Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. These two appeals arise out of applications under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and this judgment will govern both. 2. The respondents who are common in both the appeals are the decree-holders. They obtained an ex parte decree on 12-4-1950 jointly against the appellants in both the appeals in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mathurai in the State of Madras. That decree was transferred for execution to the District Judge of Gaya. In due course, after the execution was levied in the Court of the 1st Munsif, Gaya, being Execution Case No. 398 of 1953, two applications were filed under Sec. 47 of the Code objecting to the execution of the decree on various grounds -- one on behalf of Seonath Prasad and the other on behalf of Copal Prasad and Madan Murari Prasad. The former was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 61 of 1955 giving rise to Miscellaneous Appeal No. 92 of 1956, and the latter was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 62 of 1955 giving rise to Miscellaneous Appeal No. 138 of 1956. The suit was instituted by the respondents against the joint family firm, Babu Kali Prasad Lakshmi Prasad, and also against the partners constituting the joint family, namely, Sheonath Prasad (appellant in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 92 of 1956), Girdhari Prasad, Mani Babu, Gopal Prasad and Madan Murari Prasad, the last two being the appellants in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 138 of 1956, on the allegations that all the defendants were members of a joint Hindu family, of which Sheonath Prasad was the karta and manager of the family. He was sued in his personal capacity as well as in his capacity as the manager and karta of the joint family. The contention of the appellants in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 138 was that the decree was against the firm only and they were not personally liable for the payment of the decree and that their personal property was not liable to attachment and sale. Sheonath Prasad opposed the application for execution on the ground that the decree was void and without jurisdiction as the Subordinate Judge of Mathurai had no territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. He further urged that he was not personally liable for the payment of the decree. 3. Sheonath Prasad opposed the application for execution on the ground that the decree was void and without jurisdiction as the Subordinate Judge of Mathurai had no territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. He further urged that he was not personally liable for the payment of the decree. 3. In both the cases the learned Munsif rejected their contentions and held that the decree was executable both against the property of the firm and personally against the partners who had been individually served in the suit. He accordingly dismissed the applications and allowed the execution to proceed. The judgment-debtors preferred appeals against those decisions and the learned Subordinate Judge who heard them agreed with the learned Munsif that the decree was not void for want of jurisdiction and was executable both against the firm property and personally against the individual partners. He accordingly dismissed the appeals. Now, the judgment-debtors have come up in Second Appeal. I shall take up these appeals separately. Miscellaneous Appeal No. 138 of 1956. 4. Mr. Madan Mohan Prasad I appearing for the appellants reiterated the contention raised in the Courts below and urged that the decree was against the firm only & was therefore not executabe against the appellants in absence of the order of the decreeing Court under Rule 50 (2) of Order XXI of the Code. He relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Satchidanand V/s. Prayag Sah-Saheb Ram, AIR 1930 Pat 205. This decision is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. In that case a suit was filed and decree granted against a Hindu joint family partnership firm consisting of father and son in the names of Himmat Prasad Satchidanand. Satchidanand, the son of Himmat Prasad, neither appeared in the suit proceedings, nor admitted partnership in pleadings, nor was he adjudged as a partner. He was also not served individually. The decree-holder sought to execute the decree against the property in the hands of Satchidanand, whereupon the latter objected denying the partnership and the fact that it was partnership property. On these facts it was held that in the absence of an order of the decreeing Court under Rule 50 (2) of Order XXI, the decree-holder was not entitled to proceed against the property in the hands of Satchidanand. On these facts it was held that in the absence of an order of the decreeing Court under Rule 50 (2) of Order XXI, the decree-holder was not entitled to proceed against the property in the hands of Satchidanand. In the present case, the suit was not only against the joint family firm but also against the members constituting the joint family individually, and they were served with summons in that suit. The contention of Mr. Prasad is agaiast the provisions of Rule 50 of Order XXI and Order XXX of the Code. The provisions of Order XXX deal with the procedure in the suits instituted by or against the firms, while Rule 50 of Order XXI deals with the mode of execution of decree against firms in the firms names. Now, Order XXX, Rule 1 allows "any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in the States "to" sue or be sued in the name of the firm (if any) of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action". Therefore, under this rule it is permissible for two or more partners alone to sue provided the suit is brought in the name of the firm. Rule 3 provides for the mode of service of summons in a suit against the firm. It runs as follows: "Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons shall be served either- (a) upon any one or more of the partners, or (b) at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within the States upon any person having, at the time of service, the control or management of the partnership business there, as the Court may direct and such service shall be deemed good service upon the firm so used, whether all or any of the partners are within or without the States:" There follows a proviso which is not material. Rule 6 provides for appearance of the partners. It lays down: "Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, they shall appear individually in their own names, but all subsequent proceedings shall, nevertheless, continue in the name of the firm." Rule 7 forbids appearance except by partners. Rule 6 provides for appearance of the partners. It lays down: "Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, they shall appear individually in their own names, but all subsequent proceedings shall, nevertheless, continue in the name of the firm." Rule 7 forbids appearance except by partners. It enacts: "Where a summons is served in the manner provided by Rule 3 upon a person having the control or management of the partnership business, no appearance by him shall be necessary unless he is a partner of the firm sued." The main object of this rule appears to avoid unnecessary delay caused by the appearance of persons who are neither partners nor their agents. It will be material to refer to Rule 5 which provides that at the time of the service of summons as provided by Rule 3, every person upon whom it is served shall be informed by notice in writing given at the time of such service, whether he is served as a partner or as a person having the control or management of the partnership business, or in both characters. It provides further and it is important that in default of such notice, the person served shall be deemed to be served as a partner. The present suit was instituted not only against the joint family firm but also all the members constituting the joint family were impleaded as defendants. The suit was against the joint family firm through the partners who were named in the suit itself, and there was service of summons upon them, as provided in Rule 3 of Order XXX of the Code. In other words, all the members constituting the joint family were impleaded as defendants and were served individually as partners, constituting the firm. Having regard to these facts, there is hardly any doubt that the decree-holders are entitled to proceed with the execution not only against the property of the firm, but also against the partners who had been served individually in the suit and some of whom are appellants in these two appeals. Now, Rule 50 of Order XXI provides how execution shall be levied. Now, Rule 50 of Order XXI provides how execution shall be levied. It lays down as follows: "(1) Where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted- (a) against any property of the partnership; (b) against any person who has appeared in his own name under Rule 6 or Rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, partner; (c) against any person who has been individually served as a partner with a summons and has failed to appear. Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the provisions of Sec.247 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. (2) Where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in Sub-rule (1), Clauses (b) and (c), as being a partner in the firm, he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such Court may grant such leave, or, where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined, (3) Where the liability of any person has been tried and determined under Sub-rule (2), the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or other wise as if it were a decree. * * * * *" It makes it perfectly clear that the decree passed against a firm cannot be executed against any one or more of the partners personally, that is to say, against their person or personal property unless the conditions laid down in Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 50 are complied with. The reason is obvious. The reason is obvious. Where summons of a suit against a firm has been served on the partners of the firm also as provided in Rule 3 of Order XXX or where any person has appeared personally under Rule 6 or Rule 7 of Order XXX, or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is or he has been adjudged to be a partner, it is for such partners to appear in the suit in obedience to the summons and dispute their liability to pay the amount sued for. Where, however, in spite of the service of summons, the partners do not appear and the suit is decreed ex parte, his liability as partner must be deemed to be established in the suit itself, and he cannot so long as the decree stands, urge in an execution proceeding that the decree was not binding personally upon him. The reason is that such persons must be deemed to be parties to the decree by reason of service of summons, or admission, or adjudication, as partners. Where, however, a person said to be a partner does not come under Clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 1, he cannot be deemed to be a party to the decree. In order to make him liable the procedure laid down in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 50 must be complied with. Unless his liability has been determined as laid down in Sub-rule (2) he cannot be made liable for payment of the decree, either as a partner or personally. Therefore, it is obvious that where a decree-holder, claims to execute a decree against a partner not coming under Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 50, in other words, against a partner who was not served individually in the suit or who did not appear under Rule 6 or Rule 7 of Order XXX, or who did not admit on the pleadings that he was, or who has not adjudged to be a partner, he has to apply under Sub-rule (2) for leave to execute the decree against such partner. In the present case, the provisions of Sub-rule (2) are not attracted, for the simple reason that all the persons constituting the joint family, in other words, all the partners of the joint family firm, were sued also individually and were served with summons. In the present case, the provisions of Sub-rule (2) are not attracted, for the simple reason that all the persons constituting the joint family, in other words, all the partners of the joint family firm, were sued also individually and were served with summons. Therefore, leave of the Court under Sub-rule (2) was not at all necessary. They come under Clause (c) of Rule 50, and therefore the decree can be executed not only against the property of the firm but also personally against the partners, who had been served with summons in the suit itself, namely, the appellants in these two appeals. It follows from the above that both the contentions raised by Mr. Prasad are not tenable, because the appellants were parties to the suit and were accordingly liable personally for the payment of the decree. 5. I may mention here that Mr. R.P. Katriar appearing for the respondents conceded that the appellants were" not personally liable, but, in my opinion, as will appear from the above, he was wrong. In this case, the appellants were really liable also, personally for the payment of the decree. 6. Mr. Prasad also contended that the amount of the claim laid against them was in respect of the money misappropriated by the karta of the family and, therefore, the other members were not liable. But, this also was a question which should have been agitated in the suit itself when the summons was duly served. This question cannot be considered collaterally in the execution proceeding, and the decree cannot be said to be unenforceable, unless on that ground the decree is set aside in an appropriate proceeding. 7. It follows that there is no merit in this appeal. Miscellaneous Appeal No. 92 of 1956. 8. The main contention raised in this appeal by Mr. G.P. Das appearing for the appellants is that the Subordinate Judge of Mathurai had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass the decree, because the cause of action did not arise within his territorial jurisdiction, but at Gaya, and, therefore, the decree was void for want of jurisdiction. Mr. 8. The main contention raised in this appeal by Mr. G.P. Das appearing for the appellants is that the Subordinate Judge of Mathurai had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass the decree, because the cause of action did not arise within his territorial jurisdiction, but at Gaya, and, therefore, the decree was void for want of jurisdiction. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha appearing for the respondents referred to Sec.21 of the Code and contended that the defects due to want of territorial jurisdiction cannot be agitated either in appeal or in revision, much less in an execution proceeding, unless the conditions specified in the aforesaid section are complied with. His contention is that Sec.21 makes it perfectly clear that non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 15 to 20 of the Code which provide for the venue of a suit does not render the decree a nullity, and, therefore, if an objection about lack of territorial jurisdiction is not taken at all before the Court of first instance or not taken at the earliest possible opportunity and before the settlement of issues, an appellate or re-visional Court is precluded from entertaining such an objection. His argument is that when the appellate and the revisional Court are debarred under the law from entertaining such objection, more so the executing Court cannot entertain an objection that the decree was void for lack of such a jurisdiction. In my opinion, the contention raised by Mr. Sinha is correct and is supported by authorities. The executing Court is no doubt debarred from going behind the decree, but where there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction in a Court, the decree passed by it is a nullity, which can be ignored without being formally set aside, and the executing Court can refuse to execute a decree where want of jurisdiction of a Court is apparent on the face of the record, because such a decree is null and void and incapable of execution. Where, however, the want of jurisdiction is not apparent on the face of the record and is rested on grounds which require determination by a Court, it does not by itself make the decree a nullity, but only voidable, such a decree can be set aside by appropriate proceeding but cannot be collaterally impeached. Where, however, the want of jurisdiction is not apparent on the face of the record and is rested on grounds which require determination by a Court, it does not by itself make the decree a nullity, but only voidable, such a decree can be set aside by appropriate proceeding but cannot be collaterally impeached. But where the objection as to jurisdiction relates to the place of suing the decree passed by a Court having no territorial jurisdiction cannot be impeached either collaterally or by a separate suit if the conditions laid down in Sec.21 were not fulfilled. A Division Bench of this Court in Dirgopal Rai V/s. Kesho Prasad Singh, AIR 1928 Pat 324, has held that a Court of first instance cannot in execution entertain an objection as to the place of suing. Subsequently, another Division Bench of this Court in Ishwar Mahton V/s. Naipal Singh, AIR 1956 Pat 280 , has laid down that the validity of the decree under execution cannot be challenged on the ground that it was not passed by a Court having territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit when such an objection was not raised at any stage in the suit or in any appeal or revision connected therewith. In both these cases reliance was placed upon a decision of the Madras High Court in Zamindar of Ettiyapuram V/s. Chidambaram Chetty, AIR 1920 Mad 1019 -- Wallis C.J. delivering the judgment on behalf of the Full Rench in the aforesaid Madras case has laid down the law as follows : "I am clearly of opinion that the provisions of Sec.21, Civil P. C., apply to all objections based on the alleged infringement of the provisions of Sections 16 to 18, Civil P. C., as regards, the institution of suits relating to immovable property ..... Sec.21 forbids any appellate or revisional Court to allow any objection as to the place of suing unless it was taken in the original Court and even then unless there was a consequent failure of justice. The effect of the section in my opinion is that objections which the appellate or revisional Court is thereby precluded from allowing must be considered cured for all purposes unless taken before the passing of the decree in the original Courts. The effect of the section in my opinion is that objections which the appellate or revisional Court is thereby precluded from allowing must be considered cured for all purposes unless taken before the passing of the decree in the original Courts. The ordinary way of questioning a decree passed without jurisdiction is on appeal or in revision, and if this is forbidden, a Court of first instance cannot in execution do that which the appellate or revisional Court is precluded from doing." 9. Similarly, a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Musa Ji Lukman Ji V/s. Durga Dass, AIR 1946 Lah 57, has held as follows : "The doctrine of conferring jurisdiction on or depriving Courts of jurisdiction by consent only applies to cases of inherent jurisdiction of a Court over the subject matter of a suit. This proposition has been conceded in this decision, but the question of territorial jurisdiction of a Court is not a question of inherent jurisdiction. An objection as regards the territorial jurisdiction of a Court can be waived by a party and if it is not raised at earlier stages of a case it cannot be raised in a Court of appeal; see in this connexion the provisions of Sec.21, Civil P. C., and Section 99 of the same Code. The judgment or decree of a Court having no territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit is not a nullity but is a judgment of a competent Court." 10. A Full Rench of the Hyderabad High Court expressed likewise in Anand Rao V/s. Kishen-das, AIR 1954 Hyd 190. It has laid down that if failure to raise objection as to territorial jurisdiction of a Civil Court, as provided in Sec.21, precludes the appellate and revisional Courts from entertaining it, the execution Courts should also be precluded, being tribunals wherein original proceedings were entertained. It has further observed that failure to take objection as to territorial jurisdiction is cured by Sec.21, and where such failure is cured for all purposes of the suit obviously it cannot be excluded for the purposes of execution proceedings. It has further observed that failure to take objection as to territorial jurisdiction is cured by Sec.21, and where such failure is cured for all purposes of the suit obviously it cannot be excluded for the purposes of execution proceedings. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that Sec.21 lays down the law relating to the territorial jurisdiction of all Civil Courts and applies also to the execution proceedings and therefore on failure to raise objection in the Court which passed the decree, it cannot be reagitated in the execution proceedings. 11. Mr. Das, however, referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 and laid stress on the following observations of their Lordships : "It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." These general observations are no doubt true. They are not based upon the interpretation of Sec.21 of the Code. In that case their Lordships were concerned with the construction of Sec.11 of the Suits Valuation Act. They have, however, made it clear in that very case that objections relating to territorial jurisdiction should not be entertained unless the conditions laid down in Sec.21 of the Code were fulfilled. Their Lordships have observed as follows : "With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Sec.21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Sec.11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Sec.11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99, C. P. C. and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice On the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under Sec.11 of the Suits Valuation Act. Therefore, this decision of their Lordships does not help Mr. Das at all and does not shake the authority of the Full Rench decisions of different High Courts referred to above. In my opinion, this contention of Mr. Das is not well-founded and must be overruled. 12 Mr. Lalnarain Sinha further argued that even on merits the objection of Mr. Das was not tenable. His contention, is that the appellant had promised to pay the money at Mathurai, and, therefore, the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Mathurai, had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. I have been taken through the plaint, and I think that the contention of Mr. Sinha is well-founded. It is perfectly clear from the plaint that there was a promise to pay the money at Mathurai, and, therefore, the Mathurai Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Thus, the contention of Mr. Das is not tenable either in principle or on merits. 13. The appellant had also raised an objection as to his personal liability to pay the decree. I have discussed this question above in relation to the appellants in the other appeal and those observations apply here. It must be held that this appellant is liable also personally to pay the decree. 14. There is no merit in this appeal either. 15. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed with costs.