Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the plaintiffs in a suit for partition which has been decreed, though not to the full extent claimed. 2. The 1st plaintiff and defendants 6 and 7 are the children of Lekshmikutty Amma deceased, through her husband the 8th defendant, Raman Nair. The plaintiffs 2 to 4 are the children of the 1st plaintiff. The 1st defendant Madhavikutty Amma is the sister of Lekshmikutty Amma abovesaid and defendants 2,3 and 4 are her children through the 8th defendant who married her subsequent to the death of Lekshmikutty Amma. The 5th defendant is the child of the 3rd defendant. The plaint averred that the plaintiffs 1 to 4 and the defendants 1 to 7 were members of an undivided marumakkathayam tarwad, to which the B schedule items 1 to 36 immovable properties and C schedule movables appertained and the plaintiffs accordingly claimed a per capita division of their 4/11 shares therein. We are concerned in this appeal mainly with B schedule items 4 to 36. In respect of items 4 to 35 of these, the court below by its preliminary decree held that the group of the plaintiffs I to 4 and 6 and 7 on the one side and that the 1st defendant on the other were each entitled to one-half share on basis of stirpital division and that inside the plaintiffs' group, the plaintiffs 1 to 4 for themselves were entitled to only a one-fourth share. As regards B schedule item 36, the court below disallowed the plaintiffs' claim altogether on the footing that it belonged to the 8th defendant exclusively. The plaintiffs in this appeal have reiterated their claim as laid in the plaint. They have also raised the question that their maintenance claim as per E schedule in the plaint should have been allowed in full. The defendants 2,4 and 6 have, by their cross-objections, questioned the grant of any maintenance at all. 3. Taking up, first, the question of B schedule items 4 to 36, these items along with others were bequeathed in favour of Lekshmikutty Amma and Madhavikutty Amma and their three sisters, Parukutty, Nanikutty and Meenakshikutty and also their mother Kalliani, under Ext B-1 joint Will of 1918 executed by Krishna Menon their father and his mother Cheethamma and a later Will Ext. B-2 of 1930 executed by Cheethamma alone after the death of Krishna Menon, Kalliani and Lekshmikutty. The exact extent of the rights obtained by these sisters under the Wills was the subject-matter of a suit O. S.52 of 1956 of the Ottapalam Sub-Court. That was a suit for partition filed by the defendants 1 and 2 and the 1st plaintiff and defendants 6 and 7 against the other seven members of their tarwad comprising Parukutty and Nanikutty and Meenakshikutty and her children. The plaintiffs in that suit claimed a per capita division of not only their tarwad properties but also the properties covered by the Wills. The court, however decided that the properties covered by the Wills devolved upon the five sisters and their issue on the stirpital principle as contrasted with the per capita basis which governed the tarwad properties. Vide Ext B-6 judgment and B-7 preliminary decree dated 31-3-1938. But before final decree was passed by the court, the parties to that suit entered into a partition arrangement under Ext. B-9 dated 28-3-1941, so as to allocate the B schedule items 4 to 35 herein of the properties covered by the Wills, towards the 2/5th share of the group of the plaintiffs in that case. B schedule items 1 to 3 represented their 5/12 share in the tarwad properties. The management of these properties on behalf of the group was left to the 1st defendant. In describing the plaintiffs' group, Ext. B-9 partition deed used the words'sakha and thavazhi'. And so the 1st defendant had carried on until the date of the suit styling herself as karnavathi and manager. It is, based upon this group allotment and subsequent conduct, that the plaintiffs claimed that B schedule items 4 to 35 were divisible among the present members of the group on per capita basis. 4. But the intention of the parties and their conduct notwithstanding, they could not form a marumakkathayam thavazhi known to law. For, a thavazhi any more than a tarwad cannot be created by act of parties. A group of persons following marumakkathayam law may hold property jointly as any other group may do but they do not thereby become a thavazhi and such property does not get the incidents of tarwad property attached to it. As observed in Kallianikutty Amma v. Devaky Amma,1950 K.L.T. 705. A group of persons following marumakkathayam law may hold property jointly as any other group may do but they do not thereby become a thavazhi and such property does not get the incidents of tarwad property attached to it. As observed in Kallianikutty Amma v. Devaky Amma,1950 K.L.T. 705. "A marumakkathayam group as a legal entity or thavazhi cannot be created ad hoc. To be a legal entity, the group must be a natural group comprised of a mother and her children and their descendants in the female line". That was a case of a gift to a group of children alone excluding the mother and it was held that such artificial group cannot be recognised as a thavazhi under marumakkathayam law. See also Mathevan Pillai v. Bhagavathi Pillai 1952 K.L.T. 140 and K. Moithiyan v. Puthiapuravil, A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 870, where the question was the formation of a marumakkathayam group by a wife and some of her children only, they being the children of one father, others being excluded and it was held to be impossible. Here undoubtedly the plaintiffs' group was constituted of some members only of the group of Kalliani Amma's children and their descendants in the female line. There was therefore nothing wrong in treating them as incapable of holding their 2/5 share of the properties covered by the Wills Ext. B-1 and B-2, as their thavazhi properties. 5. Learned counsel says that the court below was acting inconsistently in treating the share of the tarwad properties obtained by the plaintiff's group under Ext. B-9, as now available for division per capita. It may be so but that in our opinion cannot improve the plaintiffs' position. Learned counsel then said that the 1st defendant blended her 1/5th share in the properties covered by the Wills in favour of the entire group and cannot now be heard to say otherwise. But there was no specific plea to that effect. And again there can be no blending of that 1/5th unless it is shown that there is a voluntary throwing by the owner into the common stock, with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it. See Naina Pillai v. Daivanai Ammal, A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 177, where in a series of documents self-acquired property was described and dealt with as ancestral joint family property. See Naina Pillai v. Daivanai Ammal, A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 177, where in a series of documents self-acquired property was described and dealt with as ancestral joint family property. The court held that mere dealing with self-acquisitions as joint family property was not sufficient but an intention must be shown to waive his claims with full knowledge of his right to it as his separate property. The result is that B schedule items 4 to 35 could be divided only in the proportion of the original rights of the two groups, the 1st plaintiff and defendants 6 and 7 on the one side and 1st defendant on the other. 6. It does not follow however that the plaintiffs and defendants 6 and 7 among themselves must have stirpital division. They all together took their one-half right as a marumakkathayam group and with the division inter se brought about on by the institution of this suit, the plaintiffs might get their 4/6 share per capita basis. The court below was wrong in taking the plaintiffs 1 to 4 as one group with equal right as the group of defendants 6 and 7 on the other. The plaintiffs will therefore have 4/6 of 1/2, viz. 1/3 share in B schedule items 4 to 35. The decree of the court below will stand modified to this extent. 7. Coming to B schedule item 36. This property was acquired in the name of the 8th defendant under Ext. B-10 dated 21-5-1942 for a sum of Rs. 1,000. The document does not disclose anything more than, that the consideration proceeded from the 8th defendant himself or that he alone is interested in the property. There was an old building in the property at the time of Ext. B-10 and the evidence is that in or about 1947 the present building put up in its place. The 8th defendant was a Station Master at the time of the purchase and could well have commanded his own money for the purchase as well as the construction. There was also evidence that properties intended for the tarwad were purchased in the 1st defendant's name, e.g. Ext. A-I of 1945 in respect of the jenmom rights over B schedule item 2. There was finally a clear acknowledgment by the 1st plaintiff and others in Ext. There was also evidence that properties intended for the tarwad were purchased in the 1st defendant's name, e.g. Ext. A-I of 1945 in respect of the jenmom rights over B schedule item 2. There was finally a clear acknowledgment by the 1st plaintiff and others in Ext. A-2 of 1948 of the 8th defendant's title to this item 36 and the building thereon. The court below discounted the oral evidence let in on the plaintiff's side to show that the item did not belong to the 8th defendant, in our opinion rightly. We confirm the finding of the court that B schedule item 36 belongs to the 8th defendant only. 8. Taking up next, the maintenance claim of the plaintiffs. Their case was that nothing was paid towards the maintenance of the plaintiffs after the 1st plaintiff's marriage in 1942, when she left for her husband's house and a sum of Rs. 5,455 was due on that account. The court below has found that two years' maintenance may properly be granted to the plaintiffs, particularly in the absence of any demand therefor and the 1st plaintiff's junction in executing Ext. A 2 of 1948 along with the 1st defendant. We think the award made by the court below in the matter is right and the complaint on either side made before us, is without merit. 9. Finally, learned counsel for the respondents, raised a question not covered by the objection memorandum that the 7th defendant's 7/11 share in the tarwad properties in B schedule items 1 and 2 was wrongly held by the court below to have devolved on his death pending suit, in equal halves in favour of the plaintiffs on the one side and the 6th defendant on the other. The argument is that the plaintiffs must be deemed to have separated from the defendants 6 and 7 when they filed this suit and so the death of the 7th defendant could not enlarge the share of the plaintiffs. However, we do not think we should interfere with this matter. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs, except to the extent that the plaintiff's share in B schedule items 4 to 35 will be 1/3 and not 1/4 as provided by the decree of the court below. The cross-objection memorandum is also dismissed with costs. Dismissed.