JUDGMENT Roy, J. - This is a civil revision by two persons who were Defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in the court below. It is directed against an order dated 20-2-1954, passed on an application of some of the other Defendants u/O. IX, R. 13 of the CPC, by which a decree passed on 13-11-1952, had been set aside and the case was restored to file on its original number for rehearing subject to payment of a sum of Rs. 1000 as costs to the Plaintiff and Rs. 400 as costs to Defendant Nos. 5 and 6. The ground urged on behalf of the applicants is that the decree in question so far as it related to Defendants 5 and 6 in respect of the liability cast upon them was decree upon contest and it was divisible from the rest of the decree that was passed against the other Defendants and Consequently it was neither just nor essential to set aside that part of the decree which concerned Defendants 5 and 6. The view of the lower court has been that there was dispute between the two sets of the Defendants inter se, and the question of liability of one set could not but have a bearing on that of the other set and that under the circumstances the whole of the decree should be set aside and not merely that part of it which was against the applicants to the application u/O. IX, R. 13. It may be mentioned here that in the proceedings taken on the application u/O. IX, R. 13, Defendants 5 and 6 had preferred an objection that the decree so far as it related to them should not be set aside, but they remained absent on the day when the application was heard and the order which is the subject of revision was passed. 2. The suit was instituted by the Provincial Cooperative Industrial Federation Limited, Lucknow, against eight persons arrayed on the side of the Defendants. The reliefs were claimed against Defendants Nos. 1 to 6 alone it was alleged in the plaint that the Plaintiff purchased 628 bales of yarn from Defendant No. 1 on various dates and he paid for them a sum of Rs. The reliefs were claimed against Defendants Nos. 1 to 6 alone it was alleged in the plaint that the Plaintiff purchased 628 bales of yarn from Defendant No. 1 on various dates and he paid for them a sum of Rs. 3,87,783/12/6 by means of certain cheques for which three stamped receipts were granted by Defendant No. 1, two receipts bearing date 27-9-1948 and the third receipt bearing date 19-10-1948; that during the relevant period Defendant No. 5 was acting as the financier of Defendant No. 1; that the aforesaid cheques were endorsed by Defendant No. 1 in favour of Defendant No. 5 who had then the custody of the said bales of yarn sold to the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 asked Defendant No. 5 to deliver the said bales to the Plaintiff; that the Defendant No. 5 agreed and accepted the cheques and promised to give delivery to the Plaintiff when transport was arranged, that Defendant No. 5 obtained payment of the said cheques; that defenant No. 5 delivered only 309 bales of yarn as stated in the plaint; that the Plaintiff was not given delivery of the remaining 319 bales in spite of all efforts and arrangements for transport; that when Defendants Nos. 5 and 6 (Defendant No. 6 having been a proprietor of Defendant No. 5) were pressed to despatch the balance of the bales to their destination they gave a letter on 21-2-1949, to the Plaintiff admitting that they would despatch the said bales at the earliest possible opportunity which were lying with them in Plaintiff's account; that thereafter Defendants 5 and 6 by a letter dated 23-2-1949, wanted a letter of authority from the Plaintiff to sign the delivery receipt of the bales from Defendant No. 1 and also to sign forwarding notes and despatch advices on behalf of the Plaintiff, that the Plaintiff did this on 24-2-1949; that thereafter in pursuance of the authority mentioned above, Defendants 5 and 6 took sixteen bales of yarn which were lying in the Plaintiff's godown in Agra for despatch to Jhansi but they failed to do so; that Defendants 2 to 4 are partners of Defendant No. 1 and that thus Defendants 1 to 6 are liable in the sum of Rs. 2,43,577/15/6 and they, or at any rate Defendants 5 and 6, are further liable in the sum of Rs. 10,447/2/7. 3. 2,43,577/15/6 and they, or at any rate Defendants 5 and 6, are further liable in the sum of Rs. 10,447/2/7. 3. Defendants 1 to 3 resisted the claim, inter alia, on the ground that Defendant No. 5 was liable and responsible for the delivery to the Plaintiff of the bales sold by Defendant No. 1 and that they have been unnecessarily dragged into this litigation. Defendants 5 and 6 admitted that they were the financiers of Defendants 1 to 4 under a finance agreement dated 6-7-1948; that under that agreement Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 could take advances and loans to the extent of Rs. 25,50,000/- on the security of a floating charge on their entire movables and business assets provided the advances in excess of Rs. 5,50,000/- were further secured by the pledge of the bales of yarn actually put by Defendant No. 1 into their possession as pledgees; that accordingly dealing continued between Defendants 1 to 4 on the one hand and Defendants 5 to 6 on the other and in the course of the dealings Defendants 1 to 4 from time to time used to take advances and also used to take payments towards their account; that they also off and on took delivery of the bales of yarn pledged in the said finance agreement; that no bales of yarn in respect of which payment had been made by Defendant 1 to 4 in accordance with the terms of the said finance agreement remained undelivered with Defendants 5 and 6; Defendants 5 and 6 were therefore not liable. As regards the sixteen bales of yarn mentioned above Defendants 5 and 6 contended that on account of the unsatis-factory work of the despatching agents the Plaintiff's representative approached these Defendants; that out of the sixteen bales of yarn which were of course received by the employees of Defendants 5 and 6, ten bales were despatched to Lucknow under receipt No. O 47836 and the remaining six bales could not be despatched as certain other bales for despatch were not available and there was no specific direction regarding these six bales. They further contended that these Defendants had always been willing to give delivery of these six bales and subject to what has been stated above the Plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. 4. On the pleadings of the parties a number of issues were framed. They further contended that these Defendants had always been willing to give delivery of these six bales and subject to what has been stated above the Plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. 4. On the pleadings of the parties a number of issues were framed. The case was listed for hearing on the 11th,12th and 13th of November, 1952. On the 11th November, Defendant 1 to 4 were absent. The other two Defendants 5 and 6 were present. The case proceeded ex parte against Defendants 1 to 4. Evidence was recorded on behalf of the Plaintiff and of Defendants 5 and 6 and a decree was passed on 13-11-1952. The decree was in the following terms: This suit is decreed as prayed in respect of relief A with costs at the uncontested scale against Defendants 1 to 4. 5. The suit is dismissed with costs as against Defendants Nos. 5 and 6. But Defendants Nos. 5 and 6 shall be liable to deliver six bales of yarn of 16 s. to the Plaintiff as and when demanded by it, add, at Plaintiff's cost, after being paid the actual charges incurred by Defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in keeping the six bales till the date of delivery. 6. In case the bales are not delivered by Defendants Nos. 5 and 6 as ordered, they shall be liable to pay the price of the six bales calculated at the controlled rate prevailing at the time. In case the Plaintiff fails to take delivery of the bales within three months from today's date the Plaintiff shall no longer be entitled to recover these six bales and the suit shall stand dismissed with costs in toto against Defendants 5 & 6." On 11-12-1952, an application for the setting aside of the ex parte decree was made by Defendants 1 to 4 on the ground that the Defendants and their attorneys and pairo-kars had been ill on the date of hearing and they therefore prayed that the decree should be set aside. The application, as we have already stated above, was opposed not only on behalf of the Plaintiff but also on behalf of Defendants 5 and 6, the latter contending that so far as the decree affected them it was not an ex parte decree and it was passed upon contest and consequently it ought not to be set aside in respect of them. The court below, as we have already pointed out above came to the conclusion that the contest between the two sets of Defendants was so inextricably mixed up that it has a very important bearing upon the Plaintiff's claim and the decree in view of the allegations made in the plaint being one and indivisible, it could not be allowed to stand and the whole of it must be set aside. 7. It has been contended before us on behalf of the applicants shat the view of the court below was wrong. 8. O. IX, R. 13 of the CPC so far as is relevant for our purposes may be quoted and it stands as follows: In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a Defendant, he may apply to the court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into court or otherwise as i thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such Defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other Defendants also. 9. Now, in the present case the court below was satisfied that Defendants 1 to 4 who were the applicants in the proceeding u/O. IX, R.13 were prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. The court below was therefore right in allowing the application u/O. IX, R. 13. 9. Now, in the present case the court below was satisfied that Defendants 1 to 4 who were the applicants in the proceeding u/O. IX, R.13 were prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. The court below was therefore right in allowing the application u/O. IX, R. 13. The short question which we have got to consider upon the facts and circumstances of the present case is whether the proviso to O. IX, R. 13 was properly attracted by the court below in setting aside the decree against Defendants 5 and 6 as well. Ordinarily an ex parte decree can, and should, be set aside only against the Defendant applying. But if a decree is indivisible, or where the liabilities of the Defendants as set out in the plaint are not separable, the decree, in view of the proviso, may be set aside in toto and not in part. 10. In the Full Bench case of Bhura Mal v. Har Kishnan-Das ILR 24 All 383 the suit was brought by the Plaintiffs for money alleged to be due to them on a balance of accounts. The Defendants were one Bhura Mal, his daugher-in-law Smt. Gayatri, the widow of Ganga Prasad, a deceased son of Bhura Mal, who was a minor, and Jamuna Das the minor son of Bhura Mal. On the date of hearing there was no appearance for any of the Defendants and an ex parte decree was there upon passed against all the Defendants for the amount alleged by the Plaintiffs to be due. An application was made on behalf of Smt. Gayatri and Jamna Das to have the decree set aside. The question arose as to whether the order should be limited to setting aside the decree against those two alone or should go further and set it aside in its entirety. An application was made on behalf of Smt. Gayatri and Jamna Das to have the decree set aside. The question arose as to whether the order should be limited to setting aside the decree against those two alone or should go further and set it aside in its entirety. Sir John Stanely, C. J. and Burkitt,J. refrained from expressing any opinion whatever on a case in which whilst some of several Defendants appeared and defended the suit, others as to whom a decree had been passed ex parte made an application u/s 108 of the Code because such was not the case before them And on the admitted and proved facts of that case in which none of the Defendants appeared at the hearing and decree was passed against them all ex parte, they held that where a decree is one and indivisible, as the decree in that case was, it must be set aside in its entirety and not simply against those parties who had made the application u/s 108. Aikman, J. on the other hand, endorsed the view expressed in certain previous decisions and, relying upon a passage in the judgment of Banerjee, J. in Mohammed Hamidulla v. Tohurennissa Bibi ILR 25 Cal. 155 159, which says: It may often happen that the setting aside of the decree as regards some of the Defendants renders it necessary in the interests of justice that the whole decree should be reopened. 11. Which was in accord with what Norman, C.J. said in Dookhee Khan v. Rajessuree Ranee 15 WRCR 371 observed: In my opinion the court must be assumed to have the power to set aside the whole decree, if the decree from its nature is one and indivisible, or if in order to give the Defendants against whom an ex parte decree has to be pronounced the relief to which they are entitled, it must be set aside as a whole. 12. The observation made by Aikman, J. in Bhura Mal v. Har Kishan Das ILR 240 All 383 was relied upon by Kendall, J. in Ram Baran Vs. Bodh Ram and Others, AIR 1934 All 1051 . There one of four Defendants had made appearance in the suit and the suit as against him was dismissed. But an ex parte decree was given against the other three Defendants. Bodh Ram and Others, AIR 1934 All 1051 . There one of four Defendants had made appearance in the suit and the suit as against him was dismissed. But an ex parte decree was given against the other three Defendants. One of them applied u/O. IX, R. 13 to have the ex parte decree set aside, and the court after fully discussing the merits of the case with the object of showing that the decree sought by the Plaintiff against the four Defendants was one and indivisible, set aside the whole decree; and it was held that under the circumstances the court cannot be acting irregularly in so doing. 13. In this connection we may quote S. 108 of the CPC as it stood when the Full Bench case of Bhura Mal v. Har Kishan Das ILR XXIV Allahabad 383 was decided. The section ran as follows: In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a Defendant, he may apply to the court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside, and if he satisfies the court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall pass an order to set aside the decree upon such terms as to costs, payment into court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. 14. O. IX, R. 13, as engrafted by its proviso is a complete improvement upon the terms of S. 108 of the old CPC. The proviso says that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such Defendant only, it may be set aside as against all or any of the other Defendants also. It is therefore sufficient for the purpose of the present case to say that if the proviso to O. IX, R. 13, CPC can be used in the circumstances described in the case which came up before the Bull Bench, the Court cannot be acting irregularly in using that proviso in the present case. 15. It is therefore sufficient for the purpose of the present case to say that if the proviso to O. IX, R. 13, CPC can be used in the circumstances described in the case which came up before the Bull Bench, the Court cannot be acting irregularly in using that proviso in the present case. 15. Learned Counsel for the applicants have relied upon a Full Bench decision of the Assam High Court in Khagish v. Chandra Kanta Barua AIR 1954 Ass 183 where, in interpreting the proviso to O. IX, R. 13 to the peculiar facts of that case, it was held that although there was on paper one decree, in subtstance there were two decrees, and the court had no jurisdiction to set aside the whole decree and direct that the entire suit should be restored to its file to the prejudice of one Defendant who had successfully contested the Plaintiff's claim, and when the Plaintiff himself had preferred no appeal against that part of the decree. In that case the Full Bench decision of this Court in Bhura Mal v. Har Kishan Das ILR XXIV Allahabad 383 and the single Judge decision in Ram Baran Vs. Bodh Ram and Others, AIR 1934 All 1051 were referred to, and it was remarked that the observation of Aikman, J. in the Full Bench case relied upon by the learned single Judge in the later case did dot really support the view that he had taken. 16. The value of a decision as a precedent necessarily depends to a considerable extent on the facts of a particular case. 17. We have given our earnest consideration to the facts set out in the present plaint and we are of opinion that the setting aside of the decree as against Defendants 1 to 4 who had made the application u/O. IX, R. 13 rendered it necessary in the interests of justice, particularly having regard to the allegations made in the plaint and also with regard to the disowning of the liability inter se between the two sets of the Defendants, as averred by them in their defences, that the whole decree should be reopened. This view which we have taken is in accord with the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mohammed Hamidulla v. Tohurenissa Bibi ILR 25 Cal. This view which we have taken is in accord with the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mohammed Hamidulla v. Tohurenissa Bibi ILR 25 Cal. 155 at p. 159 decided by Maclean, C. J. and Bannerjee, J., and also with the view of Norman, C. J. in Dookhee Khan v. Rajessuree Ranee 15 WRCR 371. In Mohammed Hamidulla's case a suit was bro-ought against several Defendants on a promissory note. Some of the Defendants appeared and resisted the suit. Two of the Defendants did not appear. The Court passed a decree against the applicants but also against all the Defendants. The two Defendants against whom the decree had been made ex parte afterwards made an application u/s 108 of the Code to have the decree set aside. The application was granted and the deeree was set aside not only as against the other Defendants who had appeared and defended the suit. The Plaintiff appealed. Maclean, C.J. and Banerjee, J. held that the decree had been rightly set aside against all the Defendants. 18. Having regard to the facts of the present case we are of opinion that it is not similar to the facts of the Assam case decided by the Full Bench, cited above, so as to merit the observation that the Court in the present case had no jurisdiction to set aside the whole decree. In our opinion the order of the court below must be upheld and the revision is accordingly dismissed with costs. The stay order is discharged. 19. The record must be sent down to the court below at once for proceeding with the suit in accordance with law.