Judgment :- 1. These two applications have been filed by two parties, applicants Nos. 26 and 27, in respect of the route in question. They got permits under the order of the Regional Transport Authority, the second respondent, but lost by virtue of the order passed by the first respondent, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Kerala State. 2. There were 55 applicants for four stage carriage permits on the route Vypeen - Pallipuram in pursuance of a notification issued on 3-7-1956 in the Travancore-Cochin Gazette. 3. Among the 55 applicants, the two applicants before me were also competing for the grant of permits. 4. On 31-1-1957, the 2nd respondent by its order marked as Ext. P-1 in these proceedings, granted four permits, to applicants Nos. 3, 20, 26 and 27. The last two refer to the two applicants before me in this court. The other disappointed applicants carried the matter in appeal before the 1st respondent, and the latter by its order dated 8-2-1957 marked as Ext. P-2 remanded the entire matter to be disposed of afresh by the Regional Transport Authority in the light of the observations contained in that order. 5. Notwithstanding the order of remand and the directions contained therein, the Regional Transport Authority, again by its order dated 24-8-1957, marked Ext.P-3, confirmed to its original order and granted the permits to the said parties, namely, applicants Nos. 3, 20, 26 and 27. 6. It must be stated at this stage that whatever the merits of the directions contained in Ext. P-2, nobody has chosen to challenge those proceedings of the Appellate Tribunal and the directions contained therein have become final. 7. Against the order, Ext. P-3, there were again appeals by applicants Nos. 1, 10, 12, 34 and 32. The appellate authority by its order dated 25-2-1958 reversed a portion of the order of the Regional Transport Authority and confirmed the order in other respects. In particular, applicants Nos. 26 & 27, who were granted permits by the Regional Transport Authority were displaced by virtue of the order of the Appellate Authority as evidenced by Ex. P-4. Now applicants Nos. 26 and 27 have come up to this court in these two original petitions and pray that the powers of this court should be exercised under Art.226 of the Constitution and also for quashing the orders of the Appellate Tribunal, the first respondent, dated 25-2-1958. 8. P-4. Now applicants Nos. 26 and 27 have come up to this court in these two original petitions and pray that the powers of this court should be exercised under Art.226 of the Constitution and also for quashing the orders of the Appellate Tribunal, the first respondent, dated 25-2-1958. 8. Mr. Abraham, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the order of the Appellate Tribunal, Ext. P-4, is perverse, and contains errors apparent on the face of the order. Though Mr. Abraham contended that the order is perverse, in my opinion, he has not been able to satisfy me as to how exactly this criticism against the order is well-founded. Therefore, I am only left with the other criticisms of the order, namely, that there are errors apparent on the face of the record. The merits of the order, Ex. P-4 has not been challenged. 9. At this stage I may mention that this court is not sitting as laid down by the Supreme Court and the various High Courts regarding the exercise of powers by the High Courts under Art.226 of the Constitution, as a court of appeal to review the correctness of the findings arrived at by the Tribunals who are charged with duties under the various sections of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, I am not inclined to go into the merits of this matter to find out whether the reasons given by the appellate authority are correct or those given by the Regional Transport Authority are correct. Even otherwise, there is no attack on Ex. P-4 regarding merit In my opinion, the appellate authority has got full powers to review the reasons given by the first authority and come to a different conclusion and so long as it confines itself to the relevant matters under the Act or under the Rules governing these judicial tribunals, that order cannot be interfered with by this Court. 10. Mr. Abraham very strenuously urged before me that the error apparent on the face of the record in the order of the Appellate Tribunal, Ex. P-4, consists in the non-observance of the provisions of S.134, clause (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, incorporated by the Amending Act of 1956. 10. Mr. Abraham very strenuously urged before me that the error apparent on the face of the record in the order of the Appellate Tribunal, Ex. P-4, consists in the non-observance of the provisions of S.134, clause (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, incorporated by the Amending Act of 1956. S.134, which is found in Chapter X, headed 'Miscellaneous' runs as follows: - "(1) Where an appeal has been preferred or an application for revision has been made against any order passed by an original authority under this Act, the appeal or the application for revision shall not operate as a stay of the order passed by the original authority and such order shall remain in force pending the disposal of the appeal or the application for revision as the case may be, unless the prescribed appellate authority or revisional authority otherwise directs. (2) No order made by a competent authority under this Act shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings, unless it appears to the prescribed appellate authority of revisional authority, as the case may be, that such error, omission or irregularity has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice". The contention of Mr. Abraham, the learned counsel for the petitioners is that this sub-cl. is in the nature of a proviso restricting the powers conferred under S.64 on an appellate authority. The question is whether this contention is correct in law. 11. On the other hand, Mr. T. N. Subramania Iyer, supported by Mr. K.K. Mathew for the Government Pleader, Mr. P. Govindan Nair and Mr. K.P. Ramunni Menon, appearing for the several parties, contended that S.134. cl. (2) cannot constitute an exception or a proviso to the wide powers conferred upon the appellate authority under S.64. S.64 gives the right of appeal to the party aggrieved by any of those matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (i) of that section and it provides that the appeal can be filed and the prescribed authority is to give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard. In my opinion, Mr. Abraham is not well-founded in his contention that S.134 (2) is to be read as a proviso to S.64. As I view it, S.134 clause (2) is something analogous to the provision made in the CPC in S.99. In my opinion, Mr. Abraham is not well-founded in his contention that S.134 (2) is to be read as a proviso to S.64. As I view it, S.134 clause (2) is something analogous to the provision made in the CPC in S.99. S.99 of C. P. C. provides: "No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, or shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court". If really the legislature intended in any way to restrict the powers of an appellate authority under S.64, one would have naturally expected such a limitation being provided for in that very section itself as is generally done in the case of such limitations. There is no dispute that the powers of an appellate authority are concurrent with the powers of the authority whose orders are the subject matter of appeal before that Tribunal. Having prescribed no limitation as to the way in which the powers of the appellate authority are to be exercised under S.64, the question is whether by embodying cl. (2) to S.134 in the Chapter headed 'Miscellaneous' the legislature in any way intended to place a restriction on the exercise of the powers by the appellate authority. Cl. (2) of S.134 when closely read, in my opinion, does not in any way fetter the discretion or the power of an appellate authority exercising its powers in matters coming before it under S.64. Cl. (2) of S.134, in my opinion, deals only with errors or omission or irregularity in procedural matters which might have been committed by an authority and it only provides that such errors, omission or irregularity in such procedural matters cannot certainly be made a ground by the appellate or revisional authority to interfere unless the appellate or revisional authority is satisfied that there has been a failure of justice in consequence of such procedural errors, omission or irregularities. For instance, there are several sections of the Act which provide for the procedure to be followed by the various tribunals. For instance, S.57 may be looked into. S.57 provides the procedure to be followed by the Regional Transport Authority in the matter of the applications received for the grant of a permit. For instance, there are several sections of the Act which provide for the procedure to be followed by the various tribunals. For instance, S.57 may be looked into. S.57 provides the procedure to be followed by the Regional Transport Authority in the matter of the applications received for the grant of a permit. Similarly, there are several other sections in the Act. There is also provision made now for prescribing the procedure to be followed by the authorities in hearing original or appellate matters. One other matter also can be considered in considering the scope of S.134, cl. (2) and that is, S.64-A of the Act which was also brought on the statute book along with S.134 by the Amendment Act, 100 of 1956. S.64-A gives power to the State Transport Authority to interfere in revision either on its own motion or on an application made to it and there it is provided that the revisional authority is entitled to interfere if it is of the view that the order of the subordinate authority is improper or illegal. Having made such a provision and given the power under S.64-A to the Revisional Authority it is very unlikely that the legislature by incorporating S.134 (2) by the very same amending Act again intended in any way to restrict the power granted by S.64-A On a consideration of all the circumstances, in my view. S.134 (2) cannot be considered to be a proviso to S.64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 12. As already stated, the appellate authority is entitled by virtue of the powers conferred upon it to interfere with the findings arrived at by the Regional Transport Authority and in my opinion the order Ex. P4 does not warrant any interference by this court under Art.226. 13. In the result, the two original petitions are dismissed with costs. The parties represented by counsel in each Original Petition will each receive Rs. 75 as costs from the petitioner. 14. The Civil Miscellaneous Petitions are all dismissed. Dismissed.