Judgment This is a revision filed by the landlord against an order passed by the Rent Tribunal and District Munsif in F.R.C.M.A. No. 36 of 1957 on his file. The respondent herein filed an application before the Rent Controller for fixation of fair rent. It was numbered as F.R. No. 438 of 1957. The petitioner herein filed a counter on 22nd May, 1957, in which he admitted the respondent to be a tenant and pleaded an agreement for higher rent. When the petition came on for hearing on 29th May, 1957, it was dismissed for non-appearance. The suit was then restored and renumbered as F.R. No. 457 of 1957, and it was posted to some date in June, 1957. The case was adjourned at the request of both the parties to 9th July, 1957. On 9th July, 1957, the respondent herein was examined as P.W. 1. The trial was adjourned to 30th July, 1957. On 30th July, 1957, P.VVs. 2 and 3 were examined, and the respondent is said to have closed his case. Then the petitioner herein filed an additional counter dated 9th July, 1957. In the meantime one Natesa filed F.R. No. 498 of 1957 dated 29th May, 1957 before the same Rent Controller in respect of the same lands for fixation of fair rent. In that the present petitioner and Natesa compromised. An order in terms of compromise was passed. The trial Court refused to receive the additional counter filed on 30th July, 1957, the additional counter being dated 9th July, 1957, and stated that that counter was presented long after the two witnesses were examined and that that counter could not be considered as amendment of pleadings, as in that counter the contents of the earlier counter were totally denied. The trial Court further observed that in the original counter filed by the respondent herein it was admitted by the respondent that the petitioner herein was a cultivating tenant whereas in the present additional counter it was denied. The trial Court, therefore, treated this as a fresh counter and refused to admit the same in the present case. Against the said order of refusal to admit the second counter filed on 30th July, 1957 an appeal was preferred before the District Munsiff, who was the Rent Tribunal Officer. The trial Court, therefore, treated this as a fresh counter and refused to admit the same in the present case. Against the said order of refusal to admit the second counter filed on 30th July, 1957 an appeal was preferred before the District Munsiff, who was the Rent Tribunal Officer. Before the lower appellate Court a preliminary objection was taken that no appeal lies against the order of the trial Court refusing to receive the counter. The preliminary objection was upheld and the appeal was dismissed. It is against this order of the lower appellate Court which dismissed the appeal summarily on the ground that no appeal lies the present revision has been filed. The only point for decision in this revision is whether the expression “ From every decision of a Rent Court, an appeal shall, within such time as may be prescribed, lie to the Rent Tribunal” found in sub-clause (2) of section 9 of Madras Act XXIV of 1956 includes an order refusing to accept the petition as in this case. In short, the question is whether every decision of a Rent Court means and includes decisions on interlocutory applications as well. There is no definition of the expression ‘decision' in the Act. In Tassaduq Basul Khan v. Kashi Ram1, the expression ‘decision ‘in section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is equivalent to section 110 of the present Code, came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Privy Council. In that case the appellate Court confirmed the decree and judgment of the trial Court, but for reasons different from those given by the trial Court. Nevertheless it gave leave to appeal to the Privy Council under section 110. A preliminary objection was taken before the