JUDGMENT G. Kumara Pillai, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam, dated 30th July 1956, in O. S. No. 18 of 1946, allowing plaintiff 5 in the said suit to recover possession of a part of the plaint schedule properties. Defendants 7 to 13, who are the legal representatives of the deceased first defendants are the appellants. 2. The facts of the case, as put before us by counsel appearing for the two sides, are as follows :-A forest region having an extent of 36 sq. miles, which was both unsurveyed and unassessed, in Tengara amsom belonging to a Nair tarwad at Ottapalam known as Kizhakaepadath tarwad, was leased by the karnavan of that tarwad, one Gopala Menon, to defendant 1 on 2-12-1918 by Ext. B1. The rent stipulated for in Ext. B1 was 15 paras of paddy per year for the entire area. Under the terms of the lease, defendant 1 was authorised to reclaim and convert into paddy lands such portions of the property as he chose and also to plant teak and other timber trees on such portions as he elected, the costs of which were to be paid at the time of the redemption of the lease. The plaintiff's case is that nothing was done in pursuance of this lease. On 16-10-1922 Gopala Menon executed a mortgage, Ext. B38, for this property and certain other properties for a period of 14 years which period was to commence from 1931. This mortgage was styled undaruthipanayam and its principal incident was that there was to be no liability on the part of the mortgagor to return the mortgage amount as that amount was to be considered to have spent itself by the use of the property by the mortgagee. In 1927, Gopala Menon and two other junior members of the tarwad executed another lease, Ext. A21, with a premium of Rs. 1500 and a period of 60 years authorising defendant 1 to plant rubber, coffee, etc., in such portions of the property as he chose. It was admitted before us by the appellant's counsel that effect has not been given to this lease and that no right is claimed by the appellants under it. In 1937, the power of attorney holder of the karnavan executed yet another lease (Ext. It was admitted before us by the appellant's counsel that effect has not been given to this lease and that no right is claimed by the appellants under it. In 1937, the power of attorney holder of the karnavan executed yet another lease (Ext. B2) in favour of defendant 1, which purported to be one in renewal of Ext. B1, and authorised defendant 1 to hold the property for a period of 12 years on a rent of 15 paras of paddy per year. The other provisions of this lease were that defendant 1 might plant fruit trees in the property and convert such portions of it as he chose into paddy lands and that he should pay a further rent at the rate of 1 para of paddy for every acre of land converted into paddy land or garden land. He was to get the costs of the conversion and planting at the time of the redemption of the lease. Before this lease was granted one of the junior members of the tarwad has issued a notice to the karnavan claiming partition of the tarwad properties, and ultimately a suit for partition was filed in the court of the subordinate Judge of Ottapalam as O. S. No. 29 of 1940. In that suit a receiver was appointed for the tarwad properties and after the preliminary decree was passed, the receiver sold the 36 sq. miles of forest land referred to above, along with other lands, with the permission of the court, as it was found difficult to effect a partition of the forest area between the members of the tarward. By that time a portion of the 36 sq. miles of forest land had been reclaimed and converted into paddy lands and garden lands, and as a consequence of it that portion was surveyed and brought to assessment. At the auction sale conducted by the receiver the surveyed and assessed portion was purchased by one Govindankutty Menon, who is now dead and who was a member of the tarwad. Defendants 2 to 6 are his legal representatives. The unsurveyed and unassessed portion, in respect of which alone the decree now appealed against has been passed by the lower court, was purchased by plaintiff 4 who subsequently transferred his rights to plaintiff 5. Defendants 2 to 6 are his legal representatives. The unsurveyed and unassessed portion, in respect of which alone the decree now appealed against has been passed by the lower court, was purchased by plaintiff 4 who subsequently transferred his rights to plaintiff 5. The suit was brought by plaintiffs 1 and 2, plaintiff 1 being the receiver and plaintiff 2 a member of the tarwad who was assisting the receiver in the management of the properties, attacking the above alienations, other than those made by the Receiver, on the ground that they were highly detrimental to the interests of the tarwad and were not binding on it and seeking to restrain defendant 1 and persons claiming under him from cutting trees from the property and also to recover possession of the property from him if it was found that he was in possession. Plaintiff 1 died during the course of the suit, and plaintiff 3 succeeded him as receiver appointed by court. After the sale of the property by the receiver, and after the death of Govindankutty Menon, the latter's legal representatives, did not elect to prosecute the suit so far as the portion of the property he (Govindankutty Menon) had purchased was concerned, since, it is said, he had large debts and his assests were insufficient to satisfy his creditors. Plaintiff 5 got himself impleaded and prosecuted the suit so far as the portion of the property he had purchased was concerned. 3. The principal contesting defendant in the lower court was defendant 1, and his contention was that the leases were valid and binding on the tarwad and, since he had obtained fixity of tenure under the Malabar Tenancy Act, plaintiffs had no right to recover possession of the property from him. The other contentions of the parties do not require consideration in view of the conclusions we have reached on the dispute as to the validity and binding nature of Exts. Bl and B2. 4. On behalf of the appellants it was contended before us that, in view of S.33 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, the karanavan of the tarwad and his power of attorney holder were comptent to execute Exts. B1 and B2, and so no member of the tarwad could impeach those leases. No doubt, under S.33 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, as it stood on the dates of Exts. B1 and B2, and so no member of the tarwad could impeach those leases. No doubt, under S.33 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, as it stood on the dates of Exts. B1 and B2, it was open to the karnavan of a marumakkathayam tarwad to lease immovable property belonging to the tarwad for a period not exceeding 12 years without the consent of the other members of the tarwad, granting of leases being only acts of management. But that section does not confer a charter on the karnavan to mismange the tarwad affairs and execute improvident leases to the detriment of the tarwad. The right of the junior members to challenge the validity of even leases granted by the karanavan if such leases are wholly detrimental to the interests of the tarwad has always been recognised by law, and even in Kunchikutty Ali v. Mahomed Hajee ILR 54 Mad. 239 relied upon by the appellants' counsel this right was recognised. All that was said in that case was that it is only in exceptional cirumstances that a junior member can challange a lease executed by the karnavan on the ground that it is fraudulent, improper or detrimental to the tarwad. The fact that the karnavan can manage the tarwad affairs and execute a lease by himself does not mean that he should be allowed to wantonly and wilfully mismanage its affairs and alienate properties to the utter detriment of the tarwad under guise of granting leases. Whether a particular lease was executed fraudulently and improperly and to the detriment of the tarwad and should therefore be held to be not binding on it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 5. In the present case by Ext. B1 36 sq. miles of forest land were leased for a period of 12 years on an annual rent of 15 paras of paddy. The price of the paddy is given in the document as Rs.11-4-0. It was admitted by both sides before us that, in pursuance of this lease, nothing had been done till the execution of Ext. B2. No portion of the forest land was reclaimed or converted into paddy land and no teak or other timber trees were planted in any part as provided for in the document. It was admitted by both sides before us that, in pursuance of this lease, nothing had been done till the execution of Ext. B2. No portion of the forest land was reclaimed or converted into paddy land and no teak or other timber trees were planted in any part as provided for in the document. The appellant's counsel stated before us that some land had been planted up with rubber by the date of Ext. B2. Some of the survey numbers given in Ext. B2 for the assessed portion of the land appears from the evidence in the case to have been planted with rubber before the date of that document. But the lessee was not authorised by Ext. B1 to plant rubber. These rubber lands, which appear from Ext. A47 to measure 14 acres in all, were subsequently sold by defendant 1 himself for about Rs. 1000. In his evidence dw. 2 (defendant 1's kariasthan) denied that the reference in Ext. A47 was to the rubber lands in the plaint property. But it is explicitly stated in Ext. A47 that the rubber lands are part of the lands covered by Ext. B2. dw. 2's denial was due to his desire to conceal the fact that a very small part of the plaint property had been sold at such a high amount. Although Ext. B2 purports to be only a renewal of Ext. B1 it is really no renewal, for the period provided for in Ext. B1 terminated in 1930 and admittedly nothing was done in pursuance of Ext. B1 and no rent has been paid to the tarwad after 1930 and before the date of Ext. B2. It is also significant that Ext. A21 was executed in 1927 purporting to supersede Ext. B1 although the appellants' case now is that effect was not given to that document (Ext. A21) - we may also remark in this connection that even though Ext. A21 provided for a period of 60 years it was executed without the consent of all the major members of the tarwad. As has been stated already Ext. B2 was executed by the power of attorney holder of the karnavan almost immediately after the demand for partition came from a junior member of the tarwad, and the partition suit followed in 1940. In Ext. B2 also the rent provided for is only 15 paras of paddy per year. As has been stated already Ext. B2 was executed by the power of attorney holder of the karnavan almost immediately after the demand for partition came from a junior member of the tarwad, and the partition suit followed in 1940. In Ext. B2 also the rent provided for is only 15 paras of paddy per year. There is a provision for payment of a further rent of 1 para of paddy per acre of converted land if the lessee chose to convert any portion later on. Ext. B38, which was executed in 1922, would show that the right to collect the minor produces and to fell timber from the plaint and certain other properties were mortgaged for 14 years for a sum of Rs. 13000 which was not to be returned after the termination of the mortgage. For the unassessed portion of the plaint property plaintiff 5 himself has paid about Rs. 6000 in 1945, about six years after the date of Ext. B2. Having regard to all these facts we have absolutely no doubt that Exts. Bl and B2 were highly improvident transactions and that Ext. B2 was caused to be executed for the purpose of defeating the interests of the members of the tarwad since one of them had made a demand for partition. We hold that they are not binding on the tarwad and that defendant 1 has not obtained any right to the plaint property under Exts. Bl and B2. The decree of the lower court is therefore confirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs.