ORDER V.R. Nevaskar, J. This petition for revision arises out of Plaintiff's suit for recovery of arrears of rent. The Defendant, who was the original owner of the house in suit had executed a mortgage of this house and had executed a rent-note in favour of Mahant Atmaram agreeing to pay rent to him for continuing to occupy the said house subsequent to the date of the mortgage. The rent-note was for a period of one year and had been executed on 15-10-1952. The Defendant however had paid rent for one year in advance and the rent-note appears to have been extended to enable the Plaintiff, if he so desired, to obtain ejectment from the Defendant. The rent-note contained a specific stipulation that in case the Defendant did not vacate at the end of the year for which the rent had already been paid in advance, the landlord would be entitled to obtain ejectment by having recourse to a suit for the costs of which he would be liable. The mortgage deed mentioned the fact that the mortgagor had obtained Rs.4,000 for securing which the Defendant had executed the usufructuary C.R. No. 371 of 1958 decided on 7-4-1959. (Indore Bench.) J mortgage deed and had executed a rent-note for one year. One year's rent had been paid in advance which was credited towrads interest of one year. The house would be redeemed at the end of the year. In case this were not done the house should be deemed to have been sold to the mortgagee. It is clear that the last mentioned term was a clog on the mortgage and was invalid. The mortgage appeared to be of anomalous sort and the rent-note was intended by the parties with a view to convert the occupation of the Defendant as an owner into that of a tenant. The Plaintiff claims to be the heir of Mahant Atmaram the person named as the landland in the rent-note and entitled to recover arrears of rent as Mahant Atmaram was dead. It was asserted by the Plaintiff that subsequent to the death of Mahant Atmaram the Defendant paid Rs.300 through Indarmal Kataria. He was given credit for the rent of Rs.50 said to have been paid in excess to Mahant Atmaram. It was asserted by the Plaintiff that subsequent to the death of Mahant Atmaram the Defendant paid Rs.300 through Indarmal Kataria. He was given credit for the rent of Rs.50 said to have been paid in excess to Mahant Atmaram. The Plaintiff claimed Rs.200 as rent due from 15-6-1956 upto 14-2-1957 at Rs.25 P.M. The Defendant denied Plaintiff's right to succeed to Mahant Atmaram and contended that he could not recover arrears of rent in the absence of succession certificate. The payment of rent Rs.300 to the Plaintiff was not specifically admitted although it was admitted that the transaction of payment took place through Indarmal Kataria. Whatever had been paid was said to have been paid as interest as according to the Defendant the alleged document styled by the Plaintiff as a rent-note was in fact a interest-note and the Plaintiff therefore was not entitled to recover any rent from him. The amount of interest to which he might be liable would be determined at the time of redemption. On these contentions the trial Court framed the following two points for determination in the first instance: 1. Whether the Plaintiff could sue without obtaining succession certificate ? Whether the document sued upon is not a rent-note but is only an interest-note and had become inoperative subsequent to 14-10-1953 ? Both these points were determined in favour of the Plaintiff. It was held that since the Defendant had paid rent to the Plaintiff he could not contend that he was not his tenant. The Plaintiff if he is entitled to recover rent for the period in question he could do so without obtaining succession certificate. It was further held that the document sued upon was a rent-note and not an interest-note. It was further held that it was meant to be operative even subsequent to the expiry of one year as one year's rent had already been paid in advance. After these findings two more points of determination were added and as one of them involved question of fact evidence was taken. These points are: 1. Whether the Plaintiff could claim Rs.200 as arrears.? Whether by reason of the expiry of the period of one year for redemption of mortgage had expired no suit could be based on the rent-note covering that period ? These points are: 1. Whether the Plaintiff could claim Rs.200 as arrears.? Whether by reason of the expiry of the period of one year for redemption of mortgage had expired no suit could be based on the rent-note covering that period ? The learned Small Cause Judge held on these two points that the Defendant had accepted Plaintiff as the landlord by making payment of arrears through his brother-in-law Indarmal and by adjusting the previous account in the presence of his 'Byahi' Sagarmal. The learned Judge saw no reason to disbelieve the Plaintiff that Rs.200 were due as arrears. He relied upon the decision reported in Ramnarain v. Sukhi AIR 1958 Bom. 8 , for finding in Plaintiff's favour as regards point No. 2. He therefore held that the Plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount as compensation for use and occupation. Accordingly he awarded a decree in Plaintiff's favour. In this petition Mr. Patel for the Petitioner relied upon the decisions reported in Harilal Bhagwanji v. Hemeshankar Umiyashankar AIR 1958 Bom. 8 , Bhijnath Prasad v. Jang Bahadur Singh AIR 1955 Pat. 357 , in support of the contention that where there are two documents one of mortgage and the other what is outwardly a rent-note it is competent for the Court to look to the real intention of the parties, by reference to both the documents, to find whether any lease in fact was intended to be created or whether the documents were intended to secure regular payment of interest and no such relation was intended to be created. In the present case, he urged, since the mortgage deed provided for one year's period for redemption and the rent-note covered that period and since the interest for one year had been paid in advance the document sued upon was really not intended to be effective after that period particularly in view of the stipulation in the mortgage deed that in case the mortgage money was not paid within one year the mortgagor would not be entitled to recover back the property. In my opinion the contention of the Learned Counsel of the Petitioner is untenable. In a case reported in Feroz Shah v. Sohbat Khan AIR 1933 P.C. 178, the mortgagee-landlord brought a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent. In my opinion the contention of the Learned Counsel of the Petitioner is untenable. In a case reported in Feroz Shah v. Sohbat Khan AIR 1933 P.C. 178, the mortgagee-landlord brought a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent. The learned Judicial Commissioner of Peshawar who heard the case held that the suit was incompetent as according to him the mortgage dated 12-3-1917 and the lease of even date together with the circumstances that the possession all along remained with the mortgagor and that there had been similar transactions in the past should have led to no other conclusion than that the mortgage had been intended to be a simple one. This view was negatived by their Lordships of the Privy Council who observed at page 180: Their Lordships find themselves unable to accept the view of the Judicial Commissioner as to the nature of the transaction evidenced by the two documents in question. It is not suggested that there is anything in the Act of 1900, before referred to, which would invalidate a possessory mortgage accompanied by a lease back to the mortgagor, nor do their Lordships think that there is anything in itself suspicious about such an arrangement. The mortgagee may well have preferred to leave the cultivation of the land in the hands of the mortgagor, being entitled to take possession at any time if the provisions of the lease were not adhered to. Assuming this to have been one of the conditions upon which the mortgage was agreed to, the mere absence of a formal handing over of the land to the mortgagee, and a handing back by him to the mortgagor in the character of lessee, is, they think, of little significance. The reality of the transaction, is, moreover, supported by the mutation in the Government records. Section 92, Evidence Act forbids the admission or consideration of evidence as to the intentions of the parties, or to contradict the express terms of the documents see; Balkishen(sic) Dass v. Legge ILR 22 All. 149 and their Lordships think that no presumption can legitimately be drawn from the fact that there had been previous transactions between the parties of a similar character. The decision of the Privy Council in Ramarayanimgar v. Maharaja of Venkatagiri AIR 1927 P.C. 32, also points to the same conclusion. 149 and their Lordships think that no presumption can legitimately be drawn from the fact that there had been previous transactions between the parties of a similar character. The decision of the Privy Council in Ramarayanimgar v. Maharaja of Venkatagiri AIR 1927 P.C. 32, also points to the same conclusion. In that case a mortgage, which was held to be a combination of simple and usufructuary mortgage, had been executed by the Defendant in respect of properties A, B, C and D for securing a sum of elevan lakhs. It was agreed that the interest at a certain rate was to be recovered out of rents and profits. In case the amount was not paid by a certain date enhanced rate of interest was chargeable. At the same time another deed called a counter part lease was executed by the mortgagor who took 'A' properties on lease from the mortgagee for the period of the mortgage. Out of the amount borrowed namely 11 lakhs, 2 lakhs were to be applied for paying off mortgage decrees in respect of A properties and Anr. 2, lakhs were to be applied for paying off a mortgage decree against 'B' properties and the remaining 6 lakhs to satisfy mortgage decree against C properties. The annual rent for the lease of A properties represented interest payable at the agreed rate upon Rs.2, lakhs. The mortgagee paid Rs.2, lakhs and A properties were redeemed. He also paid a certain sum in Court for satisfying the decree upon B properties. But the properties were auctioned off before and the mortgagor could get back somewhat reduced sum 'B' properties were therefore lost. The mortgagee thereupon did not advance Rs.6 lakhs. The mortgagor too did not pay stipulated rent in respect of A properties. In this state of things the mortgagor filed suit for redemption of 'A' properties. Question arose whether the rent payable under the lease of 'A' properties was a charge upon the 'A' properties or not. It was held that the two transactions of the mortgage and the lease should have been read together as they formed part of the same transaction and that the amount of arrears with interest thereon had a charge upon 'A' pro-perties. In that case it has to be noticed that interest was payable under the mortgage deed. That would certainly be a charge. In that case it has to be noticed that interest was payable under the mortgage deed. That would certainly be a charge. The mortgagor in spite of execution of what he called usufructuary mortgage was allowed to be in possession by means of a transaction called lease and he agreed to pay rent representing the interest on the sum advanced which was intended to be secured by that property. In these circumstances it was contended on behalf of the mortgagor that the arrears of rent could not be said to constitute a charge upon the mortgaged property when he tried to redeem the mortgage. Their Lordships negatived that contention holding that the intention of the parties in entering into both these simultaneous transactions was to secure a charge both as to the principal and interest represented by the arrears. This decision does not lay down that in spite of the execution of the lease no relationship of landlord and tenant had been created. In view of these decisions of the Privy Council and particularly the first one there is no doubt that the document sued upon could not be regarded as something else than what its terms indicate. In fact since the rent of the period of one year for which the document pertained had been paid in advance, it cannot be said that it was intended to secure to Mahant Atmaram the payment of that sum. The mortgage was intended to be a combination of simple and usufructuary sort. Interest was agreed upon and the date by which the principal money was to be paid was mentioned in the mortgage deed. The Defendant was to continue in occupation and it was therefore agreed that he would thenceforward be in occupation not as an owner but only as Atmaram's tenant. This was perfectly a logical and legally competent position. The rent-note more specifically entitled Atmaram to sue for ejectment with liability of Defendant to pay costs of that suit in case the Defendant failed to redeem or vacate at the end of that period. There was therefore clearly a relationship of landlord and tenant created between the Defendant and Mahant Atmaram. Even subsequent to the period of the rent-note the Defendant continued to pay rent to Atmaram and on latter's death recognised the Plaintiff as his landlord and paid rent to him except for the suit period. There was therefore clearly a relationship of landlord and tenant created between the Defendant and Mahant Atmaram. Even subsequent to the period of the rent-note the Defendant continued to pay rent to Atmaram and on latter's death recognised the Plaintiff as his landlord and paid rent to him except for the suit period. In this state of things it is futile for him to say that a suit for the recovery of rent is not competent or the Plaintiff, at any rate, could not recover. After the Defendant recognised the Plaintiff as his landlord and paid rent to him no question of application of Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act arises. The period for which the rent is claimed is subsequent to the death of Mahant Atmaram. The decisions reported in Bajnath Prasad v. Jang Bahadur Singh AIR 1955 Pat. 357 and Harilal Bhagwanji v. Hemeshanker Umaiyashanker AIR 1958 Bom. 8 , upon which the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied cannot help the Petitioner. The former decision does not correctly appreciate the true effect of the decision in Ramarayanimgar v. Maharaja of Venkatagiri AIR 1927 P.C. 32, and does not take into account the decision reported in Feroz Shah v. Sohbat Khan AIR 1933 PC. 178, referred to above. The Bombay decision relies upon the aforesaid Patna decision for its views. The petition therefore is without force and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed