These three applications arise out of proceedings under sub-s. (3), S. 15, of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter called the Act), and raise similar questions of law and jurisdiction. (2) The Cachar Chah Sramik Union filed appli­cations out of which these cases arise under S. 15(3) of the Act for wages which were delayed in payment to labourers affiliated to the Union and for compen­sation. The applications were filed on various dates but within a short period of presentation of the respective applications the entire wages due were admittedly paid and accepted. The Authority under the Act, however, directed payment of compensa­tion to the labourers concerned; but on appeal the learned District Judge has set aside the direction and held that since the delayed wages were actual­ly paid and accepted, the applications had become infructuous and could not be maintained merely for the purpose of payment of compensation; in other words an order of compensation alone the learned Judge held could not be passed by the Authority con­cerned within the meaning of S. 15(3) of the Act. (3) Mr. Lahiri in support of the petitions has raised various points. He contends firstly that the; appeals before the learned District Judge were not maintainable. This branch of his submission is on a two-fold basis. He firstly says that the payment of wages to each labourer as directed by the Authority, was below Rs. 300/- and, therefore no appeal lay to the District Judge under S. 17(l)(a) of the Act. Section 17(l)(a) of the Act provides that an appeal against a direction made under sub-s. (3) of S. 15, may be preferred, within the specified period before the District Court, by an employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under S. 3, if the total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and compensation exceeds three hundred rupees. In each case here, the direction was for pay­ment of a consolidated sum by the Authority con­cerned. It is contended that in fact the sum pay­able to the labourers individually works out at a figure which is much less than Rs. 300/-, therefore there could be no appeal. The right of appeal depends upon the actual direction of the Authority. Here the direction was for payment of a sum of more than Rs. 300.7- in each case and, as such, an appeal did lie to the District Court. 300/-, therefore there could be no appeal. The right of appeal depends upon the actual direction of the Authority. Here the direction was for payment of a sum of more than Rs. 300.7- in each case and, as such, an appeal did lie to the District Court. The direction is for payment of a consolidated overall amount and there­fore the formula of working out the amount on in­dividual basis will not apply to the case for purposes of determining the right of appeal. The point is covered by a decision of this Court in "Cachar Cha Sramik Union v. Manager, Marty-cherra Tea Estate", Civil Rule 21 of 1957, D/- 6-6-1958: (AIR 1959 Assam 13). The petitions in these cases were filed on behalf of a large number of workers by the Union and there was one direction for payment of the entire amount of damages per­missible in law. The appeals to the District Court were therefore quite- competent. The second branch of his argument is that because there was direction for payment of compensation only, therefore no appeal lay to the District Court. The learned counsel thus concedes by implica­tion that clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 17 of the Act contemplates a direction for payment of both wages and compensation and not compensation alone. This argument evidently cuts at the root of his second submission which I propose to discuss here­after. In any case, however, the simple answer to the present contention is that the order passed by the Authority purports to be an order under S. 15(3) of the Act and, as such, the order is appealable. Whether the order was right or wrong on merits, or legal or illegal is a different question. (4) The second contention of the learned counsel is that even though the wages had been paid and accepted by the petitioners, it was still open to the Authority to make a direction for payment of com­pensation only and, as such, the order of the Autho­rity was justified; and the learned District Judge was in error in holding otherwise. The plain language of sub-s. (3) of S. 15 is against this contention of the learned counsel. Sub-sec. The plain language of sub-s. (3) of S. 15 is against this contention of the learned counsel. Sub-sec. (3) is: "When any application under sub-s. (2) is enter­tained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under S. 3 or give them an opportunity of being heard, and, after such further inquiry (if any) as may be necessary, may without prejudice to any other penalty to which such em­ployer or other person is liable under this Act, direct the refund to the employed person, of the amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compen­sation as the authority may think fit, not exceed­ing ten times the amount deducted in the former case and not exceeding ten rupees in the latter." There is a proviso to the sub-section which enjoins that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person, or on account of any emergency etc. It would thus appear that compensation alone could not be claimed and the Authority while directing payment of the delayed wages could also grant such compensation as he thought fit. A mere direction for payment of com­pensation could not be given by the Authority. Where, therefore, wages had already been paid and accepted, obviously there could be no direction for payment of wages. That being so, it follows that the Authority could give no direction for pay­ment of compensation either. This is also confirm­ed by the language of S. 17 of the Act, wherein an appeal is provided. Payment of wages and payment of compensation go together; there could be a direction for payment of wages alone but there could be no direction for payment of compensation alone. This is also confirm­ed by the language of S. 17 of the Act, wherein an appeal is provided. Payment of wages and payment of compensation go together; there could be a direction for payment of wages alone but there could be no direction for payment of compensation alone. The point appears to be covered by the deci­sion in Chimanlal Iswarlal Mehta v. Junior Inspector of Factories, AIR 1942 Bom 273, where Divatia, J., observed with reference to sub-s. (3) of S. 15 of the Act, that the sub-section meant that the order for compensation could be passed along with the order for the payment of delayed wages; bufi where there could not be any order for payment of delayed wages, if they were already paid, it would not be open to the applicant to apply for a direction for payment of compensation alone. The learned Judge concluded his judgment with the observation that the only construction which could be put on the section was that an order for compensation could be made along with the order for wages, but not by itself; and that, therefore, an application for compensation alone was not compe­tent. It is true that the amount of wages due in that case was paid before the applications were filed, but that fact would hardly make any difference of principle in the construction of S. 15(3) of the Act and the power vouchsafed to the Authority there­under in respect of the directions he is entitled to give. A similar view was taken in Chief Inspector of Factories, U. P. v. V. K. Modi, AIR 1952 All 804 , where Desai, J., also said that the language of S. 15 made it clear that an order for payment of com­pensation alone was beyond the jurisdiction of a Magistrate, or the Authority under the Act. If com­pensation could be ordered to be paid, it could be ordered to be paid only along with the wages, if no wages were ordered to be paid, no compensation also could be ordered to be paid. My own reading of the language of S. 15(3) entirely agrees with the views expressed by the Hon'ble Judges in the deci­sions referred to above. I, therefore, hold that the decision of the learned District Judge on the point was correct. (5) Mr. My own reading of the language of S. 15(3) entirely agrees with the views expressed by the Hon'ble Judges in the deci­sions referred to above. I, therefore, hold that the decision of the learned District Judge on the point was correct. (5) Mr. Lahiri has, however, contended that such an interpretation would be opposed to the scheme of 'the Act. He says that S. 3 of the Act defines the responsibility of an employer for payment of wages S. 4 of the Act fixes the time for payment of wages; under S. 20 of the Act, a person, responsible for the payment of wages, if he delays payment, is liable to a penalty, and similarly under S. 23 of the Act, it is not open to the party interest­ed in the payment to contract himself out of any of the rights conferred on him by the statute. In my opinion, these provisions do not have any direct bearing on the interpretation of S. 15(3) of me Act specially when the language of the section is plain enough. It would be wholly wrong to suggest that the acceptance of delayed payment (after the expiry of the period during which the wages were payable) by the labourers, the deprivation of compensation in consequence thereof amounted to any relinquishment of their rights under the Act. The compensation permissible under the Act (Was not as of right and therefore no question of relinquishment of any contractual or statutory right arose. The grant of compensation wag a matter within the discretion of the Authority, who in cer­tain cases could refuse to allow any compensation at all. Of course the Act is meant for the protection of the labourers and to ensure regular payment of their dues, but that object will not be defeated and has hardly anything to do with the interpretation of S. 15(3) itself as to whether an order for com­pensation simpliciter could be passed by the Autho1-rity. I have already held, for the reasons indicated earlier, that such an order could not be passed. In my opinion, therefore, the order of the District Judge is correct. (6) These applications fail and must be rejected and the Rules discharged. There will be no order for costs in these cases. This order governs all the three cases. Applications dismissed.