JUDGMENT A.N. Mulla, J. - This is an application of revision filed by one Abid Ali, who is a Kirana merchant and whose shop is situate in Rakabganj, police station Chowk, Lucknow. The applicant has been convicted u/s 27 of the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947, as he committed a breach of S. 10 of the said Act. The applicant has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 30. The charge against him was that he opened his shop on Thursday 9-2-1956, which was declared a 'close day' for the locality by the District Magistrate u/Rr. 5 and 6 which supplement the provisions of this Act. 2. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The applicant admits that his shop was open on Thursday 9-2-1956, when Sri P. N. Sabarwal, the Deputy Chief Inspector, Shops and Commercial Establishments, UP, Kanpur, came and inspected his shop. His only contention is that he has been observing Fridays as the close days since the law nine or ten years and this he did with the approval of the District Magistrate. He further contended that from the year 1950 onwards repeated attempts were made to coerce him into changing this day, but he did not succumb to that pressure and followed the old practice of closing his shop on Fridays. It was further contended by him that u/s 10 of the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947, the option of changing the day was with the applicant and the District authorities could not compel him to change this day. As this contention was not accepted by the trial court and it did not find favour even with the appellate court, applicant was convicted as mentioned above. 3. I have heard the counsel for the applicant as well as the counsel for the State and I have come to the conclusion that on merits as well as on law the contention advanced by the applicant must succeed. In my opinion the trial court came to perverse findings on the evidence placed before it and, therefore, even if there had been only one point of law involved in this application, I would have allowed this application in the interests of justice. In my opinion the trial court came to perverse findings on the evidence placed before it and, therefore, even if there had been only one point of law involved in this application, I would have allowed this application in the interests of justice. The appellate court accepted the findings reached by the trial court, though from some of the observations made by the appellate court it does appear that perhaps if it had functioned as the trial court, it would not have reached the same findings. I will, however, take up the facts of the case a little later and I would first deal with the legal aspect of the case. 4. The City Magistrate tried this case summarily and so no specific and regular charge was framed against the applicant. The accusation which may be taken as the substitute for a charge is mentioned by him, on the printed form of summary trials. There is a head entitled 'Offence complained of.' Under this head, the Magistrate wrote S. 10 reads with Rr. 5 and 6, UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947 in so far that the accused was found to have opened his shop on Thursday 9-2-1956 which was a close day of the locality." It would appear from the extract quoted above that the Magistrate never applied his mind to determine the question whether the applicant was an employer within the meaning of S. 2 (6) of the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947. He was labourring under the misapprehension that any shop-keeper, who opens his shop on a close day is per se guilty of an offence u/s 10 of this Act. This is quite an erroneous conception of law. Only that shopkeeper who is also an employer, as defined in the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947 can be held guilty for opening his shop on a close day. The evidence produced in the case does not contain even a suggestion that the applicant was an employer. Only one prosecution witness, Sri P. N. Sabarwal, was examined in the case and he only alleged that the shop of the applicant was open on Thursday 9-2-1956 when, he inspected it and the applicant himself was selling some species. Before a person can be convicted under this Act, the prosecution has to discharge the onus of proving that an accused person is an employer. Before a person can be convicted under this Act, the prosecution has to discharge the onus of proving that an accused person is an employer. 'Employer' is defined u/s 2 (6) as follows: 'Employer' means a person having charge of or owning the business of a shop or commercial establishment and includes the manager, agent or any other person acting in the general management or control of such shop or commercial establishment. 5. I may also quote the definition of the word 'employee' given in this Act: 'Employee' means any person wholly or mainly employed on wages in or in connection with any trade or business usually carried on-in a shop or a commercial establishment. 6. It was argued on behalf of the State that because the applicant was the owner of the shop, therefore, he comes within the definition of the word 'employer' quoted above, This contention is not maintainable. 'Employer' by itself indicates that some one is employed by him and where there is no evidence that the owner of a shop has employed any workman he does not become an employer, merely because he is an owner of a shop. 'Employer' is only one end of a relationship, the other end being an 'employee.' It would be like calling a man a husband who is not married and who has no wife. The entire spirit of the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947, is to protect the interests of the employees and to regulate the conditions of employment. The preamble of this Act runs as follows: Whereas it is expedient to provide for holiday and to regulate the hours of employment and certain other conditions of employment in shops and commercial establishments, it is hereby enacted as foliows:-" Similarly a reading of S. 4 of this Act also points the same way. The relevant part of S. 4 runs as follows: 4. Nothing in this Act shall apply to (e) members of the family of any employer. 7. The word 'family' has been defined in S. 2 (8) of the Act and the definition is as follows: 'family' in relation to an employer means the husband or wife, child or children, brother or sister of such employer, living with him and being wholly dependent on him. 8. 7. The word 'family' has been defined in S. 2 (8) of the Act and the definition is as follows: 'family' in relation to an employer means the husband or wife, child or children, brother or sister of such employer, living with him and being wholly dependent on him. 8. It can, therefore, be seen that if a shopkeeper employs only the member of his family for running his business concern, the provisions of this Act do not apply to the employment of such persons. It would be, therefore, against reason that where a person only employs himself for running a business, he can be punished under the provisions of this Act. A person is entitled to subject himself to all sorts of hardship in order to earn a living and no law can take away this right from him. I am, therefore, of the opinion that when in the definition of the word 'employer', the owner of a business or a shop is mentioned, it contemplates the employment of some person other than himself and other than his family members to attract the application of the provisions of this Act. It would be quite unjustifiable that a person should be stopped from earning his livelihood one day out of a week. Obviously the provisions of this Act do not apply to mobile shops. It seems unjustiliable that while a hawker could sell his goods when he is moving on the roads, a petty shopkeeper if he sits on a stall cannot do so. He must close his shop for one day and give up the pursuit of his livelihood. It is not possible to interpiet the word 'employer' in this manner. 9. If, as contended by the counsel for the State, the definition of the word 'employer' includes a petty shopkeeper, who employs no one else, then in my opinion the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947, becomes ultra vires of the Constitution of India, because it violates the right given to every citizen u/Art. 19 (g) of the Constitution. 9. If, as contended by the counsel for the State, the definition of the word 'employer' includes a petty shopkeeper, who employs no one else, then in my opinion the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947, becomes ultra vires of the Constitution of India, because it violates the right given to every citizen u/Art. 19 (g) of the Constitution. Article 19 (1) (g) runs as follows: to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business." The only restriction placed on this right is as follows: 19 (6) Nothing in Sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing in the interests of the general public, reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.... 10. It is only in the interests of the general public that a reasonable restriction can be placed upon the right to carry on any trade or business. Where a person wants to work on every day and his working in this manner does not affect any one else, it cannot be considered to be a reasonable restriction if he is stopped from earning his livelihood. I am, however, satisfied that the legislature never intended to include within the orbit of the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act 1947, those shopkeepers who had no employees and who worked themselves alone. 11. In interpreting a word it is true that the particular definition given to it by a statute must be followed, but where an artificial definition is given, there must be a clear indication that this artificial definition is intended to take away the natural meaning of the word. As observed by me above the word 'employer' connotes that some one is employed. To quote the meaning given only in one 'Dictionary', (The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. I, 1933 Ed., page 602) 'employer' means "one who employs ; especially one who employs servants, workmen etc. for wages " 12. There is nothing in the definition given in the Shops and Commercial Establishmets Act, 1947, to indicate that the basic meaning of the word 'employer' was to be changed. I, 1933 Ed., page 602) 'employer' means "one who employs ; especially one who employs servants, workmen etc. for wages " 12. There is nothing in the definition given in the Shops and Commercial Establishmets Act, 1947, to indicate that the basic meaning of the word 'employer' was to be changed. As I understand it, the definition was made wider in order to make the owner of a shop vicariously responsible for the act of employment done by his Manager, agent or some other person acting on his behalf. It was not meant to indicate that every owner of a shop became an employer, even though he employed no one else to help him in his trade and business. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the essential meaning of the word 'employer' is not changed by the definition given in the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947. 13. It was observed in H.S. Shukla v. Divelkar 1957 SCJ 83 89 : It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of that ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended. Where within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirment of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined. 14. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mindt that the word 'employer' used in the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947 contemplates such an owner of the shop who has engaged some employees to help him in running his business and does not convert an owner of the shop per se into an employer, even when he has no 'Employees'. 15. It was, therefore, necessary for the prosecution to prove that the applicant was an employer. No such evidence was led and the substance of accusation levelled against the applicant also did not indicate that the applicant was an employer. It may be that the applicant has some employees, but this fact should have been proved in order to discharge the onus of establishing that the applicant was an employer. No such evidence was led and the substance of accusation levelled against the applicant also did not indicate that the applicant was an employer. It may be that the applicant has some employees, but this fact should have been proved in order to discharge the onus of establishing that the applicant was an employer. The prosecution failed to do so and, therefore, on the record as it stands, there is no evidence to come to the conclusion that the applicant was an employer. In this view of the matter the provisions of the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947, cannot be utilised against him and his conviction, therefore, is bad in law. 16. As observed by me above, even on merits the prosecution in this case appears to be a coercive measure and not a legitimate prosecution. Any reasonable court would have felt no doubt in coming to the conclusion that the District Magistrate had permitted the applicant to observe Fridays as close days in the year 1918, 1949. The City Magistrate, however, preferred to ignore the weight of evidence and came to the conclusion that Thursdays were declared to be the close days for Rakabgunj from the very beginning. There is a long history of notices given to the applicant and his replies to these notices. The first notice was given on 30-11-1950 (Ext. D 2). Since that time no less than six notices were given to the applicant and every time he offered this explanation that he has been observing Fridays as close days from the very beginning with the approval of the District Magistrate and as he does not want to change this date he cannot be compelled under the law to observe Thursdays as close days. The words of S. 10 of the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947 are very clear. The words of S. 10 of the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947 are very clear. S. 10 runs as follows: 10(1) Every employer shall close his shop or commercial establishment not included in the Schedule on one day of the week, and such day shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the close day.' (2) Except as provided in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, or any other enact ment applying to a shop or a commercial establishment, the choice of a close day shall, subject to the approval of such authority as may be appointed in this behalf, rest with the employer and shall be specified by him in a notice prominently exhibited in a conspicuous place in the shop or commercial Establishment.... (3) The close day specified under Sub-section (2) shall not be altered by the employer except once in a year and any alteration shall take effect only as from 1st January in any year and shall be subject to the approval of such authority as may be appointed u/s 10(2).....' A reading of the Section quoted above makes it abundantly clear that the initial choice of selecting a day for closing the shop rests with employer and not with the District authorities. He has only to get the approval of the District authorities for the day which he proposes to observe as the close day. Sub S. (3) again makes it very clear that if any alteration is to be made., that alteration can be made by the employer himself and this alteration cannot be imposed upon him by the District authorities. The documentary evidence produced in this case by the applicant leaves no doubt in my mind that the applicant opted to close his shop on Fridays and since the year 1950 the District authorities were repeatedly exer(sic) ing pressure upon him to make him change his mind and follow the general rule of observing Thursdays as close days. 17. I would first refer to that evidence which proves to my satisfaction that in the years 1948-1950 the District authorities had approved that the Muslim shopkeepers of Rakabganj area including the applicant, should close their shops on Fridays. The applicant summoned the original order given by the District Magistrate in the year 1948, but the prosecution could not produce it and alleged that such an order was not traceable. The applicant summoned the original order given by the District Magistrate in the year 1948, but the prosecution could not produce it and alleged that such an order was not traceable. The applicant thereupon led secondary evidence to prove that such an order was passed. I will refer only to the more important pieces of evidence relating to this point. There are two publications in the 'Qaumi Awaz', a local Urdu daily, dated 30-1-1948 and 1-1-1949. These are Exts. D1 and D24. The note mentioned in Ext. Dl runs as follows: Dukanen band rakhne ka din District Magistrate ke ek hukm ke mutabiq Rakabgunj aur Yahiagunj ke Musalmanon ki dukanen Jumairat ke bajai har Jumme ko band raha karengi. 18. When this application of revision was filed before this Court, two copies of the 'National. Herald' an English daily of Lucknow, were also filed. In the National Herald of 30-1-1948, the following note occurs: Muslim Shops closing day by an order of the District Magistrate Muslim shops in Rakabgunj and Yahiagunj will close on Fridays instead of Thursdays as hitherto." The entry in the National Herald is word for word the same as the insertion in the 'Qaumi Awaz'. The Magistrate, however, did not accept this evidence as sufficient to indicate that the District Magistrate in the year 1948 had given the necessary approval to the prayer made by the Muslim shopkeepers Rakabgunj that Fridays should be declared to be close days so far as they were concerned. The line of reasoning adopted by the Magistrate was that even in these notes it appears that initially Thursdays were declared to be the close days for the Rakabgunj area and only subsequently a change was made and as the applicant has produced no evidence to show that he had filed any application praying for this change, therefore, he was not willing to accept that the District Magistrate had approved this change. In his opinion the note in the 'Qaumi Awaz' was not reliable. Only a person who had made up his mind to reject good evidence could have adopted this line of reasoning. It cannot be conceived that as early as January 1948 the applicant had persuaded the 'Qaumi Awaz' as well as the 'National Herald' to put in doubtful notes in their papers so that at a subsequent date he may use these notes to vindicate his stand. It cannot be conceived that as early as January 1948 the applicant had persuaded the 'Qaumi Awaz' as well as the 'National Herald' to put in doubtful notes in their papers so that at a subsequent date he may use these notes to vindicate his stand. It seems to me that the District authorities proposed Thursday to be the close days for the Rakabgunj area when the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947 came into force. As soon as the Muslim shopkeepers of Rakabgunj came to know about this proposal, they approached the District Magistrate and he, acting like a reasonable person granted their prayer and permitted to observe Fridays as close days. In the year 1950 the departmental authorities were perhaps controlled by some persons whose zeal for uniformity was stronger than their reason. They, therefore, started coercing the Muslim shopkeepers to observe uniformity and close their shops also on Thursdays. A great deal of light is thrown on this attitude by Ext. D8 which is a letter from Sri R. L. Misra, Inspector of Shops, Lucknow, to the applicant. This letter is dated 26-5-1951. It runs as follows: Dear Sir, Reference your letter dated 14-3-l951, I have to inform you that the matter was referred to higher authorities and it is their opinion that in secular State no administrative decisions can be taken on communal basis. Therefore I have been directed to advise you to close your shop on Thursday which has been approved as close day of the area in which your shop is situated. If you fail to act according to the advice given to you and in future your shop is found open on Thursdays, strict view shall be taken and that may entail hardship for you. 19. When the above letter came to the applicant, he very rightly protested that no question of a secular State was involved in this matter, but the mind of the District authorities as well as the higher authorities can very well be read by the letter quoted above. I have little doubt in my mind that similar letters were sent to other Muslim shopkeepers of the area and most of them succumbed to this pressure. I have little doubt in my mind that similar letters were sent to other Muslim shopkeepers of the area and most of them succumbed to this pressure. The applicant, however, insisted on his legal right and so when the authorities failed to coerce him, they had to prosecute him in order to teach him a lesson and to bring him in line with the others who proved more amenable to these coercive measures. The very fact that although since the year 1948 the applicant has been observing Fridays as close days and his shop was always open on Thursdays, yet he was not prosecuted till the year 1956 is an indication that the District authorities could not make up their minds whether they could legally proceed against him or not. The prosecution has sought to explain this delay in prosecuting the applicant by saying that educative and persuasive methods were sought to be used against him instead of taking any legal action. This explanation is quite unbelievable, and Ext. D8 cited above is an illustration of these educative and persuasive methods. 20. There are clear indications that for more than three years between 1951 and 1954, no notices were issued to the applicant at all, although he was regularly opening his shop on every Thursday. The conduct of the District authorities, when they knew full well that the applicant was opening his shop on Thursdays, amounted to an acquiescence and approval. It was not open to them after a lapse of so many years to turn round and say that all these years they were hoping that the applicant would himself give up his habit of opening his shop on Thursdays. 21. Another important document which throws considerable light on the attitude of the District authorities is provided by Exts. D26 and D27. Ext. D26 is an application dated 6-6-1950. This application purports to have been presented to the District Magistrate, Lucknow, by the shopkeepers of Dal Mandi and Rakabganj. Ext. D27 is a receipt signed by someone on behalf of the District Magistrate acknowledging receipt of this application. The contents of this application present the whole background of this case. I will mention some relevant paras from this application (Ext. D26): 1. That your Petitioners under the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947 (Act XXII of 1947) have been observing Friday as the close day with your approval. The contents of this application present the whole background of this case. I will mention some relevant paras from this application (Ext. D26): 1. That your Petitioners under the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947 (Act XXII of 1947) have been observing Friday as the close day with your approval. 2. That now we have been ordered to observe Thursday as the close day against which we respectfully make the following submissions: (a) That this change from Friday to Thursday has been made without giving us any chance to make our submissions. (b) That u/s 10(2) of the Act we have been given the right to make a choice of the close day of course subject to your honour's approval. (c) That further from the wording of Clause (3) of S 10 of the Act, it transpires that any change of 'Close day' will be the privilege and right of your Petitioners subject to your honour's approval but when we have made no change, we beg to submit alteration of the close day will not be justified and legal. (d) That on our representation in accordance with the spirit of the grand Constitution of our Republic your honour was pleased to order as announced in 'Qaumi Awaz' dated 1-1-49 that the Muslim shopkeepers will observe Friday as close day in Rakabgunj etc. (e) That since then nothing has occurred which justifies any change, rather we are more entitled to press for Friday to observe as close day as it will add to enhance confidence amongst the Muslims in general. 22. I have already mentioned above that a receipt was issued and this receipt is Ext.D27. If the facts mentioned in this application were not correct or if the prayer made by them was not granted, it was for the prosecution to place those orders of the District Magistrate before the court. On the other hand the very fact that no notice was issued to the applicant for about three years is an indication that this prayer was accepted. From 9-8-1951 upto 17-6-54 no notice was given to the applicant. A reference to a note in the'Qaumi Awaz'of 1-1-1949 was also mentioned in this application. On the other hand the very fact that no notice was issued to the applicant for about three years is an indication that this prayer was accepted. From 9-8-1951 upto 17-6-54 no notice was given to the applicant. A reference to a note in the'Qaumi Awaz'of 1-1-1949 was also mentioned in this application. The 'National Herald' of the same date, which has been filed in revision, also supports the note given in the 'Qaumi Awaz.' I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that the District Magistrates in the year 1948 and then in 1950 approved that the Muslim shopkeepers should observe Fridays as close days in the Rakabgunj area. Subsequently the departmental authorities raised the question again on the plea of uniformity, but, on the representations of the applicant no action was taken against him earlier. There was never any denial of the allegation made by the applicant that the District Magistrate had approved the observance of Fridays as close days. Even Sri P. N. Sabarwal, when he was cross-examined, stated that he had no knowledge that in 1948 and 1949 the District Magistrate Lucknow, had approved Friday as the close day of the Muslim shops of Rakabgunj. On the other hand the applicant stated on oath that Friday was approved as the close day and he examined several witnesses to support the statement made by him. That the departmental authorities exercised coercive measures to force the Muslim shopkeepers is fully made out by the statement of D. W. 3 Mohammad Salim Khan, who stated on oath that he also along with other Muslim shopkeepers used to close his shop on Fridays, but on account of pressure, he started opening his shop on Fridays, and observed Thursday as close day. It seems to me that the departmental authorities can seldom make a difference between sheer defiance of law and a legal stand in opposition to an executive order. Every attempt was made to coerce the applicant also, but it seems that he was built of sterner stuff. He had the law in his favour and so he was not willing to be coerced. The departmental authorities could not brook this resistance to 'their illegal orders and so the applicant had to be prosecuted. Every attempt was made to coerce the applicant also, but it seems that he was built of sterner stuff. He had the law in his favour and so he was not willing to be coerced. The departmental authorities could not brook this resistance to 'their illegal orders and so the applicant had to be prosecuted. The applicant also refused to see the Regional Conciliation Officer, when he was called and he also objected to the type of language used in the notices given to him. This made the departmental authorities all the more keen and zealous to prosecute the applicant. I am, therefore of the opinion that as the District Magistrate had approved that the Muslim shopkeepers should observe Fridays as close days, it is no longer open to the departmental authorities to change the day, for the option under the law lies with the shopkeepers and not with the departmental authorities. As the applicant has been observing Fridays as close day with the approval of the District Magistrate, he cannot be compelled to observe Thursdays as close days and if he kept his shop open on a Thursday, he did not commit a breach of S. 10 of the U. P. Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947. So even if the applicant was an employer he committed no breach of any law and his conviction cannot be upheld. 23. For the reasons given above, I set aside the conviction of the applicant and acquit him. The fine, if paid by him should be refunded.