Judgment H.Mahapatra, J. 1. This appeal by the defendant is directed against the judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal No. 40/20 of 1956 by the Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Monghyr. The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought in respect of a house in plot No. 169 of khata no. 69 situated in tauzi no, 4507 having an area of 1 katha 12 dhurs. The plaintiff alleged that the house belonged to one Munshi Pandit who had a son by name Posan Pandit Posan Pandit died in 1939 leaving his widow, Mt. Bhama, who is the defendant-appellant before this Court. Munshi Pandit died in 1948. His widow, Mt. Jhamia succeeded to the property left by Munshi Pandit. She had incurred debts to meet the expenses of the Sradh of her deceased husband, for payment of which she executed a mortgage bond on 8-7-1949, in favour of Dharnidhar Sahu for Rs. 700.00 in respect of the disputed house. She executed a sale deed on 11-5-1955, for Rs. 800.00 in respect of the same property in favour of the plaintiff. This money was taken to pay the mortgage debt and for some other necessary expenses. The plaintiff took possession of the house after his purchase, and Mt. Jhamia went to live with her daughter in another village. The plaintiffs further case is that the present defendant, the widow of the deceased son of Munshi Pandit, lived in one room of the disputed house with the permission of the plaintiff, but subsequently she raised a dispute at the instigation of some persons inimically disposed towards the plaintiff, and, in consequence, a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was started. That ended in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the present suit for declaration of his title and for recovery of possession and ejectment of the defendant from the disputed house. 2. The defence was that Munshi Pandit had two more brothers and all the three brothers owned the suit house which was their ancestral property. After the death of Posan Pandit, the defendant remained in the same house with the father-in-law and mother-in-law. After the death of Munshi Pandit, his widow Mt. Jhamia and the defendant continued to live together in the house. The plaintiff in collusion with Mt. After the death of Posan Pandit, the defendant remained in the same house with the father-in-law and mother-in-law. After the death of Munshi Pandit, his widow Mt. Jhamia and the defendant continued to live together in the house. The plaintiff in collusion with Mt. Jhamia took a mortgage bond in favour of one of his men, and later on got a sale deed in his favour. Both the deeds were challenged as collusive and without consideration. She claimed to have performed the Sradh ceremony of her father-in-law as well as of her mother-in-law as Mt. Jhamia died in the meanwhile. She claims to have been succeeded to the property of her husband and father-in-law. A more substantial defence was raised that Mt. Jahmia had no right to sell away the suit property to the plaintiff, and, as such, the plaintiff has acquired no title thereby. 3. The learned Munsif decreed the plaintiffs suit rejecting the defence in its entirety and passed a decree for eviction of the defendant. 4. The defendant had gone in appeal before the learned Subordinate Judge who has upheld the decree of the trial court. The learned Subordinate Judge has found that the sale deed executed in favour of th e plaintiff, which has been marked as exhibit 1 in this case was genuine, and for consideration, and it was executed by her in order to raise money to repay the debts which had been incurred for meeting the expenses of the Sradh Ceremony of the deceased Munshi Pandit. He has further found that Mt, Jhainia the vendor, had performed the Sradh ceremony of her deceased husband. 5. It is admitted by both sides that the property in question is the ancestral property of the family. The only question, "therefore, to be considered in this appeal is whether the alienation made by Mt. Jhamia is binding on the defendant, and in view of the fact that Mt. Jhamia is since dead, whether that alienation will continue to be binding beyond her lifetime. 6. When Posan Pandit died in 1939 he was a coparcener in the Hindu joint family consisting of himself and his father, and, therefore, had an interest in the family property. Jhamia is binding on the defendant, and in view of the fact that Mt. Jhamia is since dead, whether that alienation will continue to be binding beyond her lifetime. 6. When Posan Pandit died in 1939 he was a coparcener in the Hindu joint family consisting of himself and his father, and, therefore, had an interest in the family property. On his death, his widow had in the property the same interest as he himself had according to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Sec.3 of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act which came into force on 14-4-1937. This interest she continued to have in the property when Munshi Pandit died in 1948 and thereafter. On the death of Munshi Pandit, his widow, Mt. Jhamia had an interest in the property which her husband had. Thus after his death the two widows continued to have interest in the property in equal shares. This interest is 110 doubt a limited interest known as a Hindu Womens estate with, however, a right of claiming partition. If the mortgage or the sale of the disputed property was done by both the widows Mt. Jhamia and Mt. Bhama (defendant), there would have been no difficulty in view of the finding that the sale was genuine and for consideration, and that the necessity for which the sale was brought about was legal. In the present case Mt. Jhamia was the only vendor, and there is no evidence that either the consent of Mt. Bhama, the defendant, was obtained, or even applied for, before this alienation was effected by Mt. Jhamia. One of the limited interest-holders cannot effect an alienation to bind the other limited interest-holders-either during her lifetime or thereafter, irrespective of the fact whether such alienation is for legal necessity or not. Had there been a partition between the two widows it was open to one of them to alienate her interest for legal necessity, and that would have been binding during her lifetime. To have a binding effect beyond her lifetime, it is necessary for the alienating limited interest holder to take the consent of the other limited interest-holders. In the present case there was no partition, and, therefore, the position is much worse for the plaintiff vendee. Mt. Jhamia was not competent to transfer any of the properties belonging to the family which she and Mt. In the present case there was no partition, and, therefore, the position is much worse for the plaintiff vendee. Mt. Jhamia was not competent to transfer any of the properties belonging to the family which she and Mt. Bhama, the defendant, had inherited under Act XVIII of 1937, after the death of their respective husbands. Therefore, the present alienation, though for legal necessity and for consideration, will not be binding against the defendant. In Gajapati Radhamani V/s. Pusapati Alakarjeswari, 19 Ind App 184 (PC), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that in case of two co-widows the mortgage of a part of the deceased husbands estate by one of the widows for payment of Peshkash and other debts, without the consent of the other co-widow was not valid and binding against her. The mortgagee could not have any relief on that account. Their Lordships have expressed a doubt whether an application by the alienating co-widow for the consent of the other widow could have validated such mortgage. In a case where such application for consent is made before the alienation and the consent is withheld unreasonably, the question will be different. The necessity for which the alienation is made, if found to be for the preservation of the estate, the unreasonable withholding of the consent by one of the co-widows will not render the alienation by the other widow invalid. In the present case neither Mt. Bhama, the defendant was asked to give her consent, nor did she unreasonably withhold that before Mt. Jhamia effected the mortgage or executed the sale deed. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot be said to have obtained any valid title by his purchase from Mt. Jhamia under exhibit 1, and, as such, he is not entitled to the declaration or possession, as he had sought for. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are set aside, and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed with costs throughout.