. The plaintiff very strongly relies on Ext. A 2 dated 13-7-1908 the Karar executed by Soopi Haji and his wife Ummach. The rights of the plaintiff under Ext. A 2 regarding this item are very hotly contested by the contesting defendants. Under Ext. B 29 the will executed by Soopi Haji, he had left these properties to his second wife and her daughter, defendants 16 and 17. Ultimately the rights in these properties have now been acquired by defendants 9, 25 and 26 and also defendants 10 and 31. 22. Both the courts have held in favour of the plaintiff that the decree in 0. S. 373/42 and the sale of this item in execution of the said decree are not binding on her. Therefore the question to be considered is as to whether the plaintiff has obtained any rights under Ext. A 2 regarding these items and as to whether Soopi Haji was entitled to dispose of this item as per his will Ext. B 14. If the rights of parties regarding this item are concluded by the Karar Ext. A 2, then the plaintiff is entitled to succeed. If not, the persons claiming under Exts. D 16 and D 17 will be entitled to succeed. 23.The terms of Ext. A 2 have been very fully set out in the judgment of Mr. Justice Wadsworth in S. A. Nos. 56 and 57 of 1935, High Court Madras. That was a Karar executed between Soopi Haji and his first wife Ummacha on 31-7-1908 Ext. A 2. It is stated therein that both of them should hold and manage the properties mentioned in the schedule which belonged to Soopi Haji and acquired in the name of his wife Ummacha. 56 and 57 of 1935, High Court Madras. That was a Karar executed between Soopi Haji and his first wife Ummacha on 31-7-1908 Ext. A 2. It is stated therein that both of them should hold and manage the properties mentioned in the schedule which belonged to Soopi Haji and acquired in the name of his wife Ummacha. Clause 2 provides for the properties etc., being held by Soopi Haji till his death and enjoyed by him as he likes subject to performance of certain religious ceremonies. Clause 3 provides that after the death of Soopi Haji the properties are to be held by his wife Ummacha and that after the death of both of them, all the children then living and to be born to Soopi Haji and Ummacha, should enjoy the properties without powers of alienations. There are certain other clauses which it is not necessary to refer. Clause 6 on which the plaintiff now relies was as follows :- "It is also agreed that all the movable and immovable properties to which No. 1 is now entitled and which No. 1 rnay in future acquire, should also be held and enjoyed as stated above" The exact legal effect of this clause is the subject matter of dispute between the parties in these proceedings. 24. According to the plaintiff, the same directions, conditions of enjoyment and limitation as to the persons who are entitled to enjoy the properties apply not only to the properties which were the subject matter of the Karar but also to properties acquired by Soopi Haji subsequent to the Karar. It is the Karar that Governs the rights in the properties and as such, Soopi Haji has no power to dispose of the properties by will. 25. On the other hand, Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar contends that the provision contained in clause 6 regarding properties to come into existence in future is absolutely void as opposed to section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and has no effect. At the most, Ext. A. 2 is only an agreement which by itself does not transfer any interest in the after-acquired properties to either Ummacha or her children. In law, it may give a right to Ummacha or her children to complete that title by taking appropriate proceedings by way of specific performance of the agreement. At the most, Ext. A. 2 is only an agreement which by itself does not transfer any interest in the after-acquired properties to either Ummacha or her children. In law, it may give a right to Ummacha or her children to complete that title by taking appropriate proceedings by way of specific performance of the agreement. No such proceedings have been taken in this particular case. Item 4 was admittedly purchased by Soopi Haji on 9-12-1912 long after Ext. A 2 and Soopi Haji himself has disposed of the properties by his will Ext. B 29 nearly 16 years after the purchase. He also very strongly relies upon the decision of Mr. Justice Govinda Menon in S. A. 475 of 1951 which is the final judgment of the Madras High Court in O. S. 744/45 District Munsiff's Court, Tellicherry. The certified copies of the judgment and decree of the trial court in the said suit have been marked as Exts. B 48 and B 48-A respectively in these proceedings. 26. Ext. B 17 is the judgment of Mr. Justice Wadsworfh in S. A. 56 and 57/35. Those proceedings arose out of suits filed by the children of the first wife of Soopi Haji and by the second wife and her daughter. Regarding the same item comprised under the present Karar Ext. A 2, the members of the two families filed, each of the suits, to recover rents from the tenant in possession ] of the property and for recovery of possession. The first wife's children claimed the property under the Karar A2 and the second wife and her daughter claimed the property under the will of Soopi Haji. The question arose as to the nature of right that Soopi Haji had in the properties comprised in the Karar. 27. The learned Judge considered the entire matter and come to the conclusion that in respect of the properties comprised in the Karar, Soopi Haji had only a life interest and he had no power to dispose of the properties by his will. The learned Judge no doubt, did not express any final opinion on clause 6 of the Karar as it was not necessary in that case. The learned Judge had held that Soopi Haji was governed by Marumakkathayam law and that he had no right to deal with the properties comprised in the Karar by way of a will. The learned Judge no doubt, did not express any final opinion on clause 6 of the Karar as it was not necessary in that case. The learned Judge had held that Soopi Haji was governed by Marumakkathayam law and that he had no right to deal with the properties comprised in the Karar by way of a will. In this ] view, the learned Judge held that the will executed by Soopi Haji regarding the items comprised in the Karar are not valid and that the first wife's children are entitled to get possession of the properties. 28. The learned Judge has also held that Ext. A2 is nothing but a contract between Soopi Haji and his first wife Ummacha by which one party gave up a possible claim and received a contingent benefit for herself and her children while the other party got an actual right over the properties for the rest of his life-time. 29. In the proceedings before Mr. Justice Wadsworth, the members of both the competing families were parties and the decision of the learned Judge conclusively binds them and also the parties who claimed title through them. Mr. Pocker attempted to argue that Ext. A2 may be considered to be in the nature of a family arrangement and he also wanted to argue that the will Ext. B29 is not valid according to Muhammadan- Law. Apart from the fact that the plaintiff has not raised any of these contentions in the courts below, in my opinion, it is not also open to the plaintiff to raise all these points in view of the decision of Mr. Justice Wadsworth in Ext. B17. 30. Therefore, the main contention of Mr. Pocker is that clause 6 of the Karar governs even after-acquired properties of Soopi Haji namely, item 4. He has attacked the judgment of Mr. Justice Govinda Menon in S. A. 475/51 regarding the interpretation of the karar. On the other hand, Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar very strongly relies upon this judgment of Mr. Justice Govinda Menon and according to him, it finally decides the rights of the parties based upon clause 6 of Ext. A2. Mr. Pocker has also very strongly relied upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Prem Sukh Gulgulia v Habib Ulla (A. I. R. 1945 Cal. 355) and of the Supreme Court in Jagalkishore v Raw Cotton Co. A2. Mr. Pocker has also very strongly relied upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Prem Sukh Gulgulia v Habib Ulla (A. I. R. 1945 Cal. 355) and of the Supreme Court in Jagalkishore v Raw Cotton Co. (A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 376). 31. In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is necessary to mention the circumstances under which S. A. 475/51 High Court of Madras came to be decided by Mr. Justice Govinda Menon. 32. Item 4 was outstanding with a tenant under Ext. B34 at the time of Soopi Haji's death. The assignee under Ext. B34 one Beevi Umma, executed a Marupat, Ext. B30 on 31-7-1934 to defendants 16 and 17 reciting the will Ext. B29. The arrears of rent due under Ext. B30 were assigned by defendants 16 and k 17 to one K. C. Muhammad and the latter's Legal Representatives purchased ultimately the tenant's rights of Beevi Umma. These legal representatives of K. C. Muhammad assigned the tenant's rights in favour of the 9th defendant under Ext. B32. Thus the 9th defendant became the tenant of this item. 33. In the meanwhile, defendants 16 and 17 assigned their rights in item 4 to defendants 25 and 26 under Ext. B33. The 7th defendant purchased the rights of defendants 2 to 7 in item 4 on 10-6-1944 under Ext. B6 and he also assigned his rights under Ext. B ll to defendants 14 and 27 to 30. 34. Defendants 14 and 27 to 30, the assignees under the 7th defendant representing the interest of defendants 2 to 7 filed O. S. 744/45 District Munsiff's Court, Tellicherry for arrears of rent from the tenant of the property. The tenants contended that the second wife and daughter of Soopi Haji (present defendants 16 and 17) are entitled to the properties and that they have paid the rent to them. Therefore, the main controversy ia the suit was as to the title to the present item 4 namely, as to whether the property belongs to the first wife's children or to the second wife and her daughter. The very same question arises before me also. 35. A decision regarding the title to item 4 depended entirely on the construction to be placed on clause 6 of Ext. A2 and the effect of the will Ext. B29. 36. The learned Judge, Mr. The very same question arises before me also. 35. A decision regarding the title to item 4 depended entirely on the construction to be placed on clause 6 of Ext. A2 and the effect of the will Ext. B29. 36. The learned Judge, Mr. Justice Govinda Menon, has, if I may say so with respect, considered the leading English and Indian cases on the subject including Holroyd v Marshal (1864 - 10 - H. L. C. 191); Collyer v Issacs (1881 -19 Ch. D. 342); Tailby v Official Receiver (1888 - 13 - Ch. D. 523); and Performing Right Society Ltd. v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd. (1924 Appeal Cases 1 at 13). 37. The learned Judge held that Ummacha and her children did not acquire any interest in the properties, as soon as it was acquired, as per the provisions of clause 6 of the karar. The learned Judge has also considered the decision in Prem Sukh Gulgulia v Habib Ullah (A. I. R. 1945 Cal. 355) very strongly relied upon before me by Mr. Pocker. The learned Judge held that the said Calcutta decision is applicable only to suits for specific performance of the contract. The learned Judge accepted the contention that even if a contract to transfer a property is valid, it does not become effective until there is specific performance of it and as the contract has not been specifically performed, it offends section 18 (a) of the Specific Relief Act also. 38. In this view, the learned Judge was of the opinion that by virtue of clause 6 of the Karar, without anything more, Ummacha or her children have not acquired any interest or right in item 4 and as such, he negatived the rights of the parties who claimed ultimately under the children of Ummacha. 39. I respectfully agree with the interpretation placed by the learned Judge on clause 6 of the Karar and about the validity of the will of Soopi Haji. In my view, that decision is conclusive as regards the rights of the parties before me. Though strictly not res judicata, the judgment in S. A. 475/51 is entitled to great weight as the judgment of the High Court interpreting the same document and deciding the very questions that arise before me. In my view, that decision is conclusive as regards the rights of the parties before me. Though strictly not res judicata, the judgment in S. A. 475/51 is entitled to great weight as the judgment of the High Court interpreting the same document and deciding the very questions that arise before me. As the learned Judge has fully explained the scope of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Prem Sukh Gulgulia v Habib Ullah (A. I. R. 1945 Cal. 355) and as I am in full agreement with Mr. Justice Govinda Menon, I do not think it necessary to deal with that case further. 40. But Mr. Pocker very strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Jugalkishore v Raw Cotton Co. (A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 376). In particular, he has relied very strongly upon some of the observations of the learned Chief Justice in that decision. 41. The main question that arose in that case before their Lordships was as to whether there has been a transfer of decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law under Order XXI rule 16 C, P. C. All the learned Judges agreed that the document before them did not cover the decree and as such, there was no room for the application of the equitable principle as the matter did not come under Order XXI rule 16 C. P. C. No doubt, their Lordships referred to the principles underlying an equitable assignment. But a very close reading of the judgment will show that the principles laid down by their Lordships, do not in any way support the contention of Mr. Pocker that the equitable title relates back to the earlier agreement in writing and converts the agreement to transfer the future property into an assignment of that property as soonas it is acquired. In fact, the following observations of the learned Chief Justice at page 384 appears to indicate that it is not so : "Where there is a contract for the transfer of property which is not in existence at the date of the contract, the intending transferee may, when the property comes into existence, enforce the contract by specific performance, provided the contract is of the kind which is specifically enforceable in equity. It is only when the transferor voluntarily executes a deed of transfer as in all conscience he should do or is compelled to do so by a decree for specific performance that the legal title of the transferor in that property passes from him to the transferee. This transfer of title is brought about not by the prior agreement for transfer but by the subsequent deed of transfer." The further observations at page 386 also make the decision very clear: "The implication of this principle, to my mind, is clearly that the agreement, by itself and 'proprio vigore', does not transfer the property when it is subsequently acquired but that instead of putting the intending transferee to the trouble and expense of going to court for getting a decree for specific performance directing the promissor to execute a deed of transfer which when executed will transfer the after acquired property, equity intervenes and places the parties in a position relative to each other in which by the prior agreement they were intended to be placed as if a deed of transfer had been made. As I apprehend the position, it is by the operation of equity on the subsequent event, namely, the actual acquisition of the property on its coming into existence that the beneficial interest therein is transferred to the promisee. This transfer, to my mind, is brought about by operation of equity which is something dehort the prior agreement. It is true that that agreement makes the application of the equitable principle possible or I may even say that it sets the equity in motion but, nevertheless, it is equity alone which denudes the transferor of his interest in the after-acquired property and passes it to the intending transferee. That being the true position, as i think it is, the after acquired property cannot, logically and on principle, be said to have been transferred to the intending transferee by the agreement in writing. That being the true position, as i think it is, the after acquired property cannot, logically and on principle, be said to have been transferred to the intending transferee by the agreement in writing. I do not see on what principle this transfer can be said to relate back to the previous agreement." Finally, the learned Chief Justice at page 389 has held that while a transfer or an agreement to transfer a decree that may be passed in future may, in equity entitle the intending transferee to claim the beneficial interest in the decree after it is passed, such equitable transfer does not relate back to the prior agreement. 42. Mr. Justice Bhagwati, the other learned Judge has also considered this question and at page 398 observes as follows : "The decree not being in existence at the date of the transfer cannot be said to have been transferred by the assignment in writing and the matter resting merely in a contract to be performed in the future which may be specifically enforced as soon as the decree was passed there would be no transfer automatically in favour of the 'transferee' of the decree when passed. It would require a further act on the part of the 'transferor' to completely effectuate the transfer and if he did not do so the only remedy of the 'transferee' would be to sue for specific performance of the contract to transfer." These observations of their Lordships, to my mind, indicate that the contention of Mr. Pocker cannot be upheld. Even if there are some passages which may appear to lend some support to the contention of Mr. Pocker, in my view, those observations of their Lordships are applicable only to cases of assignment of decrees with which their Lordships were dealing. They cannot certainly be understood as in any way having application to transfers of immovable property which are governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act. I do not think that their Lordships would have intended to give the go by to all the statutory provisions regarding transfer and assignments of interests in immovable properties which are governed by special statutes. I do not think that their Lordships would have intended to give the go by to all the statutory provisions regarding transfer and assignments of interests in immovable properties which are governed by special statutes. All these discussions may not be necessary because, in my opinion, their Lordships are very clear that the original agreement by itself and 'propriovigore' does not transfer the property when it is subsequently acquired and that the after-acquired property cannot logically and on principle, be said to have been transferred to the intending transferee by the original agreement entered into between the parties long before the property was acquired. The contention before me, as stated earlier, is that by virtue of clause 6 of Ext. A2 the after-acquired property item 4 as soon as it is acquired, stands transferred to Ummacha and her children. This position has been negatived by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. 43. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Pocker regarding item 4 also fails and the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge regarding item 4 are also confirmed. The appellant will pay regarding this item half the costs in this court to defendants 9, 25 and 26. In the result, the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with half costs of I defendants 9, 25 and 26 one set and with another half costs of defendants 7, 10, 14 and 31 one set. Leave refused.