JUDGMENT : Mohapatra, J. - This is a Plaintiff's second appeal against the confirming judgments of the courts below arising out of a suit for ejectment of the tenant in occupation of a house in Balasore town and for arrears of rent. The courts below have granted relief to the Plaintiff regarding the prayer for rent. The appeal is not against that part of the decree by any of the parties. This appeal confines only to the prayer for ejectment which has been disallowed by the courts below. Several defence were taken against the prayer for ejectment. But the lower appellate court has come to the conclusion that the notice required under the Transfer of Property Act for eviction of a monthly tenant was a valid notice and was actually served. But nevertheless the courts below have come to the concurrent finding that as the Plaintiff does not require the house for his personal use, he is not entitled to evict the tenant in occupation as this is in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1951. 2. At the outset it is absolutely dear to me that the courts below have gone completely out of their jurisdiction in discussing the question whether the house was required for the personal use of the Plaintiff. It would be worthwhile to quote a few relevant provisions of the Act. Section 5 runs thus: 5. 2. At the outset it is absolutely dear to me that the courts below have gone completely out of their jurisdiction in discussing the question whether the house was required for the personal use of the Plaintiff. It would be worthwhile to quote a few relevant provisions of the Act. Section 5 runs thus: 5. Subject to the provisions of this Act and not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in an agreement or law where a tenant on a tenancy from month to month is, on the date of the commencement of this Act, in possession of any house (a) he shall not be liable to be ejected, whether in execution of a decree otherwise, except for non payment of rent or breach of the conditions of the tenancy, and X X The proviso runs thus: Provided further that a landlord may apply to the Controller for exemption from the provisions of Clause (a) in respect of any house and if the Controller is satisfied: (i) that the house is reasonably and in good faith required by the land-lord for the occupation of himself or any member of his family joint in mess with him, or for the occupation of any person or persons for whose benefit the house is held by him, or What is more important is Clause (ii) which runs thus: that the landlord has any other good and sufficient reason for ejecting the tenant, the Controller shall pass an order exempting the landlord from the provisions of the said clause in respect of the house. It is clear from the provisions aforesaid that it is within the jurisdiction of the Controller, after considering the cases of both parties, to determine whether he would pass an order exempting the landlord from the provisions of the said clause in respect of the house. It is clear from the provisions aforesaid that it is within the jurisdiction of the Controller, after considering the cases of both parties, to determine whether he would pass an order exempting the landlord from the provisions of the said clause in respect of the house. The landlord had obtained the requisite order of exemption of the appropriate authority under the Act and once he obtains such an order of exemption from the appropriate authority constituted by the Act, it is not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go further into the investigation of the provisions of Section 5 to vary or set aside the order of the Controller as to whether it was necessary for the personal use of the Plaintiff or not Section 12 of the Act makes provisions for appeal against the order passed by the Controller and makes it clear that subject to the decision in appeal, the order of the Controller and the order of the appellate authority will be final and shall not be caned in question in a Civil Court. Section 13 runs to the effect that no suit or proceeding by a landlord against a tenant in possession of a house for eviction of such tenant therefrom in which the ground specified in the second proviso to Clause (b) of Section 5 has been taken as a ground for such eviction shall be entertained by any Court unless the landlord has been permitted by the Controller by an order in writing to institute such suit or proceeding and he has produced before such Court proof that such permission has been granted. Those provisions oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to enter into such question. It is clear that as a protective measure against the tenants this Act came into existence and constituted a special Tribunal for the purpose of granting the order of exemption on a consideration of certain conditions laid down in the Act. This Act not only does not confer any special jurisdiction on the Civil Court to investigate into the question referred to in Section 5, but oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as contained in Section 12 of the Act. 3. Mr. This Act not only does not confer any special jurisdiction on the Civil Court to investigate into the question referred to in Section 5, but oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as contained in Section 12 of the Act. 3. Mr. Sinha, appearing on behalf of the tenant-Respondent, has drawn my attention to the last proviso to Section 5 which runs thus "Provided further that where in consequence of an order under the last proceeding proviso a tenant has been ejected he will be entitled to be restored to possession on the same grounds by the same procedure and subject to the same limitations as laid down in Sub-section (3) of Section 10 in the case of other tenants. His contention is that it is a proviso for restoration of possession on .the selfsame ground, that is to say, if it is not for the personal use of the landlord the tenant is entitled to agitate the question in the Civil Court by way of defence and when the Civil Court comes to the conclusion that it is not required for the personal use of the landlord, it can dismiss the suit for ejectment. Mr. Sinha further relies upon Section 10(3) of the Act. But Clause (3) of Section 10 gives jurisdiction for reconsideration only by the Controller as constituted by the Act. Here again the special jurisdiction has been conferred upon the special Tribunal and not on the Civil Court. The contention of Mr. Sinha therefore must fail and manifestly the orders passed by the Courts below that it was no longer necessary for the personal use ot the Plaintiff are without jurisdiction and therefore liable to be set aside. When the plea of ejectment is otherwise admissible, the Courts below ought to have granted relief to the Plaintiff. 4. In conclusion therefore, the decrees of the Courts below refusing to eject the Defendant are set aside and the Plaintiff's suit is decreed and the Second Appeal is allowed. Each party to bear his own costs through ant. The Defendant is to vacate by 31st. October 1958. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed