G. MEHROTRA J. : This Rule has been issued on an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus or certiorari or any other appropriate writ against the opposite parties to show cause why the order passed by them should not be quashed. The petitioner is a resident of Lakhipur under Goal-para Subdivision in the district of Coalpara and had made an application for granting him a stage car­riage permit for Lakhipur-Goalpara route. Along with the petitioner one Khairuddin had also applied for the grant of a permit on 'the same route. The petitioner and Khairuddin were considered suitable for the grant of the permit. The Regional Transport Authority of Gauhati in its meeting held on 25th and 26th October 1956, de­cided & granted a stage carriage permit to the peti­tioner for the Lakhipur-Goalpara route for a period of three years with effect from 1-12-56. The Goal-para Bus Association opposed the increase of num­ber of stage carriage permits on Lakhipur-Goalpara route in the meeting held on the 25th and 26th of October, 1956, but their objections were turned down. An appeal was filed by the Goalpara Bus Asso­ciation against the grant of permits to the peti­tioner and Khairuddin and that was rejected. Permit fee was thereafter deposited by the petitioner and he purchased the bus No. ASK 1745 and put it on the Lakhipur-Goalpara route. He obtained a special permit No. P. St. P. 1/57 from the Regional Transport Authority, Gauhati on 21-5-57 and since that date he has been plying the bus on that route. Opposite party No. 4 Rohini Ku­mar Das who had also a permit for a bus on Ban-gigaon-Basugaon-Sidly-Chapar route filed an appeal to the Appellate Board, Transport, Assam against the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Gauhati refusing to grant him a permit on the Lakhipur-Goalpara route and allowing the petitioner a permit on that route. The Appellate Board-respondent No. 2 after hearing the appeal filed by Rohini Kumar Das opposite party No. 4, allowed the appeal and granted him a permit on the said route. Respondent No. 2 while granting the permit to respondent No. 4 Rohini Kumar Das, offered the petitioner a permit on the Bongaigaon-Basugaon-Sidly-Chapar route if he so desired. The Appellate Board-respondent No. 2 after hearing the appeal filed by Rohini Kumar Das opposite party No. 4, allowed the appeal and granted him a permit on the said route. Respondent No. 2 while granting the permit to respondent No. 4 Rohini Kumar Das, offered the petitioner a permit on the Bongaigaon-Basugaon-Sidly-Chapar route if he so desired. The Appellate Authority held that the peti­tioner was a new comer to this business and he had no experience of the business and thus the order granting him the permit was cancelled and the per­mit was granted to opposite party No. 4. It is this order which has teen impugned by the present peti­tioner before us. The main contention raised by the petitioner is that the appeal having been filed by respondent No. 4 against the refusal of permit to him, the Appellate Authority had no jurisdiction to cancel the order granting him the permit and to grant the same to the respondent No. 4. He further contends that he acquired a right to get a permit under the order of the Regional Transport Authority, which according to his conten­tion, could not lie set aside on an appeal by the res­pondent No. 4, specially when no written objection was filed by him to the grant of permit to the peti­tioner before the Regional Transport Authority. In this connection it is further argued that the peti­tioner was granted a temporary permit to -ply his bus on this route on 21-5-1957 and the order of the Ap­pellate Authority amounts to cancellation of that permit which the Appellate Authority had no juris­diction to do, except on the grounds mentioned in S. 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It will be convenient to dispose of the second contention first. The petitioner was granted a perma­nent permit for stage carriage by the Regional Trans­port Authority as decided in its meeting held on 25th and 26th October 1956 and an application op­posing the grant of the permit made by the Goalpara Bus Association was rejected. Respondent No. 4 filed the appeal and during the pendency of the appeal the petitioner was allowed to ply his bus under the permit granted on 21-5-1957. The petitioner, there we, cannot contend to have acquired any perma­nent right to ply his bus under the permit dated 21-5-1957. Respondent No. 4 filed the appeal and during the pendency of the appeal the petitioner was allowed to ply his bus under the permit granted on 21-5-1957. The petitioner, there we, cannot contend to have acquired any perma­nent right to ply his bus under the permit dated 21-5-1957. The effect of the permit granted on 21-5-1957 was to permit him to ply the bus during the pendency of the appeal. The Appellate autho­rity did not cancel any permit granted to the peti­tioner and thus the provisions of S. 60 of the Mo­tor Vehicles Act ure not attracted. (2) The main point however, urged by the peti­tioner is that the order of the Appellate Authority is without jurisdiction. In brief the argument is that in an appeal filed by the respondent No. 4 against the order refusing to grant him a permit, the Appel­late Authority had no jurisdiction to cancel the per­mit granted to the petitioner. (2) The main point however, urged by the peti­tioner is that the order of the Appellate Authority is without jurisdiction. In brief the argument is that in an appeal filed by the respondent No. 4 against the order refusing to grant him a permit, the Appel­late Authority had no jurisdiction to cancel the per­mit granted to the petitioner. Section 64 of the Mo­tor Vehicles Act reads as follows : "Any person - (a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or (b) aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof, or (c) aggrieved by the refusal to transfer the per­mit to the person succeeding on the death of the holder of a permit, or (d) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to countersign a per­mit or by any condition attached to such counter-signature, or (e) aggrieved by the refusal or renewal of a permit, or (f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a person providing trans­port facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto, or (g) aggrieved by the refusal to grant permis­sion under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) of S. 59, or (h) aggrieved by a reduction under sub-s. (1-A) of S. 60 in the number of vehicles or routes or area covered by a permit, or (i) aggrieved by any other order which may be prescribed, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the origi­nal authority an opportunity of being heard.'" (3) According to the petitioner, clause (a1) of S. 64 gives a right to a person whose application for grant of permit has been refused by the Regional Transport Authority to file an appeal to the Appel­late Authority. Clause (f) of the Section gives a right to a local authority or police authority or an asso­ciation which, or a person providing transport facili­ties who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto, before the original authority to file an appeal. Clause (f) of the Section gives a right to a local authority or police authority or an asso­ciation which, or a person providing transport facili­ties who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto, before the original authority to file an appeal. The right, therefore, to challenge the grant of permit has only been given to a person who has opposed the grant of permit before the Regional Trans­port Authority, and simply because a person has exercised his right under clause (a) against the order refusing to grant him permit, he cannot be given a higher right than what he would have had if he had appealed under clause (f) of S. 64. In other words the contention is that unless he had opposed in writing the grant of permit before the Regional Transport Authority, he was not entitled to a relief under clause (f) of S. 64. This argument in effect presupposes that S. 64 of the Act not only enumerates the persons who are entitled to file appeals against the order of the Regional Transport Authority but also lays down the powers of the Appellate Authority and the nature of order which it can pass. On a plain reading of S, 64 we are not prepared to accept this contention. Section 64 enumerates the persons or bodies who have been given right to appeal against different orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority. Once an appeal has been filed by the aggrieved person under clause (a) the Appellate Authority had full jurisdiction to consider all the relevant matters to the grant of permit and determine whether the appellant was a suitable person for the grant of a permit. It is not disputed that in the present route only one permit could be granted. Under these cir­cumstances if once it is found that the respondent No. 4 had a right to come up in appeal against the order refusing to grant him permit under S. 64 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, all the materials being before the Appellate Authority, it could consider the claims of rival claimants and decide whether the permit was properly granted to the petitioner or not. trong reliance is placed on the case of Dholpur Co-operative Transport and Multi Purpose Union Ltd. v. Appellate Authority, Rajasthan, AIR 1955 Raj 19 . trong reliance is placed on the case of Dholpur Co-operative Transport and Multi Purpose Union Ltd. v. Appellate Authority, Rajasthan, AIR 1955 Raj 19 . Particular attention was invited to the fol­lowing observations at page 21 of the report : "The answer is a matter of some1 difficulty, par­ticularly as in most cases the number of permits to be issued on a particular route is limited under S. 48(a). In the case before us, it has been agreed bet­ween the Dholpur and Agra authorities that six permits on the Dholpur-Agra route will be granted by the Dholpur authorities (which means the Re­gional Transport Authority, Jaipur) and six by the Agra Authorities. Another difficulty, which arises, is that the section does not lay down the nature of order which the Appellate Authority will pass in appeal. It may be argued, because the nature of the order in appeal is not prescribed, that the Appellate Authority may pass any order which it considers just and proper. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that S. 64 has seven clauses dealing with specific griev­ances which give rise to appeal, and it should be clear that the order of the Appellate Authority must have reference to the grievance put before it. For example S. 64 (b) provides for appeal by a person aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit granted to him. Now in such an appeal the Appellate Authority would have the power only to set aside the revocation or suspension, and it can hardly be contended that it would have, while setj 'ting aside the revocation or suspension, the power to revoke or cancel some other person's permit." (4) Reliance has also been placed on the case of Ramnihora Thakur v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 Pat 293 . The decision in this case is based entirely on its own facts. It was clearly found by the learned Judges on the materials before them that no founda­tion was laid before the Regional Transport Autho­rity for opposition and it could not be said that the grant of permit had been opposed before the Regional Transport Authority. In these circumstances, it was held that in an appeal under S. 64 (a) the Appellate Authority had no power to cancel the permit. Another case relied upon is Kishanchand Narsingdas Bhatta v. Appellate Authority, Madhya Bharat, AIR 1956 Madh-B 231. In these circumstances, it was held that in an appeal under S. 64 (a) the Appellate Authority had no power to cancel the permit. Another case relied upon is Kishanchand Narsingdas Bhatta v. Appellate Authority, Madhya Bharat, AIR 1956 Madh-B 231. In that case it was observed that "there are limitations on the powers' of the Appellate Authority and in an appeal under S. 64(a) it cannot take into account matters or ob­jections for which no foundation was laid by making representations against the petitioner's application. It is not possible to accept the contention that the Appellate Authority is not bound by limitations which govern the grant of permit by the Regional Transport Authority and that it is free to deal with appeal and acts on any material which was not there when the permit was granted to the petitioner by 1 the Regional Transport Authority." These cases in lour mind do not lay down that in cases where the appeal has been filed by a person against refusal to grant permit to him under S. 64(a), the order grant­ing permit to respondent cannot be quashed. In the present case where admittedly there was scope for grant of only one permit and the petitioner and the respondent No. 4 were the rival candidates along with others for the grant of the same, it cannot be said that the respondent No. 4 did not oppose the grant of permit to the petitioner. The fact that he applied for grant of permit to himself in preference to the applicants amounts to an opposition to the grant of permit to the petitioner and it cannot be said that no foundation was laid before the Regional Authority by making representations against the grant of permit to the peti­tioner. On that ground also these cases are distin­guishable. In the case of Nadar Transports Tiruchi-rapalli v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 1 , it was observed by the Madras High Court as follows : "Clauses (a) and (f) of S. 64 are intended to apply to different situations. Cl. (a) is confined only to cases where a person is aggrieved by the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a per­mit to him or is aggrieved by any condition attached to a permit granted to him. Cl. (a) is confined only to cases where a person is aggrieved by the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a per­mit to him or is aggrieved by any condition attached to a permit granted to him. There may be a person who while applying for the grant of a permit for himself has also objected to the grant of a permit to the other. In such a case if the permit is refused to him he would fulfil the conditions of both Cls. (a) and (f). There may be a person who though he had not applied for a permit to himself, was a per­son who provided transport facilities and opposed the grant of a permit to another, and if the permit is granted to the other, notwithstanding that he did not apply for a permit he would be entitled to pre­fer an appeal against the order under Cl. (f), though he would not answer the description in Cl. (a) as a person aggrieved by the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit and though he opposed the grant of the permit only formally and not by a representation in writing as required by S. 57, sub-ss. (3) and (4)." We are in agreement with these observations. There is a distinction between the representation contemplated under S. 56 (4) and the opposition which is a condition precedent for the exercise of a right of appeal under S. 64 (1) (f) of the Act. As we have observed the petitioner and the respondent No. 4 being rival candidates for the grant of the permit, opposition is implied. It cannot be said that there was no material before the Appellate Authority on which it could decide the respective claims of the 'parties in a proper appeal by the respondent under S. 64(a). To the same effect is the case of S. Gopala Reddi v. Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot, (S) AIR 1955 Mad 386 . (5) Once an appeal is filed under Cl. (a) of S. 64, the Appellate Authority is fully seized of the matter and could dispose of the rival claims of the parties on the materials before it. To the same effect is the case of S. Gopala Reddi v. Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot, (S) AIR 1955 Mad 386 . (5) Once an appeal is filed under Cl. (a) of S. 64, the Appellate Authority is fully seized of the matter and could dispose of the rival claims of the parties on the materials before it. In the present case the petitioner was impleaded as opposite party in the appeal by the respondent No. 4; notice was issued to him, he was given an opportunity to de­fend his case,-the Appellate Authority had thus the entire materials before it and could dispose of the matter. In this view of the matter, it is not neces­sary for us to consider if the objection made by the Bus Association with regard to the increased number of buses on that route could be regarded as an op­position to the grant of permit to the petitioner. In the result, therefore, we see no force in this peti­tion and it is rejected with costs. DEKA, J. : (6) I agree with my learned brother and do not propose to discuss all the points except that I would be to add a few lines on a particular point. The case as sought to be made at the stage of the hear­ing was not initially made in the application itself and as such, the basis of the argument on the ground that respondent No. 4 did not oppose the grant of a permit to the1 petitioner might have been completely ruled out. But in view of the fact that the point had been later argued in Court, my learned brother has been pleased to consider that point as-stressed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Sen seemed to argue that Cl. (f) of S. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act should be read along with Cl. (a) of that section for all purposes, but I do not think that it is the correct view of law. Different clauses of S. 64 clearly point out the class of person or persons who may prefer an appeal against the sort of orders suggested in different clauses. Section 64(a) relates to an appeal by per­sons who are aggrieved by' the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, and Cl. Section 64(a) relates to an appeal by per­sons who are aggrieved by' the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, and Cl. (f) of that section relates to an appeal by a local authority or police authority or an asso­ciation which, or a person providing transport faci­lities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condi­tion attached thereto. Therefore, the two clauses speak of right to file appeals by two sets of person who may be differently hit. In the present case res­pondent No. 4 comes within the category of persons described in Cl. (a) of S. 64 he having sought for a permit and being refused one. It would be equally distinct that the Goalpara Bus Association comes within the definition of an Association or a group of persons providing trans­port facilities who might have objected by way of appeal under Cl. (f) of S 64. It is very doubtful whether we can describe the respondent No. 4 to be a person "providing transport facilities", because he files only an appeal in his capacity of a disappointed candidate for grant of a permit I fully agree with the observations of my learned brother in his refer­ence to the case reported in AIR 1953 Mad 1 , that there may be two classes of persons availing of the rights of appeal and the Appellate Authority was within its jurisdiction to hear the appeals taking the entire view of things as a Court of appeal under the law, I, therefore, agree that the rule may be dis­charged with cost, - hearing fee Rs. 100/-. Rule discharged.