JUDGMENT : Mohapatra, J. - These two miscellaneous appeals arise out of objections raised u/s 47 of the CPC against an award dated 19th August 1953 passed by Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Society. M.A. 57/55 arises out of proceedings u/s 47, CPC where judgment debtors 1, 4 and 5 are the objectors and M.A. 58 of 1955 arises out of proceedings u/s 47 CPC where judgment-debtors 2 and 3 are the objectors. The loan from the Society was taken originally by one Golak Krishna Patnaik, the father of judgment-debtors 1, 4 and 5. judgment-debtors 2 and 3 are the coparceners of the same joint family. The award has been passed against these objectors as coparceners of the joint family. The objectors had taken two fold grounds: (i) on the point of limitation, and (ii) that the Assistant Registrar had no jurisdiction to pass the award against the coparceners as they were never members of the Co-operative Society. The point of limitation has been decided against the judgment-debtors by both the Courts below and it is not controverted before me. But the objection has prevailed in the lower appellate Court that the award was without jurisdiction. 2. The main question to be determined is whether this Golak Krishna Patnaik who had taken the loan on the basis of which the award has been passed was a member of the Society as Karta of the joint family of which the present objectors are coparceners. There is no doubt over the proposition of Jaw which has been settled that there is no bar within the four corners of the Cooperative Societies Act that a joint family can be a member of the Co-operative Society and further that the joint family in accordance with law can very well be represented by the karta of the joint family as the Karta representing the joint family may very well be a member of the Co-operative Society. The position, therefore, comes to this "whether Golak Krishna Patnaik was a member of the Society as Karta of the joint family, or in other words, the joint family was a member of the Society or not?". 3. The lower appellate Court has come to the conclusion that in fact there is no evidence worth the name from which it can be inferred that Golak was a member of the Society as representing the joint family. The finding remains unassailable. 3. The lower appellate Court has come to the conclusion that in fact there is no evidence worth the name from which it can be inferred that Golak was a member of the Society as representing the joint family. The finding remains unassailable. Manifestly therefore the persons against whom the award was passed were non-members, Golak being a member of the Co-operative Society in his own personal and individual capacity and not representing the joint family. 4. Mr. Mohapatra, appearing on behalf of the Appellant Co-operative Society, has placed reliance upon observations made in the case of Bindeshwari Prasad Vs. Shiva Sutt Singh and Others. There their Lordships emphasise the position that mere non-mention of the member as Karta of the family may not be of importance to conclude that in fact he was not representing the joint family. In my opinion, the case, so far as this point is concerned, cannot be any guide to me to determine the present appeals. The matter before their Lordships arose in a First Appeal. Their Lordships were fully competent to go into details of the evidence on record and in fact they had thoroughly discussed the evidence and come to the conclusion that in fact the original debtor was representing the joint family and therefore the joint family was a member of the Society. After coming to the conclusion that the original debtor was representing the joint family while he was a member, their Lordships came to the conclusion that the persons against whom the award was passed being members of the joint family were bound by the award and the award was within jurisdiction. But the position before me is entirely different, as I have already mentioned, the finding being that there is no evidence on record worth the name from which it can be concluded that Golak was representing the joint family while he was a member of the Society. On the face of this finding it is bound to be held that the award is a nullity so far as the objector-coparceners are concerned. 5. The present case is fully covered by a decision of our High Court in the case of Bhagabat v. Ramnarayan ILR 1949 Cutt. 505. On the face of this finding it is bound to be held that the award is a nullity so far as the objector-coparceners are concerned. 5. The present case is fully covered by a decision of our High Court in the case of Bhagabat v. Ramnarayan ILR 1949 Cutt. 505. Their Lordships On a full discussion of the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act laid down the proposition that the question to be determined is not whether the loan was incurred for the benefit of the joint family but whether the debtor while being a member of the joint family was representing the joint family and as such the joint family was a member, and then only the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar will have jurisdiction to pass an award. If it is found that the original debtor or the member of the Society was not representing the joint family while being a member, the award must be taken to be a nullity against the members of the joint family. 6. The other point taken by Mr. Mohapatra is that a question of this nature cannot be agitated in execution proceedings u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, but this can only be agitated in a separate suit. For this purpose he strengthens his argument by reference to a decision where a sharp distinction has been made between Cases where there is inherent absence of jurisdiction and cases where the decrees are of voidable nature, there being no question of inherent absence of jurisdiction. Mr. Mohapatra contends that where absence of jurisdiction has to be determined after investigation only, the matter must be agitated in a separate suit and cannot be raised in proceedings u/s 47. This contention does not appeal to me; but nevertheless I must observe, as has been held by high authorities, with which I agree with great respect, that if there is no case of inherent absence of jurisdiction, the matter may not be agitated in execution proceedings. But in my opinion, this is a case where absence of jurisdiction is manifest and inherent and appears on the very face of it. If Gloak was not a member of the Society as representing the joint family, the Assistant Registrar had manifestly no jurisdiction over any members excepting the member himself. But in my opinion, this is a case where absence of jurisdiction is manifest and inherent and appears on the very face of it. If Gloak was not a member of the Society as representing the joint family, the Assistant Registrar had manifestly no jurisdiction over any members excepting the member himself. This Act is a special Act conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal constituted by the Act itself and ousting ordinary jurisdiction of the Courts of law established in this country. The special jurisdiction given to the Assistant Registrar or the Registrar can be exercised only as against the members of the Society. Once the position is unassilable that Golak was not representing the joint family while being a member, it does not require any further elucidation that absence of jurisdiction is manifest and inherent. Merely because it has got to be seen whether Golak was representing the joint family while he was a member, this question cannot be thrown out in the execution proceedings and be a subject matter of a separate suit. 7. Mr. Mohapatra relies upon a decision of the Patna, High Court reported in Girwar Narayan Mahton and Others Vs. Kamla Prasad and Others. Their Lordships have drawn a distinction between two varieties of decrees-void and voidable. If the decree is void and therefore a nullity it can be Ignored by the party against whom it was passed; the party can attack the decree collaterally at any stage when the decree is being levelled against them. But if it is of a voidable character then only a separate suit is necessary to set aside the decree. The proposition is not disputed before me and is not disputable too. But the position here is entirely different as 1 have discussed above. The absence of jurisdiction is inherent and the award itself is, therefore, a complete nullity. Under the above circumstances both the miscellaneous second appeals are dismissed with costs. Hearing fee in each case is assessed at Rs. 100/- (Rupees one hundred). Leave to appeal as prayed for by Mr. Mohapatra is refused. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed