JUDGMENT :- This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree of the District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 71 of 1956, by which he remanded the Declaratory Suit No. 5 of 1953 1o the Court of the Subordinate Judge, for disposal and directed the Subordinate Judge to give an opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidence. The suit was filed by the 3 respondents, representing 133 villagers of Awing Jiri for a declaration of their title to 33 paris of land under 3 pattas. Their case was that the said lands were reclaimed by them from the jungle, 40 years before suit and that they have been in possession since then, but in order to avoid objections they allowed the lands to stand in the name of the late R.K. Chandrahas Singh when he was in power during the Maharajahs rule, that by way of courtesy they were presenting him with same fish caught from the lands, but that he had no other title in the lands, that they have been paying the revenues sometimes by themselves and sometimes through the pattadar, that the appellants who are successors-in-interest of the late R.K. Chandrahas Singh continued the said arrangement for sometime, but in 1952 an attempt was made by the appellants to get the kinds sold in auction for non-payment of revenue and hence the respondents were forced to file this suit for declaration of their title and confirmation of possession. The appellants in their written statements denied the respondents claim and stated that the respondents were the tenants of the late R.K. Chandrahas Singh paying Loushal to him. They raised also a rather inconsistent plea that the respondents were not in possession of the lands. They further said that the respondents had no cause of action to file this suit and further that the court-fee paid was insufficient. 2. On these pleas the Subordinate Judge Sri Radhamohon Singh framed issues relating to the title and possession of the respondents and also about the alleged payment of Loushal to the appellants and again as to whether the respondents had any cause of action. No issue was raised as to whether the court-fee paid was sufficient. Opportunity was given to both sides to let in oral and documentary evidence. The respondents examined 5 witnesses on their side while the appellants examined 4 witnesses and both side marked certain documents. No issue was raised as to whether the court-fee paid was sufficient. Opportunity was given to both sides to let in oral and documentary evidence. The respondents examined 5 witnesses on their side while the appellants examined 4 witnesses and both side marked certain documents. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge gave findings on all the issues. But I must say that in his judgment he failed to discuss the oral evidence adduced by the witnesses on either side in the matters in issue. This is not the first occasion when I have come across such judgments by this Subordinate Judge. It is the duty of the trial Court to refer to the evidence in respect of the points at issue between the parties before he arrives at his findings. It is the failure on his part which makes his judgment unsatisfactory. The lower appellate Court has mentioned in its judgment that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge was highly unsatisfactory. But it cannot be said that the Subordinate Judge has not given his findings on the various issues. Regarding the title of the respondents, the Subordinate Judge has come to the finding that the respondents had no title, but that they were only Paikastadars of the appellants, paying loushal to them. On the question of possession he has found that the respondents were in possession of the lands and he has further found that the respondents had no cause of action to file a suit for declaration of their title as they were only tenants. He has even gone further and held, though no specific issue was raised, that if they wanted a declaration of their ownership they had to pay ad valorem court-fee on the value of the lands which, according to Mm, were worth Rs. 32,000/-. Another finding which he has given about which there was not even a pleading was that all the heirs of the late A.K. Chandrahas Singh not having been made parties "the suit has been hopelessly framed simply to harass the defendants and the suit does not succeed". 4. On these findings of the Subordinate Judge, what the appellate Court had to do was to see whether on the pleadings and the evidence adduced in the case, the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge were correct. 4. On these findings of the Subordinate Judge, what the appellate Court had to do was to see whether on the pleadings and the evidence adduced in the case, the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge were correct. But curiously enough the appellate Court without discussing the evidence on record remarked that the first Court; had assumed that the respondents were the tenants of the appellants and thereby refused to investigate the very question which was the subject-matter of controversy between the parties on which depended the decision of the case and hence the case has to be sent back for a fresh decision. I cannot accept this statement of the lower appellate Court. The learned Subordinate Judge has referred to the pattas and other documents marked in the case in coming to his conclusion that the respondents were tenants of the appellants, though he failed to discuss the oral evidence adduced by the parties. Thus, it was not a case of assumption of the tenancy on the part of the Subordinate Judge. Even granting that there was any such wrong assumption by the first Court, appeals are intended to correct such wrong assumptions. A suit I cannot be remanded under O. 41, R. 23, C.P.C; to correct such wrong assumptions. I am unable to see under what provision of law the learned District Judge remanded the suit. Section 151, C.P.C., no oubt, vests inherent power in an appellate Court to remand suits. But such inherent power could be exercised only for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court. It does not appear from the judgment of the appellate Court that the remand was intended for the ends of justice or for preventing the abuse of process of Court. On the other hand, it would appear that the lower appellate Court was not prepared to go into the evidence adduced in the case and come to its own conclusions on the issues arising in the case. A remand for such a purpose is not permissible under S. 151, C.P.C. It was the duty of the lower appellate Court to have gone through the evidence, as the entire evidence in the case was before that Court. Such purposeless remands have to be deprecated. A remand for such a purpose is not permissible under S. 151, C.P.C. It was the duty of the lower appellate Court to have gone through the evidence, as the entire evidence in the case was before that Court. Such purposeless remands have to be deprecated. This, may be an easy way of disposal of an appeal without understanding the points involved in the appeal and without taking the trouble to go through the evidence. But the first appellate Court forgets that such remands mean unnecessary delay in the final disposal of the suit. 5. The lower Appellate Court has further stated in the order of remand that parties should be given an opportunity to adduce further evidence. There was no allegation that either party was not given opportunity to adduce evidence in the first Court. Nor has the lower appellate Court stated that the evidence on record is not sufficient for the disposal of any matter in issue. It is meaningless therefore to direct the lower Court to give an opportunity to both sides to let in further evidence. Order 41, Rr. 25 to 27, C.P.C., do not apply to the case and neither party appears to have asked the lower appellate Court for additional evidence being taken. This is a case where Order 41, R. 24, would apply and the evidence on record was sufficient to enable the appellate Court to pronounce judgment. Regarding the question of court-fee and the non-maintainability of the suit due to the alleged failure to implead all the heirs of the late R.K. Chandrahas Singh, no issues were framed by the Subordinate Judge. It is left to the lower appellate Court to follow the provisions of O. 41, C.P.C., regarding the same. 6. The order of remand for the reasons mentioned by the lower appellate Court was wrong. It is accordingly set aside and the appeal is sent back to the lower appellate Court for decision in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. The appellants are entitled to the costs of the second appeal. The costs in the first Court and in the lower appellate Court will abide the fine decision of the case by the lower appellate Court. Case remanded.