Judgment 1. This application is made on behalf of one Roshan Mistri for grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order passed by the State Transport Authority dated the 28th/29th February, 1956, and also for quashing the order of the State of Bihar, dated the 2nd August, 1956, under Sec. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, refusing to interfere with the decision of the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority. 2. The first objection taken on behalf of the petitioner is that the order of the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority, dated the 28th/29th February, 1956, cancelling the permit of the petitioner and granting a permit to Phulchand Ram, which is annexure F to the application, is illegal and ultra vires, since Phulchand Ram was incompetent to prefer an appeal under Sec. 64 (f) of the-Motor Vehicles Act, which states as follows : "64. Appeals. Any person -- X X X X (f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which or/a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto, or X X X X X may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard." The argument of the petitioner is that Phulchand Ram did not prefer any objection under Sec. 57 of the Act, and so his appeal before the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority was not competent. In support of this proposition learned Counsel relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this High Court in Ramnihora Thakur V/s. State of Bihar, 1957 Pat LR 361 : ( AIR 1958 Pat 293 ), but we do not think that the ratio of that decision has any application to the present case. That was not a case of a temporary permit falling under Sec. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The report of that case shows that the question at issue in that case was with regard to a permit for four months, subject to automatic renewal every four months. That was not a case of a temporary permit falling under Sec. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The report of that case shows that the question at issue in that case was with regard to a permit for four months, subject to automatic renewal every four months. In the present case we are concerned with a temporary permit which was to be granted under Sec. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and this is evident from the resolution of the State Transport Authority, which is annexure A, dated the 30th December, 1953. Sec. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act states as follows :- - "62. Temporary permits -- A regional Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in Sec. 57, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily : -- (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit, and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit : Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under Sec. 46 or Sec. 54 during the pendency of the application. Provided further that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted more than once in respect of any route or area specified in an application for renewal." In view of the statutory provision that the procedure laid down in Sec. 57 need not be followed with regard to temporary permits, we are of opinion that the argument of the petitioner based under Sec. 57 of the Act is not a valid argument and must be rejected. 3. The next contention made on behalf of the petitioner is that by its order dated the 28th/29th February, 1956, the Appeal Board had in some way revised its previous order dated the 11th January, 1955, requiring the petitioner to procure a "newer model bus". 3. The next contention made on behalf of the petitioner is that by its order dated the 28th/29th February, 1956, the Appeal Board had in some way revised its previous order dated the 11th January, 1955, requiring the petitioner to procure a "newer model bus". We think that the order of the State Transport Authority, dated the 28th/29th February, 1956, did not review or revise its previous order, but it was only a clarification of the meaning of the previous order made by the Appeal Board, and we do not consider that there is any illegality which vitiates the order of the Appeal Board, dated the 28th/29th February, 1956. 4. Lastly it was contended that the application of Phulchand Ram for permit was time-barred. The ground taken is that there was no Treasury challan filed along with the application on the 26th December, 1953, but the Treasury challan was filed two days later, that is, on the 28th December, 1953. There is no statutory provision in the Motor Vehicles Act itself requiring that the Treasury Challan should be filed along with the application for permit. We asked Counsel for the petitioner to show whether there was any rule on the point, and we were referred by him to Rule 48 which says that every application for a permit in respect of a transport vehicle shall be in form P. Tem. A with regard to a temporary permit, and this form requires in column 9 that non-judicial stamps for the amount should be enclosed. In the present case the Treasury challan was filed two days after the application for a permit was made to the Transport Authority. But there is no specific statutory provision that the Treasury chalkn should be filed along with the application. In the absence of any such statutory provision, we do not think that the application of Phulchand Ram made on the 26th of December, 1953, was barred by limitation. The argument of learned Counsel on this point must be rejected. 5. In our opinion, there is no case made out for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against the opposite party in this case. The application is accordingly rejected. Hearing fee Rs. 100.00 to be shared equally by the two opposite parties.