ORDER R.S. Shukla A departmental inquiry was held against the Appellant who is a Revenue Inspector, on a number of charges. The Deputy Commissioner, late Sbri R.C. Dube, agreeing generally with the report of the inquiring officer found most of the charges proved against the Revenue Inspector and came to the conclusion that the Revenue Inspector should be dismissed from service as all the charges were severally and jointly proved against him. Necessary show cause notice was, therefore, served on the Appellant as required by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and after hearing the Revenue Inspector finally, the learned Deputy Commissioner confirmed his tentative conclusion of dismissal but did not pass a formal order as a question arose whether an order of dismissal, in the case of a Revenue Inspector, should be passed by the Deputy Commissioner or by the Director, Land Records. A reference was, therefore, made by him to the Director, Land Records, enquiring if it would be competent for him to pass order in the case. The Director, Land Records, vide his memo, dated 7-1-56, informed the Deputy Commissioner that the latter was empowered to punish a Revenue Inspector. But, in the meantime Shri Dube died before passing final order. The successor Deputy Commissioner, therefore, issued a fresh notice to the Appellant and reheard him. He held the following charges proved and ordered the dismissal of the Revenue Inspector: (i) That the Revenue Inspector added the name of one Rajkrishna in annual papers of village Belai along with Shrimati Ramrani in an unauthorised and arbitrary fashion, probably under the influence of corruption; (ii) That the Revenue Inspector was not impartial in the discharge of his duties and failed to report the case of Mannu Khan of Bina about manufacturing 10 laks of bricks in village Bhilawri and transporting about 100 truck loads of boulders; and (iii) That the Revenue Inspector maintained no horse, cart or conveyance and was falsely drawing Rs. 25 per month as conveyance allowance. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant raised a number of preliminary legal objections which it would be necessary to examine at some length before I go into the merits of the case, as considerable emphasis was laid on the legal issues involved. It was stated that the Appellant was appointed by the Settlement Commissioner who is an officer higher in rank to the Deputy Commissioner. It was stated that the Appellant was appointed by the Settlement Commissioner who is an officer higher in rank to the Deputy Commissioner. As such, it was against the provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution that the Deputy Commissioner, who is an officer of a lower rank, should have dismissed him. To prove his appointment the Learned Counsel relied on a certified copy of the Service-Book entry in which the number and date of order of Appellant's appointment is referred to as "Settlement Commissioner's order No. 44/I-LR, dated 18-1-36". It was further stated that on the date the Appellant was appointed the power of appointing a Revenue Inspector rested with the Commissioner of the Division and not with the Deputy Commissioner of the district. A Hindi copy of the Land Records Manual, Vol. II (Revenue Inspectors) was produced before me to show that as a result of amendment of Rule 3 contained in Government Notification No. 74/XVII, dated 21-3-27, the power of appointing Revenue Inspectors was taken away from the Commissioners only from February 1936. Since the Appellant was appointed in January 1936 it was argued that in January 1936 the Deputy Commissioner could not possibly appoint a Revenue Inspector. Considerable confusion was caused by the fact that none of the copies of the Land Records Manual, Vol. II, available either in the Court or with the Learned Counsel, was up-to-date. Reference was, therefore, made to the Director, Land Records, and correct factual position ascertained. The various amendments and copies of gazette produced by the Director, Land Records Office were duly made available to the Appellant's counsel. As a result of these inquiries it became apparent that the contention of the Appellant is incorrect. The Correspondence Register of the Director, Land Records Office for the year 1936 was examined and a certified copy thereof placed on record. This clearly showed that the reference in the Service-Book of the Appellant was to the nomination made by the Director, Land Records, for filling in vacancies lasting over 6 months as per Rule 3 of the Land Records Manual, Vol. II. The Director, Land Records, is also the Settlement Commissioner and despatches from his office relating to the two branches, namely, the Land Records Branch and the Settlement Branch bear separate indicative letters. II. The Director, Land Records, is also the Settlement Commissioner and despatches from his office relating to the two branches, namely, the Land Records Branch and the Settlement Branch bear separate indicative letters. The letters "L.R." occurring in the Service-Book of the Appellant indicate that it was in the capacity of the Director, Land Records, and not in the capacity of Settlement Commissioner, that the order dated 18-1-36 nominating the Appellant for appointment as Revenue Inspector was issued by him. The reference to the Settlement Commissioner in the Service-Book entry is, therefore, apparently incorrect. Similarly, a reference to C.P. Gazette, Part III, dated 22-11-35 showed that it was by the amending notification No. 224/XVII, dated 18-11-35, that the power of appointing Revenue Inspectors were transferred from the Commissioner to the Deputy Commissioner or the Settlement Officer, as the case might be. Further, by another amendment the Subordinate Service Rules, regulating the punishment of government servants, were made applicable to the Revenue Inspectors and the Deputy Commissioner was given the power to impose any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i) to (iv) (which did not include removal or dismissal) of the above service rules. Later on, vide amendment No. 5, dated 28-12-54, Deputy Commissioner's powers of punishment were extended to all the clauses from Clause (i) to Clause (vii) which included removal and dismissal as well. Thus it is clear that the Appellant was appointed by the Deputy Commissioner on the nomination of the Director, Land Records, and on the date the punishment in question was awarded, the Deputy Commissioner had the legal authority to dismiss a Revenue Inspector. The contention of the Appellant on this score has, therefore, no force. Lastly, it was urged that the Deputy Commissioner had not applied his mind to the facts of the case and relied only on the opinion recorded earlier by his predecessor-in-office (late Shri R.C. Dubey). This contention has also no force. The record of the case shows that the learned Deputy Commissioner took good care to re-notice the Appellant and to hear him over again before passing the impugned order. There is, therefore, no foundation to say that the Deputy Commissioner did not apply his mind to the facts of the present case. I shall now deal with the findings on the various charges. There is, therefore, no foundation to say that the Deputy Commissioner did not apply his mind to the facts of the present case. I shall now deal with the findings on the various charges. The facts relating to the charge No. 1 i.e. unauthorised entry of Rajkrishna's name in the annual papers are very elaborately given in the Sub-Divisional Officer's report and need not be repeated. None of the facts proved in the Sub-Divisional Officer's enquiry was seriously challenged before me. Exception was, however, taken against the finding that the corrections made by the Revenue Inspector were time-barred and that the refusal to allow the aid of a counsel to the Appellant had prejudiced his defence. I agree that the power of the Revenue Inspector to check and correct annual papers is wide enough but in the circumstances of the case, as brought out in the Sub-Divisional Officer's report, the conduct of the Revenue Inspector was not beyond serious suspicion against his integrity. In the first place, he should not have acted against the specific order of his superiors extending time of Girdawari checking only up to 15-5-54. Secondly, an immediate report having been asked for by the Additional Deputy Commissioner on 18-1-54, there is no explanation for sitting over it till 11-7-54. and lastly, the most serious part of it, is the fact that although the Revenue Inspector himself added the name of Rajkrishna on 2-7-54, he deliberately omitted to mention this fact in his report-The report was apparently intended to mislead the authorities in thinking that the disputed land was already lawfully recorded in Rajkrishna's name and no action by way of escheat was, therefore, called for. To say that since at the end of his report he had solicited instructions for further action, the Revenue Inspector was acting bona fide, is simply misleading. The report, read as a whole, coupled with the facts subsequently disclosed in the inquiry, bring home the charge that the entry was made with a view to causing wrongful gain to Rajkrishna and wrongful loss to Mst. Ram Rani in whose exclusive possession the land was on the date of his report. It was argued that there was no evidence to show that the money-order received from Kanauj was meant for the Revenue Inspector or that he accepted any part of it. Ram Rani in whose exclusive possession the land was on the date of his report. It was argued that there was no evidence to show that the money-order received from Kanauj was meant for the Revenue Inspector or that he accepted any part of it. True, but even if we ignore this part of the story, the making of the entry itself, in the face of known facts and the concealing of his own authorship of the revised entry clearly bring out his dishonest motive. Even if it be assumed that the conduct of the Appellant was not guided by any corrupt motives for himself, his action was highly improper and mischievous. I agree with the Learned Counsel that, in the circumstances of the case, there should have been no serious objection in permitting a counsel to the appellant. But I do not think that his case has thereby been prejudiced. He himself cross-examined a number of witnesses and the main facts substantiating the charges against him were either simple or were mostly based on government records. In any case, on this ground alone, the charges against him cannot be thrown out. With regard to charge No. 2, the findings of the learned Deputy Commissioner cannot be supported. The finding is based entirely on the statement of one Bindraban. Apart from lack of corroboration, Brindraban cannot be wholly relied upon. He has referred to facts which took place some two years back and had, possibly, a grouse against the Revenue Inspector inasmuch as the latter's report laid to a fine of Rs. 360 against his employer Dalip Singh, although for a similar offence by one Mannoo Khan the Revenue Inspector did not take any action. It is also questionable as to why the Assistant Commissioner, Shri Halve, who visited the spot earlier did not notice the existence of bricks said to have been manufactured by Mannoo Khan. Lastly, it has not been established as a fact, that Manoo Khan did really manufacture the bricks illegally. I would, therefore, take it that this charge has not been proved against the Appellant. In defence of the last charge all that has been said is that no previous inspecting officer had noted that the Appellant did not maintain a conveyance. On the other hand, they had recorded the fact that conveyance was maintained by the appellant. I would, therefore, take it that this charge has not been proved against the Appellant. In defence of the last charge all that has been said is that no previous inspecting officer had noted that the Appellant did not maintain a conveyance. On the other hand, they had recorded the fact that conveyance was maintained by the appellant. This argument is irrelevant and has no bearing on charge. The question is whether the said conveyance belonged to the Appellant ? The evidence is against his ownership of the bullock-cart. in question. The receipt of payment seems to be bogus and cannot be relied upon as it has not been proved nor has it been stamped. I agree with the learned Deputy Commissioner that the charge is proved. The question that now remains to be considered is what punishment is the Revenue Inspector entitled in view of the above findings? The Deputy Commissioner has dismissed him and I can also think of no other alternative. It is true that the Appellant has put in about 22 years of service and that this fact would have carried weight if the charges were not what they are. It can hardly be gain-said that the conduct of the Appellant has been reprehensible and wholly against the integrity which is expected of a government servant. To retain such a person would not be in the interest of administration. I would, therefore, agree with the Deputy Commissioner and dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.