JUDGMENT : Rao, J. - The Plaintiff files this appeal against the judgment and decree of Shri G. Dhal, Subordinate Judge of Sambalpur dismissing the suit for a declaration that the Revenue proceedings in Revenue Case No. 4/6,87 of 1951-52 of the Court of the Tahasildar, Sadar Circle started against him are illegal and ultravires and not justified by law and that the Defendants are not entitled to realise any money from him an account of the ferries. 2. The Plaintiff's case is that the public ferries at Dhama and Chaurpur in the Sadar Tahasil of Sambalpur were Jet out by public auction to him by the District Board, Sambalpur, Defendant No. 2 for a period from 1-4-1947 to 31-3-1950 on a rent of Rs. 5,560/- and Rs. 2685/- respectively at a time when the chief source of income was the tolls realisable from vendors and purchasers who cross the ferries for going to and coming from the public markets at Dhama and Maneswar held on Saturdays and Mondays respectively every week. The Plaintiff alleged that the District Board having auctioned the right to levy tolls on these markets after he became the lessee of the ferries, the vendors and purchasers who used to cross the ferries gradually dwindled in numbers in consequence of which there was a considerable fall in the income from the ferries and it was not possible under the circumstances to continue the ferry services and pay the agreed rent. He further stated that consequently he sent a notice on 17-2-1948 to the Chairman, District Board to cancel the leases after the expiry of the notice. He also sent a notice to the District Magistrate, Sambalpur to the same effect. He further alleged that both the District Board and District Magistrate having taken no action, he stopped the ferry services and the ferries were left to take care of themselves; that in July 1948 when the Ferry Inspector asked him to pay the ferry rent, he wrote to the Chairman, District Board that since no action was taken by the District Board on his petition dated 17-2-1948, he ceased to be a lessee after his expiry of the notice and was not liable to pay any rent; and that the District Board in the meantime sent a requisition to the District Magistrate for realisation of Rs. 5463-1.2-0 and In the orders of the District Magistrate, the Tahasildar had issued notice to the Plaintiff to pay that amount. On these allegations, he filed the suit and prayed for the declaration stated above, after having served notices u/s 80 of the CPC on the District Magistrate and the District Board. 3. The first Defendant, the State of Orissa filed a brief written statement only admitting the initiation of the Revenue case and simply stating that it had no concern with the subject matter of the suit. The second Defendant, the District Board filed a written statement denying the allegations of the Plaintiff that the chief sources of income of the Plaintiff was the tolls realisable from the vendors and purchasers crossing the ferries on their way to and back from the public markets at Dhama and Maneswar. It contended that the subsequent auction by the District Board of its right to levy tolls from these markets had nothing to do with the leases of these ferries; that the levy of tolls on these markets had no effect to discourage the purchasers and vendors who used to go to these markets; and that there was no fall in the traffic of the ferries. The District Board denied that the Plaintiff gave notices to Defendant No. 2 on 17-2-1948 or stopped the ferry service thereafter and definitely stated that the Plaintiff worked the ferries throughout the term. The District Board further contended that the suit was not maintainable in the absence of the notice to the District Board as required u/s 133 of the Sambalpur Local Self Government Act, 1939; and that the suit was barred by time under that section. 4. The Plaintiff examined himself only and Defendant No. 2 examined three witnesses. Both sides exhibited certain documents on which mainly the case was disposed of. 5. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the Plaintiff plied the ferries all the days of the week and it was not correct to say that the ferries were plied only on the market days; that the auction of the tolls of the market did not much affect the use of the ferry; that the Plaintiff failed to pro that any notice was served on the District Board surrendering the lease; and that the Plaintiff continued the plying of the ferries even after the alleged notice. He also held that no notice as required u/s 133 of the Sambalpur Local Self-Government Act, 1939 was served on the District Board; and that the suit was also barred under the said section. 6. Mr. L.K. Dasgupta, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant submits that in paragraph 5 of the plaint the Plaintiff specifically alleged that after working at a loss for about a year he on 17-2-48 gave a notice to the Chairman, District Board for cancellation of his leases or in other words allowing him to surrender his leases after expiry of the notice and that he also sent a notice to the District Magistrate; Sambalpur to the same effect. Mr. Dasgupta contends that this allegation was not traversed in the written statement filed by Defendant No. 1. He also referred us to the allegations made in paragraph 7 that since no action was taken by the District Board on his petition dated 17-12-48, he ceased to be a lessee after the expiry of the notice and was not liable to pay any rent. Though Defendant No. 1 never traversed these specific allegations made by the Plaintiff, the District Board, Defendant No. 2, categorically denied such notice having been given by the Plaintiff and asserted in the written statement that the Plaintiff did never give any notice to Defendant No. 2 on 17-2-48 as alleged in paragraph 5 of the plaint. The District Board also in paragraph 7 of the written statement averred that it was false to say that the Plaintiff wrote to the Chairman, District Board in July 1948 that since no action was taken by the District Board OD his petition dated 17-2-48, he ceased to be a lessee after the expiry of the notice and was not liable to pay any rent. It was categorically asserted by the second Defendant in the written statement that the Plaintiff in his petition dated 25-6-48 falsely alleged that he had filed a petition to the Chairman for revision of the auction sale on account of its exorbitant rate and consequent heavy loss to the Plaintiff. 7. The Plaintiff did not adduce any evidence with regard to his allegation that on account of the auction of the tolls of the market there was a diminution in the income of the ferry service. He examined only himself. 7. The Plaintiff did not adduce any evidence with regard to his allegation that on account of the auction of the tolls of the market there was a diminution in the income of the ferry service. He examined only himself. On the other hand, the District Board examined three witnesses whose evidence was accepted by the learned Subordinate Judge not only to the effect that there was no appreciable diminution on account of the auction of the tolls of the market, but that the Plaintiff was working the ferries throughout the auction period of three years. There is also evidence both oral and documentary that the Plaintiff was sending petitions to the District Board requesting it to give him relief account of the fall in the traffic which clearly shows that the case set up by the Plaintiff that he gave notice of surrender about one year after the auction of the lease of the ferries cannot be true. 8. Mr. Dasgupta next contends that it is enough to give notice to the District Magistrate which the Plaintiff did and consequently the learned Subordinate Judge is not correct in holding that no notice of surrender of the lease was given. In support of this contention of having given notice to the District Magistrate he filed a copy of the notice given as also an acknowledgment receipt of the notice having been received by the District Magistrate by registered post which are Ext. 4 and 4(80) respectively. Ext. 4 is a typed copy and bears the signature of Syed Abdul Karim. Ext. 4(80), the acknowledgment filed, bears the purported signature of one K.B. Padhan. It is not in evidence who this K.B. Padhan is the acknowledgment does not show that it was received on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner, Sambalpur or the District Magistrate. The genuineness of Ext. 4(80) also seems to be suspicious. An acknowledgment of a registered letter generally contains two postal deals one the postal seal of the post office from which the letter was despatched and the other the postal seal of the post office which delivered the letter Curiously Ext. 4(80) contains only one seal. There are many postal acknowledgments even in this suit which show the two postal seals. 4(80) contains only one seal. There are many postal acknowledgments even in this suit which show the two postal seals. The Plaintiff did not take any steps to ask Defendant No. 1 to produce the original of the notice of course the State being Defendant No. 1 it was incumbent upon the District Magistrate to produce the notice issued. But in the absence of any reliable proof that a notice was actually issued to the District Magistrate on adverse inference can, be drawn. In my opinion, Ext. 4 and 4(80) do not appear to be genuine documents. In view of this finding, the further contention of Mr. Dasgupta, the learned Counsel for the Appellant that under the Northern India Ferries Act, 1878, it is the Magistrate of the District that has superintendence to every public ferry and consequently a notice to him is enough, does not arise for consideration. But as the contention was raised, I shall briefly refer to the same. Mr. Dasgupta referred us to Section 11 of the above Act which is to this effect: The lessee of the tolls of a public ferry may surrender his lease on the expiration of one month's notice in writing to the Provincial Government of his intention to surrender such lease. But by Section 7A the Provincial Government may direct that any public ferry, wholly or partly within the area subject to the authority of a District Council or a District Board or a Local Board in the Province be managed by that Council or board, and thereupon that ferry shall be managed accordingly. u/s 17, Clause (2) of the said Act, the sums received as tolls, rents, fines and compensation under this Act by a local authority entrusted with the management of a ferry u/s 7 or Section 7A shall, in the first instance, be applied to defraying all charges incurred by it in carrying out this Act and shall then be credited to the funds of the said local authority. By virtue of these two sections, it is clear that it is the District Board that is entitled to the funds realised from these tolls, rents arising from the leasing out of the ferries and the management of the same vests with the District Board. By virtue of these two sections, it is clear that it is the District Board that is entitled to the funds realised from these tolls, rents arising from the leasing out of the ferries and the management of the same vests with the District Board. Consequently it is essential that a notice of surrender should be given to the District Board and not to the District Magistrate, and there is no evidence produced by the Plaintiff of any such notice having been given. Therefore the case of the Plaintiff that he surrendered the lease cannot be accepted. 9. The learned Government Advocate who appeared for Respondents 1 and 2 contended that the suit was barred for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 133 of the Sambalpur Local Self Government Act, 1939 and that the suit was also not filed according to the provisions thereunder. The learned Subordinate Judge, according to the learned Government Advocate, rightly held that the suit was not maintainable for non-compliance with the provisions of that Act, Section 133 of the said Act is as follows: No suit shall be brought against the District Board or any of its officers, or any person acting under its direction, for any thing done under this Act untill the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the office of such Board and been delivered or left at the office of such Board and also (if the suit is intended to be brought against any officer of the said Board or any person acting under its direction) at the place of abode of the person against whom such suit it intended to be brought, stating the cause of action and the name of place of abode of the person who intending to bring the suit; and unless such notice be proved, the Court shall find for the Defendant. Every such action shall be commenced within the three months next after the accrual of the cause of action, and not afterwards. x x x x It is the case of the Appellant that the certificate proceedings were initiated at the instance of the District Board and he has filed -the suit making the District Board Defendant No. 2. He stated in paragraph 8 of the plaint that the District Board sent a requisition to the District Magistrate for realisation of Rs. x x x x It is the case of the Appellant that the certificate proceedings were initiated at the instance of the District Board and he has filed -the suit making the District Board Defendant No. 2. He stated in paragraph 8 of the plaint that the District Board sent a requisition to the District Magistrate for realisation of Rs. 5463-12-0 and that under the orders of the District Magistrate, the Tahasildar had issued notice to the Plaintiff to pay up the amount. No notice as contemplated under Clause (1) of Section 133 of the Sambalpur Local Self-Government Act, 1939, is proved to have been given to the District Board. In paragraph 10 of the plaint, the Plaintiff stated that the cause of action for the suit arose within the jurisdiction of the Court at Sambalpur on or about 24-10-1951. Under Para 2 of Section 133 an action shall be commenced within three months next after the accrual of the cause of action and not afterwards. The suit therefore ought to have been filed before 24-1-1952. The suit was actually filed on 10-4-1952. Consequently the suit is not only barred for want of notice to the District Board under para 1 of Section 133, but is also barred by time under para: 3 of the said section. 10. Consequently, in my opinion, the appeal is bound to rail. The judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. Under the circumstances of this case, each party will bear its own costs in this appeal. Barman, J. 11. I agree. 12. Appeal dismissed Final Result : Dismissed