Balakrishna Ayyar, J.—In May, 1955 the accused was the Deputy Post Master, Erode. On the charge that he had on 8th May, 1955, accepted a bribe of Rs. 25 from P.W.1, the accused was prosecuted under section 161, Indian Penal Code and section 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The case was first heard by Mr. Krishnan Nambudripad, the then Special Judge of Coimbatore. He examined P.Ws.1 to 8 and questioned the accused under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. Thereafter P.Ws.1 to 4 and 6 and 7 were further cross-examined. At this stage Mr. Krishnan Nambudripad was transferred and he was succeeded by Mr. Manjapra Balakrishna Menon. When he took up the case — that was on 27th August, 1956 — the accused filed an application purporting to be under section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, praying that the prosecution witnesses be re-summoned and re-heard. The application was opposed by the Public Prosecutor. The Special Judge dismissed the application. Thereafter he concluded the trial and convicted the accused and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. During the arguments in the appeal which the accused preferred Mr. V.T. Rangaswami Ayyangar, his learned advocate, raised the point that the failure of the Special Judge to grant the application of the accused vitiated the entire proceedings and that for that reason the conviction was bad. In view of the conflict of decisions on this point between In re Vaidyanatha1 and Gopal Prasad v. State2 the learned Judge who was hearing the appeal referred the matter to a Bench which in its turn referred it to a Full Bench. The question we have to decide may be thus formulated. Is section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, part of the procedural law applicable to the trial of an accused person by a Special Judge appointed under the provisions of (Central) Act XLVI of 1952? It may be explained at once that before it was amended in 1955, section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, conferred on an accused person, who was being tried by a Magistrate, the right to demand that the witnesses be resummoned and reheard, “Whenever any Magistrate, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in any inquiry or a trial, ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another Magistrate”. This right of his was absolute and unqualified. This right of his was absolute and unqualified. The amendment made in 1955 considerably cut down that right. The accused lost his right to insist, as a matter of course, that any witness should be resummoned and reheard. It was left to the discretion of the Magistrate to decide whether it was necessary in the interests of justice to resummon and rehear any witness. The Special Judges who tried this case functioned under Central Act XLVI of 1952. It is as well to analyse the main features of that Act. The preamble recites that it was enacted to provide for the more speedy trial of certain offences. These offences include those punishable under sections 161, 165 and 165-A of the Penal Code, and, under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947). Sub-section (1) of section 6 empowers the State Government to appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary. Sub-section (2) provides that no person shall be appointed as a Special Judge unless he is, or has been, a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge. Section 7 specifies what classes of cases these Special Judges may try. Then follows section 8 to which we shall presently return. Section 9 provides among other things that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the decision of Special Judge as if he were a Court of Session trying cases without a jury. Section 10 provides that all cases triable by Special Judges under section 7 which, immediately before the commencement of the Act, were pending before any Magistrate shall be forwarded for trial to the Special Judge having jurisdiction over such cases. Section 8 contains four sub-sections. The first sub-section makes provision in respect of two matters. It provides that a Special Judge may take cognisance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial. It also provides that in trying accused persons the Special Judge shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. If this sub-section had stood alone, one would have been tempted to say that the Special Judge is placed in the same position as a Magistrate. It also provides that in trying accused persons the Special Judge shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. If this sub-section had stood alone, one would have been tempted to say that the Special Judge is placed in the same position as a Magistrate. Sub-section (2) confers on the Special Judge the power to tender a pardon in certain cases, and provides that for the purposes of sections 339 and 339-A, Criminal Procedure Code, a person so tendered shall be deemed to have been tendered under section 338 of that Code. Section 338, Criminal Procedure Code, runs: “At any time after commitment, but before judgment is passed, the Court to which the commitment is made, may,............tender, or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender, a person on the same condition to such person”. It is obvious therefore that section 338 does not in terms apply to Magistrates. Sub-section (2) of section 8 of Act XLVI of 1952 thus places a Special Judge in this particular respect on the same footing as a Sessions Judge. Sub-section (3) of section 8 beg ins, “Save as provided in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)” and then, it goes on to say that to the extent to which the Code of Criminal Procedure is not inconsistent with the Act the provisions of the Code shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge. The sub-section continues: “for the purposes of the said provisions, the Court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors”, and it ends “the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor." It will be noticed that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 8 place a Special Judge in the same position as a Magistrate for certain purposes and in the same position as a Sessions Judge for certain other purposes. Sub-section (3) expressly states that a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Sessions Judge. Subsection (4) in effect confers on a Special Judge the same powers of punishing a convicted person as a Sessions Judge has. Sub-section (3) expressly states that a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Sessions Judge. Subsection (4) in effect confers on a Special Judge the same powers of punishing a convicted person as a Sessions Judge has. Now, if we can say that a Special Judge is a Magistrate, we shall be justified in concluding that section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, applies to proceedings before him. But, on the other hand, if we conclude that a Special Judge is not a Magistrate, then section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, will not be applicable to proceedings before him. The analysis that has so far been made of the provisions of Act XLVI of 1952 will show that a Special Judge is neither a Magistrate nor a Sessions Judge. Judged by the classification of Courts in section 6, Criminal Procedure Code, he occupies an anomalous position ; but then section 6 itself provides for ”Courts constituted under any law other than the Code“ in addition to the five classes of criminal Courts which are enumerated. For certain purposes the Special Judge has the powers of a Sessions Judge, for certain purposes, he also stands in the position of a Sessions Judge in relation to the High Court ; but, for certain other purposes he has to act as a Magistrate has got to do. An analysis of the Act, therefore, yields only negative results. It is not therefore surprising that there has been a conflict of judicial opinion on this matter. In In re Vaidyanatha1, a Bench of this Court observed: ”We are definitely of opinion that when sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Act says that “the Court of the Special Judge ‘shall be deemed‘ to be a Court of Session”, it certainly is not in fact a Court of Session. The Court is that of a Special Judge whose procedure in the trial of such cases shall be the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code for the trial of warrant cases, in which case section 350 of the Code is definitely applicable. If that is so, there is no provision by which the Public Prosecutor can ask the Court to recall and re-examine the witnesses already examined ". If that is so, there is no provision by which the Public Prosecutor can ask the Court to recall and re-examine the witnesses already examined ". The facts of that case were as follows: One Vaidyanatha Ayyar was prosecuted under section 161, Indian Penal Code, before a Sub-Magistrate who framed charges against him and posted the case for further hearing to 12th August, 1952. Meantime Act XLVI of 1952 came into force, and by virtue of section 10 of that Act the case was transferred to the file of the Special Judge. On 18th February, 1953, Mr. S. Varadarajulu Naidu, the Special Judge, took up the case for hearing and examined certain witnesses. He was then transferred and his successor Mr. Rajabadar Odayar took up the trial. The prosecution then applied for a de novo hearing. The accused opposed the application. Nonetheless Mr. Rajabadar Odayar decided to hear the case afresh. Against that order the accused came up in revision. The Court held that section 350 of the Code applied, that the prosecution had no right to claim a de novo examination and allowed the application. An exactly contrary view was taken in Gopal Prasad v. The State1. In that case the Special Judge had decided to try the case de novo. The accused challenged the decision by means of a revision petition. The Court examined the decision in In re Vaidyanatha2 and dissented from it. Imam, C.J., observed: "With great respect to the learned Judges, as at present advised, I cannot accept the view expressed by them. * * * * * * * * * If the Special Judge in the present case is a Court of Session, then it seems to me that the Special Judge could not in law act upon evidence already recorded by the Special Magistrate. On the other hand, if it is assumed that the view taken by their Lordships of the Madras High Court is correct then one must proceed on the assumption that the Special Judge is a Magistrate and that the provisions of section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, would be applicable." With reference to section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, as it was amended, the learned Chief Justice proceeded: "Even so section 350, clause (1) does authorise a succeeding Magistrate to resummon the witnesses and to recommence the enquiry or trial held by his predecessor. In the present case the Special Judge decided to resummon the witnesses and to hold bis trial independent of any evidence recorded by the Special Magistrate. It was within his discretion, if he is to be treated as a Magistrate, to do so, and unless this Court was satisfied that it was a wholly wrong exercise of his jurisdiction, this Court cannot, in my opinion, interfere with his discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction." Das, J., expressed a similar opinion. It is clear to us that a just conclusion cannot be reached unless the question is examined in its wider and more fundamental aspects. The ordinary rule in criminal matters is that the judgment may be delivered only by the person who has heard the whole of the evidence in the case. This principle is well-established and has been firmly and consistently enforced. Vide Guruswami Thevar v. State3. The only exception is that created by section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, which empowers a Magistrate to dispose of a case on evidence heard in part by himself and in part by his predecessor or predecessors. Even so, as the section stood before it was amended in 1955, it gave the accused person an unqualified right to demand a de novo enquiry or trial. That provision is evidence of the reluctance of the legislature to depart from the old familiar and cardinal principle of law to which we have just referred. If, at the time the legislature placed Central Act XLVI of 1952 on the Statute Book, it intended to create a breach in so ancient a rule, one would expect it to have used explicit language to that effect. In 1942, several Ordinances affecting criminal Courts were promulgated. Of these Ordinance No. II of 1942 constituted various special criminal Courts. The main provision of section 6 (1) of that Ordinance is practically identical with subsection (1) of section 8, Central Act XLVI of 1952. In 1942, several Ordinances affecting criminal Courts were promulgated. Of these Ordinance No. II of 1942 constituted various special criminal Courts. The main provision of section 6 (1) of that Ordinance is practically identical with subsection (1) of section 8, Central Act XLVI of 1952. Subsequently another Ordinance No. LXI of 1942, was promulgated, sub-clause (3) of clause 3 of which runs as follows: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, when a case is transferred under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Special Judge or Special Magistrate to whom the case is transferred shall not be bound to resummon or rehear the witnesses or any of them unless he is satisfied that such a course is necessary in the interests of justice.” In other words, it was specifically provided that a de novo enquiry was not necessary. In 1950, the West Bengal Special Courts Act was passed. That Act, like Central Act XLVI of 1952, eliminated the committal procedure and substituted the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. It contained a special provision dispensing with de novo trial on the transfer of a case from one special Court to another. When, with these precedents before it, the legislature omitted to say in Central Act XLVI of 1952 that it would not be necessary to hold a de novo trial in those cases where there has been a change in the personnel of the Special Judge trying a case one should be justified in concluding that it did not want to take away the right of the accused to insist that the judgment shall be rendered only by the person who had heard the whole of the evidence in that case. Except where the legislature has used manifestly plain words, or where from the context such appears to be the necessary intention of the legislature we do not feel we shall be justified in creating an exception to a principle so salutary and ancient. Let us consider the matter from another point. What is the reason for the exception created by section 350, Criminal Procedure Code? It is hardly necessary to say that cases tried by Magistrates are usually less serious in nature than those tried by Courts of Session. It is a reasonable inference that section 350 was not intended to be applied to very grave offences. What is the reason for the exception created by section 350, Criminal Procedure Code? It is hardly necessary to say that cases tried by Magistrates are usually less serious in nature than those tried by Courts of Session. It is a reasonable inference that section 350 was not intended to be applied to very grave offences. Now, by passing the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Act XLVI of 1952, the legislature thought fit to make it plain that it considered offences under section 161, Indian Penal Code, and section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act to be very grave ones. The manifestation of such an intention would make one hesitate to make section 350 applicable to such cases. The basic reason for section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, appears in the decision in Tarada Baladu v. The Queen1. What happened there was this: “The trial of this case was commenced before Mr. Happell, Officiating Agent, and with one exception all the witnesses were examined. The case was adjourned and endeavours were made to obtain the presence of persons named by the accused as witnesses. During the adjournment Mr. Garstin resumed his appointment, and having examined one fresh witness concluded the trial.” A Bench of this Court observed: “We are compelled to pronounce the proceedings void. It is only in view of the necessarily-frequent changes in the office of Magistrate the Criminal Procedure Code provides specially that a Magistrate may pronounce judgment on evidence partly recorded by his predecessor and partly by himself, but there is no such provision in the case of Sessions Judges. The conviction must: be set aside and new trial directed.” The desire to achieve a just balance between the interests of the accused, an expeditious trial and the frequency of changes in the personnel of the Courts of Magistrates, which itself was linked up with the needs of executive administration led to the enactment of section 350, Criminal Procedure Code and its continuance thereafter. What we emphasise is that without such an express provision in the Code, the normal rule would have applied even in the Courts of Magistrates, that the entire oral evidence should have been heard by the judicial officer before he could pronounce judgment in a criminal case. What we emphasise is that without such an express provision in the Code, the normal rule would have applied even in the Courts of Magistrates, that the entire oral evidence should have been heard by the judicial officer before he could pronounce judgment in a criminal case. What has been expressly made by section 350 applicable only to a limited class of criminal Courts out of those enumerated in section 6, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be extended without the sanction of the legislature, express or necessarily implied. There was no such extension to the Courts of the Special Judges constituted under Act XLVI of 1952. Legislative practice also is against any such extension: it cannot be done by a process of interpretation. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided In re Vaidyanatha1, we are of opinion that the principle of law laid down therein is not correct. We answer in the negative the question formulated by us and set out earlier. The papers will be returned to the Bench which referred the question. The appeal then came on for final hearing before the Bench (Somasundaram and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ.). V. L. Ethiraj and P. N. Menon, for Appellant. The Advocate-General (V. K. Thiruvenkatachari) and the Public Prosecutor (P. S. Kailasam) on behalf of the State. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Somasundaram, J.†— The Full Bench has delivered judgment holding that section 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to a Special Judge appointed under the provisions of Central Act XLVI of 1952. The Full Bench heard the appeal on the 19th of February, 1958 and delivered the judgment on the 4th of March, 1958. On the 27th of February, 1958, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, II of 1958, came into force, whereby under the provisions of section 4 of that Act, section 8, clause (3) of Central Act XLVI of 1952 was amended as follows: “(3-A). On the 27th of February, 1958, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, II of 1958, came into force, whereby under the provisions of section 4 of that Act, section 8, clause (3) of Central Act XLVI of 1952 was amended as follows: “(3-A). — In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-section (3), the provisions of section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall, so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge, and for the purposes of the said provisions a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate.” Before this Act came into force, the Full Bench has declared the law that section 350, Criminal Procedure Code, does not apply to the Special Judge. The conviction, therefore, based on evidence partly recorded by one Special Judge and partly recorded by the successor is void. It has, therefore, to be set aside. In the proceedings before the trial Court, the Judge who convicted the accused, further cross-examined only P.W. 8. All the other evidence recorded was before his predecessor. Under the judgment of the Full Bench this further cross-examination and the judgment of the succeeding Judge will be void. The question is whether in the present circumstances of the case we should send back the case for a further trial by asking the present Judge to deal with it according to law, that is, by asking him to exercise his discretion under section 350 as now amended and made applicable to Special Courts. Having given our careful and anxious consideration, we think that the ends of justice do not require that in the present case that procedure should be allowed to be followed. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence but order no retrial in the case. R.M. --------- Appeal allowed.