JUDGMENT P.K. Tare, J. 1. The plaintiff-respondent sued her husband, the defendant-appellant for recovery of her dower debt amounting to Rs. 1,500. The parties are Sunnis and living separate for some years past. The appellant has married a second time without divorcing the respondent. The plaintiff pleaded that the whole of the dower debt was payable on demand and in spite of the demand, the defendant did not pay the same. The defendant denied the amount of dower debt, but did not plead what it was according to him. He further pleaded that the whole of the debt was deferred, payable upon divorce or death and that no part of it was payable promptly. 2. The trial Court decreed the plaintiffs claim in full holding that the agreement was as alleged by the plaintiff and that as the dower debt was payable on demand, it was to be paid whenever a demand was made. The learned trial Judge interpreted the phrase- 'payable on demand' in the same way as a negotiable instrument. The defendant's appeal to the lower appellate Court failed. The learned appellate Judge upheld the decree of the trial Court though for different reasons. He, relying on the authority of Mirza Bedar Bakht vs. Mirza Khurrum Bakht (1873) 19 W.R. 315 (P.C.) Masthan Saheb vs. Assan Bibi I.L.R. 23 Mad. 371 (F.B.) and Sheik Muhammad Rowther n. Ayeesha Beevi I.L.R. [1938] Mad. 609, held that the whole of the amount was payable promptly, as the phrase--'payable on demand 'meant that in the absence of an agreement the whole of the dower debt is to be treated as prompt as held in the said cases. 3. The Learned Counsel for the appellant urged only one law point, namely, that a dower debt payable on demand did not constitute a prompt dower, but a deferred one. In the alternative, he urged that only a reasonable portion be taken to be prompt. As regards the reasonable portion, the Learned Counsel urged that one-third of the amount be taken as prompt in the present case. The Learned Counsel referred to the commentary on Mohammedan Law by Sir D.F. Mulla page 251, section 290 (14th Edition) and the contrary view of other High Courts in the cases mentioned therein. The respondent was not represented in this Court. 4. The Learned Counsel referred to the commentary on Mohammedan Law by Sir D.F. Mulla page 251, section 290 (14th Edition) and the contrary view of other High Courts in the cases mentioned therein. The respondent was not represented in this Court. 4. The learned Judge of the appellate Court was probably influenced by the apparent conflict of views of the different High Courts and, therefore, he thought it safer to follow the view expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council as followed by the Madras High Court. While doing so, the learned Judge failed to notice the facts that the case before their Lordships of the Privy Council related to Shias, nor did their Lordships lay down that the said presumption about the dower being treated as prompt in the absence of an agreement was universally applicable to Muslims of all schools. The learned Judges of the Madras High Court, while following the Privy Council dictum, specifically observed as follows:-- Whether the parties are Shias or Sunnis, dower must be presumed to be prompt unless payment of the whole or any part of the dower is expressly postponed at least in the Madras Presidency whatever the nature of the decisions in other provinces may be. (Italicising mine). Thus the Madras High Court limited the operation of the presumption to all Muslims whether Shias or Sunnis to the Madras Presidency. 5. Similarly a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of, Hussein Khan Sardar Khan Vs. Gulab Khatun I.L.R. 35 Bom. 386, without referring to the case of Mirza Bedar Bakht Vs. Mirza Khurram Bakht 19 W. R. 315, held that in the absence of an agreement, the whole of the dower debt should be treated as prompt dower. It is not clear from the said decision whether the parties are Shias or Sunnis. However, these decisions cannot be precedents for application of the presumption universally to all Muslims. The distinction between the Shia and Sunni schools has to be borne in mind with reference to any special custom among any sect in any local area 6. The contrary view is taken by the Allahabad High Court in the cases of Umda Begum Vs. Muhammadi Begum I.L.R. 33 All. 291; Muhammad Subhanullah Vs. Saghirunnissa I. L R. 41 All. 562; Mangat Rai Hiralal Vs. Mst. Sakina Begum A.I.R. 1934 All. 441, and Rahana Khatun Bibi Vs. The contrary view is taken by the Allahabad High Court in the cases of Umda Begum Vs. Muhammadi Begum I.L.R. 33 All. 291; Muhammad Subhanullah Vs. Saghirunnissa I. L R. 41 All. 562; Mangat Rai Hiralal Vs. Mst. Sakina Begum A.I.R. 1934 All. 441, and Rahana Khatun Bibi Vs. Iqtiar Uddin Hasan I.R.L. (1943) All. 294. The said view further finds support of the Patna High Court in the case of Mahbooban Vs. Muhammad Amiruddin I.L.R. 8 Pat. 645, and of the Lahore High Court in the case of Nasiruddin Shah Vs. Mst. Amatul Mughri Begam I.L.R. (1947) Lah. 565 (F.B.). The last mentioned case has discussed the question in all its aspects with particular reference to the Muslim personal law and the differing views of the various High Courts. The ratio decidendi of those cases is that the proposition of law enunciated in Macnaghten's Mohommedan Law is correct so far as the Shias are concerned, that the Privy Council; case concerned the Shias and that the Madras decisions are based on the general custom prevalent in the Presidency of Madras and that so far as Sunnis in other parts of the country are concerned, the presumption does not apply and the Court should fix a reasonable part of the dower debt to be payable promptly. 7. I have no hesitation in following the Lahore Full Bench view, so far as the Sunnis in Madhya Pradesh are concerned. In the present case no particular custom is alleged or proved There appears to be no reported decision of this High Court on the point. 8. The next question is what portion of the dower should be fixed as prompt in the present case. The matter has to be decided after taking into consideration the custom, if any, the status of the parties and the amount of the dower settled. The decisions referred to above put a reasonable proportion anywhere from one-fifth to three-fourth. In Muhammad Subhanullah Vs. Saghirunnissa I.L.R. 41 All. 562, it was fixed at 72 per cent of the total amount, while in the Lahore Full Bench case it was fixed at half. In the present case the amount settled was Rs. 1,550/- , while the parties are middle-class cultivators. The plaintiff has actually agreed to pay Rs. 2,500/- as dower to his second wife, vide the Nikahnama (Ex. P 3). In the present case the amount settled was Rs. 1,550/- , while the parties are middle-class cultivators. The plaintiff has actually agreed to pay Rs. 2,500/- as dower to his second wife, vide the Nikahnama (Ex. P 3). As such he does not appear to be in straightened circumstances. In compliance with the order of this Court, dated 4th April 1957, he has already deposited Rs. 500/- - in the trial Court. I feel it would be quite reasonable to fix the prompt dower at Rs. 775/- - inclusive of the amount already deposited. The said amount of Rs. 500/- - shall be paid to the plaintiff respondent. As regards the balance of Rs. 275/, the defendant appellant is granted time to deposit the same in the trial Court within one month of this judgment. If the said payments are not made the decree shall be executable for the said amount of Rs. 775/- -. Thus the appeal is allowed partly by modifying the decree to Rs. 775/- -. The parties will bear the costs of this appeal as incurred. The costs of the two Courts below shall be borne as directed by the lower appellate Court. Although the appellant succeeds to the extent of half, he had falsely denied the whole of the claim and as such it is proper that he should be saddled with the costs of the lower Courts, A decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal allowed.