JUDGMENT J.K. Tandon, J. - This writ petition is directed against an order dated 2-6-1956 passed by the Additional Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Soram, district Allahabad in connection with a case under section 323, IPC, and section 24, Cattle Trespass Act started before the Panchayati Adalat Jalalpur, police station Mau Aima, district Allahabad, against the applicants at the instance of opposite party No. 3. 2. The facts giving rise to the petition are as follows. Smt. Shukhrani filed a complaint in July 1955 before the Panchayati Adalat Jalalpur against the applicants under section 323, IPC, and section 24, Cattle Trespass Act. Thereafter a bench consisting of five persons of whom Basdeo was the chairman was constituted for the hearing and decision of this case. The petitioners allegation is that the said bench after ascertaining documentary and oral evidence fixed 25-10-1955 for delivery of judgment. They therefore, attended the Panchayati Adalat on the appointed date but were informed that the file relating to the case had been taken away by the Sarpanch of the Panchayati Adalat, Shri Shitla Prasad. The result was that the judgment was not pronounced. The applicants' allegations further are that they met the Sarpanch who, to their great surprise, asked them to pay him Rs. 50 and that in case of failure threatened them that another bench would be constituted to try the case. It is also alleged that four out of the five Panches excluding Basdeo Sarpanch had actually prepared and signed the judgment and handed it over to Shri Shitla Prasad for being sealed and pronounced, but Shitla Prasad instead of pronouncing it, threw it away because of their refusing to pay him Rs. 50. It is again alleged that the applicants then made an application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Soram, requesting him to send for the file and to take appropriate action against Shitla Prasad for demanding illegal gratification, etc. On this application the Additional Sub-Divisional Magistrate, by his order dated 2-6-1956 rejected the applicants' contention that the judgment had actually been prepared and directed that the particular case be tried by a fresh bench to be constituted for the purpose. It is against this order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate that the present petition has been directed. 3. On this application the Additional Sub-Divisional Magistrate, by his order dated 2-6-1956 rejected the applicants' contention that the judgment had actually been prepared and directed that the particular case be tried by a fresh bench to be constituted for the purpose. It is against this order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate that the present petition has been directed. 3. The grounds urged are that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate acted illegally and erroneously in holding that the judgment prepared by four out of the five members of the bench was inoperative in law, in view of Sections 77A and R. 100 of the UP Panchayat Raj Act. Another ground taken is that the action of Shimla Prasad in demanding illegal gratification was illegal and improper; and lastly, that the Sub Divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to remand the case to the Panchayati Adalat. In this connection the learned counsel for the applicants has relied on section 85 of the UP Panchayat Raj Act, as it was prior to its amendment by the UP Panchayat Raj (Amendment) Act No. 11 of 1955. The unamended section authorised a Sub Divisional Magistrate to cancel the jurisdiction of the Panchayati Adalat or to quash any order passed by it. There was no provision, according to the learned counsel, under section 85 then authorising the Sub Divisional Magistrate to remand the case for retrial by another bench of the Panchayati Adalat. 4. So far as the allegation by the petitioner, with regard to the preparation of judgment by four out of the five Panches is concerned, the opposite party has denied that any judgment was in fact prepared. According to him the petitioners were in collusion with those four Panches and they succeeded in fabricating the judgment said to have been prepared by them and later thrown away by Shitla Prasad. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to go into this question of fact, namely, whether judgment had in fact been written and signed by four out of the five Panches as claimed by the petitioners because on their own admission even this judgment was not pronounced by the Panchayati Adalat concerned at any time. R. 100 dealing with the judgment, order or decree, by the Panchayati Adalat, provides that the Nyaya Panchayat shall record a brief judgment and the final order over the signatures of the Panches. R. 100 dealing with the judgment, order or decree, by the Panchayati Adalat, provides that the Nyaya Panchayat shall record a brief judgment and the final order over the signatures of the Panches. The judgment shall be read in the open court and signatures or thumb impressions of the parties present will be taken on it as far as possible. Admittedly, the judgment relied upon by the petitioners was never read out in open court. At the most, it was written and signed by four out of the five Panches. In the absence of the allegation that it was also read out in an open court it failed to comply with the requirements of a 'judgment' as given u/R. 100 of the Rules. Moreover, section 77A of the Act requires that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a case may be heard in the absence of some of the Panches, provided, however, that at least these Panches, including the Chairman, are present. In the present case the petitioners have admitted that Basdeo the Chairman of the Panchayati Adalat which heard the complaint against them, had not joined in the judgment written out by them nor was the judgment entrusted to him at all delivered. It was on the other hand, delivered by Shitla Prasad who was not a member of the bench concerned. Once again, therefore, the so called judgment could not be said to be a judgment by the Panchayati Adalat concerned. The finding of the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate that the so called judgment relied upon by the petitioners was "waste paper" cannot be said to be necessarily wrong. 5. Coming to the second question, namely whether the Sub Divisional Magistrate had power to remand the case for trial to a fresh bench, no case for interference by this Court has been made out by the petitioners. under section 85 as substituted by the Amending Act 1955, the Sub Divisional Officer has power to transfer a case from one bench of the Nyaya Panchayat to another bench of the Nyaya Panchayat. under section 89, which is the section dealing with the revisional powers, a Sub Divisional Magistrate has power to remand a case to a Nyaya Panchayat for retrial with such direction as he may deem fit. under section 89, which is the section dealing with the revisional powers, a Sub Divisional Magistrate has power to remand a case to a Nyaya Panchayat for retrial with such direction as he may deem fit. Both these sections came into force with effect from 15-4-1956 vide notification No. 1996/XXXIII/110.55, dated 7-4-1956 published in Part III, UP Gazette, dated 14-4-1956. Under these sections the Sub Divisional Magistrate doubtless possessed the power not only to remand the case but also to attach directions to the remand order and to further direct that another bench of the Nyaya Panchayat and not the same bench which tried the case originally would hold the trial. The learned counsel for the applicants has, however, urged that these sections came into force in April 1956 while the petition to the Sub Divisional Magistrate had been made earlier. Consequently, the powers of the Sub Divisional Magistrate should be found, not in the amended sections, but in the law as it was at the time of making the application. There is no material on record to point out on which date the petition to the Sub Divisional Magistrate was made. But quite apart from it I consider that both the Sections 85 & 89 which were part of adjuvant law will unless contrary is shown apply to pending cases also. In this view of the matter this objection also cannot prevail. There is, in my opinion, no merit in this petition. The same is dismissed. Costs will abide the result of the case. The stay order is discharged.