JUDGMENT 1. This revisional application is directed against a conditional decree for ejectment passed against the petitioner, Sm. Renubala Dassi, under section 5, Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. The case of the opposite party landlord was that the petitioner was in possession of 2 kattas of land described in the schedule of the application as a monthly tenant at the rate of Rs. 4 per month according to Bengali calendar months. The opposite party claimed that he required the land for the purpose of building on the land and otherwise developing the land and discontinuing the system of thika tenancy. A notice to quit dated the 10th July, 1953 was sent to the petitioner by registered post but the petitioner refused to accept the same. Another copy of the notice was sent under certificate of posting. As the petitioner did not vacate, the opposite party started proceedings under section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act on the 23rd April, 1954. 2. Before the Controller the petitioner contested the application for ejectment on the ground that notice was not valid and sufficient, that the application was bad for defect of parties and that the opposite party did not require the land for the purpose of building and development. These points were however decided in favour of the opposite party landlord and a conditional order of ejectment was passed, viz., that the petitioner would be evicted from the suit land on the opposite party paying or depositing the compensation agreed between the parties or in default of agreement of compensation determined by the Controller on the application of either party. There was an appeal by the petitioner which was decided by Sri S. P. Chatterjee, Subordinate Judge, Howrah. Before the appellate court the only points urged were that the, notice to quit was not valid and sufficient, and that there had been waiver of the notice to quit by the landlord by acceptance of rent after the determination of the tenancy. The learned Subordinate Judge however decided this point in favour of the opposite party landlord and so dismissed the appeal. The tenant as petitioner has therefore filed this revisional application. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge however decided this point in favour of the opposite party landlord and so dismissed the appeal. The tenant as petitioner has therefore filed this revisional application. 3. The only point urged before me is the point of waiver, viz., that the landlord by accepting the rent even after the determination of the tenancy has waived the notice to quit and he is not therefore entitled to a decree for ejectment. By the terms of the notice to quit the tenancy was determined at the end of Aswin, 1360 B. S. and the tenant petitioner wan directed to quit at the end of Aswin 1360 B. S. It is however admitted that the landlord accepted the rent sent by postal money order up to Falgun, 1361 B. S., i. e. for more than a year after the determination of the tenancy by the notice to quit and even for some months after filing proceeding for ejectment. The point is whether such acceptance of rent by postal money order constituted waiver and disentitled the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction. The learned Subordinate Judge relied on the terms of section 22 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act and the decisions in Davies v. Bristow (1) (1920) 3 K.B. 428 and Manindra Nath De v. Man Singh (2) 85 C. L. J. 339. for holding that the landlord by his acceptance of rent after the determination of the tenancy by service of notice to quit did not waive the notice or renew the tenancy, there being no intention on the part of the landlord to continue the tenancy under the old terms. 4. Mr. Dwijendra Nath Das appearing for the petitioner has urged that section 22 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act does not take away the effect of section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act and that illustration (a) to section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act would still apply directly to the facts of the case and would show that the landlord had waived the notice to quit, As regards the two cases relied upon by the learned Subordinate Judge, Mr. Dan has urged that they relate to cases under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act and the corresponding English Act and that they have no application to a case governed by the Thika Tenancy Act. Dan has urged that they relate to cases under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act and the corresponding English Act and that they have no application to a case governed by the Thika Tenancy Act. In Davies v. Bristow (1) cited above, the tenant of a house to which the Increase of Rent (War Restrictions) Act applied, held over after the expiry of notice to quit and paid rent and the landlord accepted the same. It was held that the landlord was not to be taken by acceptance of the rent to assent to the renewal of the tenancy under the old terms, for he had no choice but to accept the rent; he could not sue in trespass for mesne profits, for the Acts provided that the tenant notwithstanding the notice to quit shall not be regarded as a trespasser so long as he paid the rent and performed the order conditions of the lease. This decision was followed in the other case of Manindra Nath De v. Man Singh (2) 85 C. L. J. 339 which was decided by A. K. Sarkar, J. In that case the plaintiff served a notice on the defendant asking him to quit at the end of the month of March, 1949. The defendant did not vacate and went on paying the rent month by month up to January, 1950 and the plaintiff accepted the rent and issued receipts in the old form up to January, 1950. It was held that there was no waiver. The defendant did not vacate and went on paying the rent month by month up to January, 1950 and the plaintiff accepted the rent and issued receipts in the old form up to January, 1950. It was held that there was no waiver. A. K. Sarkar, J. referred to the decision in Davits v. Bristow (1) (supra) and he pointed out that under the law relating to landlord and tenant, whether under the common law of England or the Transfer of Property Act, rent was consideration payable by the tenant for his occupation of a premises under a contract with the landlord, but rent under the Sent Control Act meant a sum which the tenant must go on paying to the landlord if be wishes to avail himself of the protection of the Rent Control Act even though a contract of tenancy may have come to an end; and therefore when such rent is paid under the terms of the Rent Control Act after the contract of tenancy has terminated, it cannot be said to be rent payable under the contract, and acceptance of such rent does not show any intention on the part of the land lord to create a new contract of tenancy under the old terms, and that some further evidence of consent or intention on the part of the person receiving such rent to continue the tenancy on the old terms must be proved before it can be said that there has been waiver. The question is whether the principles laid down in these two cases would apply only to the case of premises governed by the Rent Control Acts or whether they would apply to tenancies governed by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. Mr. Das has pointed out that under section 12 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act or law no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant in eluding a tenancy whose lease has expired. Mr. Mr. Das has urged that the provisions of the above section thus expressly give protection to a tenant whose lease has expired or has been determined and thus creates a class of statutory tenancy as distinguished from contractual tenancy; and that while it may be correct that in the case of a statutory tenancy there is no waiver when the landlord accepts the amount equivalent to the old rate of rent after the tenancy has been determined, in the absence of evidence allowing consent on the part of the landlord to continue the tenancy under the old contractual terms, the case would be different under the Thika Tenancy Act. Now it is true that the relevant section under the Thika Tenancy Act does not expressly contain reference to a tenant whose lease has expired or the lease has been determined; but the effect of the wording is the same even in the case of a thika tenancy. A thika tenancy cannot be determined by a mere service of the notice to quit. The thika tenant can be evicted from the land only under certain specified conditions which are mentioned in section 3 of the Thika Tenancy Act and section 3 of the Thika Tenancy Act also provides that the provisions thereof shall prevail over any other law, the first paragraph of the section being as follows: "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, a thika tenant shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be liable to ejectment from his holding on one or more of the following grounds and not otherwise. . . . . . . " 5. Thus even in the case of a Thika tenant it is not possible to evict him by merely determining the tenancy by serving a notice to quit. The landlord has also to establish that the tenant has either become a defaulter by making at least three successive defaults. [clause (i) of section 3] or that the tenant has used the land in a manner which renders it unfit for the purpose of the tenancy [clause (ii) of section 3] or that the land is required by the landlord for his own use and occupation or for the purpose of building on the land or otherwise developing the land clause (iv) or. on similar grounds provided in the section 3 of the Thika Tenancy Act., Under the Rent Control Act when the landlord seeks to evict a tenant of a premises merely on the ground that he is a statutory defaulter the tenant gets a further protection as provided by section 14 (1 ). viz., if he pays the arrears with interest as determined by the court within a certain period the decree for ejectment would be refused. Similarly, under the Thika Tenancy Act there is a provision that where the landlord has served a notice determining the tenancy and has sought eviction of the tenant on the ground that he is a statutory defaulter under section 3 (i) of the Thika Tenancy Act, the tenant gets a further protection under section 6 of the Thika Tenancy Act; the order of eviction under section 5 in such a case must specify the arrears of rent and interest due thereon on the date of the order, and the order shall not be executed if the arrears with the interest as specified in the order are deposited by the thika tenant within 30 days from the date of the order. Accordingly, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Das that while in the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Acts there is creation of a statutory tenancy which continues even after the determination by notice to quit, there is no such tenancy under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. I would hold that the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act also makes provision for such statutory tenancy which continues even after the landlord has determined the tenancy after service of such notice to quit. Unless the tenant has made himself liable to eviction by coming within the mischief of one of the clauses of section 3 of the Act, the tenant can continue to be in possession of his land and he clearly does so as a statutory tenant; in such circumstances the landlord cannot get a decree or order for ejectment against him. Therefore in the matter of waiver by accepting rent or an amount equivalent to rent after the determination of the tenancy by a notice to quit; the position under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act cannot be any different from the position under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Acts and the corresponding English Acts. Therefore in the matter of waiver by accepting rent or an amount equivalent to rent after the determination of the tenancy by a notice to quit; the position under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act cannot be any different from the position under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Acts and the corresponding English Acts. I therefore hold that the learned Subordinate Judge was right in applying the principle of law laid down in the two cases mentioned above and in holding that the mere acceptance of rent by postal money order in this case did not, in the absence of any further circumstances, show consent on the part of the landlord to continue the tenancy on the old terms and therefore did not amount to waiver under section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. As regards section 22 (1) of the Thika Tenancy Act the relevant provision is as follows: "when a landlord accepts rent in respect of any holding sent by postal money order by a thika tenant under clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 13 or by the Controller under section 21 or withdraws any rent deposited under section 17 or section 18, the fact of this acceptance or withdrawal shall net be used in any way as evidence that he has admitted as correct any of the particulars set forth in the postal money order form or in the application for deposit of such rent." The contention of Mr. Das is that the above provisions have nothing to do with the saving of the landlord from the inference as to waiver of the notice to quit by acceptance of rent after the determination of the tenancy by due service of notice to quit as provided in section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a notice under section 111 (h), that is a notice determining the tenancy, is waived by any Act on the part of the person giving the notice showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. Illustration (a) shows that after the notice has expired, if the lessee tenders rent and the lessor accepts it, the notice is deemed to be waived. Illustration (a) shows that after the notice has expired, if the lessee tenders rent and the lessor accepts it, the notice is deemed to be waived. But the thing which is tendered by the lessee is rent for the premises, meaning rent due under the contract for the use and occupation of the premises; but both under the West Bengal Premises (Rent Control) Acts and the Thika Tenancy Act rent does not necessarily mean the contractual rent but it may also mean an amount equivalent to the contractual rent after the term of the lease has expired or after the lease has been determined. Accordingly, the description of the amount tendered as rent may include an amount equivalent to rent which is to be paid under these Acts even after the determination of a tenancy by a notice to quit or even after the expiry of the terra of the tenancy. In other words, the amount tendered may be statutory rent, but if the person in occupation of the land tenancy describes the amount tendered as rent, that is, the contractual rent, section 23 (1) provides that the landlord would not be bound by such description. Accordingly, there is no reason to hold that by accepting the amount sent by postal money order after the determination of the notices to quit the landlord must be deemed to have consented to continue the tenancy under the old terms and so to have waived the notice. Accordingly, I see no substance in the point urged before me. This revisional application therefore fails and the Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs.