JUDGMENT Gurtu, J. - In this case, the landlord, who is the Appellant before us, obtained a decree for ejectment of the Respondent on 5-7-1944. The decree was put into execution after the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (Act III), 1947 came into force on the ground that the Appellant had made a wilful default in payment of rent. 2, An objection was taken by the Respondent judgment-debtor, the tenant, and the dispute finally came up to this Court in second appeal No. 613 of 1952. this Court while disposing of that appeal, passed the following order: On the facts stated, I am unable to hold that there was wilful default on the part of the tenant within the meaning of S. 3 (2) of the Rent Control Act (Act III of 1947). Learned Counsel for the tenant has given an assurance that the tenant would be prepared to increase the rent to Rs. 115/- per mensem. Learned Counsel for the landlord decree-holder Respondent agrees to allow the tenant to continue to stay in the house on this term. After taking every fact and this arrangement into consideration, I allow the appeal. But it must be understood that, if there is any default in the payment of the agreed rent of Rs. 115/- per mensem for a continuous period of two months, the decree for ejectment will become executable forth-with. The tenant undertakes to make the payment within the first week i.e.up to the 7th of each month. There will be no order as to costs." 3. Thereafter the present application for execution, of the decree dated 5-7-1944 was made on 2-12-1954 on the allegation that the Appellant had made a wilful default in paymnent of rent for two months. An objection was taken that having regard to Sections 3 and 14 of Act III of 1947, as amended by the amending Act (Act No. XVII of 1954) the judgment-debtor was not liable to be ejected, unless he was in default of three months' rent. The executing court overruled the objection but the court below took the view that having regard to the amendments made in 1954 in S. 3 of the 1947 Act, default in respect of three months' rent was essential to render a tenent liable to be evicted and inasmuch as the judgment-debtor was admittedly in ar. The executing court overruled the objection but the court below took the view that having regard to the amendments made in 1954 in S. 3 of the 1947 Act, default in respect of three months' rent was essential to render a tenent liable to be evicted and inasmuch as the judgment-debtor was admittedly in ar. rears only in respect of two months' rent, he could not be said to be in default of three months' rent and could not be ejected. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that the decision given by this Court in the earlier second appeal no 613 of 1952 on the 31-3-1953 operated as res judidicata and the judgment debtor could not take advantage of the amending Act No. XVII of 1954 so as to get over a decision inter partes according to which the decree obtained by the Appellant in 1944 could be executed if the judgment debtor was in default of two months' rent. 5. Two questions, therefore, arise for consideration in the present appeal, namely(1) whether by virtue of the judgment of this Court, dated 31-3-1953, the judgment debtor was not entitled to claim the benefit of S. 14 read with S. 3 of the U.P. Act No. III of 1947, as it now stands and (2) whether the decision dated 31-3-1953 operates as res judicata between the parties so as to debar the judgment debtor from claiming any advantage under the said 1947 Act. 6. We must first consider as to what is the true effect of the judgment of this Court in second appeal No. 613 of 1952. The matter may be considered from three alternative points of view, namely- 1. That a fresh agreement, by way of a fresh contract of tenancy, came into existence, the terms whereof were embodied in the compromise which became a part of the decree. 2. That the original decree dated 5-7-1944 stood amended by this compromise which was embodied in the Courts' decree dated 31-3-1953. 3. That this compromise, which was embodied in the Court's order dated 31-3-1953, was an adjustment of the decree of 5-7-1944. 7. In our opinion, the position, as taken up under point no, 3, is the correct position. It Cannot be said that a new contractual arrangement of tenancy came into existence because the Courts' order, dated 31-3-1953 still envisages the execution of the earlier decree. 7. In our opinion, the position, as taken up under point no, 3, is the correct position. It Cannot be said that a new contractual arrangement of tenancy came into existence because the Courts' order, dated 31-3-1953 still envisages the execution of the earlier decree. Obviously the decree dated 5-7-1944 is not amended by this order of the 31-3-1953. It is only the Court, which passed the decree which could amend the decree and not the execution court. It is no body's case that the decree dated 5-7-1944 has been amended by the court that passed the decree. Therefore, this is clearly a case of adjustment of the decree of 1944. The principle, that adjustments of decrees may take place in the course of execution proceedings and that these adjustments may be looked at and recognised for the purpose of further execution of the original decree, has been recognised by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Het Ram Bodh Raj (firm) v. Aya Ram Tola Ram (firm) 1938 AWR PC 45 and in the Oudh Commercial Bank, Ltd. Fyzabad v. Thakhrain Bind Basni Kuer 1939 AWR PC 43 There can be little doubt that the order dated 31-3-1953, viewed correctly, is in essence, an order recording an adjustment, although it took the form of a decree passed in an execution second appeal. Now this order, dated 31-3-1953 is undoubtedly an order which was passed after the passing of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. But what is under execution at the moment is not that order but the decree that was passed on the 5-7-1944, regard must be had to this order of the 31-3-1953, but technically speaking that is not the order under execution. Therefore, it cannot be said that S. 14 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 could not apply. Therefore, it cannot be said that S. 14 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 could not apply. Section 14 of the said Act runs as follows: "No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 3: Provided that the tenant agrees to pay to the landlord "reasonable annual rent" or the rent payable by him before the passing of the decree, whichever is higher." Inasmuch as the decree for eviction in this case was prior to the coming into force of this Act,the decree can only be executed, if one or the other of the grounds mentioned in S. 3 thereof existed. Now S. 3, to the extent that it is relevant, may be quoted: 3 (l) Subject to any order passed u/s ub-S. (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil coutr against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds: (a) That the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand. On the date when this execution application was made, Sub-section (a), by virtue of the amendment referred to earlier, was in the terms quoted above. Perior to the amendment, however, Sub-section (a) stood as follows: (a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any ar-rears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord. 8. Now it is not necessary that the default in payment of the amount demanded should be wilful. On the other hand, it is necessary that the rent should be of three months in arrears. The rents are not of three months in arrears in this case. Therefore, it is obvious that the execution is hit by the combined effect of S. 3 (1) (a) and S. 14 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, as it stands now. The rents are not of three months in arrears in this case. Therefore, it is obvious that the execution is hit by the combined effect of S. 3 (1) (a) and S. 14 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, as it stands now. In our view, the judgment dated 31-3-1953 can have no effect on S. 3 (1) (a) or S. 14 of the said Act. Merely because the parties on 31-3-1953, agreed by way of adjustment, that the decree would be executed subject to the limitations of that agreement, would not necessarily entitle the decree-holder, the landlord, to the full benefits of that adjustment. To the extent that that adjustment is against law on the date when it is sought to be invoked, the adjustment must be disregarded even though the said adjustment is embodied in an order of the Court for, in essence, though the adjustment has been put, in this case, into the decree of the Court, that decree of the Court can mean no more than the recording of an adjustment. The adjustment is merely an agreement between the parties and, to the extent that that agreement is in conflict with the law, it cannot have a binding effect. 9. In regard to the second question, namely, whether the decision operates as res judicata between the parties so as to debar the judgment debtor from claiming any benefits under the said 1947 Act, if the decision dated 31-3-1953 is taken, to be merely as a record of adjustment, then no question of res judicata u/s 11 of the CPC would arise because the agreement flows from the will of the parties and it does not constitute a finding of a decision of court. Consent orders and decrees may operate as an estoppel, but they do not oporate as res judicata u/s 11 of the Code because there is no decision of a court on the merits. The binding nature of consent decrees is well recognised. See Kandarpa Nag v. Bamvarilal Nag 33 ALJ 244 246 . It is equally well settled that a consent decree cannot have greater validity than the compromise itself. See Huddersfield Banking Company Ltd. v. Henry Lister and Son Ltd. (1895) 2 Ch.273. The binding nature of consent decrees is well recognised. See Kandarpa Nag v. Bamvarilal Nag 33 ALJ 244 246 . It is equally well settled that a consent decree cannot have greater validity than the compromise itself. See Huddersfield Banking Company Ltd. v. Henry Lister and Son Ltd. (1895) 2 Ch.273. As observed by Parke, J. in Wentworth v. Bullen 1829 9 BC 840 : 33 RR 353"the contract of the parties is not the less a contract, because there is superadded the command of the judge" and in cases where the consent decree gives effect to an agreement which embodied a right to forfeiture, the courts have relieved against forfeiture. See Krishnabai v. Hari Govind ILR (1906) 31 Bom.15 10. Thus the limitation which attach to the agreement are recognised as attaching to the consent order embodying the agreement. Therefore, in this case, inasmuch as the term that two month's default in payment of rent will make the decree executable is a term contrary to the provisions of both the amended and unamended Cl. (a) of S. 3 (1) of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, it cannot be held to be of a binding character and that term must give way to the law. This is, moreover, not a case where it can be said that before the compromise terms were agreed to, there was any dispute as to whether S. 3 (1) (a) afforded a right to the decree holder to eject. The learned single Judge had already adjudicated upon that point before the compromise was arrived at. It is not even clear whether by agreeing, as they did, the parties agreed to give a go-by to the rights and liabilities created by S. 14 read with S. 3(1) (a) of the Act. This case, therefore, does not fall within the principle set out in Cowasju Temulji v. Kisandas Ticumdas ILR 35 Bom. 371 where it was held that a party was not entitled to give a go-by to a particular clause in an existing decree on the ground that that clause, if resting on no higher authority than the agreement between the parties, would be bad in law. It was there held that until the decree was set aside by a suit, it would continue to be binding. It was there held that until the decree was set aside by a suit, it would continue to be binding. The case where an agreement is bad in law in the sense that it is based on a wrong appreciation of the mere legal rights to the property of the parties is different from a case where the parties' agreement would be void as being an attempt to circumvent public policy. No doubt in Basangouda Giriyeppagouda Patil Vs. Basalingappa Mallangouda Patil, AIR 1936 Bom 301 it has been held that estoppel by res judicata may prevail even when the result of giving effect to it is to sanction what it prohibited by law, but that was a case on its own facts. An agreement had been entered into and embodied in a decree which, in effect, sanctioned the alienation of a watan (service) which was prohibited by S. 5 of the Hereditary Offices Act, but there a transferee from one of the parties to the decree was claiming not to be bound by the decree. It was recognised that the decree could have been set aside, but as this was not done and the period of limitation for so doing had expired, the decree was given effect to. Here merely the effect of a prior adjustment is being considered and the executing court is not precluded from considering, to what extent that adjustment can override the law, because there is no bar of limitation. 11. Looked at from the angle of estoppel, we are of the view that this agreement, to the extent that it operates to defeat S. 14 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, cannot be used by either party by way of an estoppel as against the other. We might point out that it has been held, in Panna Lal v. Pandit Debt Dayal Bhatt 1955 AWR 86 that S. 14 of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act is general in terms and would apply to all decrees, whether consent decrees or otherwise. Equally we think that S. 14 of the said Act would continue to apply with respect to the execution of all decrees, even though there has been a previous adjustment in execution proceedings by way of an agreement which has the effect of making S. 14 of the aforesaid Act nugatory. 12. Equally we think that S. 14 of the said Act would continue to apply with respect to the execution of all decrees, even though there has been a previous adjustment in execution proceedings by way of an agreement which has the effect of making S. 14 of the aforesaid Act nugatory. 12. Accordingly, this appeal fails and we dismiss it with costs.