Judgment.- This Second Appeal is preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Tanjore in A.S. No. 189 of 1954, reversing the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsiff of Tanjore in O.S. No. 195 of 1953. In 1950 the District of Tanjore and especially the area of the Sub-Divisional Magistracy of Pattukottai was the seat of continuous trouble between the landlords and the kisans. This kisan movement was being fully exploited by the Communists and their fellow-travellers on the foot that every trouble was welcome for fomenting agitations against the Government and for promoting forces of disorder and violence. The net result was that the Government took stringent measures to restrain the activities of these Communists. Special Police Officers were posted and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Pattukottai, directed all the Taluk Magistrates of Pattukottai and Arantangi to promulgate prohibitory orders under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, in all the villages under their jurisdiction and especially as the Communists were for instance trying to mar the celebrations of the Republic Day and threatening to commit acts of violence and disturb peace and tranquillity. On 23rd January, 1950, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Pattukottai, promulgated an order in M.C. No. 5 of 1950 prohibiting meetings of Communists in any public place within Pattukottai Division and within his jurisdiction for a period of one month from the date of that order: vide Exhibit B-15. It is evident from a perusal of the order that it was passed on the reports of the Police Officers P.Ws. 1, Sri V. S. Subramaniam and D.W. 1, Sri M. K. Panikkar. Sri V. S. Subramaniam was then acting as the Circle Inspector of Police, Thirutturaipoondi and Sri M. K. Panikkar was then the Sub-Inspector of Police, Adirampatnam. It is established in the evidence that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s direction to all Taluk Magistrates to publish this order in all their villages in their taluks by beat of tom-tom was carried out. The respondent in this Second Appeal, Sri Jagannathachariar is a Mirasdar of Pattukottai Taluk, owning lands in the village of Alagiyanayakipuram. The other members of his family are his brothers impleaded as defendants 2 and 3 in the suit. The respondent in this Second Appeal, Sri Jagannathachariar is a Mirasdar of Pattukottai Taluk, owning lands in the village of Alagiyanayakipuram. The other members of his family are his brothers impleaded as defendants 2 and 3 in the suit. This family is the solitary Brahmin family living in that little village and against them the entire wrath of the kisans and their fellow-travellers, the Communists, seems to have broken because they were the landlords and secondly they belonged to a community which is the special target of attack in these parts. The evidence is clear that they were subjected to systematic intimidation of murder, looting and arson. In this task of attacking this family the kisans and their fellow traveller Communist opponents were encouraged by the fact that some other leading Mirasdars were on inimical terms with this family apparently trying to curry favour with these violent people by posing as their sympathisers and friends. The net result of this was that this family of Jagannathachariar cornered like rats, was systematically bombarding the authorities, Police and the Magistracy, to take action against these trouble-makers. In these circumstances D.W. 1 on receiving information through a messenger sent by the first defendant that a Communist-sponsored kisan meeting was intended to be held in Alagiyanayakipuram in defiance of the order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, which was in force, went there on nth February, 1950. The evidence of D.W. 1 is: “At that time meetings under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, were banned, under an order in R. C. No. 5 of 1950 by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Pattukottai. The order was promulgated. All the Sub-Inspectors in the jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate including myself received copies of that prohibitory order and copies were said to have been sent to all village munsiffs. I sent constables to publish the order, and caused publication by beat of tom-tom in all the villages within my station limits. I sent the order to the village of Alagiyanayakipuram. I remember to have received the acknowledgement from the Nadar village munsif. There is also an Ayyar village munsiff. At about 3 p.m. I went in a friend’s car to Alagiyanayakipuram. When I reached there I saw about 100 or 150 persons crowded in a public street in front of the house of one Vaithilingam in that village. They Were about to create disturbance shouting slogans. There is also an Ayyar village munsiff. At about 3 p.m. I went in a friend’s car to Alagiyanayakipuram. When I reached there I saw about 100 or 150 persons crowded in a public street in front of the house of one Vaithilingam in that village. They Were about to create disturbance shouting slogans. At the sight of the Police many of them dispersed. The plaintiff and Vaithilingam and Periathambi continued to stand there. In order to prevent further trouble and disturbance, I had to arrest them and take them to the Police station under section 157, Criminal Procedure Code. I took them at about 8 p.m. or 9 P.M. It was too late that night at Pattukottai. So they were remanded the next day. Exhibit B-11 is one of the reports in connection with that incident which I sent. The endorsement on my report is made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Pattukottai, Sri C. S. Subbiah Pillai, forwarding that report to the District Superintendent of Police. Exhibit B-12 contains the endorsements of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and District Superintendent.of Police with regard to their arrests. I submitted a first information report and the case-diary of the case to the Deputy Superintendent of Police through the Inspector of Police........The Sub-Divisional Magistrate returned the first information report. So I submitted a second report on the order of the Deputy Superintendent of Police........under section 188, Indian Penal Code. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate verified my report and sent the file to the Sub-Magistrate, Pattukottai, to take cognizance. The Deputy Superintendent of Police wanted to know the result of action taken. Exhibit B-3 is my report. At the time of the arrests, Communist Kisan trouble was going on, on a large scale in Pattukottai, Mannargudi and Thirutturaipundi. Several serious crimes were being committed. There was one Kisan Deputy Superintendent of Police at Tanjore, one Inspector at Pattukottai,three SubInspectors at Tanjore, Pattukottai and Tirutturaipundi and several C.I.D. personnel were posted for the Kisan trouble. Mirasdars were put to great difficulty. The action I took against plaintiff I did only on order of my officer. I am not a friend of defendant 1. I have nothing to do with him........I have nothing to do with defendant 1. Mirasdars were put to great difficulty. The action I took against plaintiff I did only on order of my officer. I am not a friend of defendant 1. I have nothing to do with him........I have nothing to do with defendant 1. Exhibit B-8 is my report in reply to the Deputy Superintendent of Police’s queries, Exhibit B-7.” The learned Stationary Sub-Magistrate, Pattukottai, before whom the plaintiff Chinnamuthu Ambalam and two others Vyithilinga Thevar and Periathambi Ambalam, were charged for an offence under section 188, Indian Penal Code, were acquitted after twelve witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution of whom only three witnesses spoke in support of the complainant on the ground that: “On the whole, the case seems to have been magnified out of small incidents on account of (ill feelings as already indicated. Unfortunately the Sub-Inspector has too willingly lent a helping hand and over-enthusiastically booked a case. The prosecution witnesses have not come out with a correct version........The only other evidence is that of the Sub-Inspector: it has been made clear how exaggerated his evidence is in regard to the occurrence.” The order of the Sub-Magistrate was dated 30th April, 1951. Thereupon in 1953, the plaintiff, one of the acquitted accused, filed the suit out of which this second appeal arises, for recovery of Rs. 100 as damages, for malicious prosecution. The defendants to the suit were Jagannathachariar and his two brothers. The learned District Munsif came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had made out his case and decreed the suit against the first defendant and dismissed defendants 2 and 3 out of the suit on the ground that there was no proof that defendants 2 and 3 beyond merely giving evidence in C.C. No. 450 of 1950 had done anything further and cannot be considered as prosecutors of the plaintiff. There was an appeal therefrom and the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the first defendant was the real prosecutor but that he (first defendant) did not act maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause and that the plaintiff is not entitled to damages. There was an appeal therefrom and the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the first defendant was the real prosecutor but that he (first defendant) did not act maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause and that the plaintiff is not entitled to damages. On a careful analysis of the evidence and after giving due weight to the fact that the trial Court had the ‘advantage of hearing the witnesses, and seeing them in the box he came to the conclusion: "I accept the evidence of D.W. 1 that there was a meeting of the Communists on 11th February, 1950 and that plaintiff took part in such a meeting and that he was arrested by D.W.1 at such a meeting (para. 24). Again I hold D.1 acted with malice but did not act without reasonable and probable cause" (para. 26). He allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Hence this Second Appeal by the defeated plaintiff. On a review of the entire circumstances of the case I have come to the conclusion that a suit for malicious prosecution did not lie and that the grievance, if any, of the plaintiff could only be for the tort of false imprisonment as against D.W. 1 and that if the plaintiff wanted to proceed against this first defendant Jagannathachariar also he should have filed a suit against both for the tort of conspiracy and that therefore the dismissal of the suit by the learned Subordinate Judge has got to be supported but on other grounds. The ingredients of section 188, Indian Penal Code, require: 1. That there must be an order promulgated by a public servant. 2. That the public servant must have been lawfully empowered to promulgate such order. 3. That a person having knowledge of such order and directed by such order (a) to abstain from a certain act, or (i) to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, has disobeyed such direction. 4. That such disobedience causes or tends to cause (i) obstruction, annoyance, or injury, or risk of it, to any person lawfully employed, or (ii) danger to human life health or safety, or (iii) a riot or affray; Madan Kishore, In re1. 4. That such disobedience causes or tends to cause (i) obstruction, annoyance, or injury, or risk of it, to any person lawfully employed, or (ii) danger to human life health or safety, or (iii) a riot or affray; Madan Kishore, In re1. The authors of the Code (Indian Penal Code) say: "We see some objections to the way in which We have framed this part of the law ; but we are unable to frame it better. On the one hand, it is, as we have shown, absolutely necessary to have some local rules which shall not require the sanction of the Legislature. On the other hand, we are sensible that there is the greatest reason to apprehend much petty tyranny and vexation from such rules; and this although the farmers of those rules may be very excellent and able men. There is scarcely any disposition in a rule more prejudicial to the happiness of the people than a meddling disposition. Yet, experiences show us that it is a disposition which is often found in company with the best intentions, with great activity and energy, and with a sincere regard for the interest of the community. A public servant of more than ordinary zeal and industry, unless he have very much more than ordinary judgment, is the very man who is likely to harass the people under his care with needless restrictions. We have, therefore, thought it necessary to provide that no person should be punished merely for disobeying a local order, unless it be made to appear that the disobedience has been attended with evil, or risk of evil. Thus no person will be punished for disobeying an idle and vexatious order." The evidence to prove the offence under section 188, Indian Penal Code, has been set out in Ratanlal’s "Law of Crimes," Sixteenth Edition, at page 450, as follows: "Prove (1) the promulgation of the order: State v. Sm. Tugla2. (2) That it was promulgated by a public servant (Chandrakanta, In re1, Emperor v. Mallappa,3 Hiralal v. Emperor3. (3) That such public servant was lawfully empowered to promulgate the same. (Nagappa v. Emperor4, Bacharam Kar v. State5, Emperor v. Rogunath6 ). (4) That such order directed the accused to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order, etc. (2) That it was promulgated by a public servant (Chandrakanta, In re1, Emperor v. Mallappa,3 Hiralal v. Emperor3. (3) That such public servant was lawfully empowered to promulgate the same. (Nagappa v. Emperor4, Bacharam Kar v. State5, Emperor v. Rogunath6 ). (4) That such order directed the accused to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order, etc. (5) That the accused knew of such order [Ramtoo, In re7; Abelaku Lal, In re8; N. Dutt In re9; Madankishore, In re10; Lodd Govindas v. Arumuga Mudaliar11; Emperor v. Turab Kha12and Emperor v. Afaq Hussain (F.B.)]13. (6) That he disobeyed such direction. (7) That such disobedience caused, or tended to cause, obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of the same to a person lawfully employed; or that such disobedience caused, or tended to cause, danger to human life, health or safety; or that such disobedience caused or tended to cause, riot or an affray“. (Brojo Nath Ghose v. Empress14 ; Shyamanand Das v. Emperor15 ; Ramgopal v. Emperor16and Emperor v. Raghunath17 ).” Bharat Raut v. State18. A complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate is required. A prosecution under this section should not be launched unless all the elements necessary for a conviction are present. A complaint for an alleged disobedience of the order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, must show that the disobedience caused or tended to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury or a riot; Jaswant, In re19 ; D. Srinivasiah, In re20; Lachmi Devi, In re21; N. G. Sakde, In re22; Bharat Raut, In re18, and Dalganjan Koeri v. The State23. No prosecution can be instituted under this section without the previous complaint of the public servant concerned: section 195, Criminal Procedure Code; Ram Singh v. Emperor24, Emperor v. Ganesh Vasudev Mavlanka25, Mahimchandra v. Emperor26and Queen Empress v. South27. No appeal lies against the refusal of a public servant to file a complaint: Maruda Pillai, In re28 ; see also Govindas Kunjuraman v. Krishnan Nair29. To recapitulate the foregoing: Pattukottai was a seat of disorder on account of the activities of the Kisan agitators and the exploraters of those Kisan grievancesthe Communists. No appeal lies against the refusal of a public servant to file a complaint: Maruda Pillai, In re28 ; see also Govindas Kunjuraman v. Krishnan Nair29. To recapitulate the foregoing: Pattukottai was a seat of disorder on account of the activities of the Kisan agitators and the exploraters of those Kisan grievancesthe Communists. Special Police bundobast had been made by the State to meet the situation; one of the families which suffered at the hands of the local agitators was this minority family of Alagaiyanaikapuram-the defendant in the suit. The eldest of them the first defendant was bombarding the authorities. Police Magistracy State Government, etc., to book these patent and potential mischief-mongers. These agistors were known to intend to put on a special display to mar the Republic Day Celebrations. On the reports of the responsible Police Officer the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Pattukottai, had passed prohibitory orders against holding of meetings and had widely published it. The first defendant had tipped the Police about the defiance of the same planned by Communists and their fellow-traveller, at Alagiaiyanaikapuram on 11th February, 1950. D.W. 1 rushed there with a posse of constables surprised a defiant meeting held in front of Vaithialinga Thevar’s house, and on the persons assembled, scattering arrested the three accused in C.C. No. 450 of 1950 who persisted there and removed them and with the concurrence of the higher Police Officers applied to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for sanctioning a prosecution under section 188, Indian Penal Code and which was given after consideration. The case ended in failure mostly because most of the P.Ws. would not as might be expected here support the prosecution. The conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff had not made out a case for damages for malicious prosecution is irreproachable for following reasons: In an action for malicious criminal prosecution, the plaintiff must prove the following points: (a) that the plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendant; (b) that the prosecution ended in plaintiff’s favour; (c) that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause; and (d) that the defendant was actuated by malice. It is now well-settled law that unless all these four requirements concur, the suit will fail: Bhalbaddar Singh v. Badri Sah1, Shubrate v. Shamsuddin2, Nagendra Math v. Basanta Das3, Thimmappa v. Minga Gowda4 ; Rasah Braja Sunder v. Bandek Das5 Dhanjishaw Ratanji v. Bombay Municipality6, Ramnath v. Bashiruddin7, Baldev Singh v. Pyaree Lal8and Seshi Reddi v. Chandra Reddi9. In this case that the plaintiff was prosecuted and that the prosecution ended in plaintiff’s favour had been proved. The lower appellate Court has found on ample and satisfactory evidence, and with which I entirely agree and by which I am bound, that there was a meeting of the Communists on nth February, 1950 and that P.W. 2 took part in such a meeting and mat he was arrested by D.W. 1 at such a meeting and that therefore the first defendant in tipping off the Police and which led to Police action and subsequent prosecution, did not act without reasonable and probable cause. That the first defendant was not actuated by malice in the legal sense of the term has also been made out. It is quite true that the learned Subordinate Judge has found that the first defendant acted with malice. But in doing so, he has understood the term “malice” in its popular sense and not in the legal sense in which it is used in connection with suits for malicious prosecution. Regarding this connotation of the term “malice” in connection with suits for malicious prosecution, the law is the same in India, England and America. In India the term “malice” has been construed as meaning an improper or indirect motive, that is to say, some motive other than a desire to vindicate public justice or a private right. It need not necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or ill-will. This is brought out in the following Indian decisions: Manjaappa v. Ganapathi10, Jamnadas v. Chunilal11, Imperial Tobacco Company v. Bonnan12, Mushtoorappa v. Hanumanthappa13, Laxmichand v. India14, Mahtab v. Balaji15, Nurse v. Rustanji Dorabji16, Chhaganlal Sakerlal v. Municipality of Thana17, Gaya Pershad Singh v. Bhagat Singh18, Albert Bonnan v. Imperial Tobacco10 ; see also S. Ramaswmi Ayyar’s “Law of Torts”, Fifth Edition (1957), page 331; Anand and Sastri’s “Law of Torts” (1952), page 861, Venkatesa Ayyar’s “Law of Torts”, page 506, Ratanlal’s “Law of Torts” (Thirteenth Edition), page 200. Street in his “Law of Torts” (1955), at page 415: “In addition the plaintiff must prove malice on the part of the defendant, i.e., any motive other than that of simply instituting a prosecution for the purpose of bringing a person to justice. The question is not whether the defendant was angry or inspired by hatred, but whether the defendant had a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice — there is malice, for instance, if he uses the prosecution as a means of blackmail or any other form of coercion. Where the motives of the defendant were mixed, the plaintiff will fail unless he established that the dominant purpose was something other than the vindication of the law.” “Harper on Torts (U.S.A.)” at page 586: “A malicious prosecution is one that is begun in malice, and if there is no malice found to exist in fact, the action must fail. Any feeling of hatred, animosity or ill-will towards the plaintiff, of course, amounts to malice. But it is not essential to prove such ill-will. If the defendant knew or actually believed the plaintiff innocent of the charge made, he acted maliciously, although the fact the defendant actually believed the plaintiff guilty does not conclusively negative malice. So also if the defendant employed the criminal law for the sole purpose of compelling the payment of a debt or for some other collateral purpose, it is a malicious purpose within the meaning of the law.” Thus, as Fleming in his “Law of Torts” (Australian Publication) (1957) rightly points out at page 633, malice has proved a slippery word in the Law of Torts, and some benefit would be gained from abandoning its use and replacing it, in this context ‘by improper purpose’. Malice has a wider meaning than spite, ill-will or a spirit of vengeance, and includes any other improper purpose motivating the prosecutor, such as to gain a private collateral advantage. That fact that his conduct was prompted by indignation or anger, does not negative the existence of a proper purpose, because so far from this being a wrong or indirect motive, it is one on which the law relies to secure the prosecution of offenders. That fact that his conduct was prompted by indignation or anger, does not negative the existence of a proper purpose, because so far from this being a wrong or indirect motive, it is one on which the law relies to secure the prosecution of offenders. Thus, though Jagannathachariar might have been actuated by indignation, anger, spite or ill-will or a spirit of vengeance, his object in tipping off the Police was to bring the offender defying the prohibitory order and thereby promoting public disorder to book, it cannot at all be said that he was actuated by malice. Therefore, this requirement also has failed in this suit. In addition, I find that there is another ground for coming to the conclusion that no suit would lie for malicious prosecution because in this case Jagannathachariar has not been shown to have prosecuted the plaintiff. The term ‘prosecution’ has received a special connotation in suits for malicious prosecution and is practically the same in India, England and Australia. The settled law in India is that the defendant is liable as prosecutor or if he filed a complaint himself or through his agent or advocate or if the prosecution was by the Police or the State at his instance and on his information. The question is who is the real prosecutor and the defendant’s conduct before and during trial will be material in deciding it. This is a question of fact and the onus is on the plaintiff to prove the affirmative. It is equally well-settled that instigating a prosecution is something different from the act of giving information on the strength of which a prosecution is commenced by some one else in the exercise of his own discretion. If the complainant does not give beyond what he believes to be correct information to the Police and if the Police without further interference on his part (except giving such honest assistance as they may require) thinks fit to prosecute, it would be improper to make him responsible for damages for the failure of the prosecution. If the complainant does not give beyond what he believes to be correct information to the Police and if the Police without further interference on his part (except giving such honest assistance as they may require) thinks fit to prosecute, it would be improper to make him responsible for damages for the failure of the prosecution. But if the charge is false to the knowledge of the complainant, if he misleads the Police by bringing suborned witnesses to support it, and if he influences the Police to support him in sending an innocent man for trial before a Magistrate, it would be equally improper to allow him to escape liability because the prosecution has not technically been conducted by him. These principles can be gathered from the following Indian decisions: Gaya Pershad v.Bhagat Singh1, Mohan Singh v. Bhugunath2, Nityananda v. Binayak3, Venkatadri v.gh v. Badri SahA, Nagendra Nath v. Basanta Deb5, Raghubir Das Dayal v. Kalla6, Dattareya v. Harikashad7, Chandu Reddi v. Pommirami Reddy8, Radha v. Dadi9, Krishna Rao v. Radhakrishnan10and Shanmugha v. Kandasami Asary11. See also Ramaswamy Iyer’s “Law of Torts” page 327, Anand and Sastri, page 852; Venkatesa Ayyar, page 498 and Ratanlal, page 191. Street on page 411 states: “The defendant must have been actively instrumental in instigating the proceedings. If he merely states the facts as he believes them to a Policeman or a Magistrate, he is not responsible for any proceedings which might ensue as a result of action taken on his own initiative by such Policeman or Magistrate”. Fleming at page 22 states: “Again, there is no liability, unless the defendant has been actively instrumental in setting the law in motion. A person Who simply makes a candid statement of facts to the Police or Magistrate without formulating any charge, is not responsible for a prosecution, even if his account implicates the plaintiff, so long as he actually left to the uncontrolled choice of that authority to bring the proceedings or not at its discretion. In such a case ‘the stone set rolling is a stone of suspicion only’ and the person giving the information is not considered a prosecutor”. In such a case ‘the stone set rolling is a stone of suspicion only’ and the person giving the information is not considered a prosecutor”. Bearing these principles in mind if we examine the facts of this case, we find that all that Jagannathachariar has been found to have done was the tipping off the Police about the impending meeting in defiance of the order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code and if it resulted in the Police going to the scene and arresting the offenders participating in the meeting and subsequently in the Sub-Divisional Magistrate sanctioning the prosecution for disobedience of his order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, there was a double interposition, viz., the exercise of discretion by the Police and the Magistrate between the complaint and the prosecution. It was open to the Police Officer not to act upon the complaint and it was actually open to the Magistrate not to sanction the prosecution. Therefore, by reason of this double interposing of the discretion of the Police and the Magistracy to take or not to take action upon the stone of suspicion set rolling by Jagannathachariar, he cannot be considered to be a prosecutor. In fact if the plaintiff felt aggrieved that he had been unlawfully arrested by the Sub-Inspector by reason of the requirements of section 188, Indian Penal Code, not having been made out in his case, the remedy open to him against the Sub-Inspector (P.W. 1) was to have filed a suit for false imprisonment and if he wanted to rope in Jagannathachariar also, a suit for conspiracy. Both false imprisonment and conspiracy are torts giving rise to damages. Tort of false imprisonment is the same in India, England and America. False imprisonment means the total restraint of a person’s liberty without lawful justification. The word ‘false’ in that phrase signifies the unlawful character of the restraint. False imprisonment is a tort and as it was usually accompanied with force or threat of force, was regarded at a very early time as an assault or trespass. It is also a crime known as ‘assault’ in England and as ‘wrongful confinement’ in the Indian Penal Code, (section 340). In an action for damages for this tort, the plaintiff should prove, (a) his imprisonment, and (b) that it was caused by the defendant or his servants acting in the course of their employment. It is also a crime known as ‘assault’ in England and as ‘wrongful confinement’ in the Indian Penal Code, (section 340). In an action for damages for this tort, the plaintiff should prove, (a) his imprisonment, and (b) that it was caused by the defendant or his servants acting in the course of their employment. On proof of these facts, the plaintiff’s case is complete, and it is then for the defendant to prove a lawful justification and not for the plaintiff to prove its absence. The plaintiff need not prove any wrongful intention, malice, or negligence on the part of the defendant; If the defendant cannot establish a justification recognised by the law, he cannot merely plead a bona fide or even inevitable mistake, as where he executed a warrant of arrest against the wrong man. It is also unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove malice or an improper motive. In order to constitute false imprisonment the duration of retention is immaterial and all that is necessary is that it should be unlawful. This false imprisonment and malicious prosecution are sharply distinguishable and this distinction is pointed out in all the standard books on Torts: S. Ramaswami Iyer at page 334, Anand and Sastri, pages 514-515 and 864-865; Venkatesa Iyer, page 308; Ratanlal, page 203; Street, page 25; Fleming, pages 38-39 and Harper, page 52. Harper sums up the distinction thus: The interests protected are different though somewhat akin. False imprisonment is the invasion of the interest in freedom from unlawful confinement while a malicious prosecution is the unlawful use of legal procedure to bring about a legal confinement. If the imprisonment is under legal process but the action has been carried on maliciously and without probable cause it is malicious prosecution. If it has been extra judicial without legal process it is false imprisonment. It will depend on the facts of each whether the arrest by a Police Officer was caused in a ministerial capacity and in compliance with the complainant’s request or in the exercise of his own power. If the former was the case the remedy is for malicious prosecution, if the latter is the case the remedy is for false imprisonment (Pande v. Pande1 ). The Indian case-law on the subject is sparse. If the former was the case the remedy is for malicious prosecution, if the latter is the case the remedy is for false imprisonment (Pande v. Pande1 ). The Indian case-law on the subject is sparse. Parankusain v. Stuert2, Syed Mohammed Yusufuddin v. Secretary of State3, Maharani of Nakha v. Madras4, Manmotha Nath Dutt v. Cossipore Chitpore Municipality5, Kundalal Lal v. Day Raj6, Nanjappa v. Ganapathi1and Ramanathan Chetty v. Mira Saibo Marakar8. For an excellent discussion see S. Ramaswami Iyer’s “Law of Torts”, Fifth Edition (1957), page 57 and foll. The grievance of the plaintiff in this case would appear in this case to fall more under an action for damages for false imprisonment against the Police Officer than an action for damages for false prosecution against the informant D. 1. The plaintiff has apparently avoided this action on account of the immunity and protection conferred on Police Officers under serious statutes in effecting arrests. On the other hand, if the plaintiff had wanted to proceed against this first defendant as inspiring the action taken against him, resulting in false imprisonment, then he should have proceeded against both the Sub-Inspector and the first defendant for an action for damages for conspiracy, an independent tort. Two or more persons who cause damage to another by a conspiracy among them will become liable to him (a) where their conduct amounts to criminal conspiracy and (b) where the conspiracy is malicious, i.e., as a motive or object of causing such damage. The first ground of liability is an application of the general principle that the commission of a crime, e.g., wrongful confinement resulting in damages gives rise to a civil action. The second ground of liability would arise in cases where a conspiracy does not amount to a crime. For a discussion of conspiracy as an independent tort; see Ramaswami Iyer, page 381; Venkatesa Ayyar, page 552; Ratanlal, page 284; Anand and Sastri, page 702; Street, page 365; Fleming, pages 723-731 and Harper, page 302. Therefore, looked at from any point of view the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge that the suit of the plaintiff was bound to fail, is irreproachable. The decree and judgment of the lower appellate Courts are confirmed and this second appeal is dismissed and in the circumstances without costs. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.