JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The facts as alleged in the affidavit supporting the petition are these : The petitioners Raghuraj Narain and Raghukul Narain claim to be the bhumidhars of a large area of land including the plots in dispute. The respondents lay a rival claim to this land. 3. In 1949, proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr. P.C. had to be initiated by the authorities with regard to this land, the petitioners and the respondents denying one anther's possession. Ultimately, under the direction of the High Court, an order under Sec. 146, Cr. P. C. was passed as no decision could be arrived at as regards possession and parties were directed to file a civil suit. On 16th November 1954 the petitioners Raghuraj Narain and Raghukul Narain filed a suit in the court of the Civil Judge of Meerut for a declaration that the petitioners were bhumidhars of the land in dispute. The respondents 3 to 35 were the contesting defendants in that suit. They pleaded that they had be-come the Sirdars of the land. The date of the filing of the suit is important, as one of the questions in issue in this petition is whether an amendment of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950, which came into effect in 1956 and which directed the Civil Court to remit to the revenue court an issue whether any party to the suit is or is not a sirdar, would apply to a suit filed before the amendment became law. However, to continue the narrative of facts on 17-12-1957 the learned Civil Judge passed an order referring the issue relating to the respondent's claim to be Sirdars to the revenue court for decision. This order was passed under Sec. 332B of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950 as amended in 1954 and again in 1956. In pursuance of the order of the learned Civil Judge the record was sent to the revenue court for a decision on the issue framed by the Civil Court. But the revenue court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to decide the issue, and on 31-1-58 it passed an order returning the record to the learned Civil Judge. On 15-3-58 the matter was reconsidered by the Civil Court when the learned Civil Judge reiterated his previous decision. But the revenue court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to decide the issue, and on 31-1-58 it passed an order returning the record to the learned Civil Judge. On 15-3-58 the matter was reconsidered by the Civil Court when the learned Civil Judge reiterated his previous decision. He added the observation that the revenue court could not have questioned the correctness of the Civil Court's order sending the case to it for decision. Accordingly it sent the record back to the revenue court. But the latter court, too, stuck to its original decision that it had no jurisdiction. It also observed that its decision was final and was not subject to revision or review by the Civil Court. 4. In this situation, when the Civil and the Revenue Courts have been to use a colloquial expression sending the ball back and forth, the result has been that no one has decided the issue in the petitioner's suit. They have, therefore, come to this Court for a decision as to which court hits the jurisdiction to decide the question. Learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. Shanti Bhushan, candidly stated that his clients were not particularly interest: whether the decision should be made by the Civil or the Revenue Court, as long as it was made by some one. He stated that in his petition he had included the formal prayer for mandamus directing the revenue court to exercise its jurisdiction according to law and decide the issue. But learned counsel informed me that, since the filing of the petition, a learned single Judge of this Court has decided that, in a situation like this, the Civil Court would have jurisdiction. He referred to the judgment of Bishambhar Dayal, J. dated 6-1-1958 in Civil Revision No. 1492 of 1956. The learned Judge held that the Amending Act of 1956, which required the remittance of any issue on Sirdari rights to the revenue court, did not affect the procedure in suits filed before that amendment became law. If this principle is applied to the facts of the present case, the suit filed by the petitioners on 16th November 1954 would not be affected by the amendment of 1956. It appears, therefore, that the revenue court was right in its view that the learned Civil Judge alone had the jurisdiction to decide the issue. 5. If this principle is applied to the facts of the present case, the suit filed by the petitioners on 16th November 1954 would not be affected by the amendment of 1956. It appears, therefore, that the revenue court was right in its view that the learned Civil Judge alone had the jurisdiction to decide the issue. 5. It was also brought to my notice by learned counsel for the parties that Sec. 332 B was repealed in to by the subsequent Amendment Act no. 37 of 1958. Therefore, the position today reverts to that prevailing before the passing of the Amendment Act of 1956. It appears, therefore, that the, law which required the remittance of an issue to the revenue court had a very brief span of life during which it did not affect the petitioners suit at all. In any view of the matter, therefore, the petitioner's suit must be decided by the learned Civil Judge. 6. In the circumstances, the petitioners are permitted to amend their prayer and ask for a writ of mandamus directing the learned Civil Judge, Meerut to decide The issue according to law. Let a writ of mandamus be issued to the learned Civil Judge, Meerut, directing him to decide the entire suit himself without remitting any issue to the revenue court. 7. In the circumstances of this case, there orders to costs.