JUDGMENT R.N. Gurtu, J. - In this case the Municipal Board, Sitapur through its Executive Officer made a complaint to a Magistrate against the applicant in respect of certain alleged interference with Municipal property, under one of the bye-laws framed by virtue of the power given to the Board by the State Govt, u/s 298 J. (C) of the Municipalities Act. Cognizance was taken of that complaint and several dates were fixed for the disposal of the said complaint. On the date in question the Executive Officer of the Municipal Board was absent though another employee was present. Then and application was made by the accused that the complaint should be dismissed by the Magistrate as required u/s 247 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure because of the non-appearance of the complainant. The Magistrate passed an order that he would consider that application on a subsequent date That application was considered and the Magistrate declined to dismiss the complaint because the Magistrate was of the view that a prosecution under the said bye-law was not a prosecution upon a complaint but was a prosecution upon information received and that S. 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not attracted. The learned Magistrate relied upon a case reported in Mst. Basanti v. Maqsud Ali Khan 83 IC, 730., That case lays down as follows: A complaint of an offence u/s 247, UP Municipalities Act, cannot be dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant, as under that section it is the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the offence upon information received. The proceedings are not instituted upon a "complaint" within the meaning of S. 4 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and S. 247 of the Code, has, therefore, no application to the case." Relying upon this ruling the Magistrate, as already indicated, refused to dismiss the complaint. The Magistrate, however did not think it necessary to consider whether there was or was not otherwise any good reasons for dismissing the complaint. 2. It is argued before me that the complaint should have been dismissed. I will examine this argument. 3. The Magistrate, however did not think it necessary to consider whether there was or was not otherwise any good reasons for dismissing the complaint. 2. It is argued before me that the complaint should have been dismissed. I will examine this argument. 3. S. 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows: If the summons has been issued on complaint, and upon the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day: Provided that where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dipense with his attendance, and proceed with the case. 4. That section therefore makes it obligatory for the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint because of the non-appearance of the complainant, unless for some reasons he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other date. 5. It is contended that the Court below was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the prosecution launched by the Municipal Board was not upon a complaint. S. 190 Code of Criminal Procedure lays down the conditions requisite for the initiation of criminal proceedings. That section is as follows: (1) Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf may take congnizance of any offence; (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence ; (b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed (2) The State Government, or the District magistrate subject to the general or special orders of the State Government, may empower any magistrate to take cognizance u/s ub-S. (1), Cl. (a) or Cl. (b), of offences for which he may try or commit for trial. (3) The State Government may em-power any magistrate of the first or second class to take cognizance u/s ub-S. (1), Cl. (c), of offences for which he may try or commit for trial. 6. (a) or Cl. (b), of offences for which he may try or commit for trial. (3) The State Government may em-power any magistrate of the first or second class to take cognizance u/s ub-S. (1), Cl. (c), of offences for which he may try or commit for trial. 6. It will be observed that proceedings can be initiated under that section in one of three ways ; one of the ways being upon information received and another upon a complaint of facts which constitute the offence charged. A complaint is necessarily filed by a person who suffers an injury himself. Information, however, may be given by persons who have not suffered any injury themselves but who wish to move the magistrate to initiate such proceedings. 7. S. 5 Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows: (1) All offences under the IPC shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions i.e. Code of Criminal Procedure but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. 8. Therefore, offences against Municipal bye-laws would have to be dealt with in the way indicated in S. 5 (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure unless there is something in the bye-laws or in the Municipal Act under which they are to be framed contrary. 9. Now although the Municipaliti(sic) Act puts an offence u/s 247 thereof on ating(sic) of its own and proceedings thereunder are considered to be started upon information there is no provision that in the Act or any bye-law under the Act that a complaint of facts which constitutes an offence is to be deemed to be an "information." 10. 9. Now although the Municipaliti(sic) Act puts an offence u/s 247 thereof on ating(sic) of its own and proceedings thereunder are considered to be started upon information there is no provision that in the Act or any bye-law under the Act that a complaint of facts which constitutes an offence is to be deemed to be an "information." 10. S. 247 of the Municipalities Act runs as follows: (1) When a Magistrate of the first class receives information- (a) that a house in the vicinity of a place of worship or an educational institution or a boarding house, hostel or mess used, or occupied by students is used as a brothel or for the purpose of habitual prostitution or by disorderly persons of any description, or (b) that any house is used as aforesaid to the annoyance of respectable inhabitants in the vicinity, or (c) that a house in the immediate neighbourhood of a cantonment is used as a brothel or for the purpose of habitual prostitution, he may summon the owner, tenant, manager or occupier of the house to appear before him either in person or by agent; and if satisfied that the house is used as described in Clause (a), Clause (b), or Clause (c) may, by a written order, direct such owner, tenant, manager or occupier, within a period to be stated in such order, not less than five days from the date thereof to discontinue such use..... 11. The word used in Sub-section is "information not "complaint" these are words which have a technical meaning in the Code. It will be observed that S. 247 is a section relating to a brothel. The offence contemplated thereunder is more or less an offence against the community and not against any particular person. Therefore, it is put in a class of its own. But the present complaint which has been launched under a bye-law has not to be tried out according to any special procedure contained in the Municipalities Act or under the rules framed and a complaint in respect of a bye-law has not been put in the category of "information." 12. Therefore, it is put in a class of its own. But the present complaint which has been launched under a bye-law has not to be tried out according to any special procedure contained in the Municipalities Act or under the rules framed and a complaint in respect of a bye-law has not been put in the category of "information." 12. Therefore whatever may be the true position in regard to an "information" given u/s 247 of the Municipalities Act, the position in regard to a trial of a "complaint" for an offence against a bye-law is, hat the trial must proceed as indicated in S. 5, CrPC, i.e. it must proceed as if it was a trial upon a complaint. Ch. XVII, S. 204 indicates how proceedings upon a complaint have to be commenced and subsequent chapters show how they have to be continued. I am clear in my mind that the present "complaint" for the infringement of this particular bye-law was not in the nature of an "information" and that the proceedings before the Magistrate were instituted upon a complaint and had to be proceeded with as upon a complaint. The basis of the decision of the Court below is therefore knocked out and it becomes necessary to set aside the orders of the Courts below and remand this case. 13. I accordingly set aside these orders and send this case back to the trial court, through the Court below, for a consideration of the question whether there was such nonappearance on the date in question of the complainant as would attract S. 247 of the Code and whether, if there was such nonappearance, an order of dismissal should be passed or whether the Court would be justified for such reasons as it thinks proper, to adjourn the hearing to some other date. The Court will consider these two questions, applying its independent mind, and will proceed to dispose of the case thereafter according to law.