JUDGMENT P.K. Tare, J. This is second appeal filed by the Defendants, who lost in both the lower Courts. The Respondent, on the strength of an agreement dated 24-10-41 (Ex. D-2), executed in her favour by the superior proprietor, Rani Mira Moti, for a period of 9 years ending 31-5-1950 for a consideration of Rs. 3,000 was the protected thekedar of village Punour in tahsil Sohagpur of district Hoshangabad, while the first Appellant Benisingh was the lambardar thekedar at that time. By the said deed Rani Mira Moti purported to transfer her interest as a superior proprietor. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants were liable to pay Rs. 2,728. Each year the theka-jama was payable on the first of June. The Defendants paid only Rs. 2,209-5-4 for the said period, leaving a balance of Rs. 418-10-8. Therefore, she claimed the balance with interest Rs. 150-13-4 total Rs. 569-8-0. The defense was that the Defendants as lambardars, used to deposit the theka-jama through the Plaintiff, who was the sadar lambardar. It was alleged that the Plaintiff had recovered an amount of Rs. 450-10-0 in excess of the amount payable. The claim for interest was denied. It was further alleged that the Defendants' liability to pay the theka-jama to the Plaintiff could not be enforced on the strength of the agreement, dated 24-10-41, to which the Defendants were not parties, but it could be enforced only on account of her status as a sadar lambardar, which position she ceased to occupy after 31-5-1950, the date of expiry of the theka in her favour. On the date of vesting, one Rani Ramraj Kunwar was the recorded proprietor of the village. Therefore, the suit filed on 15-6-1953, that is after 31-3-1951, the date of vesting, was not tenable, as under Section 4(3) of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act (No. 1 of 1951) she could not be deemed to be the outgoing proprietor. Both the lower Courts negative the defense and passed a decree for Rs. 569-8-0 in favour of the Respondent. The only question raised by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants was regarding the tenability of the suit and the claim for interest. The finding that an amount of Rs. 418-10-8 was due was rightly not challenged, as it was a finding of fact concluded in the present appeal. Moreover, I find that the said finding was correct on merits. The only question raised by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants was regarding the tenability of the suit and the claim for interest. The finding that an amount of Rs. 418-10-8 was due was rightly not challenged, as it was a finding of fact concluded in the present appeal. Moreover, I find that the said finding was correct on merits. Therefore, it is confirmed. Coming to the first question relating to the tenability of the suit, we have to examine the provisions of the C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1917 and the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, No. 1 of 1951 and see, whether the suit is not maintainable on the authority of the Full Bench case of Chhotekhan v. Mohammad Ubedullakhan 1953 NLJ 254 : I L R 1953 Nag. 702 : A IR 1953 Nag. 361, which was relied on by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants. The definition of a 'proprietor' as given in the C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1917 is as follows: Section 2 (13) 'proprietor' except in Sections 68, 93 and 94 includes a gaonthia of Government village in Sambalpur Territory. Section 2 (21)-'village cress means whatever is paid, delivered or rendered in money, kind or service by a person resident or holding land in a village to any person or class of persons for services rendered to the community, or to the proprietors as such of the village, or to the patel. Explanation-In this definition 'proprietor' includes a transferee of proprietary rights in possession and a thekadar with protected status. The explanation to Section 187 of the C.P. Land Revenue Act provides that the phrase 'proprietor' includes a transferee of proprietary rights in possession, a thekadar or a headman with protected status etc. Section 188 of the said Act prescribes the duties and the powers of the lambardar. Thus for the purposes of the said Act, a protected thekadar is to all intents a 'proprietor'. Now let us examine the provisions of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, No. I of 1951. Section 2 (b) of the Act provides that-"In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context- (a)........ Thus for the purposes of the said Act, a protected thekadar is to all intents a 'proprietor'. Now let us examine the provisions of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, No. I of 1951. Section 2 (b) of the Act provides that-"In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context- (a)........ (b) in relation to the Central Provinces, any expression not herein defined but used or explained in the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917 or the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920, and the Central Provinces Settlement Act, 1929, shall have the same meaning therein assigned to it; Section 2 (m) defines a 'proprietor' thus:- Proprietor in relation to- (i) the Central Provinces includes an inferior proprietor, a protected thekadar or other thekadar or a protected headman.... Thus the definition of the word 'proprietor' is inclusive in both the Acts. It is not exhaustive. Therefore, wherever the word 'proprietor' occurs, it will have to be interpreted with reference to the context in the light of the inclusive definition and it will have to be decided in which particular sense the word is used in a particular provision of the Act. The definition in the C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1917 too, being inclusive, this rule of interpretation will have to be adhered to, if we are required to travel beyond the provisions of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act into the realms of the Land Revenue Act. Further on Section 4 (3) of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, I of 1951, provides as follows: Nothing contained in Sub-section (1) shall operate as a bar to the recovery by the outgoing proprietor of any sum which becomes due to him before the date of vesting by virtue of his proprietary rights and any such sum shall be recoverable by him by any process of law which but for this Act would be available to him. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants emphasized the phrase-'out going proprietor' and urged that the Respondent was not an outgoing proprietor, as her theka ended on 31-5-1950, due to which she no more remained the sadar lambardar. The Learned Counsel further pointed out that at the date of vesting i. e. 31-3-1951, Rani Ramraj Kunwar was the recorded superior proprietor and, therefore, she alone had the right to recover any arrears of land revenue due from the inferior proprietors. The Learned Counsel further pointed out that at the date of vesting i. e. 31-3-1951, Rani Ramraj Kunwar was the recorded superior proprietor and, therefore, she alone had the right to recover any arrears of land revenue due from the inferior proprietors. I am of the opinion that there is an inherent fallacy in the said argument advanced. Firstly, the definition in the Abolition Act is not exhaustive, but inclusive. The word 'outgoing' has nowhere been defined either in the Abolition Act or the Land Revenue Act. It will have to be interpreted in its ordinary sense of the primary meaning given in the Dictionary. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. II, defines the word thus: Outgoing-that goes out, issuing, out flowing. Going out from office, position, or possession. If the word 'outgoing' has reference to the recorded proprietor at the date of vesting alone, then Sections 3 and 4 of the Abolition Act do not affect the vested rights of persons, who were proprietors formerly, but not at the date of vesting. They could exercise their vested rights irrespective of the provisions of the Abolition Act. If on the other hand, the word 'outgoing' is interpreted to include all former proprietors, who may not be recorded proprietors on the date of vesting, their claims would clearly be saved by Section 4 (3) of the Abolition Act. In either of the cases, any sum due to a former proprietor, whether recorded or otherwise, relating to the period prior to the date of vesting would be that person's property, which he could, even after the date of vesting, recover by remedies available under the law, as is clear from the wording of Section 4 (1) (c) of the Abolition Act, which states that all rents and chesses in respect of any holding in the property so vesting for any period after the date of vesting shall vest in and be payable to the State Government. The right to recover any money due before the date of vesting to either a recorded outgoing proprietor or to an unrecorded former proprietor did not vest in the State and remained unaffected by the vesting provisions of the Abolition Act. There is another aspect to be considered in connection with the proprietors, who were not so recorded at the date of vesting. There is another aspect to be considered in connection with the proprietors, who were not so recorded at the date of vesting. If such a former unrecorded proprietor paid money on behalf of the proprietary body, say relating to year 1949-50, he became a creditor of the co-sharers to that extent. Therefore he could invoke Section 69 of the Indian Contract Act in an action brought for recovery of the amount paid by him on behalf of the co-sharers. Upon the argument advanced by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants, the Appellants could in no case resist the Plaintiff's claim based on Section 69 of the Contract Act-Therefore, I reject the Appellants' contention and hold that the present case does not fall within the ambit of the rule laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Chhotekhan v. Mohammad Ubedullakhan 1953 N L J 254 : I L R 1953 Nag. 702 : A I R 1953 Nag. 361. Then coming to the interpretation of the word 'proprietor' in the Abolition Act, it will have to be interpreted with reference to the context in any particular set of circumstances. In the present case, it can have reference to the protected thekadar and not the superior proprietor. To interpret it otherwise would be to confer a benefit upon the superior proprietor at the cost of the protected thekadar by straining the meaning of the word, 'proprietor', which would be contrary to rules of interpretation. Moreover an interpretation which would have the effect of causing an obvious injustice ought to be avoided by law Courts, as against the alternate interpretation, which would be in consonance with equity, justice and good conscience. [See Homes v. Bradfield R.D. C. 1949 (2) K B 1 and Simms v. Registrar of Probates 1900 AC 323 ]. Therefore, I reject the suggestion made by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that the word, proprietor should be interpreted in the sense of a superior proprietor. In the case of Ghassu Khan Turrevbaz Khan v. Diwan Najafali Khan 1956 NLJ 299 a, Division Bench consisting of Hidayatullah C.J. and the late Rao J. had occasion to interpret the word proprietor in connection with Section 38 of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, I of 1951. In the case of Ghassu Khan Turrevbaz Khan v. Diwan Najafali Khan 1956 NLJ 299 a, Division Bench consisting of Hidayatullah C.J. and the late Rao J. had occasion to interpret the word proprietor in connection with Section 38 of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, I of 1951. The learned Judges, pointing out the error of a Division Bench of the Board of Revenue in the case of Phulbai v. Rani Mankumari Devi 1954 N L J 194, held that the word 'proprietor' meant the protected thekadar and not the superior proprietor. The Board of Revenue had fallen into the error of rigidly interpreting Section 2 (m) of the Abolition Act, without reference to Section 2 (b) of the Act. I would follow the Division Bench (I mean this Court) view, while interpreting the word 'proprietor' in Section 4 (3) of the Act. In Palia Achhelal v. Raja Hirdashingh Civil Revision No. 186 of 1953 decided on 1-10-1953, the late Rao J. had merely to consider whether the suit was tenable by the non-applicant in his capacity as sadar lambardar or as outgoing proprietor. The learned Judge held that in view of Section 50 of the Abolition Act, a suit was tenable by the outgoing proprietor and not the sadar lambardar. That case does not conclude the question that arises in the present case, whether the suit was maintainable at the instance of the superior proprietor or the protected thekadar. The position would not be different, as has been indicated by me in an earlier paragraph. The same rule of interpretation will apply, when we are required to examine the provisions of the C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1917. Even under the said Act, the word 'proprietor' includes a protected thekadar. If a protected thekadar has paid land revenue on behalf of co-sharers, he and not the superior proprietor, would have the right to recover the amount under Section 157 of the C.P. Land Revenue Act. In the case of Shrikishandas Seth v. Mst. Gangabai 1950 N L J 626, Mudholkar J. held that along with a transfer of the proprietary interest, the arrears of rent due for a period prior to the transfer do not pass to the transferee. The transferor proprietor would have a legal right to recover such arrears from the tenants. In the case of Shrikishandas Seth v. Mst. Gangabai 1950 N L J 626, Mudholkar J. held that along with a transfer of the proprietary interest, the arrears of rent due for a period prior to the transfer do not pass to the transferee. The transferor proprietor would have a legal right to recover such arrears from the tenants. I fail to see as to how, in the present case, the amount paid by the protected thekadar could be said to be passing to the superior proprietor after the expiry of the theka. The test would be, as laid down by Mudholkar J., as to what period they relate to. For the period prior to the transfer, the transferor alone would have the right to recover the arrears. The said view is in accord with the expression of opinion enunciated by Sir Gilbert Stone C.J. in the case of Chintaman v. Shrikrishna 1942 N L J 344 : I LR 1943 Nag. 319 : AIR 1943 Nag. 344 holding that a decree for arrears of rent passed in favour of a former lambardar could only be executed by him or his legal representative and not by his successor-in-office, who was not a party to the suit. A Division Bench consisting of Sinha C.J. and Mudholkar J. in the case of Hiralal v. Bare and Anr. 1953 N L J 38 : I L R 1952 Nag. 453 : A I R 1953 Nag. 179 affirmed the view of Sir Gilbert Stone C.J. The learned Judges of the Division Bench had no occasion to resolve the apparent conflict between the view of Mudholkar J. in the case of Shrikishandas v. Gangabai (supra), and of v. R. Sen J. in the case of Sadaseorao v. Girjashankar S.A. No. 481 of 1945 decided on 10-1-1950. But adopting the line of reasoning of Sinha C.J. and Mudholkar J.,. I would prefer the view of Mudholkar J. in the case of Shrikishandas v. Gangabai 1950 N L J 626. Following the same, I hold that the protected thekadar (the Respondent) alone had the right to recover the amount, she had paid during her thekadari on behalf of the proprietary body. It is true that the Plaintiff could not sue on the basis of the agreement dated 24-10-41 between her and the superior proprietor and to which the Appellants were strangers. It is true that the Plaintiff could not sue on the basis of the agreement dated 24-10-41 between her and the superior proprietor and to which the Appellants were strangers. But certainly she could sue in the capacity of a former proprietor or an outgoing proprietor whatever she may be considered to be. In either case she was entitled to succeed. Therefore, the lower Courts were correct in decreeing the Plaintiff's claim. As the Appellants, having paid a part of the amount, withheld the rest, presumably in order to make it a test case, the lower Courts acted rightly in decreeing the Plaintiff's claim for interest. The judgments and decrees of the Courts below are correct and, therefore, they are upheld. Consequently this appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 50 if certified Leave for filing appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is granted. Appeal dismissed.