G. MEHROTRA, J. : This rule was issued on an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying that a writ of Mandamus or Certiorari or any other suitable writ should be issued quashing the order of discharge passed against the petitioner and directing the au­thorities not to give effect to the impugned order. Briefly the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner was serving as a temporary office assistant in the office of the Sub divisional Officer, Mangaldai, from 1-4-1950 to 12-7-1951. There was some suspicion that he was respon­sible for the removal of certain records but no ac­tion was taken against him in the criminal courts. The petitioner was however discharged from ser­vice in July 1951. Thereafter the petitioner was appointed by the Divisional Forest Officer, Dar-rang Division to officiate as an office assistant in his office with effect from 3-6-1953 and the order was communicated to him by Memo dated 18-8-1953. After he had worked for about four years in that job, on 8-7-1957 he received a notice from the office of the Divisional Forest Officer Dar-rang intimating to him that he had been discharged from service with effect from 8-8-1957. Thereafter he made certain representations and ultimately filed an appeal. The appeal was forward­ed by the Divisional Forest Officer with certain remarks with which we are not concerned by his letter dated 23-7-1957. On 8-8-1957 no orders were passed discharging him from service. The ap­peal preferred before the Minister-in-charge, Forest was pending and on 28-8-1957 he received an in­timation from the office of the Divisional Forest Officer, Darrang informing him that he was dis­charged from service with effect from the forenoon of the next date, that is to say, from 27-8-1957. The petitioner was thus relieved of his duties on 27-8-1957. He then sent several reminders to the authorises about the disposal of his appeal pre­ferred before the Minister in charge of Forest and after lapse of several months on 11-6-1958 he re­ceived an intimation that his appeal was rejected. The present petition has been filed on 17-7-1958 challenging the notice given to him on 8-7-1957' terminating the service with effect from 8-8-1957 and a further communication dated 26-8-1957 by which he was discharged from service with effect from 27-8-1957. The present petition has been filed on 17-7-1958 challenging the notice given to him on 8-7-1957' terminating the service with effect from 8-8-1957 and a further communication dated 26-8-1957 by which he was discharged from service with effect from 27-8-1957. (2) The main contention raised by the peti­tioner is that he was a civil servant and entitled to the protection under Art. 311 of the Constitution. He was given no opportunity to show cause against the proposed action against him. It is not disputed that his services were terminated without giving him an opportunity to how cause against the proposed action, but it has been strenuously contended by the counsel for the State that in the present case the provisions of Art. 311 are not attracted. Mr. Go-swami has covered a large ground in his argument and has placed all the law on the point before us but we find it difficult to agree with his contentions. It has no doubt been laid down, by the Supreme Court that Art. 311 does not apply to all cases of the termination of service. The words 'dismissed, removed or reduced in rank' in Art. 311 have ac­quired a technical meaning and unless the employee is punished, he cannot seek protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The question whether the particular order terminating his services was by way of punishment or only in the exercise of the right under the contract will have to be determined on the facts and the circumstances of each case. Before it can be said that the State exercised its powers of terminating the services without giving him an opportunity to show cause under the con­tract, it will have to be established that what were the terms of the contract of employment. In the present case reliance is placed on the office order No. 36 dated 18-6-1953 which is Annexure 'A' to the petition for the contention that it was only a temporary employment terminable at the will of the employer. In the present case reliance is placed on the office order No. 36 dated 18-6-1953 which is Annexure 'A' to the petition for the contention that it was only a temporary employment terminable at the will of the employer. The office Memo reads as follows: "The services of officiating Office Assistant Sri M. N. Hazarika, Tezpur are dispensed with, with effect from the forenoon of 3-6-53 and one outsider Shri Tabibuddin Ahmed is appointed to officiate in his place with effect from 3-6-53 until further orders." This order by itself does not conclusively lay down that Sri Tabibuddin Ahmed was liable to be dis­charged without giving him an opportunity to show cause and thus the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution will not be attracted in his case. This order only means that the applicant has been order­ed to officiate in place of M. N. Hazarika until further orders. The notice sent to him on 8-7-1957 which is marked Annexure 'B' to the petition, reads as follows: "Please note that you will be discharged from service with effect from 8-8-57 as your past service in Government Office is reported to be not good and honest." Mr. Goswami's contention is that this order does not indicate that the Government has exercised its discretion to punish the petitioner. The question of his misconduct was not examined by the Govern­ment at all. On some report being given to the Government that his past conduct was not good, the Government took this action under the terms of the contract and terminated his service. It will appear from this notice that the founda­tion for the exercise of the power of discharge was that his conduct was not considered to be honest in the past. Whatever may be the reason but it cannot be said that in the present case the State exercising its powers under the contract terminated his services. It was really a punishment awarded to the petitioner. It cannot be said that this order attaches no stigma on the character of the petitioner. The reason for discharge is that his conduct was not considered to be honest in the past. That ground by itself attaches a stigma on the character of the petitioner and the foundation for his discharge is his misconduct. It cannot be said that this order attaches no stigma on the character of the petitioner. The reason for discharge is that his conduct was not considered to be honest in the past. That ground by itself attaches a stigma on the character of the petitioner and the foundation for his discharge is his misconduct. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the petitioner was not punished and it was a case of simple termination of the services under the terms of the contract. No rule framed by the State has been pointed to us under which the petitioner was liable to be discharged without following the procedure required under Article 311 of the Con­stitution. Reference may be made to the following passage in the case of Parshotam Lai Dhingra v. Union of India reported in AIR 1958 S. C. 36 (A) at page 49 : "In short, if the termination of service is found­ed on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Art. 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with." A good deal of argument was advanced on the ques­tion as to whether the petitioner had a right to con­tinue in service and whether in any way his emolu­ments or his accrued benefits have been affected by this order of termination or not. It was contended by Mr. Goswami that unless the petitioner succeeded in showing that he had a right to the post or that his accrued benefits have been affected, it cannot be said that he had been punished. It was contended by Mr. Goswami that unless the petitioner succeeded in showing that he had a right to the post or that his accrued benefits have been affected, it cannot be said that he had been punished. In the absence of anything in the rules to the effect that his services could be terminated without following the procedure under Article 311 and on the finding that the foun­dation for the order was his alleged misconduct and not any exercise of the right under the contract but for the order of discharge he would have continued in service and as such the order has resulted in in­jury to him and is a punishment. It is not necessary for us to go into this ques­tion in detail as after the consideration of the terms I of the appointment and the notice, we are inclined: to accept the contention of the petitioner that the order was by way of punishment and it has resulted in loss of future service to him and has the effect of attaching a stigma to his character. We accordingly set aside the order of discharge. It will be open to the Government to take proceedings against him after following the procedure laid down under Arti­cle 3)1 of the Constitution. We make no orders as to costs. (3) Mr. Goswami prays for a certificate under Article 132 of the Constitution to file an appeal to the Supreme Court as he contends that the case in­volves a substantial question of law as to the inter­pretation of the Constitution. We have considered the whole matter and we do not think that any sub­stantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution is involved in the case. The prayer is therefore refused. (4) H. DEKA J. : I agree. K.S.B. Petition allowed.