JUDGMENT 1. IN this suit the plaintiff has asked for (a) a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants Nos. 1, 2, 2a, 3 and 4 from giving any effect to the resolution of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee dated the 30th August, 1956 and of the Corporation of Calcutta dated the 9th November, 1956 or from determining the joint occupation and excluding the name of the plaintiff as joint occupier of Stall No. 'd' 84 of Sir Stuart Hogg Market, and setting up any partition or other wall between Stall No. 84 and Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 in Block 'd' of the Market in pursuance of the resolution or at all; (b) a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and each of them from interfering with or interrupting the plaintiff's joint occupation of Stall No. 84 in Block 'd' of the Market in pursuance of the resolution of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee dated the 11th July, 1941; (c) if necessary a declaration that the purported resolutions of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee dated the 30th August, 1956 and of the Corporation of Calcutta dated the 9th November, 1956 are ultra vires, illegal null and void, and of no force and effect; and (d) an order that the purported resolutions of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee dated the 30th August, 1956 and of the Corporation of Calcutta dated the 9th November, 1956, be set aside and cancelled. 2. THE plaintiff's case is that by a Resolution dated the 11th July, 1941 of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee constituted under the Calcutta Municipal Act III of 1923 the plaintiff was registered as the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 and as joint occupier of Stall No. 84 along with one Badri Prasad Dubey, since deceased. The resolution was acted upon by the Committee and also the Corporation of Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation"). The plaintiff and Badri Prasad adopted and accepted the resolution and acted in terms thereof. In 1940 it was agreed between Lachmi Chand Shukla since deceased, a son of the plaintiff and Badri Prasad Dubey after the efflux of a partnership for five years subsisting between them that Lachmi Chand would carry on business of his own at Stall No. D-84 and pay to Badri Prasad in consideration thereof Rs. 50/- per month. In 1940 it was agreed between Lachmi Chand Shukla since deceased, a son of the plaintiff and Badri Prasad Dubey after the efflux of a partnership for five years subsisting between them that Lachmi Chand would carry on business of his own at Stall No. D-84 and pay to Badri Prasad in consideration thereof Rs. 50/- per month. After Badri Prasad's death the money would be payable to his heirs and legal representatives. In terms of this agreement Lachmi Chand was making payments to Badri Prasad. After Lachmi Chand's death the plaintiff made the payments to Badri Prasad and thereafter to the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 who have no right or title to Stall No. D-84 except the right to receive Rs. 50/- per month. On the 30th August, 1956 the Public Utilities and Markets Committee, the defendant No. 3 in this suit, purporting to act under the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act XXXIII of 1951 passed a resolution that the names of the defendants Nos. 5 and 6, the heirs of Badri Prasad, be recorded as sole occupiers of Stall No. 84 and the plaintiff's name be recorded as the sole occupier of Stalls Nos 85 and 86. The Corporation at its meeting held on the 9th November, 1956 has approved of this resolution. It is this resolution and its approval by the Corporation which have been challenged in this suit on various grounds. After the institution of this Suit the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation was appointed. He has been added as a party to this suit and is defendant No. 2a. 3. THE Corporation's defense is that Stall No. 84 was originally allotted in 1916 to Badri Prasad. In 1934 Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 were allotted to the plaintiff's son Lachmi Chand. In 1935 on the application of Badri Prasad and Lachmi Chand they were allowed to carry on business in the three stalls as partners. Since January 1, 1936 Badri Prasad and Lachmi Chand carried on business in co-partnership. After the death of Lachmi Chand the plaintiff in 1941 applied for registration of his name in place of his deceased son in regard to the three stalls. Since January 1, 1936 Badri Prasad and Lachmi Chand carried on business in co-partnership. After the death of Lachmi Chand the plaintiff in 1941 applied for registration of his name in place of his deceased son in regard to the three stalls. Thereafter the resolution of the 11th July, 1941 was passed and with effect from August 1, 1941 the plaintiff's name was registered in the Rent Roll in place of his deceased son as joint occupier of the three stalls along with Badri Prasad. The plaintiff was not registered as the sole occupier of Stalls No. 85 and 86. The plaintiff never objected to and acquiesced in the issue of joint License and joint sheet or rent receipt. The agreement between lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad mentioned in the plaint is not binding on the Corporation. Under the terms and conditions of License no stall-holder could sublet the use of the stall or transfer his title or interest in the business or admit or discharge any partner without the special sanction of the Corporation. No such sanction was ever obtained by the plaintiff. The Corporation admits the resolution of the defendant No. 3 dated July 30, 1956 and its approval by the Corporation on November 9, 1956. The grounds on which the resolution and the approval thereof have been challenged, are disputed by the Corporation. The suit in any event against the Commissioner of the Corporation the defendant No. 2 herein, is not maintainable in the absence of a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. THE defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in their written statement have alleged that since 1916 Badri Prasad used to carry on business in Stall No. 84. These defendants more or less set out the same facts as in the written statement of the Corporation. The resolution of 1941 according to these defendants, was not passed in the presence of Badri Prasad. In any event it was never acted upon. These defendants have denied the alleged agreement between Lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad in 1940. The partnership has not yet been dissolved. By the terms of the partnership it was agreed that on the death of any one of the partners it would not be dissolved but his heirs or representatives would become partners in respect of his share. Each of the partners was entitled to receive Rs. The partnership has not yet been dissolved. By the terms of the partnership it was agreed that on the death of any one of the partners it would not be dissolved but his heirs or representatives would become partners in respect of his share. Each of the partners was entitled to receive Rs. 50/- per month on account of his share in the profits of the business to be adjusted at the time of taking of accounts. In pursuance of this agreement the sum of Rs. 50/ per month was paid to Badri Prasad and, thereafter from time to time, to these defendants. Upon the death of Badri Prasad on the 29th July, 1944 the plaintiff admitted the defendant No. 5, widow of Badri Prasad as a partner The defendant No. 6, son of Badri Prasad, was then a minor. He was admitted to the benefits of the partnership jointly to the extent of half share of Badri Prasad. The resolutions of the 30th August, 1956 and of the 9th November, 1956 were passed after giving notice to the plaintiff. The resolutions are valid and binding on the parties. The plaintiff and these defendants are mere licensees of the stalls in question and the Corporation has right to decide the matter by its committee. The following issues were raised on behalf of the defendants Nos. 1 to 4:-1. Is the suit bad against defendants Nos. 2 and 2a in the absence of any notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. Was the plaintiff not registered as the sole occupier of stalls Nos. 85 and 86 as alleged in paragraph 3 of the written statement on behalf of defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 4? 3. Is the plaintiff stopped from claiming to be the sole occupier of stalls Nos. 85 and 86 as alleged in paragraph 3 of the written statement on behalf of the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 4? 4. Are the resolutions dated the 30th August, 1956 of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee and the resolution dated the 9th November, 1956 void? 5. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? the issues raised on behalf of the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 are as follows :-1. (a) Did the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff become the sole occupiers or lessees or allot-tees of Stalls Nos. 5. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? the issues raised on behalf of the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 are as follows :-1. (a) Did the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff become the sole occupiers or lessees or allot-tees of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 or did the plaintiff become the joint occupier of Stall No. 84 on terms and conditions pleaded in paragraph 1 of the plaint? (b) What is the effect of the Resolution dated the 11th July, 1941? (c) Was the Resolution dated the 11th July, 1941 acted upon? (d) Is the Resolution dated the 11th July, 1941 binding on the defendants Nos. 5 and 6? 2. Was there an agreement between Lakshmi Chand Sukla and Badri Prasad Dubey in 1940 as alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint? 3. Did the partnership come to an end in 1940 as alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint? 1 Was the payment of Rs. 50/- per month made to Badri. Prasad Dubey or the defendants Nos. 5 and 6. in pursuance of the agreement pleaded in paragraph 3 of the plaint ? 5. Has the plaintiff any rights as joint occupier of Shell No. 84 ? 6. Is the plaintiff entitled to the declaration claimed in paragraph 11 of the plaint? 5. IS the plaintiff a mere Licensee? If so. is the suit maintainable, as alleged in paragraph 14 of the written statement on behalf of the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 ? 6. TO what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 7. It is contended on behalf of the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 that the suit is bad against the defendants Nos. 2 and 2a, namely, the Commissioner of the Corporation and its Chief Executive Officer in the absence of any notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under section 585 (e) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 the Corporation may defend any suit or other legal proceeding brought against the Corporation or any Municipal Authority, officer or servant in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by them respectively in their official capacity. Section 24 (1) provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Section 24 (1) provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Bye-Laws and Regulations made thereunder, the Municipal Government of Calcutta shall vest in the Corporation but the Corporation shall not be entitled to exercise or discharge any powers, duties or functions expressly assigned by or under the Act or any other law to a Standing Committee or to the Commissioner. Sections 26 and 27 provide for the powers, duties and functions of Standing Committees. Sections 28 to 41 provide for the powers, duties and functions of the Commissioner. The entire executive power for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act, is vested in the Commissioner : see section 28 the Commissioner, therefore, is a necessary party to the suit. The Commissioner is a public officer within the meaning of section 2 (17) of the Code of Civil Procedure. He is an officer in the service of the Government. The Executive Officer has stepped into the shoes of the Commissioner. Notice under section 80 of the Code must, therefore, be served on both of them before a suit can be instituted against them. Clauses (a) and (b) of the prayers in the plaint set out above are directed against the Commissioner or the Executive Officer. The suit, therefore, is bad according to learned Counsel for the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 as no notice under section 80 of the Code was served on either of them. 8. Reliance was placed on the judgment of G. K. Mitter, J. in Suit No. 3662 of 1953 (1) (Central Glass Industries Ltd. and ors. v. Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta and anr.). In this suit the question arose as to whether the Commissioner was a public officer and a notice to him under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was necessary. His Lordship after considering the relevant provisions of the Act particularly sections 19 to 23, was of the view that the Commissioner was entrusted with the performance of various public duties and he was in the service of the Government although his salary and allowance were to come out of the Municipal Fund. In his Lordship's opinion the Commissioner is a public officer within the meaning of section 2 (17) (h) of the Code. In his Lordship's opinion the Commissioner is a public officer within the meaning of section 2 (17) (h) of the Code. It was contended before his Lordship that notice to the Commissioner under section 80 was not necessary in view of the requirements for a notice under section 586 of the Act. But that contention was overruled by G. K. Mitter j. in view of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Bhag Chand v. Secretary of State for India (2) 54 I. A. 338. The Judicial Committee laid down that section 80 of the Code "was express, explicit and mandatory and admitted of no implications and no exceptions". Mr. Dutt for the plaintiff has urged that the Commissioner is not a public officer at all. It is nobody's case that the Commissioner's post is published in the lists of Government Officers maintained by the Government, The Act nowhere shows that the Commissioner is in the service of the Government. The post is a creature of the Act. The Commissioner's service is entirely governed by the Act. Moreover, the Act is a complete Code. Section 586 of the Act contemplates a special notice to be given under certain circumstances. The legislature could not have contemplated two notices one under section 586 of the Act and the other under section 80 of the Code. 7. WITH respect I entirely agree with the views of G. K. Mitter, J. on these points. The Commissioner is appointed by the State Government on the recommendation of the State Public Service Commission upon such terms and conditions as the State Government may determine. He shall not be a member of the Corporation. He is appointed for a term of five years and with the approval of the State Government and on the recommendation of the State Public Service Commission, the Corporation may renew the appointment for a further period of five years. The State Government may at any time remove the Commissioner from office. The State Government shall remove the Commissioner if at a special meeting of the Corporation called for the purpose a resolution for the removal is carried by more than one-half of the total number of the members of the Corporation. The Commissioner shall not undertake any work unconnected with his office without the sanction of the State Government and of the Corporation. The Commissioner shall not undertake any work unconnected with his office without the sanction of the State Government and of the Corporation. The salaries and allowances of the Commissioner not exceeding Rs. 3000/- per month as may from time to time be fixed by the State Government are paid out of the Municipal Fund. Leave may be granted to the Commissioner by the State Government on the recommendation of the Corporation. Whenever leave is granted, the State Government shall appoint another person to officiate as Commissioner. If any vacancy occurs in the office of the Commissioner, the State Government may appoint another person to officiate for a period not exceeding two months pending the appointment of a permanent Commissioner (Vide sections 19 to 22 of the Act). 8. IN view of these provisions of the Act there is no doubt that the Commissioner is a public officer in the service of the Government for the performance of public duties; see section 2 (17) (h) of the Code of Civil Procedure. That being so, no suit can be instituted against him unless a notice under section 80 of the Code is served on him. Since this notice does not admit of any implications or exceptions, there is no force in the contention that the legislature could not have contemplated a notice under section 586 of the Act and another notice under section 80 of the Code. Mr. Dutt has also argued that as summing that notice under section 80 is necessary, such a notice was given by the plaintiff's Advocate to the Commissioner by letter dated the 30th October, 1956 marked Exhibit 'h'. Since the plaint did not contain any such averment, it has been subsequently amended. This letter of the 30th October, 1956, learned counsel for the defendants have contended, is not a notice under section 80 of the Code at all. The residence of the plaintiff has not been mentioned in this letter. It does not set out properly the cause of action in this suit. It gives only a fortnight's time to the Commissioner to comply with the requisitions contained in the letter whereas section 80 requires at least two months' time. This letter, in fact, is the demand for justice that was required before the plaintiff made an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. It gives only a fortnight's time to the Commissioner to comply with the requisitions contained in the letter whereas section 80 requires at least two months' time. This letter, in fact, is the demand for justice that was required before the plaintiff made an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. I might have overlooked these objections as there are authorities for the proposition "that the notice need not be a verbatim copy of the plaint and the court should import a little common sense in construing notice under section 80": See Hindusthan Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (3) 59 C. W. N. 405 at page 415. But it seems to me that it would not be proper to hold that this letter was the notice to the Commissioner under section 80. The resolution of the Corporation which has been challenged in the suit is dated the 9th November, 1956 but this letter is of the 30th October, 1956. It is true that the Resolution of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee was passed on the 30th August, 1956 but under section 26 (3) of the Act all proceedings of a standing committee are subject to confirmation by the Corporation. It is clear, therefore, that the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise till the Committee's resolution was confirmed by the Corporation on the 9th November, 1956. In these circumstances the letter of the 30th October, 1956 cannot be treated as notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure: See Keshoram Poddar and Co. v. Secretary of State (4) A. I. R. 1928 Cal. 74 at page 83. On behalf of the plaintiff my attention has beer drawn to a letter of the 6th October 1956 of the Assistant Superintendent of the market to the plaintiff informing the plaintiff of the resolution of the Committee and calling upon the plaintiff to deposit Rs. 51/- as initial rent and to erect a partition wall as per the Committee's direction. It was argued that since an officer of the Corporation was attempting to give effect on the 6th October. 1956 to the Committee's resolution before its confirmation by the Corporation the plaintiff was justified in giving notice under section 80 on the 30th October, 1956. Moreover, the real subject matter of this suit is the Committee's resolution and not the Corporation's confirmation. 1956 to the Committee's resolution before its confirmation by the Corporation the plaintiff was justified in giving notice under section 80 on the 30th October, 1956. Moreover, the real subject matter of this suit is the Committee's resolution and not the Corporation's confirmation. I am unable to accept these arguments. The Assistant Superintendent of the Market might have exceeded his powers in calling upon the plaintiff to comply with the Committee's directions before the Corporation confirmed its resolution. But that does not mean that the plaintiff's cause of action for this suit, arose before the 9th November, 1956. 10. NOTICE under section 80 could not, however, be served on the Chief Executive Officer as he was appointed during the pendency of this suit. It a valid notice under section 80 had been served on the Commissioner in the circumstances of this case, it would have been binding on the Chief Executive Officer as well. In the premises I hold that the suit is bad against the defendants Nos. 2 and 2a in the absence of any notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as such, no relief can be given to the plaintiff in terms of clauses (a) and (b) of the prayers in the plaint. 11. I now come to Issues Nos. 2 and 3 raised on behalf of the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and Issue 1 on behalf of the defendants Nos. 5 and 6. In paragraph 3 of the written statement on behalf of the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 4 it is denied that the plaintiff was registered as the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86. These defendants contend that the plaintiff never objected to and acquiesced in the issue of joint License and joint rent-sheet or receipt. The Rent Roll marked Exhibit 10' of the Corporation shows that the plaintiff was a joint occupier of these two stalls with Badri Prasad and the resolution of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee dated the 11th July, 1941 has also been referred to in this Roll. The Municipal Licenses (Exhibits 'r' and 's') also go against the plaintiff's case. The License dated the 26th January, 1956 for Stalls Nos, 84 (sic) was issued to Shivadhar Shukla and others. The Municipal Licenses (Exhibits 'r' and 's') also go against the plaintiff's case. The License dated the 26th January, 1956 for Stalls Nos, 84 (sic) was issued to Shivadhar Shukla and others. The Licenses for these Stalls under section 449 (1) of the Act for January, 1956 and for November, 1956 were issued to Badri Prasad Shivadhar Shukla. Shivadhar in his evidence has stated that pursuant to a resolution of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee of the 30th March, 1935 (Exhibit 'm') the names of Badri Prasad and Lachmi Chand were recorded as joint occupiers of Stalls Nos. 84, 85 and 86 (Qs. 511 and 512). Pursuant to this resolution Lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad were registered as partners for carrying on business in all the three stalls and a joint License and a joint sheet or rent receipt was issued in both the names (Qs. 514 to 516). This system continued until the year 1956 except that in the place of Lachmi Chand the name of Shivadhar was introduced (See Q. 818). He did not make any application to the Corporation for excluding the name of Badri Prasad from either of these stalls (Q. 529). After the death of Lachmi Chand in 1940 Shivadhar applied to the Corporation for registration of his name in the place of Lachmi Chand (Q. 542). Thereafter rent receipts were issued in the name of Badri Prasad and Shivadhar for all the three stalls and on the 26th July, 1956 the plaintiff for the first time informed the Corporation about the dissolution of partnership (Qs. 544 to 551). It is, therefore, contended on behalf of the Corporation that on the plaintiff's representation the Corporation issued Municipal Licenses and Licenses under section 449 (1) of the Act as well as rent sheets or receipts in joint names. The plaintiff should now be estopped from denying that he was in joint possession of all the stalls and claiming to be the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86. 12. SIMILAR questions have been raised in Issue No. 1 of the defendants Nos. 5 and 6. Learned counsel for these defendants has urged that in order to ascertain the correct meaning of the resolution of the 11th July, 1941 one has to look into circumstances before and after the passing of this resolution. 85 and 86. 12. SIMILAR questions have been raised in Issue No. 1 of the defendants Nos. 5 and 6. Learned counsel for these defendants has urged that in order to ascertain the correct meaning of the resolution of the 11th July, 1941 one has to look into circumstances before and after the passing of this resolution. The application of the plaintiff which led to the adoption of resolution of 1941 has not been produced. The plaintiff's oral testimony is that in this application the plaintiff wanted that his name should be entered in the place of his deceased son in the records of the Corporation (Q. 540). On the 30th March, 1935 the Public Utilities and Markets Committee resolved that the application of Badri Prasad and Lachmi Chand, occupiers respectively of Stalls Nos. D-84 and D-86 for carrying on business in these stalls jointly as partners, be sanctioned on payment of initial rent (Exhibit 1). The Rent Roll also shows that prior to 1941 both Lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad were joint occupiers of these Stalls. The Trade Licenses and Rent Receipts issued before 1941 were to these two parsons. In his letter dated the 26th July, 1956 the plaintiff wrote to the Superintendent, S. S. Hogg Market, inter alia, that there was a temporary arrangement of partnership between Badri Prasad and Lachmi Chand in 1935 which came to an end in 1941 and thereafter there was a mutual agreement by which Badri Prasad would be receiving during his lifetime Rs. 50/- per month and thereafter his wife during her lifetime in lieu of Badri Prasad's interest in Stall No. D-84. Lastly Uma Sankar Tewari, a nephew of the plaintiff who is working in these Stalls for about 20 to 23 years, substantially tries to support these statements of the plaintiff in questions 259 to 277. It is clear, therefore, that before 1941 Lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad were the joint stall-holders of Stalls Nos. 84 to 86. 13. AFTER 1941 the Rent Roll, Rent Receipts and Trade Licenses merely show that in the place of Lachmi Chand, shivadhar's name has been substituted and Badri Prasad's name continues. It is in evidence there was no objection to these documents by the plaintiff. 84 to 86. 13. AFTER 1941 the Rent Roll, Rent Receipts and Trade Licenses merely show that in the place of Lachmi Chand, shivadhar's name has been substituted and Badri Prasad's name continues. It is in evidence there was no objection to these documents by the plaintiff. On this point Shivadhar's evidence is that he requested the Corporation to grant receipts in his name only but the Corporation asked him to erect a partition wall between Stalls Nos. 84 and 85 whereupon Rent Receipts in his name would be granted (Q. 356). He has admitted in question 366 that from 1940 to 1956 the Corporation granted receipts in the joint names of Shivadhar and Badri Prasad for all the three Stalls and he accepted these receipts. Uma Sankar has said ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . we accepted the trade License unwillingly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . We represented our case before the Corporation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and they told us 'if you do not accept this position, a partition wall would be raised between Stalls Nos. 84 and 85. So, you will suffer' " (Q. 194). In Question 199 he has added that the Market Superintendent also told him that when the resolution was in favor of the plaintiff nobody could take away the stall from him. These answers of the plaintiff and of Uma Shankar, according to learned counsel, should not be believed. In paragraph 15 of an affidavit affirmed by the plaintiff on the 31st March, 1958 the plaintiff has said that no objection was taken and has given reasons there for. Moreover, in questions 550 and 551 the plaintiff has admitted that by the letter of the 26th July, 1956 the plaintiff for the first time intimated the Corporation that the partnership had been dissolved. 14. IN this state of the evidence Mr. P. K. Sen, learned counsel for the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 has argued that before 1941 both Lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad became joint occupiers of the three stalls. 14. IN this state of the evidence Mr. P. K. Sen, learned counsel for the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 has argued that before 1941 both Lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad became joint occupiers of the three stalls. The plaintiff has stated that in 1941 after the death of Lachmi Chand he applied to the Corporation for substitution of his name in the place of Lachmi Chand in the records of the Corporation (Q. 540) The resolution of 1941, therefore, could not go beyond the scope of this application. The fact that in 1941 Shivadhar was recognised as a partner, shows that the partnership was subsisting. There was no discontinuance of the partnership after the death of Badri Prasad either: Vide section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act. Mr. Sen's contention is that the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest did not become the sole occupier or lessee or allottee of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86. The plaintiff did not also become the joint occupier of Stall No. 84 on terms and conditions pleaded in paragraph 1 of the plaint. The effect of the resolution of the 11th July, 1941, was that the plaintiff was to be recorded as a joint occupier with Badri Prasad of all the three stalls. The resolution from this point of view was acted upon and is binding on the defendants Nos. 5 and 6. If however, the resolution means that the plaintiff and Badri Prasad would jointly occupy Stall No. 84 and the plaintiff would be the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86, the resolution is not binding upon the defendants Nos. 5 and 6, as it exceeded the terms and scope of the plaintiff's application to the Corporation. 15. THE plaintiff's application to the Corporation in 1941 has not been produced before me. It would not be proper to base one's conclusions on the plaintiff's oral evidence on this application as it was made nearly 18 years ago. My impression is that the plaintiff in his advanced age did not also appreciate the implications of the questions referred to above. The resolution which was passed by the Public Utilities and Markets Committee on the 11th July, 1941, is before me. The resolution is as follows:- "that the registration of the name of Shivadhar Sukhla as the occupier of Stalls Nos. The resolution which was passed by the Public Utilities and Markets Committee on the 11th July, 1941, is before me. The resolution is as follows:- "that the registration of the name of Shivadhar Sukhla as the occupier of Stalls Nos. 85-86 and as one of the occupiers of Stall No. 84 in Block 'd' in Sir Stuart Hogg Market in place of Lachmi Chand Sukhla the deceased occupier of the above stalls for sale of cloth on payment of an initial rent of Rs. 270/- equivalent to 90 days' rent of the stalls and the prescribed daily rent of Rs. 3/-subject to the usual terms and conditions of License of vendors in the Municipal Markets be sanctioned. " 16. IT is clear, therefore, that by this resolution the plaintiff was to be the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86. He was also to hold Stall No. 84 as one of the occupiers along with Badri Prasad. The plaintiff's rights to these stalls were derived from this resolution. At one stage it was suggested by learned counsel for the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 that there was no evidence that this resolution was confirmed by the Corporation. If it was not confirmed, it was for these defendants to take this point in the written statement and to prove that fact before me. I do not also see why the resolution should be noted in the Rent Roll of the Corporation in the absence of confirmation. The Rent Roll strangely enough refers to this resolution but the necessary corrections have not been made therein. I find from the extracts of the Minutes of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee dated the 30th August, 1956, certain remarks of the Deputy Commissioner II dated the 22nd August, 1956. The Deputy Commissioner refers to the resolution of the 11th July, 1941 and states that, that in pursuance of the resolution Shivadhar Sukhla became the recorded occupier of Stall No. 84 along with the original recorded occupier Badri Prasad and the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 and Licenses should have been issued accordingly. These observations of the Deputy Commissioner, it seems, correctly represents the rights of the plaintiff in respect of the stalls in dispute. 17. 85 and 86 and Licenses should have been issued accordingly. These observations of the Deputy Commissioner, it seems, correctly represents the rights of the plaintiff in respect of the stalls in dispute. 17. ON the 31st October, 1957 Sales Tax Registration Certificate was issued by the Commercial Tax Officer, Taltola Charge to Shukla Brothers and the principal place of business of the concern was stated to be D-84-86 New Market, Calcutta. 18. ON the 8th October, 1945 a notice of demand under section 29 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 was issued to Messrs. Shukla Brothers of D-84 to 86 Hogg Market, Calcutta. On the 4th December, 1947 notice of assessment of tax under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Bengal Finance Act, 1939 was also issued to Shukla Brothers of D-84 to 86, Hogg Market, Calcutta. 19. A number of treasury challans has been exhibited in this suit which shows payments made by Shukla Brothers of D-84 to 86, Hogg Market, Calcutta. 20. ALL these documents go to support the plaintiff's case as to the scope and effect of the resolution of 1941. This resolution has been on record from July, 1941 till August, 1956. No attempt, in the meantime, has been made either to rescind it or to set it aside. The resolution provided for payment of the initial rent of Rs. 270/-by the plaintiff. This initial rent was deposited by the plaintiff with the Corporation on the 21st April, 1941 and was kept in the Corporation's suspense account. The money was retained by the Corporation after the resolution was passed. The Rent Roll, as I have said earlier, also refers to the resolution of 1941. Balai Chand Banerjee who used to maintain the books of account of the Hogg Market between 1930 and 1950 for reasons best known to him even stated that after the resolution of July, 1941 Shivadhar according to the Rent Roll, was the sole occupier of Stalls. Nos. 85 and 86 and a joint occupier of Stall No. 84 (Q. 79). It is true that the Rent Roll was not corrected in accordance with the resolution of 1941 and that is why subsequent rent receipts and Licenses were issued showing that Badri Prasad and Shivadhar were joint occupiers of all the three stalls. Nos. 85 and 86 and a joint occupier of Stall No. 84 (Q. 79). It is true that the Rent Roll was not corrected in accordance with the resolution of 1941 and that is why subsequent rent receipts and Licenses were issued showing that Badri Prasad and Shivadhar were joint occupiers of all the three stalls. But can it be said that because of acceptance of these rent receipts and Licenses without any objection the plaintiff is estopped from claiming to be the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 ? 21. UNDER section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act when one person has by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing. 22. THE allegation in paragraph 3 of the written statement on behalf of the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 4, is that the plaintiff never objected to and actually acquiesced in the issue of the joint license and rent sheet or rent receipts. The issue of estoppel has been raised on this pleading. It seems to me that the essential elements of estoppel are lacking in the instant case. The plaintiff did not make any representations to the Corporation on which the Corporation acted. The issue of rent receipts or Licenses are the acts of the Corporation itself. If the Corporation fails to make the necessary corrections in the Rent Roll in terms of the resolution of 1941 and issues wrong receipts and Licenses which are accepted by the plaintiff. I do not see how the question of estoppel can be raised. The plaintiff has said in paragraph 15 of his affidavit affirmed on the 31st March, 1958 that no objection was taken on his behalf to the Licenses and rent receipts as he was in occupation of the three stalls at all material times in terms of the resolution of the 11th July, 1941. Moreover it is well known that the person claiming the benefit of an estoppel must show that he was not aware of the true state of things. If he was aware of the real state of affairs or had means of knowledge there can be no estoppel. Moreover it is well known that the person claiming the benefit of an estoppel must show that he was not aware of the true state of things. If he was aware of the real state of affairs or had means of knowledge there can be no estoppel. The Corporation cannot say that it was not aware of the resolution of 1941. I, therefore, hold in accordance with the resolution of the 11th July, 1941 that the plaintiff became the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 and a joint occupier with Badri Prasad of Stall No. 84. The resolution has been acted upon by the Corporation as it has been noted in the Rent Roll and is binding on the defendants Nos. 5 and 6. I hold further on the facts and circumstances of this case that the plaintiff is not stopped from claiming to be the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 in terms of the resolution of the 11th July, 1941. 23. I shall next deal with Issue No. 4 of the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and Issues Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of the defendants Nos. 5 and 6. Mr. P. P. Ghosh for the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 has invited my attention to the terms of the License granted to the stall-holders marked Exhibit 's'. This License is required under section 449 of the Act. of 1951. Section 548 provides, inter alia, that every License shall specify the restrictions and conditions (if any) subject to which it is granted. Under section 456 the Corporation, inter alia may charge stall ages, rents or fees for the occupation or use of any stall in a Municipal Market and for the right to expose goods for sale in a Municipal Market. 24. IN the instant case clauses 2, 5 and 6 of the terms and conditions of the License are relevant. They are as follows :-Clause 2. That no stall-holder shall sublet the use of the stall or any portion thereof or transfer his title, interest or any portion of interest in the business conducted in the stall or admit or discharge any partner in business without special sanction being first obtained from the Corporation in that behalf. Clause 5. They are as follows :-Clause 2. That no stall-holder shall sublet the use of the stall or any portion thereof or transfer his title, interest or any portion of interest in the business conducted in the stall or admit or discharge any partner in business without special sanction being first obtained from the Corporation in that behalf. Clause 5. That the stall-holder shall be bound to quit and make over peaceful possession of the stall within seven days from the service of a written notice to that effect by the Corporation clause 6. That the stall-holder shall be bound to comply with the directions and orders of the Corporation as may be given from time to time and with the provisions of the Municipal Act and the Rules and Regulations and Bye-Laws made thereunder which are now in force or may hereafter come into force in respect of Municipal Markets. Reliance was also placed on Clauses 58, 59, 61 and 65 of the Market Manual of the Corporation which are as follows:-Clause 58. When the original allottee or one or more of the original allottees of a particular shop or stall dies, License under section 391 (1) stands revoked and his or their heirs, being in the market without any License, can be dealt with under section 394 (ii). Clause 59. Heirs of original allottees of any shop or stall shall be registered as occupiers of such shop or stall on payment of an initial rent ordinarily equivalent of three months' or ninety days' rent of the shop or stall respectively, but which can be wholly or partially remitted under orders of the Public Utilities and Markets Standing Committee. Clause 61. No person shall be entitled to recognition by the Corporation as a partner of any shop-keeper or stall-holder in a Municipal Market in respect of either of the business carried on in his shop or stall or of the goods dealt with therein unless he half been registered in the Rent Roll on payment of initial rent as a partner. Ordinarily the amount of initial rent is equivalent to three months' or 90 days' rent of the shop or stall. Clause 65. Ordinarily the amount of initial rent is equivalent to three months' or 90 days' rent of the shop or stall. Clause 65. No vendor shall sublet, assign or otherwise transfer his interest in his shop or stall in a Municipal Market or any portion of such interest without the previous sanction of the authorities; and no transferee of any such interest or portion shall enter into occupation unless such sanction has been obtained and until the transfer has been registered in the Rent Roll. 25. SECTION 394 referred to in clause 58 is of the 1923 Act. The corresponding section of the new Act is section 449. The provision, inter alia, is that no person shall without a License from the Commissioner, sell or expose for sale any animal, article or thing whatsoever in any Municipal Market. A person contravening this provision may be summarily removed from the market by any Municipal Officer or servant under the direction of the Commissioner. 26. THE reasons for referring to all these provisions are two-fold. Firstly, the right of a partner in a stall is of a limited nature. Secondly, what is granted to the stall-holder is a License revocable by seven days' notice in writing. In clauses (a) and (b) of the prayers in the plaint the plaintiff seeks an injunction inter alia, restraining the defendants Nos. 1, 2, 2a, 3 and 4 from giving effect to the resolutions of the 30th August, 1956 and the 9th November, 1956 and restraining all the defendants from interfering with or interrupting the plaintiff's joint occupation of Stall No. 84. The injunction prayed for, according to learned counsel, cannot be granted and the suit must fail. Learned counsel relied on Dominion of India v. Sohanlal, (5) A. I. R. 1950 East Punjab page 40 and Ziaul Haque v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. (6) 55 C. W. N. 232. 27. MR. P. P. Ghose has also submitted in the premises aforesaid that the resolutions of the 30th August, 1956 and the 9th November, 1956 are not void. 28. ARGUING on Issues Nos. 5, 6 and 7 raised on behalf of his clients the defendants Nos. 5 and 6, Mr. P. K. Sen has also contended that the plaintiff has no right to an injunction and is entitled only to damages if the license has been wrongfully revoked. Mr. 28. ARGUING on Issues Nos. 5, 6 and 7 raised on behalf of his clients the defendants Nos. 5 and 6, Mr. P. K. Sen has also contended that the plaintiff has no right to an injunction and is entitled only to damages if the license has been wrongfully revoked. Mr. Sen has contended further that if the stall-holder has a license coupled with an interest then under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, the License must be in writing and registered. In the absence of registration, therefore, the plaintiff held merely a revocable License; and he is not entitled to ask for an injunction. 29. THE next contention of Mr. Sen is that the plaintiff is not also entitled to ask for a declaration in terms of clause (c) of the prayers in the plaint, namely, that the resolutions of the 30th August, 1956 and the 9th November, 1956 be declared ultra vires, illegal and void In Prosad v. Corporation of Calcutta (7) 40 Cal. 836 where plans for buildings were rejected by the Chairman and the General Committee of the Corporation it was held that no suit was maintainable to have the plans approved or for damages. If the Chairman and the General Committee had acted honestly and within their authority their decision would not be reviewed by any Court. If the plans had been rejected mala fides, the only remedy is by an application under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act for an order to compel the Chairman and the General Committee to hear the matter in the manner provided by law. 30. THE points raised by Mr. Sen are interesting. But it is not necessary for me to decide them in this suit owing to reasons I shall presently indicate. Mr. B. C. Dutt for the plaintiff first of all contends that a stall-holder is not a licensee at all. He is a tenant, of the Corporation under the provisions of the Act. Section 449 speaks of a License to sell or expose for sale any article, animal or thing in the Municipal Market. It is an independent provision which has no connection with a stall or shed in the market. Under section 458 (1) (c) the Commissioner may determine any lease or tenure which a person may have in, inter alia, a stall or shop. It is an independent provision which has no connection with a stall or shed in the market. Under section 458 (1) (c) the Commissioner may determine any lease or tenure which a person may have in, inter alia, a stall or shop. Clause 59 of the Market Manual gives to the heirs of a stallholder the right of inheritance. In the case of a License questions of heritability or transferability do not arise at all. If, therefore, the plaintiff is a tenant and not a licensee, a suit by the plaintiff under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act is maintainable. 31. I find similar arguments were advanced before Bose, J., in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in Matter No. 94 of 1951 (Shew Sewak Bajpai v. Corporation of Calcutta and ors.) (8). His Lordship after considering the relevant provisions of the old Act, the Market Manual and other documents was pleased to observe as follows:- "now the essential characteristic of the bare license is that it is revocable at will and is not assignable. But it is clear in the present case that the stall-holder can subject to certain conditions transfer his interest in the stall. Moreover, as I have already pointed out, the heirs of a deceased stallholder have a right to get themselves registered as stall-holders as a matter of course on payment of a certain sum by way of initial rent. In my view the right of a stall-holder to use and occupy the stall is not a bare license but it is a license coupled with an interest. . . . . . . . " 32. WITH respect I find myself in agreement with the conclusions of Bose, J. Reliance was placed before His Lordship on the words 'tenant', 'rent', 'landlord and Tenant', 'lease and Tenure' which had been used in connection with allotment of stalls in the various documents annexed to the affidavits and in the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act for showing that the interest of a stall-holder is in the nature of a demise or tenancy. But His Lordship pointed out that the nomenclature used was not conclusive and the substance of the transaction had to be looked into: See also O. C. Ganguly v, Kamalpat (9) A. I. R. (1947)Cal. 236 and Dwijendra v. K. Shaw (10) A. I. R. (1953) Cal. 147. But His Lordship pointed out that the nomenclature used was not conclusive and the substance of the transaction had to be looked into: See also O. C. Ganguly v, Kamalpat (9) A. I. R. (1947)Cal. 236 and Dwijendra v. K. Shaw (10) A. I. R. (1953) Cal. 147. An appeal was preferred against the judgment of Bose, J. being Appeal No. 79 of 1952. It was dismissed by Das and Debabrata Mookherjee, JJ. The appellate court did not specifically deal with the observation of Bose, J. that the stall-holder's right to occupy a stall was a license coupled with an interest. It has, however, been observed by Das, J. who delivered the judgment that the grant of 'license' to the heirs of a stall-holder is a matter which rests with the Corporation. His Lordship has used the term 'license' and not 'lease' or 'tenancy'. The question, therefore, for determination is whether the plaintiff having a license coupled with an interest, is entitled to an injunction under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that he is either a tenant or a licensee coupled with a grant. If he is a tenant, he has the right to property. If he is a licensee coupled with a grant, he has the right to enjoyment of property. A bare licensee is not entitled to an injunction. Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act sets out the cases in which an injunction cannot be granted. A license coupled with a grant has not been mentioned in this section. A special meeting of the Public Utilities and Markets Committee was held on the 17th March, 1945 at 2 P. M. 33. EXHIBIT U-1 is a resolution adopted at this meeting containing the terms and conditions to be imposed on stallholders of the Hogg Market. The rents of all permanent stalls were increased by 10 p. c. In view of this increase the stall-holders were granted certain concessions. Subject to conditions laid down the stall-holders, for instance, were allowed to transfer their rights and interests to any person other than their heirs; a person might be admitted as a partner with lien in the stall; an old partner could transfer his rights and interests to a new partner or partners; and occupiers of stalls could change the nature of their business. These rights are not given to a bare licensee. In a case of illegal or wrongful termination of the rights and interests of the stall-holders, a suit for an injunction under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act is maintainable. 34. IN Ziaul Haque v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. (6) 55 C. W. N. 232, Sinha, J. has reviewed various decisions on this subject. The following propositions can be deduced from these authorities :-1. A license is revocable unless (i) it is coupled with a grant or interest or (ii) the licensee acting upon the license has spent money in executing works of a permanent nature (see section 60, Indian Easements Act). 2. Where a license is prima facie irrevocable either because it is coupled with a grant or interest or because the licensee has erected works of a permanent nature, there is nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing expressly or by necessary implication that the license nevertheless shall be revocable (See Dominion of India v. Sohanlal (5) A. I. R. 1950 East Punjab 40 at page 47). 3. The parties may also expressly or impliedly agree that a license which is prima facie revocable being not within either of the two categories of irrevocable license should nonetheless be irrevocable (See Dominion of India v. Sohanlal (5) A. I. R. 1950 East Punjab 40 at page 47). 4. Where a license is revocable the licensee is entitled to reasonable notice. If, however, the license is revoked without reasonable notice, the remedy is by way of damages and not by way of an injunction (See Aldin v. Lehimar Clark Muirhead and Co. (11) 2 Ch. 437 at page 447 and Wilson v. Davener (12) (1901) 1 Ch. 578). The reason is that to restrain the revocation of a revocable license is to make it irrevocable. 5. Where the license is irrevocable and its enjoyment is obstructed by the licenser, the remedy of the licensee is by way of injunction or in damages (See Peacock on Easement 3rd Edition page 680). 6. The trend of decisions in the Calcutta High Court is that even in the case of revocation of an irrevocable license the only remedy is by way of damages (See Swarnamoyee v. Chander (13) 12 C. L. J. 443 and Motilal v. Kalu. (14) 19 C. L. J. 321). 6. The trend of decisions in the Calcutta High Court is that even in the case of revocation of an irrevocable license the only remedy is by way of damages (See Swarnamoyee v. Chander (13) 12 C. L. J. 443 and Motilal v. Kalu. (14) 19 C. L. J. 321). I have already held following the decision of Bose, J. referred to above that a stall-holder in the Hogg Market is given a license, coupled with an interest. It is, therefore, prima facie an irrevocable license. But in the instant case the License was granted subject to the condition that "the stall-holder shall be bound to quit and make over peaceful possession of the stall within seven days from the service of a written notice to that effect by the Corporation. " The parties, therefore, expressly agreed that the License shall be revocable. That being the position, the only remedy which the plaintiff has if his License has been illegally or wrongfully revoked, is by way of damages and not by way of injunction. It is relevant in this connection to note the following observations of S. R. Das, C. J. in Dominion v. Sohanlal (5) A. I. R. 1950 East Punjab 40 at page 50:- "if the Calcutta decisions referred to above were correct the only remedy, if any, of the respondent licensee would lie in damages. Unless of course cl. (11) bars even that remedy as to which I express no opinion. Again if the argument that the Indian Easements Act having, by section 64, prescribed the special remedy by way of damages, no other remedy is available were sound, then also no injunction can be granted. Finally, if the license has, by special agreement, been made revocable on certain grounds as to the existence of which a particular person's opinion has been made the sole test and criterion and he has expressed his opinion as I hold he has, thorn also there can be no injunction, for to grant an injunction in such circumstances will be to make that irrevocable which the parties themselves had by their special contract thought fit to make revocable. " 35. " 35. IT seems to me that the plaintiff in the present case is, no doubt, hit by the third proposition of S. R. Das, C. J. In any event the decisions in 12 C. L. J. 443 (13) and 19 C. L. J. 321 (14) are against the plaintiff's claim for an in junction. Moreover section 64 of the indian Easements Act lays down that where a license has been granted for a consideration and the licensee, without any fault of his own, is evicted by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed. 36. UNDER the license, the right for which he contracted, he is entitled be recover compensation from the grantor. The Act does not apply to West Bengal but there is authority for the proposition that it may serve as a useful guide for ascertaining the rule of law on this subject. See Bhola Nath v. Radha Nath (15) A. I. R. (1924) Cal. 844 at page 846. This suit therefore, under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, is not, in my opinion, maintainable. Considerable arguments were advanced by Mr. Dutt to the effect that the Corporation's actions and decisions in this matter are malafide, illegal and ultra vires and constitute gross and manifest abuse of powers. Having regard to the view I have taken on the maintainability of this suit, I need not express any opinion on these points at all. The plaintiff, if he is so advised, may choose his remedy in damages. 37. AS I have said, I do not also intend to express any views on Mr. Sen's arguments on clause (c) of the prayers in the plaint. Mr. Dutt categorically states that his suit is not a suit under section 42 but under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act. He has also said that because it is a suit under section 54 his client has not served any notice under section 586 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. I have held that the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain a suit under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act. Assuming that the declaration asked for in clause (c) of the prayers in the plaint is a declarations under section 42, the suit will not be maintainable in the absence of a notice under section 586 of the Act. 38. I shall now indicate my views on Issues Nos. Assuming that the declaration asked for in clause (c) of the prayers in the plaint is a declarations under section 42, the suit will not be maintainable in the absence of a notice under section 586 of the Act. 38. I shall now indicate my views on Issues Nos. 2 to 4 raised on behalf of the defendants Nos. 5 and 6. Mr. Sen has contended that there is no documentary evidence in support of the alleged agreement between Lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad in or about 1940 that Lachmi Chand would carry on business at Stall No. D-84 and pay to Badri Prasad in consideration thereof Rs. 50/- per month during his life time and to his heirs and legal representatives after his death. On the 30th March, 1935 the Public Utilities and Markets Committee passed a resolution allowing Badri Prasad and Lachmi Chand to carry on business in Stalls Nos. D-84 and D-85 to D-86 on payment of initial rent. From the Rent Roll it appears that the last installment of initial rent was paid on the 29th January, 1936 and the joint business started on the 1st March, 1936. This business according to the plaintiff, was for five years and came to an end by efflux of time during the lifetime of Lachmi Chand. Lachmi Chand died in 1940. The plaintiff's case, therefore, cannot be true. There are documents according to the plaintiff to support his case of arrangements with Badri Prasad but they have been destroyed by white ants. 39. MONEY Order Receipts disclosed by the plaintiff showing payments for Rs. 50/- per month, are all after the death of Lachmi Chand. There is no receipt before the death of Lachmi chand which would have strongly supported the plaintiff's case The explanation of Shivadhar is "they might not have been in existence" (Q. 280). 40. THE entries in the plaintiff's books of account show that the sum of Rs. 50/- per month was being paid as rent to Badri Prasad's widow. This is inconsistent with the agreement pleaded in paragraph 3 of the plaint. The explanation of Uma shankar is "we had a contract with Badri Prasad that he would leave the business to be carried on by us and he asked us to carry on the business and to pay him Rs. 50/- per month" (Q. 790). 41. This is inconsistent with the agreement pleaded in paragraph 3 of the plaint. The explanation of Uma shankar is "we had a contract with Badri Prasad that he would leave the business to be carried on by us and he asked us to carry on the business and to pay him Rs. 50/- per month" (Q. 790). 41. IT would be necessary to consider relevant portions of the evidence of the plaintiff and their other witnesses in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether or not there was an agreement between Lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad as alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint. 42. THE plaintiff Shivadhar Shukla has stated that when the partnership business came to an end Lachmi Chand expressed his desire not to continue or renew the partnership because he had to shoulder all the responsibilities while Badri Prasad was ill all along. At the suggestion of Badri Prasad it was fixed that Rs. 50/- per month would be paid to him and Lachmi Chand would carry on business in all the three stalls. This sum of Rs. 50/- would be payable on account of business carried on at Stall No. 84 (Qs. 16 to 23). After this arrangement Lachmi Chand started carrying on business under the name and style of Shukla Brothers (Q. 31). The partnership between Lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad commenced for five years in the month of march, 1935. It came to an end in 1940. Lachmi Chand died in 1940 but the partnership was dissolved before his death (Qs. 329 to 335). The sum of Rs. 50/- per month was to be paid to Badri Prasad and thereafter to his heirs till the shop lasted (Q. 344). At first Badri Prasad demanded Rs. 60/-ac Rs. 70/- per month but the amount was ultimately settled at Rs. 50/- per month (Q. 520). In his evidence before me Shivadhar has stated that Lachmi Chand died in 1940. In a letter to the Superintendent of the Hogg Market dated the 26th July, 1956 he has said that Lachmi Chand died in 1941. Shivadhar is now 84 years of age. His forget fullness of a tragedy which occurred nearly 19 years ago, Mr. Dutt has rightly submitted, can be well understood. 43. I shall now deal with the evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . Shivadhar is now 84 years of age. His forget fullness of a tragedy which occurred nearly 19 years ago, Mr. Dutt has rightly submitted, can be well understood. 43. I shall now deal with the evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . [his Lordship then discussed the evidence of Umasankar, Krishnaditt Dubey, Badri Prasad's son and Kalicharan Dubey and proceeded as follows:- Upon consideration of the evidence oral and documentary after observing the witnesses mentioned above. I am inclined to accept the plaintiff's case that there was an agreement between Lachmi Chand and Badri Prasad in 1940, that Lachmi Chand would carry on business at Stall No. D-84 and pay to Badri Prasad Rs. 50/- per month during his lifetime and to his heirs and legal representatives after his death. The partnership between Lachmi chand and Badri Prasad came to an end in 1940. Pursuant to this agreement payments were continuously made between 1940 and 1955 to Badri Prasad and after his death to his widow. That is why after Lachmi Chand's death the plaintiff applied to the Corporation in 1941 for recording his name as the sole occupier of Stalls Nos. 85 and 86 and as a joint occupier with Badri Prasad of Stall No. 84. On this application the resolution of the Corporation dated the 11th July, 1941 was passed. The agreement to dissolve the partnership may or may not affect the Corporation but it was binding on Badri Prasad, and is binding on the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 after his death. 44. I have expressed my views on and the issues raised in this suit. The result is that this suit is dismissed. But having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, each party will bear and pay its own costs.